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ABSTRACT
The informal sector—which includes informal street vending—comprises any economic ac-
tivity that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the state—the evasion of tax codes,
zoning ordinances, etc.—but does not include the provision of explicitly illegal goods or ser-
vices. The phenomenon of ‘informal street vending’ has generally been analyzed froma strictly
economic point of view. This research examines informal street vending in Mexico, particu-
larly in Mexico City, from political and historical perspectives. The thesis’ main goal is to
learn how increasing political competition—resulting from democratization and alternation
of political parties in power—aected the politics and policies of informality (informal street
vending) in Mexico.
To this purpose, this work carries out a historical analysis of informal street vending and the
policies and regulations implemented over time in Mexico City; a detailed comparative polit-
ical analysis of the ex-ante and ex-post situation of informal groups and organizations going
through the democratization process and the alternation in power that occurred in Mexico at
city and federal levels in 1997 and 2000, respectively; and a case study to examine the largest
and most powerful street vending organization in Mexico City. The thesis concludes that
increasing political competition—resulting from democratization and alternation in power—
did not result in an improvement in the capacity of theMexico City government or the federal
government to control informality and street vending. While democratization and political
competition opened the doors for representation and more political participation by street
vendors, it also set the conditions for the expansion of the bargaining power of vendor leaders,
the multiplication of vendor organizations, the exacerbation of the political struggle between
rival vendor groups, and the weakening of the government capacity to implement policies to
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At some point over the course of the second half of the 20th century, the relationship between
Latin Americans and their governments broke down. Large segments of the population where
‘excluded’ from basic services (such as education, health care, judiciary services) and from eco-
nomic opportunities,1 having no other option but to rely on the informal sector (Perry et al.,
2007). Additionally, other segments of the population ‘opted out’ of the formal sector after
sensing that laws and regulations were not serving them well, choosing which of them to com-
ply with and which to ignore (Perry et al., 2007). In search of a way to make a living, individ-
uals who ‘opted out’ or were ‘excluded’ from the formal sector became micro-entrepreneurs
or micro-employees, all operating under the enforcement radar of the government. It is open
to debate whether this hurt the economy as a whole, but it certainly created a development
underclass: the informal sector or informal economy. Thus, informal sector agents in general
and informal street vendors in particular emerged as a new kind of economic phenomenon
and, almost simultaneously, as a new kind of political interest group.
The informal sector or informal economy (generally known as ‘informality’) is often asso-
ciated with small-scale, semi-legal, low productivity, and frequently family-based enterprises,
which employ between 30 percent and 70 percent of the urban work force in Latin America
(Perry et al., 2007). The informal sector or informal economy in Latin America represented
an average of 41.1 percent2 of the region’s gross domestic product (gdp) between 1999 and
2007 (Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro, 2010).3 Its size varies widely across Latin Ameri-
can countries, however. For instance, average estimates between 1999 and 2007 of the informal
1Mainly as a result of segmented labour markets and factor market imperfections, as well as persistent levels
of inequality rooted in dierences in power, voice, and influence (Perry et al., 2007)
2This number (41.1 percent) is the region’s simple unweighted average informality. The average informality
weighted by total country gdp in 2005 is 34.7 percent for the Latin American and Caribbean region (Schneider,
Buehn and Montenegro, 2010).
3Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010) estimated the shadow economies for 162 countries from dierent
regions and dierent income levels, from 1999 to 2007. This paper is the best and most recent cross-country
comparative study in terms of measurement of the shadow economy available to date (April 2016). The next
release date will be on July 13, 2016 and will include more recent data.
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sector accounted for about 66.1 percent of gdp in Bolivia, 50.5 percent in Guatemala, 39 per-
cent in Brazil, 30 percent inMexico, 25.3 percent in Argentina, and only 19.3 percent in Chile.
Informality is also widespread in other parts of the globe. For example, the average estimates
between 1999 and 2007 of informality in Asian countries ranged between 12.7 percent and
50.6 percent and between 8.3 percent and 28 percent in high income countries4 belonging to
theOrganization forEconomicCooperation andDevelopment (oecd) (Schneider, Buehn, and
Montenegro, 2010).
The growth of the informal sector corresponds to the growth of informal trade and ‘infor-
mal street vending’5 in the world, particularly in—but not confined to—the developing world.
The informal sector—which comprises informal street vending—includes any economic ac-
tivity that takes place outside of the regulatory norms of the state—such as the evasion of
tax codes, labor regulations, licensing and permit procedures, and zoning ordinances—but
does not include the provision of explicitly illegal goods or services (e.g. drugs or prostitu-
tion) (Cross, 1998). Typically carried out by micro-firms ignored or unnoticed by government
authorities because of their size, these economic activities have been praised by some schol-
ars as the rise of a new form of entrepreneurship and condemned by others as a new form
of exploitation or disloyal competition with the formally established businesses. This is be-
cause an increasing amount of work takes place outside of the formal sector without the labor
guarantees and collective bargaining protection workers have fought to achieve (Cross, 1998).
Until recently, the literature on informality for themost part omitted altogether the political
questions about informality, giving priority to its economic facets. This created a gap in the
scholarly knowledge of the informal sector which has only partially been addressed. It is the
aim to this thesis to contribute to fill this gap. Thus, while the phenomenon of ‘informality’
has been generally analyzed from a strictly economic point of view, this thesis analyzes infor-
mality in Mexico, particularly in Mexico City—one of the largest cities in the world—as a
political process and through a historical perspective. Mexico and Mexico City are ideal for
the development of this thesis because it is one of the countries, and one of the cities, in which
the phenomenon of informality is best documented. Therefore, the subjects of study of this
research are the politics, policies and institutions of informality and street vending in Mexico.
The main goal of this thesis is to understand to what extent and in what ways recent political
4Other countries within the oecd that do not belong to the high income bracket have larger percentages. For
example, Mexico has 30 percent, Estonia 31.2, and Turkey 31.3.
5Throughout this thesis I will use ‘street vending’ and ‘informal street vending’ indistinctively, but at times
will purposely use the term ‘informal’ before ‘street vending’ to underline its condition of informality and be more
specific about this particular sub-category of informal activity, as will be later explained in this chapter.
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change in Mexico—democratization and the alternation of political parties in power—has
aected the dynamics between the informal sector (street vending), the state, and political
parties.
1.2 Concepts and denitions
Given the importance of the formal-informal duality in the development discussion—and the
underlying semi-formality that exists within these two poles—one might expect to see a clear
and unambiguous definition of the concepts, as well as a fair degree of consistency across the
whole range of empirical, theoretical, and policy literature. However, I found this was not
the case. Rather, ‘formality’ and ‘informality’ are better thought of as metaphors or figures
of speech that evoke a mental picture of whatever the author or researcher had in mind when
using these terms (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom, 2006). To illustrate this, in his
paper ‘Informality: It is time we stop being Alice-in-Wonderland-ish’ Gary Fields (2011) cited
some twelve dierent definitions of informality. Fields has been a strong advocate of the need
to standardize the definitions used when discussing and researching informality and the other
terms derived from it (Fields, 2012). For now—and for the purpose of this thesis—this vast
collection of definitions should not be seen as an impediment but rather as an opportunity
to identify significant relevant gateways for research and to select target groups for various
interventions in policy-making.6 Thus, Ravi Kanbur summed it up in one phrase: “Informality
is a term that has the dubious distinction of combining maximum policy importance and
political salience with minimal conceptual clarity and coherence in the analytical literature”
(Kanbur, 2009:2).
The terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ have shown notable endurance since their first appear-
ance in the development literature several decades ago. Notwithstanding the claims that they
have consistently been used imprecisely, and misapplied in policy areas, they have endured
and even flourished during the discussion (Sinha and Kanbur, 2012), and it seems rather un-
feasible and impractical to forgo them. The question, then, is how best to use the concepts
that lie beneath these terms—in assembling the facts and realities they characterize—in order
to advance research and propose policies to deal with the problems they underline (Sinha and
6In fact, the formal sector or formal economy is also defined through a broad range of sub-categories, which
are tackled in dierent ways through various policies and programs.
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Kanbur, 2012). That is why it is vital to discuss ‘what’ informality (the informal sector or
informal economy7) is and ‘why’ it is important.
By and large, informality comprises those activities that are outside of the scope, capacity,
or cognizance of the state. This notion was fundamental in the conceptualization of Keith
Hart—the anthropologist recognized as the creator of the concept—in his 1973 paper ‘Infor-
mal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana’, but the exact meaning of this
term has remained open to debate until these days. In a recent publication—Linking the For-
mal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies edited by Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and
Ostrom (2006)—Hart (2006) revisited his 1973 paper stating that, followingWeber (1981), he
argued that the ability to stabilize economic activity with a bureaucratic form made returns
more calculable and regular for employees and employers. Moreover, he said that stability was
in turn guaranteed by the state’s laws, but their impact was limited by the state’s inability to
enforce them throughout the economy (Hart, 2006). ‘Formal’ incomes came from regulated
economic activities and ‘informal’ incomes, both legal and illegal, lay beyond the scope of
regulation (Hart, 2006).
Over time, Hart’s conceptualization has been used in dierent ocial definitions and mea-
sures of informality. Nevertheless, after Hart, the literature on the conceptualization of infor-
mality has continued to evolve. For instance, in his 1984 paper ‘Family, Fungibility and For-
mality: Rural Advantages of Informal Non-Farm Enterprise versus the Urban-Formal State’,
Michael Lipton identified several features of informality, among them the overlap between cap-
ital and labor, the small size of enterprise, and the high incidence of perfect or ‘near-perfect’
competition (Lipton, 1984). However, Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom (2006) argued
that these aspects or characteristics of activities—or of a sector—are the consequences of an
economic process rather than core defining aspects of informality and that the core concept
has to be the relationship of the informal activity to state regulation.
In this vein De Soto (1989) defined informal economy as the collection of firms, workers,
and activities that operate outside of the legal and regulatory framework. Indeed, most re-
searchers have agreed that the proper scope of the term ‘informal sector’ encompases “those
actions of economic agents that fail to adhere to the established institutional rules or are de-
nied their protection” (Feige, 1990:990). Or alternatively, it includes “all income-earning ac-
tivities that are not regulated by the state in social environments where similar activities are
7Other terms associated with the informal economy include the ‘black market’, the ‘shadow economy’, the




regulated” (Castells and Portes, 1989:12). Later, Sinha and Kanbur (2012) stated that infor-
mality of an employment relationship or informality of a production unit is generally defined
as the lack of one ormore forms of statemandate regulation such as enrollment into a social se-
curity system, registration for tax payments, or minimum wage regulation. Evidently, details
vary from country to country, whichmakes cross-country comparison dicult and precarious,
but the concept of informality ought to be unambiguous (Sinha and Kanbur, 2012).8
These definitions do notmake a judgement on whether such activities are good or bad, leav-
ing the matter to empirical investigation. However, a key distinction must be made between
‘informal’ and ‘illegal’ activities because each of them have dierent characteristics that sets
them appart from each other (Centeno and Portes, 2006).9 An ‘illegal’ activity involves the
production and/or commercialization of goods and/or services that are defined in a specific
society as ‘illicit’, while an ‘informal’ activity deals, for the most part, with ‘licit’ goods and/or
services (Centeno and Portes, 2006). Thus, the basic dierence between ‘formal’ and ‘infor-
mal’ relies not on the character of the final product, but on the manner in which it is produced
or exchanged.10 By explicitly distinguishing these three categories (formal, informal and il-
legal activities) it is possible to explore their mutual relationships systematically, a task that
becomes dicult when ‘illegal’ and ‘informal’ are confused (Centeno and Portes, 2006).
Moreover, the elusive nature of the informal activity has also contributed significantly to
the challenge of defining and measuring it accurately. The necessity to measure, quantify, and
made internationally comparable the informal sector led the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ilo) in 1993 to recommend, in the 15th International Convention of Labour Statisticians
the use one or more of the following three criteria when defining informal sector: (i) no reg-
istration of the enterprise; (ii) small size in terms of employment; and (iii) non-registration
of the employees of the enterprise (ilo, 1993). The ilo was aware that, given the conceptual-
ization of the informal sector, the process of turning the concept into an empirical measure
8The definition of ‘informal sector’, ‘informal worker and ‘informal firm’ may vary from country to country,
as the definition depends on the laws and regulations of individual countries. Santiago Levy (2008) does a very
good job of defining these concepts for Mexico in light of his quantitative research, but this definition might not
be appropriate for other countries and may limit the scope of qualitative research since he uses job security as
the measure of formality, defining participants in the informal economy as those who do not have employment
security, work security, and social security.
9Centeno and Porter (2006) point out that the legal and criminal, like the normal and abnormal, are socially
defined categories subject to change.
10Thus, clothing, food, or computer chips—all perfectly licit goods—may have their origins in legally regulated
production arrangements or in those that bypass ocial rules (Centeno and Portes, 2006)
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could vary from country to country. As a guideline, the ilo presented a general definition or
general concept of informal sector:11
The informal sector may be broadly characterized as consisting of units engaged
in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating
employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate
at a low level of organization, with little or no division between labour and cap-
ital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour relations—where they
exist—are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social
relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees.
(ilo, 1993:2, 2013:14)
The appeal of the term ‘informality’ most likely lies in its ability to signify a collection of
circumstances, such as the absence of regulation, the irregular or undefined status of a worker
or firm, the smallness of size of an enterprise, and so on, that in general go hand in hand
(Hussmanns, 1996).
Thus, there are two specific reasons why informality—understood as the vaguely defined
collection of characteristics considered above—has endured in development and policy dis-
cussions.
The first is the high correlation between poverty and informality. Even though some main-
stream research—such as that by Castells and Portes (1989) and Martha Chen (2006)—has
pointed to the existence of heterogeneity in the informal sector, recent empirical economic
research—including Chen’s (2006) article, Jutting and de Laiglesia (2009), and the National
Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (nceus) (2007) report on the ‘unor-
ganized’ sector—illustrates that the individuals operating in the informal sector have a high
incidence of poverty and are largely poor according to both income and non-incomemeasures
(Sinha and Kanbur, 2012).
The second reason why informality is fundamental to the development discussion is be-
cause several development theories predict, directly or indirectly, that informality will fade
away as development advances. For example, this can be concluded to be the forecast of the
11Some scholars have used the ilo’s guidelines to reach their own definition of the informal sector. For example,
in their book Trade Liberalization and India’s Informal Economy, Harriss-White and Sinha (2007) use the ilo’s
guidelines to describe the informal sector as consisting of units involved in the production of goods and/or services
working characteristically at a low level of organization, with very low or no division between capital and labor
as factors of production—or between labor and ownership or management—and generally on a small scale, in
order to preserve its condition of informality through anonymity.
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so called ‘LewisModel of Development’, drawn up byWilliamArthur Lewis in his 1954 paper
‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor’, in which labor is removed from
the ‘traditional sector’ and put into the ‘modern sector’ during the process of development
(Lewis, 1954). In fact the share of the informal sector in total output (gross domestic prod-
uct or gross national product) or total employment is frequently utilized as an indicator of a
nation’s development. For example, Flodman Becker (2004) used those terms of reference to
define the informal economy (or informal sector) as that part of an economy that is not taxed,
monitored by any form of government, or included in the gross national product (gnp), unlike
the formal economy. Nevertheless, informality has not diminished significantly over the last
years but might even have risen in a number of nations (Kanbur, 2011).
Thus, because of its inherent heterogeneity in conceptualization, there are several ways of
defining informality, the informal sector or informal economy. Among the several definitions
used in the literature there is a distinction between those that look at informality from the
firm’s perspective (the ‘productivity’ view), and those that consider rather the status of the
firm’s employees (the ‘social protection’ view) (Perry et al., 2007). The first view focuses on
the type of firm and its legal status, and it includes small-scale production units with no legal
separation from their owners (i.e., firms not legally registered as businesses), such as family-
based businesses in which one or more family members participate, and micro-enterprises
with at most five employees (Gërxhani, 2004; Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir,
2009). This definition has been used in important contributions to the literature, such as the
seminal work of De Soto (1989) for Peru. The ‘social protection’ or ‘legalistic’ view focuses on
employment, recognizing that in many cases larger, formally registered firms establish infor-
mal working contracts with their employees, thus avoiding payment of social security contri-
butions, severance payments, and other penalties in case of dismissal (Oviedo, Thomas, and
Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009). An example of this is the definition used by Levy (2008) who
uses job security as the measure of formality, defining participants in the informal economy as
those who do not have employment security, work security, and social security.12 This second
view allows for informality to take place both in informal and formal production units. The
ilo (1993) definition aforementioned contemplates both types of informality, and it includes
also households producing goods for their own final use, as well as households employing
paid domestic workers, as parts of the informal sector. Yet another dimension of informality
relates to firms’ compliance with regulations, for instance tax evasion. Several studies con-




sider lack of regulatory compliance as a part of informal economic activity (Schneider and
Enste, 2000; Gatti and Honorati, 2008).
For the purpose of this research I will use a general definition of informality, in line with
the concepts presented above.13 I have decided to use the definition given by Oviedo, Thomas,
and Karakurum-Özdemir (2009:3) which states: ‘
Informality’means legal economic activity taking place below the radar of govern-
ment.14 It takesmany forms, from the unregistered small firm, to the street vendor,
to the large, registered ‘formal’ firm that employs a share of its workers without
oering themwritten contracts with access to benefits and unemployment protec-
tion.15 Thus the importance of being precise as to what kind of informality one
refers to—unregistered firms, unprotected workers, the self-employed—because
the appropriate [research, regulation, and] policies are likely to dier depending
on the aspect under consideration.
I use the term ‘informality’ in the definition for practical reasons. My view in this work is
nominalist and I see no particular diculty in substituting this term for ‘informal economy’ or
‘informal sector’.16 In the following chapters, I use these terms as synonyms. The reasons for
deliverately opting for the concept of informality were the existence of an extensive prior re-
search literature under this label and the desire to build on this literature rather than challenge
it.
Moreover, there are still more practical distinctions—within the informal sector and its
sub-categories—that could be made for any specific purpose in research, but in particular for
policy-making. It must be clear which groups, segments, or sub-categories are referred to in a
work when the informal sector or informal economy is discussed. This thesis deals primarily
with street vendors but throughout its analysis it also deals with other groups, segments, or
sub-categories of informality (e.g. metro vendors, commercial plaza vendors, etc). The nar-
rative will make clearer to the reader what the relationship is between these other groups and
street vendors (and with informality in general) as well as their relevance for this study. Thus,
13I will not use the ilo (1993) definition on informal sector since this is not a quantitative research and also to
leave open to discussion some aspects of informality such as scale and level of organization.
14Hence, the term informality refers to activities that are normally subject to taxation and other regulations,
and thus excludes all kinds of activities explicitly considered illegal (e.g. drug tracking, etc.).
15According to Levy (2008) evidence shows that inMexico minimumwage laws are not binding, and therefore,
we can ignore this in the definition.
16In other words, I will use almost indistinctively the expressions ‘informality’, ‘informal sector’ and ‘informal
economy’ throughout this thesis to refer to the same idea or notion; even though, strictly speaking, these concepts
may not be the same thing.
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throughout this work, I will generally refer to ‘street vending’ as ‘informal street vending’ to
underline its condition of informality and to refer specifically to this group or sub-category of
the informal sector that will be primarily analyzed in this thesis, as it will be explained later
in this chapter.
1.3 Literature review on the informal sector, informal economy, and informality
This chronological literature review is a selection of the most relevant and influential works
I reviewed throughout the period of research. These are: the original works on the subject,
which developed the concepts of the informal sector, informality, and the informal economy;
the works that marked a milestone in the study of the informal sector, informality, and the
informal economy; those studies which share a similar political, social, or economic research
approach to this thesis; and finally those works that cover the same geographical location
(Mexico and Mexico City), analysing especific policies implemented or studies performed in
these locations in matters of informal sector, informality and informal economy.
1.3.1 Initial notions of informality, informal sector and informal economy
The first notions of the ‘informal sector’ and ‘informal labor’—using the terms ‘subsistence
sector’ and ‘disguised unemployment’—are credited to the economic development model pro-
posed by former lse economics professor and Nobel laureate William Arthur Lewis. In 1954,
W. A. Lewis published what became his most influential development economics paper: ‘Eco-
nomic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’, in which he identified and analyzed
the idea of the informal sector and even of informal street vending. Lewis states that an unlim-
ited supply of labour existed in those countries where population is large relatively to capital
and natural resources, and then draws attention to the existence of a ‘disguised unemploy-
ment’, where many workers make a living with negligible, zero or even negative marginal
productivity. Lewis points out to a whole range of casual jobs as occupations that usually
have the multiple of the number they need, each earning very small sums from ocassional em-
ployment. He identified ‘petty retail trade’ as one of those occupations and asserted that it
was enormously expanded in overpopulated economies (Lewis, 1954).
In explaining his model of unlimited supply of labor, Lewis used the concept of the ‘cap-
italist sector’ to define “that part of the economy which uses reproducible capital, and pays
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capitalists for the use thereof” (Lewis, 1954:146). Workers laboring outside the ‘capitalist sec-
tor’ earn what they can in the ‘subsistence sector’ which is “all that part of the economywhich
is not using reproducible capital” (Lewis, 1954:147). Moreover, in his 1955 book Theory of
Economic Growth, Lewis presented a model where he explains ‘employment’ or ‘livelihood
generation’ mainly within the developing world (Lewis, 1955). Lewis used the expression ‘dis-
guised unemployment’ in both publications to describe a type of employment he regarded as
falling outside of the modern industrial sector (Lewis, 1954, 1955).
The theoretical model of economic development that Lewis elaborated introduced the two
assumptions that there was an unlimited supply of labor in most developing countries and
that, as the modern industrial sector in these countries expanded, this large pool of surplus
labor would be absorbed (Lewis, 1954). The optimism of the Lewis model of economic devel-
opment led many scholars in the 1950s and 1960s to accept as true that ‘traditional’ forms of
production and work would vanish as a result of economic progress in developing countries.
As this optimism proved to be unsubstantiated, scholars turned to examine more closely what
was then dubbed the ‘traditional sector’. They found that this sector hadnot only endured, but
in fact had expanded to include new developments. Realizing that these forms of production
were here to stay, scholars continued and deepened their study.
Thus, after Lewis, the conceptualization of informality or the informal sectorwas further re-
fined by anthropologist KeithHart in his 1970 paper ‘Small-Scale Entrepreneurs in Ghana and
Development Planning’, in which he described the activities of small entrepreneurs in Ghana
who increased their revenues by investing their savings in various short-term provisional busi-
nesses.17 Hart was worried about the increasing importance of this small-scale mercantile
class and its potential impact on the overall economy. In this 1970 paper, Hart contended that
these activities had been overlooked as potential sources of development because they often
were outside of the overriding image of modern development, associated with large compa-
nies collaborating jointly with government ocials. Hart’s paper also noted a feature that
would be addressed later on by other scholars such as Hernando De Soto and John C. Cross:
the vitality in the activities performed and the sense that this group of people were not only
surviving individuals, but also supplying fundamental and necessary services for their country
as a whole (Hart, 1970; De Soto, 1989; Cross, 1998).
17Hart also used the notion to refer tomuch of the inter-urban transport and residential construction in Ghana.
Therefore, we could say that Hart identified three of the most representative activities in the informal sector: in-
formal trade, informal transport, and informal housing.
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The expression ‘informal sector’—although correctly attributed to the British anthropolo-
gist Keith Hart for his research on Ghana, even though the term was first published by him in
197318 (Hart, 1973, 2006)—first appeared in an International Labour Organization (ilo) pub-
lication in 1972, a report on Kenya titled Employment, Incomes and Inequality: A Strategy
for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. This 1972 ilo report, among other things,
underscored the problems in the measurement of both labour force and employment. It stated
that the problem with the labour force was “to define who is in it—a dicult matter given the
limited opportunities for employment, particularly for women, and the diculties of predict-
ing how participation might change with a change in the social context” (ilo, 1972:4–5). The
problem with employment was that “the statistics are incomplete, covering a major part of
wage-earning employment and some self-employment in the larger and more organised firms
but omitting a range of wage earners and self-employed persons, male as well as female, in
what we term ‘the informal sector’...” (ilo, 1972:5).19
Almost simultaneously with the 1972 ilo report,20 Hart published his 1973 paper ‘Informal
IncomeOpportunities andUrban Employment in Ghana’ where he developed further the con-
ceptualization of the informal sector. Hart points out to informalwork and suggests that infor-
mal economic activities could include undertakings with autonomous capacity for generating
growth in the incomes of the urban (and rural) poor. He denotes that the distinction between
formal and informal income opportunities is based essentially on that between wage-earning
and self-employment, and suggests that the key variable is “whether or not labour is recruited
on a permanent and regular basis for fixed rewards” (Hart, 1973:68).21 Hart goes on to arm
that “most enterprises runwith somemeasure of bureaucracy are amenable to enumeration by
surveys, and constitute the ‘modern sector’ of the urban economy. The remainder—thosewho
18Hart justified the use of the term ‘informal sector’ by explaining: “I hoped to interest economists [in the
concept of the informal sector] by presenting my ethnography in a language they were familiar with. The idea
of an informal sector was taken up quickly by some of them, so quickly indeed that a report by the International
LaborOrganization (ilo, 1972) applying the concept toKenya came out beforemy own article had been published”
(Hart, 2006:25)
19The 1972 ilo report also makes a description of the informal sector: “The popular view of informal-sector
activities is that they are primarily those of petty traders, street hawkers, shoeshine boys and other groups ‘under-
employed’ on the streets of the big towns. The evidence presented... suggests that the bulk of employment in the
informal sector, far from being only marginally productive, is economically ecient and profit-making, though
small in scale and limited by simple technologies, little capital and lack of links with the other (‘formal’) sector.
Within the latter part of the informal sector are employed a variety of carpenters, masons, tailors and other trades-
men, as well as cooks and taxi-drivers, oering virtually the full range of basic skills needed to provide goods and
services for a large though often poor section of the population.” (ilo, 1972:5).
20Chen et al. (2002) noted that many African researchers, particularly at the Institute of Development Studies,
in theUniversity ofNairobi, hadbeen studying the sector before the ilo report and theHart paperswere published.
21Something that Hart (1973:68) denominates the ‘degree of rationalization of work’.
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escape enumeration—are classified as ‘the low-productivity urban sector’, ‘the reserve army
of underemployed and unemployed’, ‘the urban traditional sector’, etc.” (Hart, 1973:68).
Furthermore, Hart oers a typology of urban income opportunities. In doing so, he states
that the number of those outside the organized labour force is very large and that informal ac-
tivities encompass a wide-ranging scale (frommarginal operations to large enterprises) (Hart,
1973). Most interestingly, he acknowledges that “a consideration of income opportunities out-
side formal employment must include certain kinds of crime” (Hart, 1973:68) and declares
that the incidence of illegitimate activity was all-pervasive, mentioning it was dicult to find
anyone who had not transgressed the law at some point, frequently with some profitable re-
sults if undetected (Hart, 1973). His typology of urban income opportunities dierentiates
between legitimate and illegitimate activities in the informal sector: i) Formal Income oppor-
tunities; ii) Informal income opportunities: legitimate; and iii) Informal income opportunities:
illegitimate (those activities that broke the law in one way or another, e.g. usury, prostitution,
drug-pushing, larceny, etc.) (Hart, 1973).
He concludedhis paperby opening the ideological debate about informality andby pointing
out the avenues for future research. Hart stated that, while socialists may argue that foreign
capitalist dominance determines the scope for informal (and formal) development, and con-
demns the majority of the urban population to deprivation and exploitation, liberals may see
in informal activities, “the possibility of a dramatic ‘bootstrap’ operation, lifting the underde-
veloped economies through their own indigenous enterprise” (Hart, 1973:89). Hart concludes
that “before either view may be espoused, much more empirical research is required... histor-
ical, cross-cultural comparison of urban economies in the development process must grant a
place to the analysis of informal as well as formal structures” (Hart, 1973”89). Next section
will continue the debate on the definition of informality, after the initial positions of Lewis
and Hart.
1.3.2 Evolution of the informal sector debate after Lewis and Hart
After Hart, the literature on informality and informal sector is divided into two groups. On
one side, there were the policy-oriented studies of the ilo and the Regional Employment Pro-
gram for Latin American and the Caribbean (Programa Regional de Empleo para América
Latina y el Caribe, prealc). These agencies viewed informality as an inexpensive way of em-
ployment creation through micro-business growth and self-employment opportunities, but
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these conditions would only be eective if structural inequalities that favored large compa-
nies could be overturned (prealc, 1978; Sethuraman, 1981; Cross, 1998).
On the other side, there was this notion that informality is bad. It is bad for poverty re-
duction, for equity and for competitiveness. This view was based on the common agreement
that informality was linked to poverty and economic activities characterized by low produc-
tivity and low income generation prospects. This notion was framed within the so called
neo-Marxist literature. This literature states that entrepreneurs in the informal sector were
in reality ‘disguised workers’ who were being exploited in many and dierent ways by formal
companies and, in the end, by international capital (Birbeck, 1978; Gerry, 1978; Alonso, 1980;
Portes and Walton, 1981; Lopez-Garza, 1985). For the most part, this line of reasoning was
that the situation in the informal sector could not get better since informal workers were in
some kind of ‘informality trap’, living in a state of exploitative, unethical, and disadvanta-
geous relations with the formal sector and unable to break away from it (Cross, 1998).22
These two visions portrayed people working in the informal sector as passive economic
and political agents rather than active economic and political actors, as those who had failed
to win the race for formal jobs rather than individuals making an eort to have an honest
and decent living. At this time, those writing on informality saw the phenomenon as a ‘refuge
occupation’ and failed to notice the ‘human ingenuity’23 (Hart, 1970; Cross, 1998) behind it—
understood as the process of applying clever, original, and inventive ideas to solve problems
or meet challenges—which would be later underlined by De Soto (1989) and Cross (1998). By
the same token, while the conceptualization of informality was vaguely defined as an activity
not registered or not regulated by the state, a few authors—among themWhiteford (1974) and
Bromley (1978)—discussed, even if only partially, the particularmatter of state regulation (De
Soto, 1989; Cross, 1998).
Analytical work on informality in matters of state regulation was necessary as it was pre-
cisely the informal agent’s ability to circumvent the law and avoid paying fees and taxes that
made the activity lucrative and favorable for them. However, these factors presented a moral
and a political quagmire: people working in the informal economy can make a living mainly
because they are infringing the law (Cross, 1998). Moreover, this opened up awhole new arena
22An ‘informality trap’ is a set of conditions—regulatory, economic, social, or even political—which makes it
very dicult for workers or firms to escape informality. Informality impedes firm development or increases in firm
size, by undermining investment and productivity growth. Contrary to the common belief, informal firms do not
always develop and join the formal sector. Instead, they are caught in an informality trap, excluded from markets
for funding, and forced to evade taxes and other regulations in order to be able to compete with more productive
or formal competitors (Kenyon and Kapaz, 2005; Kanbur, 2011).
23This ‘human ingenuity’ is an integral part of the culture of informality.
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of political and economic implications not only between the informal and formal economies,
but also between informal agents, the state, and political parties.
1.3.3 State regulation and the informal sector
The book The Other Path24 by Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto, published in 1989, is
a milestone in the field of the informal economy. This seminal work is not only a detailed
description and study of the informal economy in its many forms and fronts in Peru, but
also the first systematic eort to analyze the role of state regulation in the configuration of
the informal economy. De Soto argued that the regulatory system itself is responsible for the
outburst and rapid growth of the informal economy. He acknowledged that by determining
the legal basis of formality, the state was eectively defining what activities were informal
(De Soto, 1989). He also maintained that the state in fact encouraged informality by setting
up ‘semi-formal’25 administrative rules for many informal agents, such as informal transport
(informal taxis), informal trade (street vendors), and informal housing (informal settlers) (De
Soto, 1989; Cross, 1998).
De Soto portrayed informal economic activities as the ‘other’ path towards development
and as an economic alternative to both the guerrilla group (the Shining Path) and the state’s
inability to satisfy basic needs. In thinking of the informal economy as a form of develop-
ment, De Soto advanced previous work done by the ilo. In thinking informal economy as an
economic alternative, De Soto gave a viable option versus the guerrilla’s alternative26 and ac-
knowledged the underlying conflict between the state and the informal sector (De Soto, 1989).
However, he did not thoroughly discuss or analyze the political implications and consequences
of the informal economy (Cross, 1998).
24The title of the book, The Other Path, or “El Otro Sendero”, alludes to Sendero Luminoso, the guerrilla
movement in Peru called the Shining Path. The title evokes the opening of economic opportunities for the poor
by formalizing the informal economy, as an alternative to the proposal of the guerrilla, which was that of regime
change by anymeans possible, including violence and terrorism. Many poorpeoplewho did not findopportunities
for a better life joined the guerrilla hoping to get these opportunities once the guerrilla took over the state.
25This thesis further develops the idea of ‘semi-formality’, as it refers to not only to the establishment of admin-
istrative rules that are only partially enforced (as De Soto suggested), but also to a more elaborate ‘semi-formal
status’, as described in the following chapters.
26The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla movement is a Maoist insurgent organization in Peru. Its
objective was to substitute the existing ‘bourgeois democracy’ with what the guerrillas named ‘new democracy’.
The Shining Path believed that by imposing a dictatorship of the proletarian, its members could achieve pure
communism. In 1980, the movement started a guerrilla war in the countryside (in the Ayacucho region) and
gradually moved to Peru’s urban areas. It was supported by peasants and the urban poor by filling the political
void left by the central government and providing ‘popular justice’. In 1992, after the capture of its leader, Abimael
Guzmán, the Shining Path’s activities declined (Gorriti, 1999).
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Almost simultaneously to De Soto’s work, Castells, Portes, and Benton (1989) edited The
Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries’. The contributors
to this book took an international perspective and included several case studies from dierent
countries in dierent regions to present an innovative multicountry comparative study in spite
of the dierentmethodologies and disciplinary approaches used. The authors reviewed the ex-
isting literature, presented findings from studies in fourteen cities and ten dierent countries,
and analysed the implications of their research for practical attempts to respond to the in-
formal economy, helping readers to understand informality better. Contributors of this work
pointed out that informality is not exclusive to the poor and reflects an economic and political
rearrangement between workers and employers, and a shift in the regulatory mission of the
state. In this book, Castells and Portes (1989) outlined the general theoretical framework of
the cases presented—which would become influential in future research on the subject—and
stated that since the informal economy does not result from the inherent characteristics of
activities but from the social definition of state intervention, the boundaries of the informal
economy vary in dierent context and historical circumstances. Furthermore, these bound-
aries of informality are determined by the dynamics of social struggles and political bargain-
ing, which involve but are not limited to the changing conflict between labor and capital. These
authors state that the social challenge posed by these developments lies in the choice between
the advantages of a new society based on the relationship between unrestrained capital and
primary social networks and those of a society in which public institutions extend control over
the logic of capital by incorporating into a new social contract workers and entrepreneurs op-
erating outside the legal realm. In addition, Fernandez-Kelly andGarcía (1989) challenged the
existing understanding of the regulatory functions of the state by examining the behaviour of
state agencies and their representatives in twoNorthAmerican cities: Los Angeles andMiami.
Their analysis further expanded the literature on the relationships between the informal econ-
omy and the state by contending that informality developed from complicated relationships
between government regulations, semi-regulations, and economic agents.
1.3.4 The emergence of politics in the informal sector debate in Latin America
In 1994, a book edited by Cathy Rakowski called Contrapunto: The Informal Sector Debate
in Latin America was published. Two of the most valuable contributions to this book are
the chapters by Moser (1994) and Rakowski (1994) who comprehensively evaluated the op-
posing postulates that made up the theoretical debate on the informal sector until the mid
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1990s. Both authors provide overviews of the issues at the center of the informal sector de-
bate, comparing periods 1970–1983 and 1984–1993, respectively. Moser (1994) argues that
the early debate emerged from studies of unemployment, employment, and poverty and they
mainly focused on whether or not—and under what conditions—the activities identified as
an informal sector could generate economic growth and employment. Moser discussed how
progress on addressing this question got stuck on three problems: the first one was conceptual
or definitional (is the informal sector synonymous with poverty? Is informal sector one half
of a dichotomy or a segment on a continuum of activities?); the second problem was method-
ological (how to operationalize and conduct research on the sector—survey and census data
sets, case studies, ethnographic research); and the third one focused on the type of linkages
with modern activities (i.e. independent, subordinate). Moser argued that the third issue is
the most important for policy making and is in itself dependent upon definitions and meth-
ods. Hence, Moser articulated the critical issues between 1970 and 1983 and underlined their
relevance for undertanding the relationships between the state, capital-intensive development
strategies, and the persistence of the informal sector.
Rakowski (1994) argued that one critical shift in the debate was from a view of the informal
sector as resulting from the failure of development theories to a view of the informal sector as
a potentially rational and ecient opportunity for genuine development (Rakowski associates
this shift to the increasing exposure given to the ideas ofDe Soto and to the greater visibility of
ngos and other microenterprise programs). The relevant academic and policy questions then
were: which informal activities generate economic growth and employment?; which serve as
a buer against unemployment?; and what policies promote which informal activities? It is
argued that this shift in the debate contributed to the clarification of the dierent roles of the
informal sector and encouraged actors involved in the debate to talk to each other and avoid
getting lost in arguments over semantics and labels. Another change discussed by Rakowski
(1994) is the growing attention placed on ‘people’ (informals—people who engage in informal
activities) as opposed to a ‘sector’ (i.e. subcontracted workers, workers (entrepreneurs) and
owners of microenterprises, the under and unemployed). The resulting policy debate split
into a focus at the macro level on economic issues and how state bureaucracies obstructed
entrepreneurship; and at the micro level on the best means for promoting microenterprise
development.
This discussion helped to create a framework to elucidate theworkof the other contributors
in the book, who analyzed empirical research findings and policies at the macro and micro
levels on the informal sector, bringing to the forefront the subjects of policy research and the
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role of the state. Some of the chapters in this book dealt broadlywith politics, power, ideology,
exploitation, poverty, and entrepreneurship; setting up the basis for further research to come
on these topics.
Among the topics discussed by scholars carrying out research in the 1990s were the fairness
of regulation and enforcement, and the indirect benefits informality had for the state and the
formal sector. For example, if the state executes the law and enforces the payment of taxes
on some economic agents (the formal ones) but not on others (the informal ones), the non-
compliers are in a way being subsidized by the compliers, which should lead to demands for
fair and equal enforcement. Alternatively, informality may also help the state by reducing
the public demand for formal employment and economic benefits. Informality may also serve
the formal sector bymaking available low-cost inputs—including cheap labor—and providing
more ecient distribution channels. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement by scholars of the
role of the state in the informal sector led only to hints, insinuations, and suppositions of the
political position and interests of informal economic agents.
Thus, it became evident to scholars that a number of intricate political issues and prospec-
tive interest groups were involved in the informal sector. Moreover, if we accept that informal
economic agents take advantage of their status of informality, we recognize that they have the
ability to defend these benefits and advantages, either individually (by means of corruption
or evasion) or collectively (by means of organized resistance through a group or association)
(Cross, 1998). However, while political activity by informal agents—such as informal settlers,
street vendors, garbage pickers, and informal taxi operators—had been mentioned in the lit-
erature, there was no broader analysis of the political dynamics of the informal sector. This
changed from the late 1990s onwards, with advances made by a few authors, some mentioned
in the next section.
1.3.5 The informal sector in Mexico
Historian Gary I. Gordon in his doctoral dissertation ‘Peddlers, Pesos and Power: The Po-
litical Economy of Street Vending in Mexico’ (1997b), sociologist John C. Cross in Informal
Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City (1998), and editors Patricia Fernandez-
Kelly and Jon Shefner in Out of the Shadows: Political Action and the Informal Economy
in Latin America (2006) have contributed to fill this gap, particularly in the case of Mexico.
They dealt with several questions of a political, historical and social nature that had only been
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considered in part by the literature until then, for example the politics of informal groups, the
evolution of regulations to tackle informality, and the influence of marginal poor civil society
groups on democratization. Most importantly, they have shed light on how it is possible that
groups that were in general considered to be politically peripheral—such as informal street
vendors—could influence state actions and decisions in the presence of potential opposition
from dierent groups within the formal sector and the state.
In 1997 Gary I. Gordon presented his doctoral dissertation, which analyses the political
economy of street vending in Mexico, at the history department of the University of Chicago.
Although his research is little known in the mainstream literature on the informal sector, Gor-
don’s work has been a valuable reference for this thesis in its historical analysis of the regu-
latory framework of street vending in Mexico. Gordon (1997b) argued that the conflict over
street vending in Mexico City is essentially a struggle among urban interest groups over the
use of public space, with established formalmerchants andwealthier city residents on one side
and the poor urban population on the other. Since 1929 Mexico City authorities have con-
ducted a number of campaigns to remove street vendors from the city’s historic downtown, at
times with great violence. These campaigns have alternated with periods of ‘corrupt tolera-
tion’ by city ocials. According to Gordon (1997b), these cycles of repression and toleration
have been the result of changes in the city’s employment situation, the changing interests of
the ruling party, and transformations in the urban environment. He placed the present-day
conflict over street vending in historical perspective, explaining how street vending came to
be the intractable policy problem it is today. This perspective demonstrated that institutional
failures in the Mexican legal and political systems bear principle responsibility for fostering
conflict. This situation detracts from the ecient functioning of the city, if any, and provides
political advantage and opportunities for corruption to public ocials. The narrative of the
street vending conflict presented byGordon (1997b) also sheds light on the development of the
state-society relationship in modern Mexico. In recent years and until the mid-1990s, street
vendors (and other ‘popular sector’ groups) have taken on an increasingly important role in
maintainingMexico’s ruling party in power. Gordon (1997b) suggested that this circumstance
has favoured the vendors as a group, but has caused a situation in which the majority of ven-
dors remain legally insecure and subject to exploitation by their own organization leaders and
the political establishment.
John Cross’s book is the work that most closely antedates and inspires this thesis. Using
historical and ethnographic research, Cross (1998) showed how, starting in the mid 1950s
and subsequently, local authorities combined harsh repression and negotiation to control the
34
literature review on the informal sector, informal economy, and informality
informal occupation of public spaces in Mexico City. Street vendors responded by seeking
protection from politicians in exchange for votes and political support. However, according
toCross (1998) the forging of clientelistic relationships, which is a common practice inMexico,
was only part of the story. Government ocials, overwhelmed by individual applications for
permits to sell goods on the thoroughfare and eager to rid themselves of continuous demands,
oered to negotiate with street vendors but only if they formed organizations aliated to the
ruling party. The result was not the elimination of street vending as they had expected but
the proliferation of street vendor associations, an unintentional outcome of the ambiguous
interaction between state representatives and informal agents. In this case, city ocials acted
as a catalyst for the political mobilization of street vendors (Cross, 1998). In this way, Cross
developed further the inquiry about the relationship between unregulated workers and the
state.
In Fernandez-Kelly and Shefner’s book the chapters by Centeno and Portes (2006), and
Cross and Peña (2006) deserve particular attention. They both expanded our understanding
of nuances in the relationship between government structures and informal agents. This is
in contrast to earlier research which emphasized the antagonistic relationship between the
state—conceived as the body responsible for the creation and implementation of legislative
restrictions—and informal agents attempting to circumvent control. As these authors showed,
that polarity proved to be, at best, a simplification. An important contribution of these two
chapters is the elucidation of how economic behaviours intersect with regulatory structures.
According to Centeno and Portes (2006) it is not only the state’s ability to pass laws but also
its capacity to enforce them that determines the size and shape of the informal sector. Their
classification of ‘frustrated’, ‘welfare’ and ‘liberal’ states complements with Cross and Peña’s
(2006) use of the terms ‘informal’, ‘illegal’ and ‘mafia’ to identify dierent types of economic
transactions among unregulated workers and entrepreneurs. The intersections of this model
yield various results. In some cases, informality favours state regulation, in others, it opposes
it. At first sight, the informal sector may seem homogeneous but, as these authors revealed, it
is internally heterogeneous.
1.3.6 The conceptualization of the informal sector evolves
Conceptually speaking, things started to evolve by the end of the 1990s. In 1999, economist
William Maloney published a paper titled: ‘Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban
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Labor Markets? Evidence From Sectoral Transitions in Mexico.’ In it Maloney (1999) argues
that the traditionalist dualistic view of the relationship between formal an informal labormar-
kets is probably conceptually inappropriate. He uses the National Urban Employment Survey
(Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, eneu), taking advantage of its panel characteristic,
which follows individuals for fifteen months, to examine earnings dierentials and mobility
patterns as workers move from formal salaried employment to three modalities of informal
work: self-employment, informal salaried employment, and contractwork. He concludes that
both earnings dierentials and mobility patterns indicate that much of the informal sector is
a looked-for alternative for workers. Therefore, these modalities of informal work can exist
in unsegmented labor markets, and they can be actually well-integrated.
A few years later, in 2004, Maloney published ‘Informality Revisited.’ Maloney (2004) is
related toMaloney (1999), going against the dualistic view of labormarkets and oering a dif-
ferent view for the countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. The author revisits
the segmented labor markets view, citing evidence from his previous panel data analysis on
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, to conclude that, as a first approach, we should view the infor-
mal sector as an unregulated, developing country equivalent of the voluntary entrepreneurial
small firm sector found in advanced countries (opposed to the view that the informal sector is
a residual composed by disadvantaged workers rationed out of formal jobs). After presenting
evidence to sustain this point, the author concludes that policies towards decreasing informal-
ity in the Latin American and Caribbean region should gear towards increasing the size and
productivity of the formal sector.
Thus, during the first decade of the 21st century, as the phenomenon of informality was
more widely recognized and studied, there has been a series of publications—papers and
books with dierent approaches and from dierent disciplines—that advance the research
on the topic on several fronts.27
27Further work by Fajnzylber, Maloney and Montes (2006), examine whether micro-businesses in developing
countries have a similar or dierent behaviour from their industrial counterparts for the case of Mexico. Using
the National Urban Employment Survey (eneu) and the Mexico’s National Survey of Microenterprises (Encuesta
Nacional de Micronegocios, enamin), they conclude that the self-employment sector in Mexico corresponds to
the dynamic models of voluntary entrepreneurship that is described in the mainstream literature, that correspond
to the one existing for industrial countries.
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1.3.7 Recent developments on the evolution of concepts and policies of informality
In 2006, a multidisciplinary group of distinguished scholars led by Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur,
andOstrom contributed to Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concept and Policies
(2006). The book revisits the concepts and measures of the formal and informal economies
and then provides some empirical studies of policies and inter-linking between informality and
formality. Among its main postulates are the proposal of moving beyond the formal-informal
dichotomy and the suggestion of taking amore subtle or ‘nuanced’ approach, and considering
the conceptual and empirical advances and past policy failures when characterizing informal-
ity as disorganized or unsystematic. Particularly useful for this thesis are chapters 5, 7 and 14.
Chapter 5 (written by Martha Chen) starts comparing the old and new views of the informal
sector: the new views do not longer describe the informal sector as a traditional economy,
marginally productive, and clearly separated from the formal sector. On the contrary, Chen
argues that the new views have as a central characteristic a continuum of economic relations,
where labor relations tend to fall in the middle of a continuum between a pure ‘formal’ rela-
tion (regulated and protected) and a pure ‘informal’ one (unregulated and unprotected). She
also claims that workers and production units can work simultaneously at dierent points of
the continuum. Moreover, Chen proposes that the two extremes (formal-informal) are often
dynamically linked: formal enterprises hire informal workers and many informal firms have a
direct relationship with formal enterprises (e.g. buying them products or services). This ‘con-
tinuum’ proposal has an interesting corollarium for public policy design: the formalization
debate should take into consideration that, depending on the segment of the informal econ-
omy that is being considered, there can be dierent meanings of the word ‘formalization’.
According to this author, even though it is the desired way to go, the feasibility of formalizing
the informal sector is unclear, and it is unlikely that all informal producers and workers can
be formalized. Her main point is that, at the end of the day, the policy challenge is to decrease
the costs of working in the informal sector and to increase the benefits of being formal. In
chapter 14 (written by Sally Roever), illustrated by a study about street markets and informal
traders in Lima (Peru), Roever claims that there is a need for a more stable and coherent reg-
ulatory framework. In the absence of such framework, there exists a high level of mistrust
between leaders of vending organizations and policy-makers. Interestingly, this mistrust does
not translate directly into unwilligness to formalize their businesses, which opens the door
to discuss formalization. As in Chen’s chapter, Roever explains that the meaning of formal-
ization varies, in her case, among street vendors, but in general, they agree that they could
37
literature review on the informal sector, informal economy, and informality
be better o formalizing their businesses (that in many cases means owning or renting an o-
street space instead of being in the streets). Chapter 7 (written byNorman Loayza, AnaMaría
Oviedo, and Luis Serven) is also an interesting contribution to the literature because it helps
understand the linkages between informality and regulation. More specifically, it concentrates
on the role of business regulation on economic growth and informality. Through regression
analysis of data for more than 70 countries around the world, Loayza and his co-authors con-
clude that high levels of regulation are associated with lower growth, especially clear in the
case of product and labor market regulation. They also point out the importance of taking
into consideration the ‘quality’ of regulation: stronger institutions help mitigate the adverse
impact that regulations have on growth. In terms of the impacts of regulation on informality,
the authors conclude that an increase in either product or labor regulation leads to a rise in
informality, but they also point out the importance of regulatory quality to attenuate this ef-
fect. Even though the authors find these results in terms of growth and informality, they do
not recommend eliminating regulations, because they make sense from other points of view
(social, environmental, etc.), but rather evaluating regulations in a more comprehensive way
to understand both their economic and welfare implications.
In 2007, the World Bank published Informality: Exit and Exclusion (Perry et al., 2007),
in which several specialists and economists examine informality in Latin America and the
Caribbean. The authors continue the discussion started by Martha Chen and William Mal-
oney about the informal sector in this region, deepenining the analysis of the reasons for and
causes of the emergence of informality and the implications of its growth. They describe in-
formality as a manifestation of a flawed relationship between the state and its citizens and use
two distinctive but corresponding perspectives to explain what drives informality. These are
informality driven by ‘exclusion’ from state benefits or from the circuits of the modern econ-
omy, and informality driven by voluntary ‘exit’ decisions resulting from private cost-benefit
estimates that lead firms and workers to opt out of formal institutions (Perry et al., 2007).
The authors argue that both perspectives contribute to our knowledge of the causes and con-
sequences of informality in Latin America. They conclude that reducing the levels of infor-
mality and overcoming the culture of informality will entail actions to increase aggregate pro-
ductivity in the economy, improve and correct poorly designed social policies and regulations,
and advance the legitimacy of the state by improving the quality and impartiality of state
policies and institutions (Perry et al., 2007). Particularly useful for the theoretical conceptual-
ization of this thesis was chapter 8, by Jaime Saavedra-Chanduvi, which refers specifically to
the relationship between the informal sector and the state and presents an enriching study of
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institutions and social norms where he argues that the state-society interactions underlying
informality, whether leading to exit or to exclusion, ultimately represent an indictment of the
general eectiveness and legitimacy of the state (Perry et al., 2007).
1.3.8 Political organization in the informal sector
In 2007, yet another group of scholars, led by Chen, Jhabvala, Kanbur, and Richards, con-
tributed toMembership-Based Organizations of the Poor (2007), ormbop, a term the authors
use to refer to organizationswhose governance structures respond to the needs and aspirations
of the poor because they are accountable to their members. Through its chapters—some the-
oretical, some empirical, and comprising specific case studies from South Asian, African, and
Latin American countries—the book elucidates several aspects of grassroots organizations,
including: what activities and structures characterize them; what their internal governance
structures and leadership styles are; why some organizations are successful while others are
not, andwhat factors account for the success; whether these factors are replicable across coun-
tries or even within the same country; and what constraints there are of successful mbop or-
ganizations that want to expand and/or of new ones being formed. While informality is not
exclusively a phenomenon in which only the poor participate, the associations of informal
street vendors have their origins in this type of civil society or grassroots organizations and
that is why the views expressed in this book are valuable for the purpose of this thesis. Rele-
vant for this work have been the introductory chapter 1 (written by the editors of the book)
and chapter 14 (written by Sally Roever) on Lima’s street vending organizations.28 In the in-
troductory chapter, the authors summarize the findings of the dierent study cases showcased
in the book, but they do not stop there: they also extract from the compiled research the in-
ternal and external determinants of success factors and challenges faced by mbops around
the world.29 In addition, the authors claim that there is an important role played by these
28In a previously cited book (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, andOstrom, 2006), SallyRoever also analyses informal
street vending in Lima, Peru, but does so in relationship to the need for a more stable regulatory framework. In the
case of Chapter 14 in Chen, Jhabvala, Kanbur, and Richards (2007), Roever analyses street vending organizations
in relation to its main success factors and challenges.
29According to the authors, the external factors behind successes and failures include: “functioning democratic
structures; capacity to run the organization; a moral code that guides actions; an enabling legal, political and
policy environment; diversified sources of finance and support that do not themselves undermine the mbop”; and
the internal and external challenges thatmbops face, as they grow and becomemore complex include: “enhancing
management capacity; maintaining accountability of organization to members; ensuring an enabling, rather than
debilitating, flow of external finance and support; changing the policy and regulatory environment so it becomes
more enabling of mbop operations and of the members of mbops.” (Chen et al., 2007:19).
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organizations in terms of their impact on the country’s development. To preserve them and
maximize their development impact, the authors claim that there should be a set of reforms
in terms of their regulation, financial support, and inclusion in national and international
deliberation and policy making. Chapter 14, written by Sally Roever, looks at twelve street
vendors organizations (classifying them as mbops), assessing their ability to achieve organiza-
tional success. Even though she claims that some of these organizations can reach success in
terms of influencing the policy-making process and obtaining benefits for their members, she
concludes that a lack of compliance with the internal governance structure limits the success
of these organizations.
Also in 2007, a book was edited by John Cross and Alfonso Morales Street Entrepreneurs:
People, Place andPolitics in Local andGlobal Perspective. The book is a collection ofworks by
several contributors focusing on the dynamics of street vendors and street markets worldwide,
and includes case studies from Latin America, Asia, and Africa as well as the usa and Europe.
The book centers on the political and social regulations of street markets and their business
strategies, methods of operation, and survival tactics. Its main line of argument is that street
vendors are reviving after several decades in which they were supposed to disappear, to be
replaced by more modern, ecient, and formal alternatives (supermarkets). However, policy-
makers and consumers are finding that street vendors and streetmarkets animate and revitalize
social landscapes, and provide an important source of employment and a useful supply of
essential goods, particularly for the overlooked urban poor. While street vendors are no longer
generally seen as outcasts, they still face significant persecution and abuse from government
ocials in many places in the world, and are generally perceived only to be relevant at the
local level as a curiosity or as a mechanism for survival. The chapters in this book address
several issues, such as the struggles that street vendors have faced to legitimize their activity,
the role they play in helping societies to adapt to or survive crises, and the functional role that
street vendors play in the social and economic systems at global and local levels. The authors
also analyze the ways in which street vendors can challenge the prevailing system of control
of space and the concept of property rights by dierent means at their disposal (Cross and
Morales, 2007).
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1.3.9 Evaluation of policies and proposals to address informality in Mexico
This section presents an analysis of certain policies that have been recently tried in Mexico in
order to reduce the size of the informal sector, or rather, to increase formality. In that sense,
in 2007, Kaplan, Piedra and Seira published the paper ‘Entry Regulation and Business Start-
ups: Evidence from Mexico’ (2007, 2011). They evaluate the Fast-Track Business Creation
System (sare)30, a federal program implemented during the Fox administration aimed at re-
ducing start-up regulatory costs. The program, targeted at municipalities, ensures that micro,
small andmedium enterprises can register and begin operations in only two days. Apart from
speeding the registration process, the sare clearly defines the procedures, fees and identities of
entities involved in the registration process. This type of programs were designed and imple-
mented with the objectives of decreasing informality and increasing tax revenues. Using three
sources of data (inegi census data, industrial classification data, and imss data) Kaplan et al.
(2007, 2011) show the sare program in Mexico generated 5 percent more new formal firms
permonth in the eligible industries in the municipalities that were implementing this program.
Even though the eect of the program is positive and significant, they also conclude that these
programs alone will most likely have a small eect on informality and firm creation. More
comprehensive programs are necessary to have a sizeable impact on informality in countries
such as Mexico, which have a relatively large informal economy.31
A few months later, Miriam Bruhn published ‘License to Sell: The Eect of Business Reg-
istration Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico’ (Bruhn, 2008, 2011). Concurrently to Kaplan et
al. (2007, 2011), Bruhn (2008, 2011)32 analyzes the eects of the sare reform on registration,
employment, prices and income.33 While Bruhn (2008, 2011) shows that the reform increased
the number of registered businesses by 5 percent in eligible industries, Kaplan et al (2007, 2011)
found an estimated increase that is 7.6 times smaller. An important point is that both papers
coincide in that the Mexican reform had a small impact on increased formal firm creation.
Programs like this one will most likely have a small eect on informality, firm creation and
30Fast-Track Business Creation System (Sistema de Apertura Rápida de Empresas, sare).
31I speak more about sare and this paper in Chapters 2 and 5.
32Both Kaplan et al. (2007) and Bruhn (2008) published revised versions of their respective papers in 2011. I
am including that year (2011) in the in-text citation for the reader’s reference.
33The main dierence between Bruhn (2008, 2011) and Kaplan et al. (2007, 2011) is that, instead of using the
imss data, Bruhn uses the National Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ene). She claims that
the selection of this data set instead of the imss allows her to give a more precise estimate given that: (a) one
disadvantage of using the imss data is that it does not capture registered firms without employees; and (b) not all
registered firms with employees are included in the imss database. Additional dierences mentioned by Kaplan et
al. (2007, 2011) include the fact that the length of exposure to the program diers between the two papers.
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growth. Other aspects such as the cost of paying taxes, and the small benefits of being formal
should be addressed in order to find a sizeable eect in the economy.34
Beyond policies that target individuals or enterprises, providing information or incentives
to register as formal businesses, or increasing enforcement, there are also proposals that are
broader in scope. This second type of proposals takes the own definition of informality,
critizicing the fact that people with dierent labor statuses are treated dierently at the fis-
cal level, and goes for the dissapearence of this dierential treatment of individuals according
to their ‘labor status’, which automatically makes informality dissapear (by definition).35 One
of the most important leaders of this type of proposals has been Mexican economist Santi-
ago Levy. In 2008, he produced a seminal work on informality called Good Intentions, Bad
Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality, and Economic Growth in Mexico. Levy analyzes the
period between 1997 and 2006—the same period as that discussed in detail in this thesis—
and finds that despite various reforms Mexico has become more economically stable but has
had insignificant growth. He points out that the Mexican government has directed a growing
number of resources into subsidizing the formation of informal jobs. These social policies
and programs have hindered growth, promoted illegality, and provided unreliable social pro-
tection to workers, trapping many of them in poverty. Levy observes that at present more
than 50 percent of Mexican workers are working informally, and about one-quarter of them
are considered poor (Levy, 2008). He claims that informality has cornered Mexico into a
two-sided quandary: provide benefits to informal workers at the expense of lower levels of
growth and productivity, or leave millions of (informal36) workers without benefits. To solve
this state of aairs, Levy proposes that the existing social security system for formal workers
should be transformed into universal social entitlements (Levy, 2008). To achieve this, he sug-
gests eliminating wage-based social security contributions and increasing consumption taxes
on high-income households to concurrently raise the gdp’s rate of growth, decrease levels
of inequality, and enhance workers’ benefits (Levy, 2008). The most valuable contribution
34There is additional evidence of the impact of “formalization policies” for countries other than Mexico. For
the case of Brazil, De Andrade, Bruhn and McKenzie (2013) perform a field experiment in the state of Minas
Gerais (Brazil), in order to test dierent policy instruments, such as: providing information about how to register,
giving exceptions to some registration fees, and sending inspectors to the firms or sending inspectors to neighbour
firms (to detect potential spillovers). The main finding of the paper is that giving information and reducing the
costs of formalizing does not have a significant impact on formalization, but sending inspectors to the firms did
result in a small increase in municipal registration.
35A necessary caveat: a broader reform like to one proposed by Mexican economist Santiago Levy is much
more dicult to pass politically. A long-term agenda with intermediate steps would be an essential part of such
approach, because of the profound fiscal and economic impacts that it entails.
36In Mexico, the social security system only covers salaried workers. Self-employed individuals and people
employed by a company in a non-salaried capacity are excluded from receiving government benefits (Levy, 2008).
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of Levy’s book is that it issues a course of action to reform economic and social policy in
Mexico, which is undoubtedly a fundamental element of introducing a fairer and sustainable
development strategy for the country.37
Drawing on Levy’s theoretical model (2008), in The End of Informality in Mexico? Fis-
cal Reform for Universal Social Insurance (2012), Anton, Hernández and Levy analyzed the
phenomenon of informality in Mexico from an economic perspective, defining informality
as “the inobservance of contributive social insurance” (Anton, Hernández and Levy, 2007:11).
The authors develop an economicmodel to study the implications of the dual social insurance
architecture38 existing in Mexico and propose a reform to shift taxation for social insurance
from labor to consumption. The authors argue that this reform—consisting of setting up a
value added tax (vat) of 16 percent—will make it possible to provide all workers—regardless
of their status of formality or informality—with the same health and pensions benefits, and to
compensate poor households for the vat increase, among other positive eects brought about
by the reform.
In ‘ATale of Two Species: Revisiting the Eect of Registration Reform on Informal Business
Owners in Mexico’, Bruhn (2013) argues that there are dierent views that have been put
forward in terms of explaining why many firms operate in the informal sector. One of them
explains that informal business owners are being held back by registration processes in their
desire of becoming formal entrepreneurs (De Soto, 1989). The other point of view, in contrast,
proposes that informal business owners are so because they are in a transition period, they are
trying to earn a living while searching for a wage job (Tokman, 1992). Using panel data from
theMexicanNational Employment Survey (EncuestaNacional de Empleo, ene), Bruhn (2013)
follows the approach of DeMel, McKenzie andWoodru (2010) to classify informal business
37On July 22, 2013, Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto announced the Program for the Formalization of
Employment 2013 (Programa para la Formalización del Empleo 2013), a federal government program based on
the principles laid down by Levy’s work on informality. The initial stage was limited to 200,000 workers (less than
1 percent of the total number of informal workers in Mexico) and was in a pilot phase in December 2013. On
September 8, 2014 President Enrique Peña Nieto launched a program to grant fiscal and social security benefits to
those working on the informal sector willing to formalize, in order to stop informality and increase productivity.
In an event named Let’s Grow Together. Being Formal, It Is Good For You! (Crezcamos Juntos. ¡Ser formal,
sí conviene!) the President signed the decree for the Regime of Fiscal Incorporation (Régimen de Incorporación
Fiscal) and the Regime of Incorporation to the Social Security (Régimen de Incorporación a la Seguridad Social)
which includes benefits such as access to health and social services, pension benefits, housing credits, income tax
discounts, economic aid for the small entrepreneurs, credits for businesses, and training programs (Hernández,
2014).
38The ‘dual social insurance architecture’ discussed by Anton, Hernández and Levy (2012) comprises the fol-
lowing components: First, firms and workers in salaried contractual relations are obligated to pay for a bundled
set of health, pension and related programs. Second, nonsalaried workers benefit from an unbundled set of paral-
lel programs paid by the government. These two parts compose the ‘dual social insurance architecture’ that exists
in Mexico.
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owners in two species: (i) ‘the formal business owners’, and (ii) ‘the wage workers species’,
according to their potential for becoming formal business owners. The author uses the context
of the sare reform in Mexico that simplified registration procedures for start-ups to provide
further evidence for the existence of these two species of informal business owners. She also
examines the impact of the sare reform on the two species to conclude that informal business
workers from the ‘wage worker species’ are less likely to become formal business owners but
they are 22.3 percent more likely to become wage workers. The impacts of the reform on
the other species, namely, the ones that are called ‘the formal business owners species’ are
less clear. In municipalities with low constraints to entrepreneurship, there were no eects;
but in municipalities with high pre-reform constraints to entrepreneurship, the sare program
had an impact: informal business owners from the ‘formal business owner species’ are 26.2
percent more likely to register their business due to the reform. These results support the
idea that there are two types of informal business workers that react dierently to simplifying
regulation reforms: some operate informally due to stringent regulation and they would react
positively to these reforms; while others are looking for a job and they would switch to being
a wage earner as soon as the opportunity arises. Bruhn (2013) again points out to the fact
that the impacts of these reforms are positive but small. In the case of this particular paper,
Bruhn stresses that policies that try to increase incentives to formalize aect certain types of
informal workers (but not others). Therefore, they do not have the broader impact that is
necessary or desirable.
Overall, there is still a need for broader and more eective policies to reduce the size of the
informal sector, stimulating the growth of formal employment. A policy agenda should take
into consideration political challenges that have to be addressed in order to be able to pass a
broad and sustainable reform.
1.4 Research questions and general goals of this work
As mentioned earlier, there is a gap in the scholarly knowledge of the informal sector (in Mex-
ico and worldwide) due to the omission of political questions. One of the most important
questions that has not been addressed refers to the impact that political change and democ-
ratization have over the dynamics of the informal sector and its agents. In the particular case
of Mexico, neither Gordon (1997a, 1997b) nor Cross (1995, 1996, 1998), the two authors
who have dealt more in depth with the politics and political economy of informality in Mex-
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ico, tackle this issue fully; and it is tangentially treated or dealt with in a dierent light in
Fernandez-Kelly and Shefner (2006).39
Addressing this question is important in terms of understanding a process of change. In
Mexico, before democratization the informal sector (i.e. informal street vendors) was part
of the corporatist structure of the Mexican state; after democratization it is part of a rela-
tively more pluralist set up. This has potentially ambiguous eects on the informal sector:
On the one hand political competition can give political market power to the informal organ-
isations/leaders to bid for protection and welfare. On the other hand electoral competition
also gives voice to citizens and business organisations that demand the eradication of the in-
formal sector, among other things. The understanding of these phenomena and the potential
avenues for research and policy-making is what give relevance to this thesis.
Thus, the main goal of this thesis is to learn to what extent and in what ways recent political
change in Mexico—democratization and the alternation of political parties in power—has
aected the dynamics between the informal sector (street vending), the state, and political
parties. For this, this thesis uses the process of democratization and the alternation of political
parties in power as a natural experiment that oers variation in terms of which party is in
power, and hence the opportunity to observe how linkages between politicians, government
ocials and street vendor groups are made and unmade as power changes hands. Thus, the
articulation between politicians, government ocials and informal workers and their leaders
is the main focus of this dissertation. Therefore, the research question this thesis asks is:
How did increasing political competition, resulting from democratization and alternation
of political parties in power, aect the politics and policies of informality (informal street
vending) in Mexico?
In searching for the causality and the specific details of the research question, the following
set of four enquiries also follows the main research question:
1. How is the relationship between state and individual in an informal sector framework?
What is the ‘culture of informality’? What is ‘semi-formality’? Can informality be
viewed as the outcome of a broken social contract? What have been the policy responses
towards informality and why they have not been eective? (Discussed in Chapter 2).
2. What are the general characteristics of street vendor groups and organizations? How
do street vendors interact with the government to get what they want, or not? How
39Particularly the chapters by Centeno and Portes (2006), Cross and Peña, (2006), Ramírez Saíz (2006), and
Shefner (2006).
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do these interactions alleviate or exacerbate the problems of the informal sector? Did
alternating politicians capture street vendors organisations/leaders? Ordid their leaders
capture politicians? (Discussed in Chapter 3).
3. How has been the development of informal street vending through modern history in
Mexico? What role has politics played on informality and informality on politics? How
are policy formulation and programs towards the informal sector aected by the involve-
ment of public agencies, local business leaders, (informal) grassroots groups, or others?
How linkages between politicians, government ocials and informal street vendors vary
as power changes hands? (Discussed in Chapters 4 and 5).
4. How does a well-organized and powerful informal vendor organization work? (Dis-
cussed in Chapter 6).
These questions are answered through a qualitative research method based primarily on
historical, political, and case study research analysis.
1.5 Methodology, research design, techniques and information sources
To answer the how and why of the research questions, this thesis is committed to empirical
enquiry because it seeks to establish relationships between two or more concepts in an eort
to explain the occurrence of observed political phenomena (Landman, 2007). This thesis
follows a qualitative researchmethod, mainly because it aims to respond to political questions
of informality related to human behaviour and the reasons behind it. Because of the elusive
and often secretive nature of informality, it makes sense to use a qualitative method, as these
characteristics—elusiveness and secrecy—limit the availability of hard numerical data. In fact,
as this thesis deals only with a single country (Mexico), this research can be categorized as
a single-country study. While experiments can only rarely be conducted in political science
research, this thesis uses the process of democratization in Mexico and the alternation of
political parties in power as a natural experiment that oers variation in terms of which party
is in power, and therefore the opportunity to observe how linkages and relationships between
politicians, government ocials, and informal street vendors are made and unmade as power
changes hands.
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1.5.1 Methodology
Due to the particular nature of informality mentioned above, research on informal sector or-
ganizations, activities and individuals requires considerable methodological flexibility, and
therefore combining dierent methodologies may be a useful strategy. Therefore, this thesis
avoids epistemological and methodological disputes while keeping rigor and the generation
of cumulative progress as its basic principles.
The first methodological tool used in this thesis is comparative research. A single-country
study is considered comparative if it uses concepts that are applicable to other countries, de-
velops concepts that are applicable to other countries, and/or seeks to make larger inferences
that stretch beyond the original country used in the study (Landman, 2007). What should be
recognized is that inferences made from single-country studies are necessarily less secure than
those made for the comparison of several or many countries. Nevertheless, such studies are
useful for examining a whole range of comparative issues (Landman, 2007).40 Single coun-
try studies provide contextual description, develop new classifications, generate hypothesis,
confirm and infirm theories, and explain the presence of deviant countries identified through
cross-national comparison (Van Evera, 1997; Gerring, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005; Lees,
2006). This research achieves several of these purposes.
Comparative research in single-country studies can takemany forms. In this thesis, the com-
parative research takes the form of a comparative historical-political analysis. This strategy
involves tracking the same subjects of analysis over time. It is a chronological analysis of reg-
ulation, policies, government actions—and the general evolution of informal street vending—
over an extended period of time (1929–2006). The comparative political analysis complements
the historical analysis and consists of evaluating two stages in time. It presents an ex ante and
ex post analysis of how the linkages and interactions between informal vendor groups and
incumbent governments (and political parties) changed during the years of alternancia (1997
at city level and 2000 at federal level); as well as the continuation of the historical analysis of
regulations, policies and government actions—now under the light of dierent ideologies and
approaches depending on the party in power—in matters of street vending and informality in
Mexico. The comparative historical-political analysis overlaps, but that was intended to at-
tain a greater degree of validity through cross-verification (triangulation and cross-checking)
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Seale, 2004a, 2004b; Denzin, 2006; Rothbauer, 2008).
40For Eckstein (1975), single-country studies are the equivalent to clinical studies from medicine, where the
eects of certain treatments are examined intensively.
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The second methodological tool used is case study research. Case study research is use-
ful to gain knowledge about single cases, which can then be put to comparison according to
the comparative method or use the information and data gathered to use in triangulation41
and cross-checking techniques (Yin, 1989; Hamel, 1993; Stake, 1995; Gerring 2004, 2007;
Creswell, 2009). Here, the case study research serves to both purposes: to gain knowledge
about a street vendor organization (i.e. alcc42); and as a complement to the comparative
historical-political analyses.43 Moreover, case studies are useful for the development of con-
tingent generalizations that can explain well-defined cases. However, this often comes at the
expense of the parsimony and wide applicability of research findings (George and Bennett,
2005). This does not mean that one cannot say anything beyond the borders of a small-N
study. Generalization can be made possible if selecting cases that are especially representative
of the phenomenon under study or choosing ‘crucial’ cases (Gerring, 2004). Therefore, it is
possible to identify underlining causal mechanisms at work, which is likely to be applicable
to a vast number of cases with similar characteristics.
Thus, the combination of research methodologies (i.e. comparative and case study) is use-
ful for bringing to light the causal mechanisms at work in the topic of research—to assess the
impact a specific change has on existing conditions and norms—and the interaction between
the independent variable (increasing political competition resulting from democratization)
and the dependent variable (the politics and policies of informality (informal street vending)).
Finding the empirical association of these two variables should yield a valid conclusion; and
therefore greater confidence that the research has internal validity. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to be aware that conclusions about causal relationships are dicult to determine due to
a variety of extraneous and confounding variables that exist in a social environment. This
means causality can only be inferred, never proven (Holland, 1986; Beebee, Hitchcock and
Menzies, 2009).
In summary, this thesis carries out three types of analyses: first, an extensive historical
analysis (of regulations, policies, government actions and significant events) which comprises
41Triangulation is a research technique that permit interaction in the analytical process of information by using
findings and results from one kind of inquiry to enrich the analysis of findings and results from another. In other
words, triangulation is a method of cross-checking data from multiple sources to search for regularities in the
research data (O’Donoghue and Punch, 2003).
42The street vendor organization known as the Legitimate Civic and Commercial Association (Asociación
Legítima Cívica Comercial A.C., alcc).
43In other words, I use data triangulation and methodological triangulation, as it will be explained later in
this section.
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a general timeline between 1929 and 2006.44 Second, a detailed comparative political analysis
of the ex ante and ex post situation of informal street vendor organizations going through
the democratization process and the alternation of political parties in power that occurred
in Mexico, in the capital city and the federal government, between 1988 and 2006.45 Third,
it uses a case study to examine the largest and most powerful street vending organization in
Mexico City, the Legitimate Civic and Commercial Association (Asociación Legítima Cívica
Comercial A.C., alcc).
1.5.2 Historical research design
The purpose of using a historical research design in this thesis was to collect, verify, and an-
alyze evidence from the past to establish facts that allow to understand better the current
situation of informality and informal street vendors (Howell and Prevenier, 2001; Mahoney
and Rueschmeyer, 2003; Lundy, 2008). I used a variety of primary sources as documentary
evidence, such as ocial government records, newspapers, reports, archives, and non-textual
information (e.g. maps, pictures, and visual recordings). The only limitation was that the
sources had to be both authentic and valid. In addition, I used secondary sources, mainly
scholarly papers that shed light on particular issues related to informality or street vending
during those years, particularly in the early stages of the period of study. When researching the
last part of the period of analysis,46 interviews with vendor leaders and government ocials
operating at that time were also used.
Historical research is unobtrusive, meaning that the act of research does not aect the re-
sults of the study (Howell andPrevenier, 2001;Mahoney andRueschmeyer, 2003; Lundy, 2008).
Moreover, since I was interested in examining not only the evolution of informality and infor-
mal street vending over time, but also the cycles of toleration and repression emanated from
44My initial intention was to extend the analysis to 2008 or 2010. However, lack of space, lack of time, and
the impossibility of coordinating a formal interview with the then head of government of Mexico City (Marcelo
Ebrard)made it impossible to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, valuable information about these yearswas gathered;
for example, an interview with Héctor Serrano Cortés, who was in charge of the Informal Commerce Relocation
Program (prci) between 2008 and 2011 (during the Ebrard administration) and is currently secretary of govern-
ment of the Federal District in the Miguel Mancera administration (2012–2018). Some of this information was
included in Chapter 6, but more remains in my archives for use in forthcoming research.
45I also intended to include a comparative analysis of street vendor associations, one aliated with the pri
versus another linked with the prd, but this comparison was not possible for the purpose of this work as I was
unable to interview the organization of María Rosete (prd) despite several attempts to get in touch with her.
46Specifically, the recent period of democratic transition and alternation of parties in power in Mexico (1988–
2006), to complete the comparative historical-political analysis.
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policies, regulations and government decisions, the historical approach is well suited for this
type of trend analysis. Historical records added important contextual background required to
more fully understand and interpret the research problem. In those early years studied in this
thesis, there is no possibility of researcher-subject interaction that could aect the findings.47
It is only in the last stage of the historical research in which this thesis is focused (1988–2006)
that this possibility arose, but I took particular care that no bias came into the research when
a researcher-subject interaction occurred, particularly during the interview process.
Evidently, the ability to fulfill the aims of this research is directly related to the amount
and quality of documentation available to understand the research problem (Lundy, 2008).
Moreover, searching and interpreting historical sources can be very time consuming. In ad-
dition, original authors bring their own perspectives and biases to the interpretation of past
events and these biases are more dicult to ascertain in historical resources. Due to the lack
of control over external variables, some scholars argue, historical research tends to be weak
with regard to the demands of internal validity (Howell and Prevenier, 2001; Mahoney and
Rueschmeyer, 2003; Lundy, 2008). However, I used the technique of triangulation to avoid
this problem since it facilitates validation of information and data through cross-checking
from two ormore sources, and the combination of othermethodologies (i.e. case study) in the
study of informality and informal street vending (Denzin, 1978, 2006; Seale, 2004a; Rothbauer,
2008).48 Finally, it is rare that the entirety of historical documentation needed to completely
address a research question is available. Therefore, gaps need to be acknowledged—as it hap-
pens in this thesis in the gap existent on the 1967 regulation on street vending and vehicular
trac.49
1.5.3 Case study research design
The purpose of using a case study research design in this thesis was to reach an in-depth
understanding of an informal street vendor organization. A case study is used to narrow
down a very broad field of research (informal groups and organizations) into one more easily
researchable example (the alcc, a large andwell-organized informal street vendor association)
47The challenge while researching the early andmiddle years of the period of study (1929–1988) was to find the
years where policies, regulations and/or events took place that eectively aected informality and street vendors.
In that sense, the work of Gordon (1997a, 1997b) was extremely valuable.
48I used both Data and Methodological triangulation to strengthen the validity of the results.
49In that regard, the historical analysis presented in this thesis was slightly hampered because much of the
archival information—mainly ocial government documents—on street vending and informality is fragmentary
and at times non-existent, particularly during the early years of the period of analysis.
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(Yin, 1989; Hamel, 1993; Stake, 1995; Gerring, 2004, 2007; Creswell, 2009; Hancock and
Algozzine, 2011). A case study is defined as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to
generalize across a larger set of units (Gerring, 2004). In this case, the study of the alcc aims to
generalize across a larger set of informal street vendor organizations. The case study is useful
for the purpose of this thesis since notmuch is known about the internal and external dynamics
and the structure of large, powerful and well-organized informal street vendor associations.
Eventually, the case study presented in this thesis may be useful for testing whether a specific
theory and/or model actually applies to phenomena in the real world (Lijphart, 1971).
For the case study, I was able to apply a variety of techniques to gather information and data,
and rely on a variety of information sources to investigate the research questions. The design
of the case study was intended to add strength to what was already known about informal
street vendor associations through previous research (Cross, 1998). Moreover, the case study
helped to provide detailed description of specific and unusual practices in the informal street
vendor association of study.
As mentioned earlier, a single case study may oer little basis for establishing reliability
or to generalize the findings to a wider population of people, places, or things (George and
Bennett, 2005). However, the fact that the informal street vendor organization analyzed is
the largest, best organized, most powerful and one of the oldest that exists in Mexico should
certainly qualify it as a ‘key’ or ‘crucial’ case of study and make possible a generalization of
street vendors organizations of the same size, organizational-level, power and/or span; as well
as an approximation of those organizations which are smaller, poorly organized, less power-
ful and newer than the alcc (Gerring, 2004). The design of a case study generally does not
facilitate assessment of cause and eect relationships, but this problem was generally solved
by triangulation with the historical research also carried out on this thesis. This facilitated
the validation of information through cross-verification from several sources. Obviously, due
to the secretive nature of organizations and agents that work in informality, vital information
may be missing, making the case hard to interpret in some issues; an example is the exact
number of vendor members, which was never revealed to me, but that did not prevented me
from finding other important features such as the structure and administrative organization
of the alcc.
The most important sources of information for the alcc’s case study were interviews with
key informal street vendor leaders, political actors and experts on the subject of informal-
ity and street vending, as well as field research involving participant observation of informal
street vendor groups and individuals. These were complementedwith ocial government doc-
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uments, newspaper reports, politicalmagazine articles, and scholarly papers and publications.
The interviews were particularly useful not only for the case study, but also to complete the
comparative historical-political analysis.
1.5.4 Interviews and participant observation
This is a thesis about a series of practices and institutions of informal nature. This makes it
very dicult to use ‘hard data’ as it can be done in research on formal institutions and pro-
cesses (e.g. parliamentary practices). For this reason, the sources of information should be
appropriate to the nature of these practices and institutions. This justifies the use of infor-
mation and data collection methods such as interviewing and participant observation as key
primary sources of information in this research.
For the process of interview selection, the criterion was to interview decision-makers (elite
interviews50) in all fronts along the spectrum of informal street vending (informal vendor lead-
ers, public servants, government authorities, lawmakers) focusing on the later period of study
(1988–2006) which corresponds to the period of democratization and alternancia.51 In addi-
tion, I wanted to learn from all those whowere impartial, well-informed, andwhose expertise
gives them authority to explain and comment on informality issues in general and informal
street vending inMexico in particular; mainly international and national academics and jour-
nalists who have studied or reported on these topics for some time. Moreover, I also infor-
mally interviewed52 several street vendors in an eort to get some details on information I
50With ‘elite interviews’ I mean discussions with people who are chosen because of who they are or what
position they occupy (Dexter, 1970; Hochschild, 2009). In this case, it refers to influence and decision-making
power in the many fronts of informality and street vending in Mexico. Those whose decisions and authority
have a direct impact on informality and street vending. For these interviews, I prepared very thoroughly, reading
material and outlining a set of questions I wanted to ask the interviewee. I normally followed this outline, but
also let the interviewee expand on issues they wanted to underscore. As I was well prepared for these interviews,
I was able to test or present opposing views on some issues discussed, in this way doing cross-checking during the
interview itself. I made recordings of these interviews or took notes while interviewing. Later, I transcribed the
recorded interviews and used the data in cross-checking and triangulations with other sources to strengthen the
validity of the information gathered.
51The alternancia occurred at city level in 1997 and at country or federal level in 2000.
52More than ‘interviews’, what I had with individual street vendors were ‘conversations’ attempting to get
as much information as possible. After doing observation, I would randomly approach a stand and ask for the
product oered to begin a conversation. As the conversation continued, I would ask questions related towhat Iwas
interested in knowing. Some vendors were open and cooperative but the great majority were not. Street vendors
are very cautious when approached by strangers who are interested in the particularities of their activities. When
a street vendor agreed to talk to me, I attempted to use the snowballing method to get more vendors to speak to
me, but it did not always work. I did not make any recordings or took notes while doing these informal interviews
(this would have aroused the suspicion of the vendors), but would write down my findings after I returned home.
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was interested in their practices (e.g. how many days a week they work, etc.) and to get a
general feeling of their own personal perspective (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). At elite level,
I was successful in getting interviews with key individuals and relevant partakers, particularly
those who were in executive positions before and after the alternation in power in Mexico
City (Manuel Camacho Solís and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, respectively) as well as the leader
of the most prominent street vendor organization in Mexico City (Alejandra Barrios). Infor-
mation and data obtained in interviews were particularly useful for getting the story behind
the participants’ experience and as a complement (in triangulation) to what I found in dif-
ferent sources (newspapers, ocial government documents, scholarly research, etc.). More-
over, since interviews are a far more personal form of research than other type of research
instruments, interviews were very useful in understanding the particular standpoints of the
interviewees—particularly from those who are or were direct participants on informality or
street vending issues. The information and data obtained in these interviews were of high
value for the research and constitute one of the most valuables contributions of this thesis.
For the interview process, dierent interviewing techniques were applied (Marshall and
Rossman, 2006; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008). Semi-structured interviews were conducted
with each of the main or elite interviewees—namely, former Mexico City mayors and heads
of government, street vendor leaders, public servants, legislators, and some academics. Un-
structured interviews were conducted with other interviewees—mainly former street vendors,
journalists, and some academics. Informal interviews were conducted with current street ven-
dors after the process of participant observation. In all cases, the exact wording of the inter-
view was not critical since there was no intention to obtain a statistical sample. Rather, in
each interview the aim was to try to get as deep an understanding of the subject as possible
from the interviewee’s point of view (Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Kvale and Brinkmann,
2008).
I spent a fair amount of time during the research doing participant observation in the streets
of theHistoricalCenter, particularly inTacuba street (near theAllendeMetro station), Correo
Mayor street (behindNational Palace), and the corner of Eje 1 Norte avenue and Republica de
Argentina street, all in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation.53 I chose this observation points because
they have a high incidence of informal street vending activity, and because the vendor leaders
were located there or nearby. These observations provided valuable information to document
themethods and practices throughwhich street vendor groupsmake sense of theirworld (Mar-
53The first point of observation corresponds to the group ofAlejandra Barrios, the second to a group associated
with the prd (likely to be related to Rene Bejarano), the third to the group of María Rosete.
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shall and Rossman, 2006, Glesne, 2010).54 For example, I was able to witness directly how the
street vendors are organized in the thoroughfare, the types of stands and paraphernalia they
use, the dierent products they sell, the type of interaction they have among members of the
same association, with the authorities, andwithmembers of other vendor groups. In one case,
I saw how fees were collected in situ frommembers of an association. In addition, I witnessed
a removal operation performed by the police working together with city authorities in charge
of controlling street vending. All these direct observations and experiences provided an essen-
tial insight into the daily nature of informal street vending and the process of its organization
and enforcement, which helped to complete the profile in the analysis of both street vendors
and vendor organizations, to understand better their dynamics on the field, and to elucidate
and give direction to the analysis of this work (Marshall and Rossman, 2006; Glesne, 2010).
1.5.5 Other methodological issues
Validity and reliability of the research findings have to be determined in order to evaluate their
usefulness (Morse et al., 2002). Overall validitywas prioritizedover reliability—understanding
validity as an assessment of ‘credibility’ or ‘degree of aproximation of reality’ (Johnston and
Pennypacker, 1980; Lincoln and Guba, 1985), and reliability as an assessment of ‘dependabil-
ity’ or ‘consistency’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Kirk and Miller, 1986; Seale, 2004b). Qualita-
tive scholars have produced validity criteria which can be used to examine how well methods
explore research aims. Lincoln and Guba (1985), for example, assess the validity of findings
through ‘credibility’. Credibility is assessed on “prolonged engagementwith the research field,
triangulation, and reflexivity”55 (Seale, 2004b:77). I have engaged with these criteria through
the use of triangulation of the information gathered through interviews, writtenmaterial, and
participant observations to present a credible account of this research (Seale, 1999).
Thus, the main research technique used in this research was triangulation. I used both
data triangulation and methodological triangulation. Data triangulation refers to the use of
54In general, I would find a spot in the sidewalk and sit to observe the participants. I would pretend I was
reading orwaiting for somebody andwould take notes. Duration of each observation sessionwould range between
one and four hours. I did the observations in the mornings and afternoons. I used my yearly visits to Mexico to
do the observations. I would dedicate at least two days and a maximum of five of each of the two-week visits I did
to Mexico. I did this in 2009, 2010 and 2012. I would try to observe patters (e.g. time at which vendors open or
close) or a special event (e.g. removal operation or collection of fees).
55Reflexivity basically means thinking critically about the research experience and process, and considering
influences on the research process which aects howwell the researcher has been able to gather information (Seale,
2004a).
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dierent data sources or information (Denzin, 2006; Rothbauer, 2008). Methodological tri-
angulation refers to the use of multiple qualitative methods to study a phenomenon (Denzin,
2006; Rothbauer, 2008). If the findings from all the methods draw the same or similar conclu-
sions, then the validity in the findings has been established (O’Donoghue and Punch, 2003;
Seale, 2004a; Denzin, 2006; Rothbauer, 2008).
Quantitative data on informality and street vending in Mexico and Mexico City included
in other studies and others produced by dierent independent agencies and the federal and
city governments,are included in this thesis for descriptive rather than quantitative analytic
purposes. This is because of questions over the accuracy of the data, some of which is likely
to contain a considerable bias generated by the likelihood that informal street vendors may be
unwilling to give precise information about themselves or about their activities to data collec-
tors, survey takers, and/or government ocials. Equally, street vendor leaders were reluctant
to share the precise number ofmembers of their organizations under the pretext that themem-
bership lists are not updated. In recent years, Mexico’s statistical agency—the National Insti-
tute of Geography, Statistics and Informatics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e
Informática, inegi)—has created a database with more reliable data on informality and the
informal sector—although information is generally not disaggregated into dierent informal
activities56—and only exists at state and federal levels.57
Hopefully the combination of research methodologies, analytical approaches, multiple
sources of information, and dierent viewpoints included in this thesis will go into great
length in overcoming the weaknesses, intrinsic biases, and the problems that come from re-
searching a subject of great complexity as it is informality and informal street vending.
56The National Employment Survey (ene) had information on the number of ‘individuals working as street
vendors’ from 1998 to 2004, but the variable was discontinued when the ene was substituted by the National
Survey of Occupation and Employment (enoe) in 2005. In this thesis, I use ene’s data to illustrate some points,
but it is limited to the period (1998–2004).
57The National Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ene) was a demographic tool developed
by the inegi and implemented between 1998 and 2004. Together with the National Urban Employment Survey
(Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, eneu) (1987–2004), they provided information about the employment
status of theMexican population. The ene had information of ‘individuals working as street vendors’ from 1998–
2004. However, in 2005, the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación
y Empleo, enoe) replaced both surveys (ene and eneu) as the main labor-demographic tool used by the inegi.
The enoe did not classify ‘individuals working as street vendors’ (as it had been done in the ene), instead using
‘individuals working in the informal sector’. Because of this, it became harder to follow the ‘street vendor’ sub-
category after 2004. The Informal Sector is a broader concept which also covers other sub-categories of informal
activities.
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1.6 Ethics and the challenges and risks of research
Research in circumstances where social conflict and conflicts of interest exist can present a
number of ethical diculties for researchers, particularly when dealing with political and eco-
nomic actors on opposite sides of the conflict or with diametrically opposed interests (Sluka,
1990; Punch, 1994).
In such an antagonistic political setting, a researcher who moves to and fro between op-
posing sides often gains access to information about one group that could prove particularly
useful or beneficial to another. In the sameway, opposing sidesmay consider a researcher to be
treacherous or disloyal if that person spends too much time with the opposite side—whether
the government, a formal business, or another informal vendor group. However, my integrity
was never put in doubt by any of the interviewees, although some of them—particularly gov-
ernment ocials and the leaderof one of the larger street vendor associations—were extremely
cautious about the information they provided about themselves, their administrations, and/or
their organizations.58
On some occasions, individuals gave me confidential information about corruption or
other unlawful activities—such as drug tracking—perpetrated by groups, leaders, or gov-
ernment ocials whom they opposed. Indeed, as I obtained information about most issues
I researched from dierent viewpoints, interviewees told me directly conflicting things about
each other. This placed me in danger of being misinformed and manipulated by individuals
attempting to defame their enemies with false or misleading charges, and to present them-
selves as cleaner, fairer, and more benevolent than their opponents.59 It is worth underlining
that I have tried to be as objective as possible, avoided taking sides, and tried to state the facts I
found during this research as clearly and accurately as possible. The challenge to be objective
when using this kind of information was certainly dicult, but triangulation helped a great
deal.
In general, detailed confidential information of this kind could not be fully corrobo-
rated without being too inquisitive and thus running the risk of damaging the established
relationship with the interviewees. Fortunately, this information was mostly peripheral to the
main purposes of this work, which focuses on analyzing broader political processes and not
58Before any interview, I made sure to present and identify myself as a researcher or student to avoid intervie-
wees (especially street vendors or their leaders) being suspicious that I was an informant of the government, the
police, or any other agency or institution that could be harmful to them.
59Such was the case between prd’s María Rosete and pri’s Alejandra Barrios; and Alejandra Barrios and Do-
lores Padierna.
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individual cases of corruption or tracking, although it might be important to take account
of it when considering the wide extent of informality. Nevertheless, the progression of accusa-
tions and counter-accusations on itself reveals the importance of information manipulation,
in addition to the patterns of convergences and divergences, coalitions and disputes, and co-
operation and dissociation among government authorities, political parties, and street vendor
organizations.
Participant observation of any kind usually has some impact on the behavior of the subjects
of observation, even though it is not clear exactly how this influences the social and political
processes under research. One benefit of doing participant observation with informal street
vendor groups is that they see in the observer somebody to speak to who hardly ever disagrees
with them and who is interested in everything they do. Over time, the observer may become
trusted and therefore a confidant. However, gaining their confidence can be a rather di-
cult task. In general, informal street vendors—particularly if they sell goods that infringe or
potentially have infringed the law in one way or another—are very reluctant to share infor-
mation with strangers since they could be under-cover police, government investigators, or
informants for the government or copy-right protection associations collecting information
that could lead to detention or prosecution.
Thus, although sales take place in the thoroughfare, it is usually far too dangerous for
informal street vendors to speak about their businesses with an unknown person. They are
afraid that someonemay set them up formoney or vengeance. Onlywith the recommendation
of the leader of their organization could they feel secure about talking about their activity,
but even then they could reject the invitation. Needless to say, insisting on carrying out a
conversation or interview on these issues can be very dangerous for the observer as well. In
the Historical Center, where violence and crime are daily occurrences, it is better to know the
limits and take precautions.
Conversely, having access to confidential information about individuals, government plans,
or informal group strategies could have allowed me, deliberately or accidentally, to provide
such information to the actors involved, but as far as it is possible to know, I never released any
confidential information about one individual or group to another. This was important for
two reasons: first, it would have prevented me from observing how opposite groups resolve
their mutual problems on their own. Sharing important information would have certainly
influenced the outcomes, but as the process of participant observation advanced, it became
clear that informal street vendor groups were rather proficient in dealing with their problems
eectively. Second, it was important for the validity and objectivity of this research not to
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make value judgments about which informal street vendor group, politician, or government
ocial was good and decent or bad and immoral, much less to provide assistance to one of
the sides in any dispute.
1.7 Street vending as a representation of informality
Informality is a complex phenomenon. In order to carry out a political and historical analysis
of a phenomenon of this kind, which represents a high level of diculty, it was indispensable
for practical reasons to narrow the various forms of activities includedwithin the broader con-
cept of ‘informality’ to only one—informal street vending. For the same reason, it was also
important to concentrate on a particular geographical area—Mexico City, and specifically
the Historical Center.60 Only this approach made it possible to analyze informal street vend-
ing in detail, from dierent perspectives and viewpoints, using a variety of methodological
instruments and research techniques.
Evidently, this approach restricts the analysis in a number of ways. Political and economic
behavior dier in other forms of informal activities (such as informal housing or informal
transport), which may be less or more detectable or observable than informal street vending;
or that, for their own nature, may be less or more individualistic than informal street vending,
respectively. In addition, as this work shows, the political nature of informal street vending
(and of informality in general) is shaped—and to a certain point determined—by the specific
political and regulatory systems within which it functions.
Thus, ‘street vending’ or ‘informal street vending’,61 as I will refer to it, was chosen as the
main informal activity of analysis in this work for a number of reasons. First, informal street
vending is the most representative informal activity of all because of its visibility, ubiquity,
scope, and position in the public space. These characteristics have made informal street vend-
ing the ‘public face’ of informality. This, in turn, puts informal street vending at the forefront
of the informality debate, making it also the main target of criticisms and pressures of dif-
60Traditionally, the Historical Center of Mexico City has been a hub for commercial activity—and therefore
for informal street vending—for decades and even centuries.
61Throughout this work I will generally refer to ‘street vending’ as ‘informal street vending’ to underline its
condition of informality and to specify as much as possible this particular activity among the dierent informal
activities that exist, following the recommendation of Gary Fields (2011) and Sinha and Kanbur (2012). Likewise,
I use the expression ‘informal vendors’ more generally to include also those informal vendors who are not neces-
sarily on the thoroughfare (e.g. those who sell on the Metro), and the expression ‘vendors’ in general to include
individuals who may sell on commercial plazas but whose legal status is ambiguous (semi-formal) and may not
be entirely formal.
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ferent kinds and from dierent sectors, among more general criticisms of informal economic
activities in general. There is a reason for these criticisms and pressures. Informal street vend-
ing has been and is accused of causing problems and creating diculties in matters of urban
planning, urban transit, rehabilitation of historical sites, urban infrastructure, public health,
unfair competition, and countless other areas, generating complaints from established com-
mercial businesses, neighbors, authorities, and citizens in general. The economic, political,
and social implications of all these are among the topics of study of this work.
Moreover, informal street vendors themselves compete over street vending areas with other
groups, at times through violent methods, generating a permanent state of existing or poten-
tial conflict over space on the streets. This again makes them the leading target of criticisms
and complaints, and places them once more at the front line of the debate over informality
in the modern urban context (Cross, 1998). Thus, the presence of informal street vending
triggers an instant discrepancy between the economic realities of a country and the modern
version of it that its leaders would like to convey. As we will see, all these conditions have
strong political implications.
Second, the number of people working in the informal sector as informal street vendors is
certainly significant. Nobody knows for sure the exact number of informal workers laboring
as informal street vendors in Mexico but an aproximation is possible. If we take the data
from theNational Employment Survey (ene62) (which has the numbers of individuals working
as street vendors) and the data from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment
(Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo, enoe63) (which has the number of individuals
working in the informal sector) for the Federal District, for the period 1998–2004, we can get
an approximate number of the percentage of individuals working in the informal sector as
informal street vendors (Table 1.1).
62The National Employment Survey (ene) was a demographic tool developed by the inegi and implemented
between 1998 and 2004. Togetherwith theNationalUrban Employment Survey (eneu) (1987–2004), they provided
information about the employment status of the Mexican population.
63In 2005, the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (enoe) replaced both surveys (ene and eneu)
as the main labor-demographic tool used by the inegi. The enoe did not classify ‘individuals working as street
vendors’ (as it had been done in the ene), instead using ‘individuals working in the informal sector’. Because
of this, it became harder to follow the ‘street vendor’ sub-category after 2004. The Informal Sector is a broader
concept which also covers other sub-categories of informal activities.
59
street vending as a representation of informality
Table 1.1.: Percentage of Individuals Working in the Informal Sector as Street Vendors (Fed-
eral District, 1998–2004)
Year Street vendors† Informal workers‡ Percentage
1998 160,949 1,029,514 16
1999 164,151 970,844 17
2000 169,275 910,083 19
2001 163,040 936,998 17
2002 167,792 996,880 17
2003 173,964 996,319 17
2004 220,917 1,084,524 20
†Source: inegi’s National Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ene) (inegi, 2004).
‡Source: inegi’s National Survey of Occupation and Employment (Encuesta Na-
cional de Ocupación y Empleo, enoe) (inegi, 2010c). Data with population of
15 years or more (The minimum legal working age in Mexico is 15 years old).
Note 1: I have taken the second trimester of each year and not the yearly average to complete this ta-
ble.
Note 2: The inegi has used, when possible, the data gathered by the ene (1998–2004) and
eneu (1987–2004) to build the enoe (InfoLaboral) series from (1995–2004), using the enoe’s
criteria. The enoe substituted both ene and eneu in 2005.
The average percent for the seven years available is 18 percent in the Federal District.64 A
considerable amount if we take into account that informal street vending is only one of the
many dierent sub-categories of informal employment. In addition, informal street vending
is also only a part of a broader segment which is informal trade. Informal trade includes street
vending but also other informal activities related to informal commerce.
We know that informal employment outside agriculture is dominated by service activities,
such as informal trade, informal transportation, and various other informal services. Accord-
ing to Vanek et al. (2014), informal trade is perhaps the single most important branch of
economic activity in the informal sector, and informal street vending is a key component of
informal trade. While Vanek et al. (2014) do not have data disaggregated by country, they do
account for the importance of informal trade in Latin America (Figure 1.1).
Thus, in Latin America informal trade accounts for one third of the total (non-agricultral)
informal employment by branch of economic activity.65 Therefore, we can confirm that infor-
64I did the same exercise for the whole country, finding that the average percentage for the seven years is of
13.45 percent. The number is smaller as a large number of individuals in rural areas do not work as street vendors
(since street vending is in its large majority an urban occupation). Informal workers in rural areas work mostly on
informal agricultural activities and therefore that portion of informal workers brings the percentage of informal
street vendors down at the country level.
65In Latin America, non-agricultural employment as a percent of total employment is of 82 percent. Moreover,
informal employment as a percent of non-agricultural employment is of 51 percent. In Mexico, informal employ-
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Figure 1.1.: Distribution of (non-agricultural) Informal Employment by Branch of Economic
Activity in Latin America (Percentage, 2004/2010).
Source: Author, with data from Vanek et al., (2014).
mal trade and particularly informal street vending have great relevance in the discussion on
the informal sector and informality. This information supports the argument to focus on the
particular sub-category of informal street vending.66
Third, informal street vending in Mexico is a phenomenon that is widely known and rela-
tively well documented by the mass media, government agencies, independent organizations,
and a growing number of researchers in dierent academic areas and institutions. Therefore,
valuable and substantive material is available from dierent sources; and some of this material
has not been thoroughly examined until now, which gives high added value to this research.
Lastly, I have made an eort to gain access to key individuals whose strong interests in
informal street vending or direct participation in the events presented in this work were fun-
damental to the study of informal street vending in particular and of informality in general
ment as a percentage of non-agricultural employment is of 54 percent, all for the period 2004/2010 (Vanek et al.,
2014).
66According to Chen (2002), in countries where data is available, informal traders—mainly street vendors—
represent a very high proportion of employment in trade (between 73 and 99 percent), and a significant share of
trade gross domestic product (between 50 and 90 percent). In other words, street vendors represent an important
share of total employment in the informal sector and street vending units represent an important share of total
enterprises in the informal sector (Chen, 2002).
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included in this research, starting with informal street vendors themselves and the leaders
of their organizations, government ocials and political leaders, policy-makers, law-makers,
journalists, and researchers and academics who have dealt with this phenomenon in one way
or another before and during the period of study.67
1.8 Contributions of this thesis
This thesis makes several distinct contributions to the literature on informality and street vend-
ing, as well as the literature on Mexican politics, history, and political economy.
Theoretically, it contributes to the discussion on the definition of informality concepts. It
elaborates on the conceptualization of the ‘culture of informality’ defining it as something
broader than just a “social norm of noncompliance” (Perry et al., 2007:13). Moreover, it
introduces a third notion of ‘semi-formality’ (see Chapter 2)—dierent fromDe Soto’s (1989)
and Cross’s (1998) definitions—which is based on the legal status of informal organizations
(civil associations). It supports the view that informal activity should be understood as a
continuum of compliance rather than a well-defined and unambiguous dichotomy (Moser,
1994; Maloney, 1999, 2004; Chen, 2006); therefore, formalization can be a gradual process
that does not involve moving from one fixed state to another.
Empirically, it contributes to the knowledge of the informal sector by providing a histori-
cal analysis of the evolution of informality and street vending in Mexico , an approach that
very few scholars have used—Gordon (1997a, 1997b) and Cross (1998) among the exceptions,
whose works this thesis expands and updates. It studies how past regulations, programs,
policies—as well as governments and political regimes—have influenced and shaped present
events on the area of informality and in particular street vending. Research for this thesis cov-
ers a period of 77 years, from 1929 to 2006. Most of this time—68 years at city level and 71
years at the federal level—Mexico was under a one-party rule regime. It particularly concen-
trates on the democratic transition period, from 1988 to 2006,68 comprising two of the most
67In particular, this work presents significant testimonies from Manuel Camacho Solís—the last Institutional
Revolutionary Party (pri)Mexico Citymayor, who dealt competently with informal street vending—andCuauhté-
moc Cardenas—the first head of government ofMexico City, a member of the Party of the Democratic Revolution
(prd), who had to face informal street vending as a problem of considerable proportions and did so using a new
ideological approach.
68During this period, little by little, opposition parties won some significant electoral victories in Mexico,
starting in 1989 with the victory of pan’s Ernesto Ruo Appel in the elections for the state governor of Baja
California Norte, making him the first opposition governor in modern Mexican history. Also during this period,
opposition parties won a dominant position in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Elected in 1997, the lvii
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important democratic alternations in power in the country: at Mexico City level in 1997 and
at federal level in 2000.
This thesis uses the process of democratization and the alternation of political parties in
power as a natural experiment that oers variation in terms of which party is in power, and
hence the opportunity to observe how linkages between politicians, government ocials and
street vendor organizations/leaders are made and unmade as power changes hands. By focus-
ing on these two alternations in power (1997 at Mexico City level and 2000 at federal level)
it is possible to observe the dierent political implications of these democratic transitions on
informal street vendors (groups and individuals), and analyze how these transitions aected
their relations with the state. Moreover, it sheds light on the ability of informal street ven-
dors organisations to adapt to all these new political scenarios and how it worked for them.
Far from weakening the power and influence of street vendor organzations and their leaders,
democratization and the alternation in power increased their power and influence, as well as
their participation in politics.69
More specifically , this thesis adds to the literature of the politics of informality by map-
ping out the politics of informal street vending in relation to governance structures. It anal-
yses the interrelations and interactions between informal street vendor leaders/organizations
and politicians, public servants, and other informality partakers.70 Evidence shows that sub-
tle forms of corruption, tampering, evasion, and maneuvering may truly be the key to ex-
plain, from a political point of view, the resilience and expansion of informal street vending
in present-day Mexico.
In order to complement and illustrate the study of the relations between street vendors and
governance structures, as well as contributing to our knowledge of informal and street vend-
Legislature was the first in 68 years in which the pri failed to obtain an absolute majority in the Chamber of
Deputies. The deputies of the opposition parties—pan, prd, pt, and pvem—together formed a majority and took
control of the chamber, marginalizing the pri. That year, prd’s Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was elected as head of
government of the Federal District; it was the first time the post had been elected by popular vote rather than
appointed by the president.
69Ramírez Saíz (2006) and Shefner (2006) speak about democratization inMexico but with a dierent perspec-
tive. Ramírez Saíz (2006) analyses democratization by tracing the evolution of a left-wing grassroot organization
(Movimiento Urbano Popular) between 1977 and 2002. Shefner (2006) accounts for the development of an orga-
nizations of neighbourhood residents (Unión de Colonos Independientes) between 1993 and 2001 in Guadalajara,
Jalisco State. These authors deal with informal political organizations in times of democratization but not with
street vendor groups (or informal trade groups), and therefore their work is only partially related to the work of
this thesis.
70It is worth noticing that the structure of the state’s co-optive methods (e.g. corporatism, clientelism) is
especially important in the case ofMexico Ironically, such co-opting methods make up the power base of informal
street vendor organizations and most likely of other informal agents as well, as Cross (1998) has correctly pointed
out.
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ing organizations, the thesis presents a case study of the Legitimate Civic and Commercial
Association (alcc), the largest, best organized, and most powerful street vendor association
in Mexico. The case study goes into details of the internal workings of such organizations.
It provides information about the way informal street vendor organizations work, their ori-
gins, how they develop, how they are organized, what their mechanism of control and self-
regulation are, what their legal status is, how much money they potentially handle, and how
powerful they have become. Furthermore, it shows the levels of sophistication that some in-
formal groups achieve when they are well-organized to deal with the state and how, ultimately,
informal organizations may de facto take on the role of the state in some key areas (i.e. ‘in-
formal social security’).71
This thesis also compares the distinctive policies to control and reduce informal street
vending in Mexico implemented by dierent administrations coming from competing and
ideologically-opposite political parties; as well as those implemented by dierente levels of
government—delegation, city and federal government policies—which were almost never co-
ordinated and thereforemay partially explainwhy theywere unsuccessful. While ideologically
there is a dierence in how informal street vending is viewed by dierent political parties, in
practice governments of dierent parties have oscilated between periods of toleration and re-
pression. The current basic processes of political maneuvering in prd city governments and
pan federal governments do not seem very dierent from those that occurred under the old
pri regime, but the options and speed of change have increased significantly.
Finally, although this thesis deals specifically with Mexico, in particular Mexico City, the
issues analyzed in the thesis have a broader relevance since informality and street vending are
phenomena that are present in nearly all developing countries, in Latin America and beyond.
Therefore, the conclusions, considerations, and recommendations of this thesis could be ap-
plied to other developing countries—always bearing inmind that every case is dierent and the
applicability will depend on how similar are the cultural, institutional and regulatory settings
with respect to Mexico—or they can at least be used as a source for comparative analysis.
71Similar to whatwas noted byCross and Peña (2006:59) when they say that, in amafia regulatorymodel, crim-
inal organizations have become “alternative providers of public services.”; and by Fernandez-Kelly and Shefner




1.9 Description of chapters
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides some practical general views of in-
formality to understand better the concepts and dynamics of the culture of informality and
informal street vending. In addition, it sets up the theoretical framework under which this the-
sis will develop. For this, the chapter conceptualizes the relationship between the state and the
individual within the framework of the informal sector, presents an assesment of the pros and
cons of being formal, and outlines the perceptions about the state’s performance and infor-
mality. Then, it examines tax compliance and the social contract in Latin American countries,
and discusses the dierent concepts of semi-formality. Finally, it analyses the dierent policies
to reduce informality worldwide, with emphasis in Mexico and Latin America.
Chapter 3 presents the general characteristics, structure, political arrangements and inter-
actions of informal street vending organizations in Mexico; and in that way illustrates the
culture of informality that exist in this country. The chapter starts by describing the general
characteristics of street vendor groups and organizations in Mexico. It follows by explaining
the corporatization of informal street vending and how it developed in clientelistic practices,
and accounts for the emergence of authoritarianism in street vendor organization. Moreover,
it describes the forms or methods of interactions, control, and influence between goverment
authorities, political parties, and street vendors leaders and organizations. Additionally, it
points out to the emergence of commercial plazas as new spaces for democratic practices. Fi-
nally, it analyses the role of women in informal street vending in Mexico.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 constitute the empirical core of this thesis. Chapter 4 presents a
historical-political analysis of the evolution of informality and street vending inMexico, with
a particular emphasis in Mexico City, through a time span of 68 years (1929–1997), corre-
sponding to the years the Institutional Revolutionary party (Partido Revolucionario Institu-
cional, pri72) was in power inMexico City. Following a chronological order, the chapter looks
at the dierent political, economic, and social events that have aected and defined the condi-
tions of informal street vendors; as well as the dierent regulations and policies implemented
by the government to control them throughout these years. The chapter looks into the dif-
ferent political and social scenarios over dierent periods, and develops an overall account of
how they influenced informal street vendors in dierent ways. The chapter is divided in two
72The Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, pri) and its predecessors—the
National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, pnr) (1929–1938); and the Party of theMexican
Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, prm) (1938–1946).
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section: the first gives a general analysis of the 1929–1988 period; the second analyses in detail
the period between 1988–1997, preceding the alternation in power in Mexico City.
Since this thesis uses democratization as a natural experiment that oers variation in terms
of which party is in power, and hence the opportunity to observe how linkages between politi-
cians, government ocials and street vendor groups are made and unmade as power changes
hands, Chapter 4 uncovers the basic patterns through which the Mexican state operated dur-
ing the last years of the pri regime that preceded the dual democratic transition in Mexico,
at city level in 1997 and at federal level in 2000. This chapter establishes the grounds for a
comparative analysis in the next Chapter 5 of how policies and their implementation can vary
when informal street vending is dealt with from contrasting perspectives, ideologies, political
actors and governments.
Chapter 5 continues the historical-political analysis of informality and street vending in
Mexico and specifically Mexico City. It focuses on the period between 1997–2006, years af-
ter the alternation in power (at city level in 1997 and at federal level in 2000), which saw the
arrival of opposition political parties to power (the Party of the Democratic Revolution (prd)
at city level, and the National Action Party (pan) at federal level). The chapter analyses in
detail the political, economic, and social events that aected and defined the conditions of
informal street vendors; as well as the dierent regulations and policies implemented by the
city and federal governments during this period in which democratic transformations and new
political cycles were taking place in Mexico. The chapter is divided in two main sections: the
first analyses the period between 1997–2000, corresponding to the Cárdenas city administra-
tion; the second analyses the 2000–2006 period, corresponding to the López Obrador city
administration.
Chapter 6 presents a case study of the Legitimate Civic and Commercial Association
(alcc)—the largest and most powerful street vendor association that exists today in Mex-
ico City—and its leader—Alejandra Barrios, one of the historic leaders of the informal trade
in Mexico—to illustrate empirically the functioning of informal street vendor organizations.
The chapter describes the background of Barrios and the origins and foundation of the alcc.
Then, it explains the current situation of the alcc and details its size, process of aliation,
payment of fees, and potential revenues. It briefly describes the demographics and socioeco-
nomic characteristics of alccmembers, and then discusses the particularities of the merchan-
dise and products sold by them. The chapter elaborates on the organizational structure of
the alcc and discusses the administration of its finances through trust funds. It countinues
by examining the benefits of being a member of the alcc, in particular the ‘informal social
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security’ alcc members get from their association. It follows a discussion on the political
liaisons the alcc and Barrios have forged over time, with governments from dierent parties
and at dierent levels of government, and the political resources obtained from them. Finally,
the chapter ponders recent political events that confirm the rising power and influence of the
alcc and its leader, and of leaders of large informal street vendor organizations in general.
Chapter 7 sets out the conclusions of this work by making some considerations regarding
the informal sector and informal street vending. It presents the answer to the research question
and suggests future avenues for research on the subject of the informal sector in general and
informal street vending in particular.
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2. IN FORMAL I TY : CONCEPT S , ATTR I BUTE S ,
P ERCEPT IONS , AND POL IC I E S
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the theoretical and conceptual framework for the development of the
following empirical chapters. It reviews the most relevant theoretical concepts in what refers
to the relationship between state and informal agents, to the individual decision to be or not
to be informal, to the perception of the state and its relation with informality, and to the
importance of tax and regulatory compliance; as well as the general dynamics of informality.
In addition, it reviews recent policies to tackle informality around the world.
The chapter starts with the conceptualization of the relationship between state and individ-
ual in an informal sector framework. It analyzes the reasons and causes of the emergence of
informality (exit and exclusion). Then, it follows a reassessment and an improvement of the
definition of the culture of informality. It assesses the pros and cons of being informal and
the relationship between (the perception of) state’s performance and informality. It under-
lines the relevance of tax compliance in the context of the social contract in Latin American
countries and relates how certain social norms and social interactions may aect informality
and can place countries in dierent types of social equilibria. It discusses the concept of semi-
formality and presents a newer notion of it which is related to the importance of organized
groups and political organization, and with the understanding of informal activity as a con-
tinuum of compliance rather than a well-defined and unambiguous dichotomy. The chapter
concludes by analyzing in detail each of the dierent policies used in several countries in the
world to reduce informality (increasing tax compliance, encouraging business creation and
growth, strengthening enforcement, creating inclusive social protection systems, and building
trust and collective incentives), with a particular enfasis in Mexico and Latin America.1
1As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis will center on informal street vending—themost visible andwidespread
informal activity of all the various informal activities—to illustrate the features and workings of the culture of
informality in Mexico. This chapter, however, aims to give a more general and theoretical view of informality.
The following chapter (Chapter 3) will center on the details of informal street vending in Mexico.
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2.2 Conceptualizing the relationship between the state and the individual in the
informal sector
A recentmilestone in the field of informality is theWorld Bank’s publication Informality: Exit
and Exclusion (Perry et al., 2007), in which a group of experts examine informality in Latin
America. The authors analyze the reasons for and causes of the emergence of informality
and the implications of its growth. They describe informality as a manifestation of a flawed
relationship between the state and its citizens and use two distinctive but corresponding per-
spectives to explain what drives informality. These are informality driven by ‘exclusion’ from
state benefits or from the circuits of the modern economy, and informality driven by voluntary
‘exit’ decisions resulting from private cost-benefit estimates that lead firms andworkers to opt
out of formal institutions (Hirschman, 1970; Perry et al., 2007). The authors argue that both
perspectives contribute to our knowledge of the causes and consequences of informality.2
Several experts have analyzed the phenomenon of informality as the relationship between
economic agents and the state. Some have discussed how specific policies in the areas of social
protection, business regulation, labor legislation, and taxation can have a significant impact
on (individual) decisions and how these policies could encourage or prevent people’s partic-
ipation in the formal sector. These policies delineate a set of incentives to which informal
agents (individuals and groups) respond by weighing the costs and benefits of participating in
dierent sectors (informal and formal), taking also into account the enforcement eorts and
capabilities of the state. These responses are also influenced by how people—individually and
collectively—perceive and define a relationship with the state (Perry et al., 2007)
Social norms are defined as “the pattern of behavior that constitutes a customary rule that
coordinates actions among people and is sustained by social approval” (Young, 20063; Perry
et al., 2007:218). As Perry et al. (2007:215) state:
In some situations, there are social norms that are influenced by the perception
of the eectiveness of the state and the collective projects it represents, and that
foster willingness to comply with taxes and other regulations. For instance, the
high tax compliance rates observed in developed countries cannot be explained
2They conclude that reducing the levels of informality and overcoming the culture of informality will entail
actions to increase aggregate productivity in the economy, improve and correct poorly designed social policies and
regulations, and advance the legitimacy of the state by improving the quality and impartiality of state policies and
institutions (Perry et al., 2007).
3Young (2006:1) states that “Social norms are customary rules of behaviour that coordinate our interactions
with others”.
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only by the deterrent eect of the chance of being caught evading and the ensuing
penalties.
It also has to do with political and/or civil culture, perception of society towards evading
the law, levels of morality in society, the size of the society, cultural traditions, etc.
2.2.1 Incentives to `exit' the formal sector (in other words, incentives to select entering on not entering
the formal sector)
In Mexico and other developing countries with large informal sectors, the individual decision
leading to ‘exit’ from taxation and other regulations, and from participating in the formal
system of taxes and transfersmay be influenced by a collective perception that the action of the
state is “ineective, inecient, and unfair” (Hirschman, 1970; Perry et al., 2007:215; Saavedra
and Tommasi, 2007). From a social exchange theory4 point of view, a person’s willingness to
comply with regulations may be aected by the individual perception of the eectiveness of
the state in providing public services.
Furthermore, collective perceptions—understood as the ‘feelings or sentiments’ within a
group—about the functioning of the state influence the social norm regarding compliance.
For example, if more people operate in the informal sector, the collective perception is that it
might be easier for each person to do so. In other words, when a government enforces a tax
or regulation, one person will be less likely to be sanctioned if a large number of other people
also evade taxes or do not complywith regulations. In thewords of Perry et al (2007:216): “the
psychological [or] ethical costs of evading will be lower if most people in one’s peer group do
so, and hence one’s tax morale5 and disposition to comply with regulations will be lower”.
4Social exchange theory is a sociological and social psychological perspective that explains social change and
stability as a process of negotiated exchange between parties. It posits that all human relationships are formed by
the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the comparison of alternatives. The theory has roots in economics,
psychology, and sociology. Social exchange theory is tied on one hand to rational choice theory and on the other
to structuralism, and features many of the main assumptions of these theories (Emerson, 1976).
5Taxmorale is defined as themotivation of a country’s citizens to paying taxes, in addition to legal obligations
(Torgler and Schneider, 2007).
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This might generate what Glaeser et al. (2003:346) called a “social multiplier”,6 which might
make a specific social norm more widespread.
2.2.2 Denition of the culture of informality
Thus, the ‘culture of informality’ or ‘culture of the informal sector’ emerges from the “collec-
tive perception [‘feeling or sentiment’] of ineectiveness, unfairness and, ultimately, illegiti-
macy of the state’s actions, in terms of whom it represents and serves” (Perry et al., 2007:215).
In other words, the culture of informality appears when the state does not represent ordinary
people or serve their interests. Perry et al. (2007:215) define the culture of informality as “a so-
cial norm of noncompliance with taxes and regulations, which further undermines the state’s
capacity to enforce the law and to provide eective public services [and ultimately could ques-
tion its legitimacy]”.
However, the culture of informality also involves other behaviors, customs, and practices
carried out by informal agents like communication channels, tacit language, unwritten rules,
ways of living, and forms of operation of the agents (e.g. corrupt practices, self-regulation,
forms of organization, etc.). In fact, adding these behaviors, customs, and practices to the
original definition brings to us a new concept, where the culture of informality includes non-
compliance plus a set of forms and expressions that characterize in time to workers and firms
operating in the informal sector. By a set of forms and expression I mean customs, beliefs,
common practices, rules, regulations, codes, clothing, rituals andways of being that prevail in
the people that integrates it. Thus, this form of informal modus operandi and modus vivendi
distinguishes itself from other groups through its social norms, but also through its beliefs,
morality, customs, institutions, politics, methods of enforcement, language and parapherna-
lia, among other qualities.
6Glaeser et al. (2003) analyze recent empirical work that tries to identify social multiplier eects. Their results
indicate that social interactions may be large. The authors hypothesize that, if one person’s proclivity to certain
behaviour influences her or his neighbour’s behaviour, policy changes to address that behaviour will have a direct
and indirect eect through social influence. In Glaeser et al. (2003:346) theoretical framework, “if an individual’s
outcome rises “x” percent as his neighbor’s average outcome, then the social multiplier roughly equals 1/(1-x) for
large enough groups”.
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2.2.3 The reasons of `exclusion' from the formal sector
There is also a clear relationship between informality and inequality. High levels of inequality
manifest in having large segments of the population ‘excluded’ from basic services such as
education, health care, and legal services; and from other services that allow citizens to access
better economic opportunities. Lack of access to services and opportunities finally impact on
dierences in the exercise of power and the possibility of having a voice in society, that seem
highly related with informality (Perry et al., 2007).
Low levels of trust in the government might be a reflection of a ‘broken’ social contract.
Since the government does not perform eectively the delivery of public services, citizens are
not willing or do not have the incentives necessary to opt for being included in the formal
system.
The expression ‘social contract’ is used by Perry et al. (2007) to refer to “some degree
of societal consensus over basic aspects of the operation and role of the state relative to the
private sector and among citizens. In this usage, ‘social contract’ refers to key aspects of
a social equilibrium, including beliefs and actions of citizens, organized groups, and state
actors” (Perry et al., 2007:216).
There are two types of social equilibria where a polity can be situated: a ‘bad equilibrium’
where there is a discrepancy of purposes, a government that is inneective, unable to enforce
well its regulations nor to provide public services eciently to attract informal agents (firms
and individuals) to the formal sector (Perry et al., 2007), leading to situations of high infor-
mality (such as it is the case of Mexico); or a ‘good equilibrium’ where there is an agreement
of purposes, a government that performs its duties of enforcing the law and providing pub-
lic services eciently and economic and social actors that react positively to those incentives,
abiding the law and engaging in formal labor market activities.
As pointed out by Perry et al (2007), some of the features that relate to dierent measures
or dimensions of informality and that, in fact, are manifestations or symptoms of a systemic
failure are:
• Low levels of participation in the social security system (system that would allow them
to have access to future pensions and health care).
• Low coverage of many social insurance schemes, especially among poor people.
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• A large number of small firms that partially or completely evade tax, labor, and business
regulations.
• Excessive complexity of bureaucratic procedures, which results in delay or inaction.
• Exclusion in the access to property rights, judiciary/legal services, and other public ser-
vices.
• Low-quality public provision of social services (such as health care or education).
• Low levels of trust in the state and in the fairness of existing arrangements.
• Low and uneven enforcement of regulations.
• Low levels of tax collection, related to low compliance and low tax bases.
Each of the features mentioned above are expressions of the so called bad equilibria, and
all of these factors are found in the Mexican case. The following sections will take a look at
pros and cons of being formal, explore the relationship between informality and governance
indicators, and analyze the dierent concepts of semi-formality.
2.3 Assessment of the pros and cons of being formal
Mexico’s high level of informalitymight be a reflection of the disconnection betweenMexican
citizens and the state. To frame this analysis, this section will follow an outline presented in
Perry et al (2007) in order to discuss the dierent dimensions of the decision to participate in
the formal sector.
2.3.1 To be or not to be formal
Let’s consider an economic agent (individual or group) who has two jobs or business oppor-
tunities that are comparable but only dier in that they require or not to follow regulations.
From this agent’s point of view, the choice implies having an opinion about dierent aspects
relevant to her or his interests, taking into account dierent factors. As Perry et al. (2007)
describe in their book, these factors to be taken into account can be as follows:
1. Obtaining the protection of labor laws, paying contributions, and getting social security
benefits for the agent and her or his family;
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2. Avoiding the costs of being caught not complying with regulations, given state enforce-
ment technology;
3. Contributing to the provision of public goods and services to society as a whole, and
trusting the state in doing it; and
4. Avoiding the peer-pressure costs of being pointed out as a cheater.
Thus, to assess costs and benefits, this economic agent will consider all these factors and
come up with a selection of her or his choice. As pointed out by Perry et al. (2007), her/his
decision might be aected by:
the direct costs and benefits of formality: The assessment of point (1) above de-
pends on the costs of labormarket regulations and a comparison of those costs with the
valuation of the benefits provided to the individual (i.e. comparing payroll tax payments
with health benefits received).
state enforcement capacity: The assessment of point (2) will depend on the perceived
capacity of the state to enforce labor, tax, and other regulations.
individual perceptions about government effectiveness: The assessment of
point (3) might depend on how eective and fair the individual perceives government
institutions are in fulfilling their role.
social norms and the social multiplier: The assessment of point (4) depends on
what others believe about the role and performance of the state, that is, the social norm7
that influences collective behavior toward the state.
The revision of these dimensions of the formality decision illustrates that informality con-
nects to issues related to the reality of and perception about the state. The answer to each
of the questions above presented hinges on some characteristics and capabilities of the state
and the services (and benefits) it provides, which aect the assessment of the private benefit
of engaging with the state (formal sector). But it also hinges on a system of individual and
collective beliefs about the eciency and fairness of the existing arrangements (Saavedra and
Tommasi, 2007).
7Social norms are the set of patterns of behaviour that constitutes a customary rule that coordinates actions
among people (Young, 2006) and is sustained by social approval.
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2.4 Perceptions about the State's performance and informality
Mexico, as many other Latin American and developing countries, could be characterized as
a state that excludes parts of its population as a result of an imperfect social contract. This is
reflected the negative perceptions that individuals have about the state and its performance.
Data across countries shows that there is a negative relationship between a proxy for in-
formality (share of self-employed) and a measure of government eectiveness (government
eectiveness index).8 As it can be seen, Figure 2.1 shows a significant negative correlation
between government eectiveness and share of self-employment. In general, for countries in
Latin America, as observed in the graph, perceptions of eectiveness of the government with
respect to its function of providing public services is low, and self-employment is high (with
the exception of Chile and Uruguay).
Figure 2.1.: Government eectiveness versus % self-employed
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2009 and 2010). 
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4
 The Government Effectiveness Index is a measure of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies (Perry et al., 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006, 2009, 2001).. 
5
 The Control of Corruption Index from WGI is a measure of perceptions, where corruption is defined as the exercise of public 
power for private gain, with higher values corresponding to less corruption (Perry et al., 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 



































government effectiveness index 
Source: Own calculations based onWorldwide Governance Indicators (2011) andWorld Development
Indicators (average between data from 2008, 2009 and 2010).
Informality also tends to be higher in countries that are perceived as more corrupt (Figure
2.2). Data suggest that the perception of corruption (meas red by the control f corruption
8The Government Eectiveness Index is a measure of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and
the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies (Perry et al., 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi,
2006, 2009, 2011).
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perceptions about the state’s performance and informality
index9) is positively and significantly related to informality. In the case of Mexico and several
Latin American countries, perceptions about control of corruption is low (perception of the
existence of corruption is high), and self-employment is high at the same time. Not onlyMex-
ico shows such behavior, but also countries such as Venezuela, Paraguay, Peru and Ecuador
are in bad equilibria, where it can be seen that the proxy for informality is high, as well as the
perception of corruption.
Figure 2.2.: Control of corruption index versus % self-employed
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called Investment Climate Surveys), which included a larger sample of small firms, the 
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Source: Own calculations based onWorldwide Governance Indicators (2011) andWorld Development
Indicators (average between data from 2008, 2009 and 2010).
At the same time, judicial systems in Latin America are perceived as unfair, an Mexico is
not the exception, situation that generates very low levels of trust in the judiciary. According
to Perry et al. (2007:220–221):
On average, fir s in Latin America are less confident that th ir judicial system
will enforce contractual and property rights disputes than are firms in other re-
gions i the world. Within the Latin American region, there are large dierences,
with more than 70 percent of firms being confident in the judicial system in Chile
9The Control of Corruption Index from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (wgi) is a measure of percep-
tions, where corruption is defined as the exercise of public power for private gain, with higher values corresponding
to less corruption (Perry et al., 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006, 2009, 2011).
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and Costa Rica compared with less than 30 percent in Ecuador and Guatemala.
Evidence presented by Biebesheimer and Payne (2001) shows that even though 65
percent of citizens were reasonably confident in their judicial systems in Europe,
only 35 percent expressed such confidence in Latin America. In questions asked in
recent Enterprise Surveys [previously called Investment Climate Surveys], which
included a larger sample of small firms, the percentage of firms that perceived
courts as fair, impartial, and uncorrupt was less than 25 percent in Panama,Mex-
ico10, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru.
Other authors have analyzed the concept of informality as related to the previous notions.
For example, a related one, as presented by Centeno and Portes (2006), proposes the con-
cept of a ‘frustrated state’, which suggests that informality is the consequence of weak states
that assign themselves an unbearable and unmanageable regulatory load, with a scope that
goes beyond their enforcement capacity.11 Finally, another part of the literature underlines the
potential existence of a ‘captured state’, where a political equilibrium is preserved such that
specific groups of the population that make up the elites (business, public sector, or labor)
interact implicitly or explicitly with the state to maintain rents, even if that implies the exclu-
sion of certain segments of the population (De Ferranti et al., 2004; Perry et al., 2006; Perry
et al., 2007).12
2.5 Tax compliance and the social contract in Latin America
One of the main aspects that aects the decision to participate in the formal or informal labor
market has to do with the tax system. In general, tax systems of Latin American countries
have certain particularities thatmake it dicult to complywith them. Frequently, countries in
the region have complex administrative procedures associated with tax and regulatory com-
pliance. A large informal sector both reflects inequities and ineciencies of these tax systems,
and it imposes the challenge of improving the tax base. This section of the chapter will sum-
10Mexico’s percentage of firms that perceive the courts as fair, impartial, and uncorrupt was of 22 percent
(Perry et al., 2007).
11Centeno and Portes (2006) argue that the liberal reforms implemented in the mid-1980s in Latin America
were an attempt to reduce the regulatory intent and, at the same time, increase regulatory capacity.
12The perfect example is that of a populist government with a political base in the middle and low-middle
classes, that is reluctant to eliminate subsidies to public services, even if that forces out expanding the services to
the poorer segments of society with less political influence and power (Perry et al., 2007).
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marize the main aspects of Latin American tax systems, highlighting specific policy aspects
related to them.
2.5.1 Tax compliance in Latin America
Latin America shows tax revenues that are below oecd countries. As discussed by Lledo,
Schneider, and Moore (2004), the average tax take has been continuously smaller in Latin
America than in oecd countries, while it has been comparatively similar to the Asian aver-
age.13
Moreover, Perry et al. (2007) state that indirect taxes—in the form of taxes on domestic
and internationally traded goods and services—represent the biggest share of tax revenues
in Latin America. They comprise about 60 percent of total tax revenues; almost twice as
much as taxes on income, profits, and capital gains. Comparatively, in developed countries
tax revenues from international trade and from domestic goods and services constitute 40
percent of total tax revenues (Bird and Zolt, 2005; Perry et al., 2007)
Direct taxation (meaning taxation on income, property and wealth) is below what is ex-
pected if the level of development of the region is taken into consideration—in Latin America
direct taxes are about a third of tax collections; in Europe, 50 percent; and in North Amer-
ica that figure is of 80 percent (Perry et al., 2007). The dierence is explained by individual
income taxes. These are a third of total tax collections in Europe and more than 60 percent
in North America. In Latin America, the figure is in the single digits, lower than any other
region of the world (Perry et al., 2007). On the other hand, the share of corporate direct taxes
is not small. This situation is an indication of a very low capacity of the state to observe and
monitor (individual) incomes; and it is consistent with a concentration of taxes on businesses,
most likely medium size and large businesses that are easier to monitor (Perry et al., 2007). In
that sense, the percentage of corporate income tax revenues is three times the percentage of
personal income tax revenues.
One important aspect that needs to be highlighted in the informality analysis is the exis-
tence of tax exemptions. These are especially widespread in the region, and it is an indication
13As explained by Perry et al. (2007:223): “The median country in the Latin American region collects 4 per-
centage points of gdp less than would be expected, given its level of development (Perry et al., 2006). The average
number for the Latin American region stands at 14.2 percent of gdp in 2000–2003 (15.8 percent of gdp including
social security contributions). Only Brazil, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica have tax burdens—
without social security contributions—above 20 percent. Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela barely reach 10
percent.”
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that some specific groups have ‘special access’ to benefits, or ‘special privileges’.14 There are
also important disparities among countries in their tax administration capacity. For example,
the Chilean tax administration practices appear to be about three times more eective than
those inGuatemala in raising vat revenues (Alm andMartínez-Vazquez, 2007). Therefore, the
relatively low levels of tax revenues in most Latin American countries come as an outcome of
poor capacity of the tax system, excessive tax exemptions, and small tax bases.
Interestingly, the wealthy in Latin America pay a larger share of taxes than the share paid by
the wealthy in developed countries (Perry et a., 2007). Some comparative empirical analyses
also confirm the view that the higher the tax burden, the larger the informal sector (Johnson,
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón, 1998; Loayza andRigolini, 2006). This may be explained, as
mentioned before, because there is a concentration of taxes on businesses, which may be rela-
tively high.15 For example, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998) perform a cross
country comparative research using indicators of perceptions of the tax burden—including
how high tax rates are and the discretionary power of authorities in administering and oper-
ating the tax system—and find a large positive eect on informality. They also explain (as it
was pointed out before) that what really matters to explain informality are the management
and operation of the tax system rather than the established tax rates.16 In this sense, Friedman
et al. (2000) find that higher tax rates are not correlated with a larger informal sector. As a
matter of fact, the opposite might be true: countries with high tax rates may be those with
high benefits of formality.
2.5.2 Informality: broken social contracts and bad equilibria in Latin America
Countries can settle in dierent social purposes—or equilibria—if social norms and social
interactions that lead to specific collective behaviors are strong.17 As Perry et al. (2007:239)
neatly put it: “Youmake the queue or skip the line. Your stop at the red light or you keepmov-
ing.” As it was mentioned previously, tax and regulatory compliance may be highly impacted
by social interactions. Economic agents will be more willing to pay taxes, and be included
in the formal labor market if they think that the state is doing its job well, complying with
14Tax exemptions are common in Mexico and I will briefly discuss them in Chapter 5.
15According to Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998:387) “the unocial economy should be larger
when there is a bigger tax burden on firms in the ocial sector, where ‘burden’ on the firm is the outcome of how
the tax system is administered as well as what the rates are.”
16In other words, the size of the informal sector increases with the regulatory burden but diminishes with the
eciency in the provision of services and with compliance enforcement (Loayza and Rigolini, 2006).
17This section draws on Saavedra and Tommasi (2007) and on Kahan (2005).
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its share of the social contract and using eectively public resources. Also, economic agents
will be more willing to comply if they believe others do so, generating what is also called a
‘virtuous cycle’ where everybody is paying taxes and doing what they should do in this social
contract, establishing a highly cooperative state of aairs. On the contrary, a ‘vicious cycle’
can be found in the case that people will be inclined to evade tax obligations whenever they
believe others are inclined to do so, too. Those ‘interdependencies’ tend to generate patterns
of collective behavior with specific reinforcing mechanisms (Kahan, 2005; Perry et al., 2006;
Saavedra and Tomassi, 2007).
Mexico is in a ‘bad equilibrium’: trust in the state is low and tax collection and compliance
with regulations are low. At the same time, the public provision of public services is of low
quality and unequal if dierent socioeconomic groups are considered. The case of Mexico
is not a stand alone case. This unfavorable depiction repeats across most countries in Latin
America and reflects an unsolved problem of high inequality of opportunities associated with
an extremely high level of income inequality. This occurs in the context of a structure of taxes
and transfers that does not redistribute eectively (Perry et al, 2007).
2.5.3 Why rich and poor alike opt out of formality
Feelings about how valuable public services are for an economic agent may influence the fact
that they opt out of the formal system. In that sense, in Mexico, as well as in other Latin
American countries, analyzing dierent parts of the income distribution reveals that the poor,
the middle class and the rich feel that they are not getting a fair deal by the existing arrange-
ments, and try to ‘exit’ the system when possible. Therefore, an important amount of ‘exit’
(using Hirschman’s (1970) terminology) is observed, particularly from both ends of the in-
come distribution. In the case of the wealthier individuals, many times they are more likely
to ‘opt out’ (using Perry et al.’s (2007) terminology) of public services and move into private
provision of services (such as buying private education, health care and pensions), in search
of higher quality. Not only individuals opt out of the formal system because they individually
feel that public services are of very little value to them. When assessing how valuable such
public services are for the population at large, they collectivelly may share the perception that
these services are of little value for other people in other socio-economic strata. Also, these
feelings can be exacerbated by a generalized perception of corruption and patronage in the
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government in general and in social assistance in particular; and by the social norm external-
ities that implicitly validate generalized tax evasion (Bergman, 2002, 2003).18
High levels of socioeconomic segregation dicult the arrangement of a social contract: rich
and poor do not share the same schools, health, pension and security services. Also, some of
the rich may as well be capturing the state and using their influence to have particular privi-
leges in the tax system or maintain oligopolistic arrangements. At the same time, corporatist
groups and certain unions may use political pressure to preserve privileges that perpetuate un-
equal structures of power and of opportunities (Perry et al., 2007).19 All in sum, weak and in-
competent governments are combinedwith influential and powerful groups (Guerrero, López-
Calva, and Walton, 2006) which makes even more dicult for the poor to feel engaged in the
economic and social system. The Hirschmanian concept of ‘exit’ is also valid to the lower
end of the socioeconomic distribution: the poor may not pay many direct taxes, but they also
do not get much from the state. They feel “an adverse dierential access to public goods, to
property rights, to protection under the law and to judiciary services” (Perry et al., 2007:241).
This promotes the use of informal mechanisms (as it will be seen in Chapter 6) and diminishes
incentives to participate in the formal system. Thus, the poor organize themselves in groups
for self-protection, invade public property and, at times, take justice in their own hands. In
contrast to the wealthy, the poor are more prone to informality, to participate in clientelistic
networks, and to have a negative opinion of the government and the existent social arrange-
ment and organization. Many of the poor have never been part of the formal system; more
than ‘exiting’ the formal system, some of the poor have never actually ‘entered’ it (in other
words, they have been ‘excluded’). This situation is part of a culture of informality in which
the state is basically absent and there is no social contract in place (Perry et al., 2007).
2.6 Semiformality: the gray area between formality and informality
An important issue in the discussion on the informal sector is whether and how the informal
economy and formal economy are linked. Through the years, the discussion on the infor-
mal sector took form into three main schools of thought regarding the informal economy:
dualism, structuralism, and legalism. Each of these has a dierent perspective on how the in-
formal and formal economies are linked (Chen, 2006). The dualists argue that informal units
18Bergman (2002, 2003) argues that, in many cases, there is a negative peer-pressure eect in which tax evasion
has wide social acceptance, particularly among the wealthier populations.
19This is when the political factor comes into play, as it will be shown in the following chapters.
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and activities have few (if any) linkages to the formal economy but, rather, operate as a dis-
tinct separate sector of the economy; and that informalworkers constitute the less-advantaged
sector of a dualistic labour market (Sethuraman, 1976; Tokman, 1978). The structuralists see
the informal and formal economies as inherently linked. To increase competitiveness, firms in
the formal economy choose to reduce their input costs, including labour costs, by promoting
informal production (which provides them with cheap intermediary or final goods) and in-
formal employment relationships. According to structuralists, both informal enterprises and
informal wage workers are subordinated to the interests of capitalist development, providing
cheap goods and services (Moser, 1978; Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989). The legalists focus
on the relationship between informal entrepreneurs/enterprises and the formal regulatory en-
vironment, not formal firms. But they recognize that capitalist interests—what De Soto called
‘mercantilist’ interests—plot jointly with the government to establish the bureaucratic ‘rules
of the game’ (De Soto, 1989). There may be some degree of truth in each of these perspectives,
given the heterogeneity of the informal sector. However, the reality of informality is more
complex than what these perspectives propose (Chen, 2006).
Some scholars have proposed to move beyond these perspectives (in particular the formal-
infomal dichotomy) and take a more ‘nuanced’ approach when characterizing informality,
more in accordance to reality (Moser, 1994; Maloney, 1999, 2004; Chen, 2006). Under this
new view, the informal sector is no longer described as a traditional economy, marginally pro-
ductive, and clearly separated form the formal sector. This new view of the informal sector
has as a central characteristic a continuum of economic relations, where labour relations tend
to fall in the middle of a continuum between a pure ‘formal’ relation (regulated and protected)
and a pure ‘informal’ relation (unregulated and unprotected) (Chen, 2006). Moroever, work-
ers and production units can also work simultaneously at dierent points of the continuum.
It is observed that the two extremes of the continuum (formal-informal) are often dynami-
cally linked: formal enterprises hire informal workers and many informal firms have a direct
relationship with formal enterprises (e.g. buying them products or services). The continuum
proposal has interesting implications for the design of public policies. Under this new concept,
the formalization discussion should take into consideration that, depending on the segment
of the informal economy that is being considered, there can be dierent meanings of the word
‘formalization’. According to Chen (2006), even though formalization is the desiredway to go,
the feasibility of formalizing the informal sector is unclear, and it is unlikely that all informal
producers and workers can be formalized. Chen’s main point is that, at the end of the day, the
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policy challenge is to decrease the costs of working in the informal sector and to increase the
benefits of being formal.
In this research, I have reached the same conclusion after observing and analysing some
empirical cases: that informality/formality is not a dichotomy but a continuum, with agents
opting to remain informal on some instances in which they do not perceive the benefits of
formality, and formalize on others where they see clear advantages of becoming formal. The
following sub-section will present dierent takes on the concept of semi-formality, two exist-
ing ones and a new one. The novel concept will show that informal and formal characteristics
can be present in an agent at one point in time, simultaneously. This new concept will be
explained providing an example of what it means in the real world.
2.6.1 The concepts of semiformality
The concept of ‘semi-formality’ has been used to define two notions. The first one, developed
by De Soto (1989), refers to a semi-formal economy or sector that comprises activities that
are partly regulated, often because state ocials have recognized and sanctioned a certain
degree of informality in exchange for a degree of control over them (informal agents). In
other words, for De Soto, semi-formality means that the government actively negotiates the
implementation of regulatory norms without changing the actual regulations. Thus, street
vendors, collective taxis, land invaders, and garbage collectors have, in many cases, been given
either tacit or explicit permission to carry out their informal activities—at times in exchange
for support for the current regime—but without completely bringing them within the formal
system. Frequently, this may lead to a continual process of conflict and renegotiation between
the government and these informal agents that politicize the sector (Cross, 1998). What is
clear in each of the cases mentioned above—and not necessarily so in other types of activities
within the informal sector—is that they involve organized groups. While De Soto implicitly
recognizes this, he never explains or analyzes it in depth.20
The second notion of ‘semi-formality’ has been pointed out byCross (1998, 1999) and refers
to the case when informal firms may begin to formalize in some respects while remaining
informal in others. For example, a firm owner may obtain a permit for her or his firm, but
remain outside the tax system, fail to comply with labor regulations, and otherwise operate
20However, the importance of group organization is fundamental in the third concept of semi-formality I
present a little further down.
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informally. The potential for this type of semi-formality, which is still individualistic in nature,
will depend to a large extent on the degree of coordination between government agencies
enforcing the dierent regulations as well as, again, the overall visibility of the firm. Size
in this regard holds a double danger: it not only makes the firm more visible to regulatory
ocials and therefore easier to sanction, it also increases the number of third parties—such
as employees, neighbors, clients, or suppliers—who might use existing regulatory norms to
reinforce their own claims upon the firm (Cross, 1998, 1999).
I would like to introduce a third notion of ‘semi-formality’ which is related to the notions
developed by Cross (1998) and De Soto (1989) but with important dierences. This new no-
tion of semi-formality refers to that status and form of operation that some informal agents
(particularly organized informal groups) have, which shows or presents them as being infor-
mal, when in reality they make use of formal instruments (among them their ‘legal status’) in
order to sort out better the problems brought about by regulations and avoid the authorities
reprisals, while at the same time taking advantage of the benefits of informality (i.e. such as
tax avoidance). In other words, they are informal and formal at the same time; informal in
their modus operandi, and formal in their (legal) status. An example, which may be com-
pelling in terms of the importance of this new notion, refers to the status of ‘independent civil
associations’ orAsociación Civil that some informal groups obtain in order to have both legal
personality (and therefore legal recognition from the government) as well as the prerogative
to demand certain rights (such as the right to sell on the streets). This condition—which is no
longer individualistic and demands a greater degree of group organization—of being legally
recognized while still behaving and operating informally may represent a real problem for the
state.
Thus, the specific experiences regarding all the dierent aspects of exit, exclusion, formality,
informality and semi-formality that are behind the large informal sector in Latin America vary
notoriously, country by country, and have dierent policy implications.
2.7 Policies to reduce informality
In theory, successful policies to reduce informality will promote a “voluntary accommodation
between private enterprise and the state” (Kenyon, 2007:2). In practice, however, this accom-
modation is quite dicult to reach because the right policy not only requires regulatory re-
forms that facilitate the formalization process, but more importantly, formalization requires
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building a ‘culture of compliance’ (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009). In
other words, informal agents must be adequately informed about the increased benefits of for-
malization (as well as the increased costs of not formalizing); they must have enough trust in
the public sector that reforms will not be reversed, or promises broken, after they have formal-
ized (e.g. tax breaks that never materialize); and they must know that, because formalization
oers net benefits, most informal agents (including competitors) will also decide to formalize
(Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Due to the fact that informality takes many forms and depends on many variables, poli-
cies that succeed in one place may fail in another. Therefore, policy packages can comprise a
series of ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ that need to be adapted to the nature of informality in the local-
ity, province, or country where they will be implemented. In some places, regulatory reform
might be more relevant, while in others it could be regulation enforcement and administrative
reforms to strengthen information flows among agencies in charge of enforcement and im-
plementation. Furthermore, given the costs and benefits of increased enforcement, optimal
policies do not necessarily entail reaching full compliance; rather, the objective should be to
make formality the most desirable—and accessible— situation for the individual. In any case,
policies need to take into account the level of trust of informal agents and actors in their in-
stitutions, and make sure that they are being listened to, and included in the process of policy
design (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
In the last decade, international experience in policies to reduce informality has greatly
expanded. From the compliance perspective, high-income oecd countries have fought infor-
mality most aggressively even when, it seems, they suer the least from it. Their policies have
mainly targeted tax evasion on the part of formal businesses, as well as the use of undeclared
or undocumentedworkers. Equally, in recent years, a growing number of developing countries
have also implemented policies with the aim of increasing the eciency of factor re-allocation.
Particularly, there have been wide-ranging labor regulation reforms, as well as simplification
to registration procedures, and tax simplifications for small businesses, especially in Latin
American countries (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009). Table A.1 in Ap-
pendix A.1 lists some of the policies that have been recently implemented in several countries
in the world and the area of informality they target.21 A summary of these policies and a dis-
cussion of studies that evaluate some of them follow below. Each of the policies discussed
below targets one or more of the following objectives:
21This list draws in part from Kuddo (2008), oecd (2004), usaid (2005), Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-
Özdemir (2009), and others.
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• facilitate the formalization process
• create a framework for the transition from informality to formality
• lend support to newly created firms
• reduce or eliminate inconsistencies across regulation and government agencies
• increase information flows
• increase enforcement.
2.7.1 Increasing tax compliance
Several countries have introduced reforms to their taxation systems with the purpose of re-
ducing informality. In oecd countries, reforms have mainly targeted undeclared work. They
include, for example, reduced tax rates for low-wage earners (e.g. Belgium, Bulgaria, The
Netherlands, and France) (Mayville, 2008); tax exemptions and reductions in sectors that rely
on undeclared work (e.g. Hungary, Sweden, Belgium, and France) (Kuddo, 2008; Leibfritz,
2008, 2011); and reduced vat in labor-intensive sectors (e.g. The Netherlands). Other mea-
sures taken by oecd countries to encourage tax compliance include researching the motiva-
tions of informal firms and workers through surveys as part of a comprehensive compliance
policy (e.g. Australia and Sweden); targeted educational campaigns at specific sectors (e.g.
home repair and maintenance or small businesses) and cooperating with trade associations
to tackle industries with a high incidence of non-compliance (e.g. Australia, Hungary, Bel-
gium, and Sweden) (Kuddo, 2008); oering voluntary disclosure schemes (e.g. uk, Belgium,
andAustralia); media campaigns and follow-up surveys (e.g. Australia, Canada, and Sweden);
community visits, workshops, and specific internet sites to encourage individuals into the for-
mal economy (e.g. Australia and Canada); and schemes to undermine informal activities such
as the use of work ‘vouchers’ (e.g. Belgium)22 (UK-nao, 2008). Other actions recommended
22Belgium oers a good example of an innovative scheme aimed at undermining the informal economy. It
introduced service or work ‘vouchers’ to subsidize the cost of household services. A household buys vouchers
which pays for an hour of work from certified companies, who employ people who were previously unemployed.
The company can employ people on a part-time temporary basis. After six months, however, the company has
to oer them a permanent employment contract for at least half-time employment if the person was formerly
registered as ocially unemployed. The employee can do the following activities: house-cleaning, washing and
ironing, sewing, running errands, and preparing meals. The household can pay for the cost of the work using the
vouchers. The federal government pays the value of the voucher to the company. The households can recover 30
percent of the price of the vouchers in their tax return (UK-nao, 2008).
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by an oecd (2004) report put emphasis on increasing access to information, as well as admin-
istrative reforms that improve enforcement activities.
In developing countries, particularly in Latin America, reforms tend to focus on encourag-
ing owners of micro and small firm to formalize and pay their contributions. Latin American
countries have been very proactive in improving their tax legislation to encourage compliance.
In Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
and Paraguay presumptive taxes23 levied on gross corporate revenues have replaced either vat
or income taxes. In Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru, a single tax has replaced vat, income
tax, and social security contributions (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Notwithstanding the large amount of simplification, some of these systems have gone fur-
ther and have been more successful than others. For example, in Brazil the Integrated System
ofTaxes andContributions forMicro and Small Enterprises (Sistema Integrado de Pagamento
de Impostos e Contribuições das Microempresas e Empresas de Pequeno Porte, simples) im-
plemented in 1997 unifies the collection of federal tax payments and social security contribu-
tions. All firms with revenues below us$1 million that work in services, manufacturing, trade,
or agriculture are eligible, which represents 75 percent of the business register and 7 percent
of the Gross National Income (gni) (Kenyon and Kapaz, 2005; de Paula and Scheinkman,
2007; Santa María and Rozo, 2008; Fajnzylber et al., 2009). The simples program substitutes
six types of federal taxes and five types of social security contributions with a progressive
tax levied on gross revenues. An important feature of this program is that it has de-linked
social security contributions from the number of (declared) workers employed or the wage
bill, instead making the contributions proportional to the firm’s revenues. As a result, it has
eliminated certain incentives to employ workers without a contract (Oviedo, Thomas, and
Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009). The Brazilian streamlining model may be a good example to
follow. By several accounts, this program has been a successful one: for example, it increased
the registration rate of firms by an estimated 10 to 30 percent (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2007;
Fajnzylber et al., 2009).
23Presumptive taxation is a form of assessing tax liability using indirectmethods such as income reconstruction
or by applying base-line taxation across the entire tax base (Thuronyi, 1996). Presumptivemethods of taxation are
thought to be eective in reducing tax avoidance as well as equalizing the distribution of the tax burden (Thuronyi,
1996). The term ‘presumptive’ is used to indicate that there is a legal presumption that the taxpayer’s income is
no less than the amount resulting from application of the indirect method. This presumption may or may not
be rebuttable. A useful description is provided by Ahmad and Stern (1991:276): “The term presumptive taxation
covers a number of procedures underwhich the ‘desired’ base for taxation (direct or indirect) is not itself measured
but is inferred from some simple indicators which are more easily measured than the base itself.”
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Argentina presents a comparable case study. In Argentina, the simplified tax regime for
small taxpayers—known as Monotributo—was implemented in 1998. The system applies to
services firms with maximum revenues of us$24,000 and retail firms with maximum revenues
of us$48,000. Eligible firms cannot have more than three establishments. The presumptive
tax is levied on gross income but also takes into account the consumption of certain inputs
(e.g. electricity) and the scope of the business activity. This regime substitutes vat, federal
income taxes, presumptive minimum taxes, taxes on assets, and social security contributions.
In return, firms must pay a flat fee of 33 percent of the equivalent tax due by a firm outside
the Monotributo system; that is, in the normal tax regime. This new system has successfully
created tax incentives for small firms in Argentina (Santa María and Rozo, 2008).
Equally, Bolivia and Chile have also introduced simplified tax systems for small taxpayers;
though, their systems are much more complex. In particular, each country has introduced
parallel taxation schemes for firms in dierent areas of activity (i.e. Bolivia), or to substitute
for dierent taxes (i.e. Chile). Even though it is argued that the goal of these reforms is to
facilitate compliance, introducing too many dierent schemes and complexities is likely to
reduce the positive impact of these reforms, especially where the access to information and the
level of education of informal agents is limited (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir,
2009).
More broadly, in developing countries increasing tax compliance depends on enhancing
threemain areas: registration, audit, and collection. i) Registration can bemademore ecient
by sharing information between public and private agencies (e.g. social security, the banking
system). This has been done in several eu countries, where firms and individuals usually have a
unique id number in various agencies, which also exchange information to make sure they are
registered in all agencies. It is argued that oering tax amnesties can also add to the incentives
of informal firms to register (usaid, 2005) but opinions are divided on this issue (Farrell, 2004).
ii) Governments can also improve their audit technologies, as Spain and Chile have done suc-
cessfully (e.g. Databases containing taxpayer information were updated by cross-checking
information with other public agencies, and all companies with government contracts were
automatically audited. Additionally, administrative agencies experienced transformations to
bemademore eective in the audit and collection process (Bermeo, 1994; Isbell, 2004; Perry et
al., 2007). iii) Lastly, tax collection can be increased significantly by enhancing enforcement,
as Spain did in the 1970s by criminalizing certain tax oenses. Spain’s comprehensive tax re-
form led to a subsequent doubling of the ratio of tax revenue to gdp during the 1980s (Bermeo,
1994; Isbell, 2004). There is a warning to the last argument, though. If informal firms in fact
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have low productivity and profitability, their formalization, though desirable, does not neces-
sarily imply automatic increases in tax collection.24 In fact, this is what happens in the Mex-
ican case. Flores et al. (2004) used Mexico’s National Survey of Micro-Businesses (Encuesta
Nacional de Micronegocios, enamin) data to compute potential changes in tax collection if
informal workers were taxed. They found that in fact tax collection would not change and
net spending would increase, as most informal salaried and self-employed workers in Mexico
would then be eligible for transfers (negative taxation) as their income is below the threshold
for taxable income. Their analysis did not consider potential increases in income after for-
malization, so in this sense they took the standpoint of the ‘worst case scenario’ (Flores et al.,
2004; Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).25
2.7.2 Encouraging business creation and growth
Since De Soto (1989) emphasized the importance of the costly and burdensome registration
procedures as a key barrier to firms from accessing the formal sector, policy-makers have given
more attention to this matter, implementing radical reforms in many cases to reduce the cost
and simplify registration procedures. Therefore, simplified firm registration may be of help.26
Increasing evidence suggests that oering greater access to registration does encourage infor-
mal agents to formalize. For example, usaid (2005) reports that after Montenegro reformed
its registration process the number of registered firms went from 6,001 in 1999 to 21,724 in
2003.
There are several examples of reforms and programs that have simplified the registration
process. Among those, Mexico is one of the countries that implemented programs of this type
to encourage formalization. In 2002 the Mexican government implemented the Fast-Track
Business Creation System (Sistema de Apertura Rápida de Empresas, sare). This program
guaranteed that micro and small firms could complete the registration process in two days,
by reducing the number of procedures from eight to two. Even though most firms are eligible,
those in the food sector and those whose activity represent environmental risks need to obtain
24This is what occurs in the particular case of Mexico, as we will see in detail in Chapter 5 with the testimony
of Alma Rosa Moreno Razo, head of the Tax Administration Service in 1999.
25On September 8, 2014 the Mexican government announced a set of measures with incentives to attempt to
formalize about 750,000 informal agents (individuals and firms). The government intends to provide them with
social security, housing and other benefits to those who formalize and pay reduced taxes (Soto, 2014).
26In this sense, it is worth pointing out that the Doing Business project at the World Bank has documented
the nature of regulations around the world, and has been influential in advocating regulatory reforms in a large
number of countries. For more information, see www.doingbusiness.org.
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prior clearance from health authorities. Kaplan et al. (2007, 2011) and Bruhn (2008, 2011)
have estimated the impact of the introduction of the program on the number of new firm
registrations, concluding that it has been positive. According to Kaplan et al. (2007, 2011),
registrations increased by 4 to 8 percent, while Bruhn (2008, 2011) finds the impact to be even
more significant. The data do not make a distinction between the creation of new firms and
the formalization of existing ones, so Kaplan et al. (2007, 2011) try to estimate which eect
is more important. Since the increase in registrations took place predominantly within the
first tenmonths after the introduction of sare, they conclude that its success was to encourage
informal firms to formalize rather than to promote the creation of new firms. Even though the
eect of the program is positive and significant, they also conclude that these programs alone
will most likely have a small eect on informality and firm creation. More comprehensive
programs are necessary to have a sizeable impact on informality in countries such as Mexico,
which have a relatively large informal economy (Kaplan et al., 2007, 2011; Bruhn, 2008, 2011).
Colombia also took actions for the simplification of firms’ registration process. Business
Service Centers (Centros de Atención Empresarial, cae) were established within the premises
of the local chamber of commerce in six Colombian municipalities. The goal was to ensure
business registration in “one step, one day, one place, with one interaction, one prerequisite,
and at a minimum cost” (Cárdenas and Rozo, 2007:13). The general goal of the project was to
promote a more ecient and transparent relationship between the public sector and private
enterprises. The first phase of the project (comprising six municipalities) was carried out
between 2001 and 2004. In a second phase, the creation of caes was extended to an additional
15 municipalities. As of 2013, there were 21 municipalities included in the project and ten
more were in the process of joining (oecd, 2013). The caes oer a number of services to
entrepreneurs that range from information and business counseling to registration facilities.
According to an evaluation carried out by Cárdenas and Rozo (2007) the introduction of the
caes increased registrations by 5.2 percent.
Reforms are not only important at national level but also at sub-national level. For exam-
ple, in the municipality of Entebbe, Uganda, the government implemented a project for the
introduction of a simplified licensing process. The new system required informal agents and
entrepreneurs to provide only basic information and pay a fee, after which they immediately
received their license. This reduced average registration time from two days to 30 minutes,
and it cut the registration cost by 75 percent. Moreover, administrative costs went down by
10 percent and sta time used in registration also decreased by 25 percent (usaid, 2005). Most
importantly, these reforms were implemented without changes to national level legislation,
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which would have been too slow and dicult to achieve. Instead, other legal ways were found
to introduce the changes (usaid, 2005). This example suggests that it is important to consider
red tape at sub-national levels in order to get at all the potential obstacles to formalization
that firms face (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Labor regulations are importantwhen considering policies to combat informality. Together
with costly and cumbersome entry regulations, labor regulations have been identified by schol-
ars as important barriers to firm expansion, and there is compelling evidence in the literature
that excessive worker protection has adverse eects for employment in general, suggesting
that in the majority of cases employment protection legislation only benefits a minority of
workers, at the expense of the majority (Kugler, 2007). For example, high severance payments
and other firing costs considerably reduce incentives of firms to hire, hurting primarilywomen
and young people. In extreme cases, they are segmented out of the formal sector, with only
informal jobs available to them. In addition, stringent employment protection legislation can
also encourage exit from the formal sector for small entrepreneurs who cannot aord to oer
such protection to their employees (Perry et al., 2007). Lastly, there is also evidence suggesting
that when the interaction of labor and entry regulations is strong enough, reform in only one
area may not produce the desired eects (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003).27
There are several examples of successful reforms to labor regulations. Some of the reforms
implemented in the last years by European and Latin American nations such as Colombia and
Spain have been successful according to various studies (Kugler, 2007). Particularly, reducing
firing costs have increased worker turnover, indicating that firms can more easily adjust their
labor force according to the current economic environment.
Moreover, there are many areas where reforms can improve firm expansion and in this way
economic growth. Contract enforcement can be improved with a more transparent and e-
cient judiciary, trade taris and restrictions can be reduced to encourage exports, financial
markets can be better regulated to open access to finance for small firm owners while protect-
ing the economy from generalized financial crises, bankruptcy costs can be reduced, etcetera
(Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Furthermore, single reforms frequently need to be followed by other regulatory and admin-
istrative reforms to be eective. For example, increased access to land titling for rural workers
27Blanchard andGiavazzi (2003) also argue that determining the source of rents is crucial to design the optimal
policy. For example, lowering the bargaining power—and thus rents—of workers might lower real wages in the
short run, creating clear winners and losers. On the other hand, decreasing entry costs has positive eects for all
in the long run. These considerations alter the political economy of enacting reforms, and should be taken into
consideration.
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in Bolivia did not result in significant increases in the demand for credit from individuals,
in part because of the still burdensome business registration procedures and the lack of sup-
port for micro and small entrepreneurs (Santa María and Rozo, 2008). Similarly in Peru, a
study conducted by Winterberg (2005) found that of the 512,000 families that received titles
to their properties between 1996 and 2000, only about one percent subsequently obtained a
mortgage from a bank. There are also success stories, such as the city of Johannesburg, South
Africa, which encouraged the formalization of enterprises in the garments sector by providing
them with oce and storage space in a designated ‘fashion district’, while giving them train-
ing and counseling on marketing and business development (Rogerson, 2004; Kenyon, 2007).
According to Rogerson (2004), this initiative led to increased output, employment, product
diversification, and competitive advancement in these firms.
2.7.3 Strengthening enforcement
Better enforcement is an important element of any successful policy package to reduce in-
formality. In fact, while the ‘carrot’ element implies making formality more attractive, the
‘stick’ element can eectively raise the expected costs of being informal for individuals and
firms. Nevertheless, too much emphasis on the latter may also have detrimental eects in sec-
tors, activities, and regions where informal jobs are plentiful and the formal sector is not able
to incorporate informal workers in significant numbers (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-
Özdemir, 2009).
Several oecd countries have implemented various actions to enhance the eciency of detec-
tion. For example, Australia and the uk have used telephone hotlines to facilitate the public to
report people working undeclared; Canada and Sweden have employed the regular use of data
matching to target specific sectors and informal activities, particularly where there is a high
incidence of non-compliance; along the same lines, Australia, Canada and the United States
are making a wider use of external data in data matching to increase the rate of detection.
Additionally, sanctions are being used more methodically, and countries are now adjusting
penalties for inflation to increase deterrence. Some governments (e.g. Sweden) are also re-
searching how people perceive sanctions as a deterrent (UK-nao, 2008; Oviedo, Thomas, and
Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
In Latin America, there is also evidence of increased enforcement, but with potential un-
wanted side-eects. The evidence of a deterrent eect of regulations enforcement on infor-
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mal behavior found in Panama by Perry et al. (2007) is also found for Brazil by Almeida
and Carneiro (2006), and for Argentina by Ronconi (2007). In those countries with strin-
gent formal employment regulations—which translates into high costs of hiring and firing
workers—hiring workers informally might be a way for formal firms to adjust their employ-
ment level cheaply and swiftly according to the business cycle—similarly for workers, self-
employment is always preferable to unemployment in the absence of unemployment bene-
fits (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009). Consequently, preventing firms from
using this ‘illegal’ adjustment margin might indeed reduce informal employment within for-
mally registered firms, but at the expense of firm performance, if formal employment is kept
highly protected. Almeida and Carneiro (2006) analyze this in Brazil by using census data,
Enterprise Survey data, and data from the Ministry of Labor with enforcement information
at the municipality level. In particular, they examine how the number of labor inspections
in the city aects the performance of formally registered firms, along with the level of infor-
mal employment in the municipality28 (Almeida and Carneiro, 2006; Oviedo, Thomas, and
Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Thus, research shows that increased enforcement by itself, without complementary poli-
cies, may result in a reduction of output. It also shows that labor inspections aect firm per-
formance negatively along several dimensions. They considerably reduce employment, out-
put, sales, capital stock, and job creation as measured in new hires (Almeida and Carneiro,
2006; Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009). In addition, Almeida and Carneiro
(2006) calculate that each additional inspection per 100 firms reduces output per employee
by about 2.5 percent and capital per employee by about 4 percent. When analyzing the im-
pact of inspections on informal employment at the city level, they find that a one percentage
point increase in labor inspections in the city leads to a 1.5 percent reduction in informal
employment, which corresponds to an elasticity of informal employment with respect to en-
forcement of 0.15 (Almeida and Carneiro, 2006). They conclude that “stricter enforcement of
regulation reduces the access of firms to informal employment, thereby increasing their em-
ployment tax costs, their employment adjustment costs, and adversely aecting their output
and investment” (Almeida and Carneiro, 2006:22).
28Informal workers are defined as workers employed without a contract and self-employed workers (Almeida
and Carneiro, 2006). They instrument labor inspections with the average distance between the location of the
firm (city) and all cities within the state that have a labor inspections oce. While it is sensible to think that this
distance itself does not aect firm performance, there is still a potential bias coming from the fact that larger cities
usually have labor inspections oces, and better performing firms are more likely to choose a larger city for its
operations.
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In Argentina, increased enforcement may have actually increased employment. Ronconi
(2007) assesses the eects of changes in enforcement of labor regulations on the percentage of
private sector workers with legally mandated benefits. Ronconi (2007) uses labor data from
1995 to 2002 for the 24 jurisdictions in Argentina taken from the Argentine Permanent House-
hold Survey, while inspection data comes from theMinistry of Labor. In order to estimate the
causal eect of enforcement, he takes advantage of the fact that enforcement—measured as
the number of labor inspections—is positively correlated with the electoral cycle in Argentina
(he finds that there are on average 19.7 percent more inspectors during election years) (Ron-
coni, 2007). Thus, using the election year as an instrument, he finds that an additional labor
inspector per 100,000 people increases the share of formal private-sector workers by about 1.4
percentage points. In addition, he finds that increased enforcement has a net positive eect on
formal jobs—that is, more formal jobs are created than informal jobs destroyed— and a close
to zero eect on the average wage (Ronconi, 2007). The mechanism for the increase in formal
employment appears to be through the replacement of overtime work—above the maximum
allowed—with additional workers. Following these results, Ronconi (2007) concludes that in-
creased enforcement is a desirable policy in the dataset studied, as it creates formal jobs with
no significant costs to workers. Nevertheless, Ronconi’s analysis does not assess the eects of
increased enforcement on firm performance, as Almeida and Carneiro (2006) did for Brazil.
While it is unclear whether enforcement harms firm performance in Argentina as much as in
Brazil—since labor regulations are not as strict in Argentina—it is still possible that higher
employment in combination with wage rigidity result in lower output per worker and lower
total factor productivity (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Thus, summing up, strengthening enforcement will work best when the right incentives
to formalize are created, so that informal agents (firms and individuals) have a viable transi-
tion path from informality into formality. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that
increased enforcement might have negative eects on productivity and formal employment,
even though this will not necessarily always be the case (Almeida and Carneiro, 2006; Ron-
coni, 2007; Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
2.7.4 Creating a more inclusive social protection system
Undergoing systematic exclusion from societal arrangements may have long-term negative
eects on human capital and economic development (iadb, 2008). One important compo-
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nent of exclusion in numerous developing countries is the lack of access to basic protection
and safety nets that allow people to deal with the risks associated with shocks such as job
loss, illness, and disability. In countries where these types of social protection are provided
by social security agencies funded primarily through payroll taxes, informal salaried and self-
employed individuals are automatically excluded from receiving any protection, while formal
employees and firm owners are subject to expensive contributions that often result in poor
and unsatisfactory services (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009). This type
of systems not only create a fragmented society where only a few benefit from protection,
but their intrinsic ineciencies often also discourage people from working formally because
the costs are greater than the benefits. Furthermore, the fact that in many countries work-
ers move back and forth between formal and informal jobs often makes them ineligible to
receive benefits, given that they have not contributed for enough time to be able to claim these
benefits. In this instance, contributions may be perceived by workers as pure taxation with
little compensation, so that workers have little incentive to participate (Oviedo, Thomas, and
Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Thus, universalizing the structures of social protection can help diminish the risks to infor-
mal workers. Following this logic, recent policy recommendations advanced by scholars such
as Santiago Levy (2008) and by institutions such as the World Bank emphasize de-linking
social protection programs from labor contracts, in particular the provision of health service.
Health shocks can have serious consequences for the poor, as treatment costs are compounded
by revenue losses for sick people and their family (Perry et al., 2007). There have been success-
ful cases of reform in this direction, for example in Spain (Bermeo, 1994; Isbell, 2004; Perry
et al., 2007; Santa María and Rozo, 2008), and in other European countries that have reduced
contributions for low-incomeworkers and shifted the responsibility of contributions from em-
ployers to employees, successfully de-linking the coverage of certain benefits from holding a
formal labor contract (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Concurrently, it is important to remember that universal social protection policies have to
be designedwith great care to avoid undermining incentives to participate in the formal sector.
For instance, at present there is a debate as to whether non-contributory pension systems29
discourage workers from participating in saving schemes before retirement. Policies such as
conditional cash transfer programs implemented in Mexico (Oportunidades) or Brazil (Bolsa
Família), which tie cash transfers to enrolling children in school, are less likely to alter the in-
29Non-contributory pension system is a type of pension scheme where the employee makes no contributions
for her or his pension. Instead, the employer makes all contributions on the employee’s behalf. This contrast with
most pension systems, where both employees and employer make contributions (contributory pension systems).
95
policies to reduce informality
centives of poor people to take formal jobs, while still oering basic protection against income
shocks (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
2.7.5 Building trust and collective incentives
Social trust in public institutions is a key element in the success of policies towards informal-
ity. In addition to carrying out administrative and regulatory reforms to improve the benefits
of formality and the costs of informality, governments can vigorously work on strengthening
their relations with the public and building public trust. In spite of not being the most ob-
vious element of a strategy towards informality, public trust is in fact fundamental, because
people will be willing to participate in formal activities only if they firmly believe that their
contributions will ultimately be used to improve theirwell being in the future, either by a good
provision of social services, or by an ecient use of taxes (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-
Özdemir, 2009). As Lledo et al. (2004) indicate for Latin America, even though tax reforms
have been comprehensive in many countries, governments still face challenges in matters of
redistribution and equity, and most countries still “lack an (implicit) social contract between
governments and the general population of the kind that is embedded in taxation and fiscal
principles and practices in politically more stable parts of the world” (Lledo et al., 2004:39).
In the same vein, administrative improvements can be complemented with better govern-
ment communication eorts. As part of these eorts to build trust with the public, govern-
ments can upgrade their communications strategies to notify the public about reforms and
their related benefits. The lack of an eective communications strategy may result in poor re-
sults even if the reforms are well-designed. For instance, the new simplified taxation scheme
launched in Tanzania in 2001 to promote formalization was not properly disseminated. As
a result, informal agents and entrepreneurs did not know about this reform and it was left
to the initiative of tax administration ocials to tell people about the program (usaid, 2005).
Equally, the land titling initiative in Peru mentioned before does not appear to have achieved
great success in improving people’s access to credit for the same reasons (Kenyon, 2007). From
these examples, it can be observed that it is crucial that governments take their messages re-
garding the benefits of formalization—and the costs of informality—to the general public in
a systematic manner, with the purpose of maximizing the positive impact of their reforms
(Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
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In general, any society where the social contract is strong has stable and reliable institutions.
In this regard, improving the transparency of the judiciary system is frequently a priority in
order to restore confidence in the quality of institutions (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-
Özdemir, 2009). Many countries have been making eorts to improve their credibility and
reliability towards their citizens. For example, in Ukraine, eorts to reform administrative
procedures for business licensing have been accompanied by specific actions to increase civil
society participation and to fight public sector corruption (usaid, 2005).
Increasing trust in public institutions may take time but can be done simultaneously with
administrative and economic reforms. However, as Locke (2007) argues, countries where con-
fidence in institutions is low are not necessarily doomed to failure. Building trust can be
dicult but may still be possible if the society follows “a sequential process that blends to-
gether elements of (encapsulated) self-interest, government intervention, and the development
of mechanisms of self-governance and monitoring by the actors themselves” (Locke, 2007:9).
To sum up, the policies described in this section are important parts of a well-planned strat-
egy in order to build a ‘culture of compliance’. First, a good policy package can facilitate the
functioning of small enterprises, by simplifying procedures, reducing the cost of compliance,
and oering support and counseling to informal agents and entrepreneurs. Second, the costs
of informality can be increased by raising penalties and enhancing enforcement. Third, pub-
lic trust and awareness are indispensable to make sure that these policies are maintained in
the long term, so that the people know it is in their own interest to comply. Lastly, the provi-
sion of basic social protection benefits could in many cases be extended to the whole popula-
tion, instead of being conditioned to having a formal job (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-
Özdemir, 2009).
None of these policies is likely to work on its own; rather, a package of policies to achieve a
number of goals—economic growth, social protection, inclusion, and trust—may work best.
Specific policies to reach these goals include:
• Simplifying taxation schemes and reducing taxes on micro and small firms
• Reducing barriers to entry (costs, time, procedures)
• Allowing for more flexible hiring and firing of workers (e.g. temporary contracts)
• Oering flexibility to make payments (e.g. via financial institutions, one-stop shops)




• Informing firms about the benefits of formalization, and about regulatory reforms
• Strengthening enforcement and raising penalties
• Fighting public corruption and improving customer service in public administration
• Improving and expanding the coverage of social programs through cash transfers and
universal health systems.
Thus, any policy package to reduce informality can contain both ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’. Evi-
dence tells us that the most successful cases of countries reducing informality have included a
comprehensive policy package containing both of these elements, and that it will be the most
eective way to oer a sustainable transition from informality to formality (Oviedo, Thomas,
and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Lastly, attaining ‘full compliance’ might be too costly to be a rational objective. Amore sen-
sible approach might rather target, as a starting point, increasing formalization there where
the benefits can be greater; that is, in sectors and activities that may suer the most from the
restraints imposed by informality, but that have the most evident potential to grow (Oviedo,
Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
2.8 Conclusions
This chapter tries to highlight the fact that, to understandwhy informality is so widespread in
the region, and especially inMexico, it is very important to take into account how individuals
interact with each other and how they react to how the state performs its assigned duties of
providing quality public services in a fair and ecient way. For that, the chapter shows that
individuals both make cost-benefit analyses of their choices and select which one is better for
them, and also take into consideration the general feelings of their peers about the state to
make those choices.
Comparative, cross-country evidence based on microdata suggests that perceptions of gov-
ernment eectiveness and of the performance of public services in the Latin American region
are lower than those in other regions, and perceptions of corruption practices are higher. As
it was shown in this chapter, these low levels of trust are also correlated with high levels of
informality. A specific section of the chapter is devoted to the role of taxation (its rules, ad-
ministration and eectiveness) on informality, leading us to conclude that it actually plays a
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central part in a social contract. On the other side, governments in the region would have to
improve their performance in how they provide public services.
This chapter makes the case that more attention needs to be placed on understanding the
conditions, stages, and scenarios where formal and informal characteristics are combined in
the same individual or group. This is what is called ‘semi-formal arrangements’. A new con-
cept is introduced, that is, a new notion of semi-formality that refers to the status and form
of operation that some informal agents (particularly organized informal groups) have which
shows or presents them as being informal when in reality they make use of formal instruments
(among them their legal status) in order to sort out better the problems brought about by reg-
ulations and avoid the authorities reprisals, while at the same time taking advantage of the
benefits of informality (e.g. such as tax avoidance). An example that will be widely analyzed
with specific examples in dierent chapters of this dissertation, refers to the status of ‘inde-
pendent civil associations’ that some informal groups in Mexico obtain in order to have both
legal personality—and therefore legal recognition from the government; as well as the pre-
rogative to demand certain rights—such as the right to sell on the streets. This condition or
status of being legally recognized while still being ‘informal’ may represent a real problem for
the state and definitely will have to be carefully studied in order to avoid additional abuse,
unfairness and deepening the roots of broken social contracts in those countries that present
such situation.
One thing that is clear from the research is that there exists a continuum between formality
and informality. It could be said that, in general, few firms follow all the rules governing
enterprise behavior, and few follow none of them.30
Formalization can be a gradual process that does not involve moving from one fixed state
to another. Informality is an abstract concept that permeates many sectors and levels of activ-
ity and includes a heterogeneous group of actors. Most individuals and firms in the informal
sector do interact with public institutions to some extent; therefore it is more appropriate to
see informal activity as a continuum of compliance, rather than in a dichotomous manner.
Furthermore, depending on the level of development of the country, the nature of informal
activity varies. In developed countries informal activity refers generally to tax evasion and the
use of undeclared labor (often undocumented foreigners). In developing countries, informal
activity is the source of employment for a significant share of the labor force, often compensat-
30A business in Uganda may be registered but not pay any taxes nor declare their employees for the purpose
of social insurance. On the other hand, a business in China may not be registered as a business with central
government, but nonetheless comply with many local regulations (usaid, 2005).
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ing for the weak potential of the formal sector to create enough jobs. The lack of development
of the formal private sector may originate from a variety of causes, from too much red tape
and ineective bureaucracies, to low levels of human capital, low trust in public institutions
and low ‘tax morale’ (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
The latest evidence of formalization policies around the globe suggests that there are sev-
eral actions that governments can take to facilitate the transition of individuals and firms
from informality to formality. Comprehensive policy packages containing both ‘carrots’ and
‘sticks’ have proven to be more successful than single, isolated policies or reforms in creat-
ing the appropriate incentives to increase formality in the long run, as has been seen in the
noteworthy example of Spain, versus less impressive ones, such as those of Bolivia and Peru.
The ‘carrots’—simplifying taxation schemes and reducing taxes for micro and small firms,
and facilitating registration through fewer and cheaper procedures—reduce the costs of for-
mality, but policies can also go further in increasing growth opportunities for these firms, for
example by oering them support and counseling, as has been done in Colombia or South
Africa. On the other hand, the ‘sticks’ can include a strengthening of the enforcement pro-
cess, from increased collaboration between government agencies to share information about
non-compliers, to higher penalties for wrongdoers. Furthermore, individuals should have the
benefit of basic protections against risks regardless of their labour status, and therefore pro-
viding universal health care and other support systems for the most vulnerable groups will
help to reduce their risks in the face of adversity. Finally, individuals need to trust their insti-
tutions in order to be willing to establish long-lasting relationships with the public sector. In
this sense, fighting corruption within the public administration may be seen as one way to
restore public trust in the ethical standards and integrity of public institutions and therefore
reducing the relative attraction of informality versus formalization (Oviedo, Thomas, and
Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
The future of informality is uncertain. Policies can influence the shape and size of the in-
formal sector. However, assuming that things will continue in the route that they are now, it
can be expected that there is going to be some degree of informality. An equilibrium level will
depend on the policies in place that put incentives to workers and firms to be formal. Depend-
ing on these factors and how they play together, each economy will reach certain equilibrium
in the informality rate in the long run.
The discussion presented in this chapter will serve as a theoretical and conceptual back-
ground for the following empirical chapters, which deal more specifically with the Mexican
case andwith the specific sub-category of informal street vending. These concepts will help to
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better understand the analysis behind the relationship government-informal agents and their
dierent ways of behaving and reasoning. It will help to see more clearly the ideas of ‘semi-
formality’ as well as the ‘culture of informality’. Moreover, the policies discussed will also
help to have a better understanding of how proactive the Mexican government has been in
matters of informality.
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3. THE CULTURE OF INFORMAL I TY : G ENERAL
CHARACTER I S T IC S , S TRUCTURE , AND THE
POL I T IC S OF IN FORMAL STRE ET VEND ING
ORGAN IZAT IONS IN MEX ICO
3.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to provide a general overview of informal street vending in Mexico to un-
derstand better the culture of informality. It illustrates and explains some of the standard
characteristics, structures, schemes, and political arrangements and interactions observed in
informal street vending during both the empirical stage and the historical study of this re-
search. This chapter and those that follow, will focus on informal street vending—the most
visible andwidespread informal activity of all the various informal activities—to illustrate the
features and workings of the culture of informality in Mexico.
The chapter starts by mentioning some general characteristics of informal street vendor
groups and underlines the high degree of heterogeneity that exists among them. It also sig-
nals the general dynamics of these groups, among them the general structuring of the organi-
zations, the reasoning behind the formation of civil associations, and the sense of community
that is created among members of an organization.
The chapter then looks at the corporatization of informal street vendors, its origins and
development, its determinants, and its inherent evolution into clientelism. It briefly explains
why these schemes of corporatism and clientelism have prevailed until today, despite the demo-
cratic opening and change of political actors and parties in power, to the point that corporatist
and clientelistic practices are accepted as legitimate forms of interaction between state and
society—in this case between government and street vendor organizations—making them a
perfect example of the culture of informality, and an expression of the political culture that
exists in Mexico.
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The chapter analyzes the political arrangements and interactions of informal street vendor
organizations: First it discusses in detail the authoritarianism that exists within most orga-
nizations of street vendors; and then it examines the political interactions of these vendor
organizations in three ways: how government authorities and political parties control street
vendor leaders; how street vendor leaders and organizations can influence government author-
ities; and how members of street vendor organizations can control their leaders.
Two recent cases studied by the scholar Caroline Stamm are analyzed in detail, which
demonstrate certain new democratic practices that are taking place within commercial plazas
given to informal street vendor groups in Mexico City. She found that groups in charge of ad-
ministering some of these commercial plazas have got rid of abusive and authoritarian leaders
of organizations and are managing their commercial plazas and organizations using demo-
cratic practices such as creating general assemblies for decision-making, and selecting admin-
istrators in democratic elections. The analysis also illustrates the role that new political actors
play in these cases as a result of the new democratic framework that exists in Mexico and its
capital.
The chapter concludes with a short analysis of the role of women in the informal sector
in general, and in informal street vending in Mexico in particular. It explains why women
are generally over-represented in the street vending activity, what the historical factors were
that led many women to become street vendors in Mexico City, and why the most important
informal street vendor leaders in Mexico are women. This topic will be taken up again in
Chapter 6, which discusses the Asociación Legítima Cívica Comercial A.C. (alcc) and its
leader, Alejandra Barrios.
3.2 General characteristics of street vendor groups and organizations
Street vending is the activity of selling in the public space through a fixed, semi-fixed, or mo-
bile stall, or as an itinerant vendor (without a stand).1 Most of the legal vending activity that
happens in the public space (primarily on the street) takes place below the radar of government
(otherwise it would be subject to taxation and other regulations) and therefore is considered
1There are other types of vending schemes in the public space inMexico, for example tianguistas (i.e. open air
markets, flea markets, or bazaars); mercados sobre ruedas (i.e. markets on wheels); commercial plazas and public
markets (i.e. established indoor markets). However, these types of schemes fall more into the formal category and
are usually more systematic and better established in the public (or private) space than street vendors. Therefore,
they will not be considered in full, only in their relation to street vending. Particular attention will be given to
commercial plazas and public markets, as they are highly related to informal street vending in Mexico.
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informal. Informal street vendors do not pay taxes and often evade regulation, but do not
receive any government benefits or protection. In Mexico City they are organized in street
vendor groups (De Soto, 1989; Castro Nieto, 1990; Stamm, 2007; Castillo-Berthier, 2010).
The larger and better organized groups—located in one street or in several streets—are gener-
ally constituted in street vendor organizations, which are ocially recognized under the legal
figure (or legal status) of an ‘independent civil association’ (asociación civil).2 The status of
‘civil association’ gives street vendor organizations ‘legal personality’3; that is, legal recogni-
tion within the legal framework and the Mexican constitution, despite their informal nature.
The process for a group or organization of street vendors to become a civil association con-
sists of simple notary procedures. However, the importance for an informal organization or
group of informal street vendors of becoming a civil association lies not only in the ocial
and legal recognition of the association, but in the fact that they (street vendor organizations)
can legally claim rights4—such as the right to work—which allow them to continue perform-
ing their activities (e.g. justify their occupation of part of the public space to sell), resort to
legal instruments to defend their associations or members (e.g. use of amparo5 remedies or
actions), and in general benefit their associations using the legal system.
When street vendors have a stand, it is possible to identify to what organization they belong
from the color of their clothes—some organizations give their members waistcoats—or the
color of their stall’s tarp, which also helps to determine their territory (Stamm, 2007). In
some cases, the better organized and larger organizations also provide their members with
2According to the Mexican law—more specifically the Civil Code of the Federal District—a ‘Civil Associa-
tion’ (Asociación Civil) is a private, non-profit organization with full legal status, integrated by natural persons
(individuals) to carry out cultural, educational, outreach, entertainment, or similar purposes with the objective of
fostering social activities among their aliates and/or any third parties (ccdf, 2012). In Mexico, the asociación
civil is foreseen and governed by the Civil Codes of the several states of Mexico. This is a company where two
or more persons come together permanently to perform a common, licit, possible goal of a preponderantly non-
economic nature, and without constituting commercial speculation. It is also known as a common goal company
(therefore, not a civil company). This sort of company can be identified by the letters ‘A. C.’ used at the end of
the company’s name (Mexicolaw, 2012).
3Legal personality is the characteristic of a non-living entity regarded by law to have the status of personhood
(Smith, 1928). An entity with legal personality may protect its shareholders or members from personal liability.
The concept of a legal person is now central to Western law in both common-law and civil-law countries, but it is
also found in virtually every legal system (Smith, 1928).
4When appealing for their rights, informal street vendor groups generally refer to Articles 4, 5, 6, and 123 of
the Mexican Constitution, which cover human rights and the right to work (Jiménez, 2012).
5An amparo is a form of constitutional relief found in the legal systems of Mexico and other Latin American
countries. An amparo remedy or action is an eective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of an individ-
ual’s constitutional rights. Such remedies and actions serve a dual protective purpose: they protect the citizen and
his or her basic guarantees, and they protect the constitution itself by ensuring that its principles are not violated
by statutes or actions of the state that undermine the basic rights enshrined therein. It may therefore be invoked
by any person who believes that any of his or her rights implicitly or explicitly protected by the constitution (or
by applicable international treaties) are being violated (Gozon Jr. and Orosa, 2008).
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photo id credentials to identify themselves—to government agents and street vendor leaders
or representatives—as members of a particular organization.
These organizations, whichhave primarily been studied in theHistoricalCenter andTepito6
neighborhood ofMexico City, comprise anything from a dozen to several thousand members.
Consequently, street vendor organizations located in Mexico City’s center are very heteroge-
neous and dier in many ways, in addition to size.7 Many organizations developed in the
mid-1990s, while others date back to the mid-1950s,8 a period during which the city mayor,
Ernesto P. Uruchurtu, assigned special permits to street vendors whose organizations joined
the popular sector of the then ruling party (the pri) (Cross, 1996). The organizations are hi-
erarchically structured, so the street vendor leader controls who enters the organization they
lead, the location of members along the street, the size of vendors’ stalls, the fees vendor
members have to pay, and in several cases the merchandise that they sell (Crossa, 2009).
Within the sales area of each street vending organization, members are provided with a sale
or vending space where they set up their stall.9 Every member of the organization must pay a
daily, weekly, or monthly fee to the leader of the organization. Vendor organization leaders
transfer part of themonies to the government bodies (in exchange for permits when the option
exists) or ocials (in exchange for corrupt toleration when the situations so requires), pay
some into the organization’s funds to pay its expenses, and in general keep some for themselves
(Sanchez, 2005; Monge, 2009; Castillo-Berthier, 2010). The fee varies depending on the size
of the vendor’s stand and its location on the street10: the larger the stand, or the better its
6Tepito is a neighborhood located in Mexico City’s Cuauhtémoc Delegation. It houses a popular tianguis or
street market famous for selling thousands of items at very low prices. Much of the merchandise sold in Tepito is
illegal in one way or another. Tepito is also known for underground weapons and drugs trac in high numbers.
7This heterogeneity can have a (spatial and) geographic logic: for example, the Tepito organizations have
fewer members than those in the Historical Center; as a result, the former are more numerous and dispersed
while the latter are less numerous and more concentrated. Therefore, it can be inferred that there is a mafia-
type concentration system of these organizations in the Historical Center—there are fewer organizations there,
with more members each, and they are geographically concentrated in one location—and a dispersion system
in Tepito—where there are more associations with fewer members each, and they are geographically dispersed
(Tomas, 2004).
8As will be seen in the following chapters, most of these groups evolved from street vendor organizations to
market organizations, as they were allocated spaces in public markets or commercial plazas, but others, such as
the one led by Guillermina Rico, kept selling on the streets.
9In a large part of the Historical Center, the stands are mostly semi-fixed or movable and are positioned on
the public thoroughfare (sidewalks and streets). Stands are flexible and can be removed at night and reinstalled
the next day. In commercial plazas, vendors are given a fixed or permanent stall (made of cement or metal).
10Evidence also shows that fees may also vary depending on the type of product sold (or the volume of sales);
the more expensive the product sold (or the larger the volume of sales), the higher the fee paid to the organization
(Antunez, 2012).
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position, the higher the fee paid to the organization.11 Sometimes extra fees are charged for
very specific purposes; for example, to hire the services of a lawyer, or to bribe a particular
government ocial, among other things. Although larger and better-managed organizations
have accumulated sucient wealth to provide loans to vendor members, build schools for
the members’ children, and provide housing credits for its members, other organizations can
barely aord the necessary funds to function.
It is worth pointing out that some of the larger and better organized street vendor organi-
zations use their status as a ‘civil association’ not only to gain legal rights and recognition
but also to benefit economically (Osorio, 2007a, 2007b). In general, a civil association is con-
sidered a non-profit type of organization, but the leaders of organizations which are able to
accumulate certain levels of monetary wealth create ‘trust-funds’ (fideicomisos)12 in order to
evade the payment of taxes, to protect the organization’s assets, and obtain other economic
advantages. In situations like this, a trust-fund eectively functions as an informal bank or
informal credit institution, from which vendor leaders have readily available cash for multiple
purposes—some for the benefit of the association, some for the leaders’ personal benefit.
While some vendor organizations belong to national and international commercial net-
works, others depend on local or regional networks of exchange (Alarcón González, 2002;
Crossa, 2009). Besides the existing heterogeneity among vendor organizations, informal street
vending as an activity also varies considerably in type and size of stand, daily profits earned,
merchandise sold, the number of people working on each stand, their relationship to the
leader, supply and distribution processes, and geographical location within the city (Crossa,
2009).
Even though some street vendors are undoubtedly involved in unlawful activities, such as
selling stolen or contraband goods, or pirated music and movies (Crossa, 2009), the vast ma-
jority participate in lawful and permitted forms of distribution and exchange. By providing
11Some sources claim vendors are charged at least 50 pesos a day (Sanchez, 2005; Osorio, 2007a). Fees charged
to street vendors will be discussed in Chapter 6.
12A ‘trust fund’ (fideicomiso) is a financial tool through which financial assets are managed for the benefit of
a natural person or a legal entity. The initial assets are provided by a settlor or trustor (in this case, the vendor
organization), who assigns his or her property—money or rights—to the trustee (by law, in Mexico it must be a
bank) for management and administration. The settlor (or the beneficiaries designated by him or her, in this case
the vendor members and the organization itself) receives a payment from the fund in accordance with the terms
of the agreement reached between both parties. The trust funds are often used when a settlor is unable to manage
her or his property. They are also widely used to avoid paying certain taxes. According to the tax code of the
Mexican federation, only individuals and corporations are required to contribute to the tax system (to pay taxes).
A trust fund has no legal personality and therefore cannot be considered either a legal entity or a natural person
(individual). For this reason, trust funds are not subject to taxes. It is also worth noticing that the assets of a trust
fund cannot be legally pursued by creditors of the settlor or the trustee.
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low-priced and therefore accessible goods and products to the urban population—primarily
the poorer sectors of the population—many street vendors carry out an important socio-
economic function (Bhowmik, 2007; Crossa, 2009; Barrios, 2010; Neuwirth, 2012).
The street is the place that provides people who work as street vendors with an honest and
decent means of earning a living, and concurrently one where they build and strengthen their
ties with colleagues, friends, and family members. Several street vendors have taken part in
this form of economic activity since they were children, aiding their street vendor parents,
or working for a relative or a friend (Barrios, 2010). Those who were comparatively new to
street vending were assisted by existing ties to family or social networks set in street vending
activities. Thus for the majority of street vendors the street is both an extension of their home,
of their social circle, and a place of work (Crossa, 2009).
In practice—and when tolerated—the public authorities make an agreement with street
vending organizations to delineate a defined area of sales (Azuela, 1990), which can be dis-
puted immediately by another group of street vendors. Antonio Azuela (1990), John Cross
(1998), and Chapter 5 of this thesis describe how street occupations by street vendor groups
are common and a cause for conflict. There are frequent stories of this sort of dispute in
national or local newspapers, or on tv. This recurring problem decreased when government
authorities started to grant commercial plazas or commercial corridors13 to street vending
organizations, so they could relocate their members there. Eventually, all the larger and more
important informal vendor organizations had at least one commercial plaza under their con-
trol (Barrios, 2010), but that did not stop large informal vendor organizations from allocating
street vendors—especially new members—to the streets.
While the vast majority of street vendors belong to an organization or association, this fact
is not merely the result of grassroots organization—which allows the internal regulation of
their activities and group representation before other actors. It is, above all and fundamen-
tally, the direct result of the shaping of the Mexican corporatist system and administrative
procedures14 whose combination required that individuals belonged to a recognized organi-
zation to be allowed to sell on the street (Cross, 1998; Stamm, 2007). Therefore, the history of
13Commercial plazas and commercial corridors are a type of indoor markets built by city authorities in the
early 1990s to relocate informal street vendors. The main dierences with the traditional indoor public markets
of the 1950s and 1960s are: First, the financing of the construction and maintenance of the commercial plazas
and corridors was responsibility of the vendor organizations and not of the government as it was in the past.
Second, in the commercial plazas the individual vendor members were the rightful owners of their stalls and not
the government, as it was in the past in the traditional indoor public markets.
14Themarket regulation of 1951 recognized street vendors associations. Street vendors were required by law to
form associations in order to be recognized, to be able to sell on the street, and to able to deal with the government.
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street vending organizations in Mexico is highly politicized and closely related to the corpo-
ratization of the Mexican state after the Mexican Revolution. The next section analyzes the
corporatist inheritance of theMexican state relating to informal street vending organizations.
3.3 The corporatization of informal street vending in Mexico
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the then ocial party, the Party of the Mexican Revolu-
tion (Partido de la RevoluciónMexicana, prm)—which eventually evolved into the pri15—laid
down a project of national unity (Castro Nieto, 1990; Garrido, 2005). One of its objectives
was to organize and control Mexican society by creating distinct organizations and groups,
and then integrating them within the ocial party structure. Lázaro Cárdenas, president of
Mexico from 1934 to 1940, structured the PRM-pri in sectors: the workers’ sector, material-
ized in the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos,
ctm) founded in 1936; the agrarian sector, materialized in theNational PeasantConfederation
(Confederación Nacional Campesina, cnc) founded in 1938; the military sector—included as
a sector of the party in 1938, diluted of its authority in 1940, and finally abolished in 1946, but
whose members where later integrated into the popular sector; and the popular sector, ma-
terialized in the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (Confederación Nacional
de Organizaciones Populares, cnop) founded in 1943 (Garrido, 2005). The street vendor or-
ganizations joined the last one, the cnop, together with other groups: professionals, youth
organizations, women’s groups, and so on (Castro Nieto, 1990; Stamm, 2007).
The formation of these sector groups and their integration into the ocial party legitimized
the existing street vendor organizations16 and allowed new ones to be created, transforming
15Between 1934 and 1940, an intense struggle for political control developed between the ex-president Plutarco
Elías Calles and the new president, Lázaro Cárdenas. At the time, Calles represented the conservative elements
of the revolutionary coalition, while Cárdenas drew his support from the more radical political elements. To
strengthen his hand against Calles, Cárdenas reunited the labor and peasant organizations that Calles had earlier
fragmented and formed two national federations, the National Peasant Confederation (Confederación Nacional
Campesina, cnc) and the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos, ctm).
Using these organizations as the bases of his support, Cárdenas then reorganized theNationalRevolutionary Party
(Partido Nacional Revolucionario, pnr) in 1938, renaming it the Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la
Revolución Mexicana, prm), incorporating the ctm and the cnc and giving the prm an organization by sectors:
agrarian, labor, popular, and military. The creation of these groups and their integration into the party marked
the legitimization of the existing interest group organizations and the transformation of the political system from
an elite system to a mass-based system. In early 1940 the authority of the military sector was diluted, and in 1946
President Manuel Ávila Camacho dissolved the military sector, shifted its members into the popular sector, and
renamed the party the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, pri).
16The roots of these organizations are found at the end of the 19th century in the conflict over public spaces
and informal associative practices developed by street vendors under the regime of Porfírio Díaz (Stamm, 2007).
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the Mexican political system into one supported by the masses. In this way, individuals were
incorporated into the PRM-pri through their adherence to a union or a member organization
aliated to a specific sector of the party, according to their status and activity, even if some of
these organizations—or the activities that they performed—were, for the most part, informal.
Chapter vi of the 1951 market regulation allowed street vendors in Mexico City to form
associations to represent their interests (Diario Oficial, 1951), but only those of more than
100 members were recognized by the government and they were required to join the pri and
to support the political actions of the party. In return, Ernesto P. Uruchurtu, the mayor of
Mexico City from 1952 to 1966, guaranteed the construction ofmarkets and authorized street
vendors to sell on the streets while the markets were being built. This period was character-
ized by a true politicization of street vendors (Cross, 1998), as well as the generalization and
acceptance of corporatism as a form of relationship between the street vendors (through their
organizations) and the government (through the ruling party) (Stamm, 2007).
Thus, two fundamental characteristics of corporatism were present in the functioning of
street vendor organizations: the ‘forced mediation’, in which individual vendors are obliged
to go through an organization to obtain a selling permit to sell goods on the street, giving
organization leaders considerable power; and the ‘compulsory aliation’ of organizations to
the ruling party in order to obtain permits for their members (Azuela, 1990; Stamm, 2007).
These factors started to shape the corporatization of street vending that developed inMexico.
It was a win-win arrangement for all the groups involved: street vendor organizations and
their members provided votes, support, and important mobilization potential for the ruling
party; and vendor leaders had access to important government authorities and prominent
leaders within the party, who could become their political patrons. In this way, the political
machinery of the pri tried to co-opt street vendors—while giving them the opportunity to
neutralize attempts to control them by the authorities—in particular through the growing
power of the leaders of street vendor organizations (Stamm, 2007).
Uruchurtu’s policies had an impact on the configuration and future strengthening of the
street vendor organizations. He implemented policies to achieve two simultaneous objec-
tives: first, to remove street vendors o the street—and therefore eectively eliminating street
vending—and relocating them in public markets; and second, to create and organize a clien-
telistic group of market vendors to advance his political career (Cross, 1998). To accom-
plish these objectives, Uruchurtu undertook a large-scale program of market construction
into which he would relocate street vendors, while at the same time carrying out the most
109
the corporatization of informal street vending in mexico
severe repression of this group in Mexico City’s history. Eventually, the demands of these two
policies—basically the high costs of building public markets and the severe repression against
street vendors (among other marginal groups)—contributed to the collapse of Uruchurtu’s
political career (Cross, 1998).
Themost relevant bequest of the Uruchurtu administrationwas theway he shaped relations
between the street vendors and the city government, which later gave street vendors a stronger
position (Cross, 1998). The street vendors that did not obtain a space on the newly built
markets and that survived the harsh repression came back strengthened: those who could
survive Uruchurtu’s regime could endure any kind of suppressive regime. These groups of
non-favoured street vendors were the origin of the largest, better organized, and most pow-
erful organizations that exist in Mexico City today. As many of the survivors of this period
were women—several of whom were not granted or were unable to get a vending space in the
markets—many of the leaders who emerged from these groups were also female. They even-
tually formed their own organizations and led them in the years to come. Examples of these
leaders are Guillermina Rico and Benita Chavarría (Monge, 1990c).17
Not long after Uruchurtu resigned as mayor of Mexico City in 1966, the market construc-
tion program was discontinued in favor of new programs (such as the construction of the
Metro18). However, government ocials and city authorities continued to require vendor
groups to be organized into associations that had to demonstrate their allegiance to the PRI—
usually by finding a political patron—if they were to be allowed to sell their goods on the
streets. Government ocials concealed the fact that they were allowing street vending to re-
emerge by suggesting that street vendors were being tolerated only until markets were built
(Cross, 1998), but the government lost control of the situation, leading to a significant increase
in the number and size of street vendor groups.
The government ocials and city authorities that succeeded Uruchurtu never intended to
allow the dramatic growth of street vending that occurred in the following decades. On the
contrary, they wanted to stem the growth of street vendors, which had become politically un-
sustainable for the pri and economically unsustainable for the government. Politically unsus-
tainable because dierent political actors and interests (inside and outside the pri) demanded
the eradication of informal street vendors whose activity was seen by many as a threat to
their interests (e.g. public market vendors or formally established merchants); and economi-
17Alejandra Barrios—the other historic street vendor leader—lived through this time but formed her associa-
tion some years later, at the end of the 1970s.
18The Collective Transport System (Sistema de Transporte Colectivo) is Mexico City’s underground service,
commonly known as the Metro.
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cally unsustainable because in order to cope with the problem, the government had to spend
considerable amounts of money (e.g. the construction of markets). Nevertheless, the poli-
cies implemented by Uruchurtu had significantly politicized street vending by utilizing the
market construction program as an inducement for street vendors to organize inside the pri,
and as a recompense for loyalty towards Uruchurtu’s political goals (Cross, 1998). In order
to take advantage of the political benefits of organizing street vendors in the same manner
that Uruchurtu had organized market vendors19, new government authorities made the criti-
cal error of following his policies, but without understanding the thinking behind them, thus
fostering the formation of more street vending organizations (Cross, 1998).
Moreover, by requiring street vendors to form associations, the government authorities
gave the associations—and particularly their leaders—definitive power over individual ven-
dors, permitting these leaders to use their vendor members as they wished to defend their
interests—increasing their space on the street, increasing their membership, and ultimately
increasing the phenomenon of street vending to a level without precedent in Mexico’s history
(Cross, 1998).
3.3.1 Corporatism and clientelism
In Mexico, the corporatist system comes together with clientelism. Scholar Viviane Brachet-
Marquez (1992:94) characterized clientelism in the following way:
Clientelism refers to the structuring of political power through networks of in-
formal dyadic relations that link individuals of unequal power in relationships of
exchange. In clientelistic structures of authority, power is vested in the top indi-
vidual (the boss, sovereign, or head of clan) who personally decides how to dis-
tribute resources according to personal preferences. When applied to Mexico,
this perspective represents the state as a top-down pyramid headed by the chief
of the executive branch, who directly or indirectly dispenses favors to those below
through complex patron-client networks that link the base of the social structure
to the top. Civil society, in contrast, is perceived as a fragmented set of vertical
relationships inhibiting the formation of horizontal interest groupings, whether
based on party or social class. This form of political organization, which was
19Former street vendors that entered the market construction program implemented by Uruchurtu and became
his political clientele.
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initially understood as a typical trait of premodern oligarchic societies, was fi-
nally recognized as a more or less permanent feature of Latin American political
systems.
Moreover, it is common that within the street vendor organizations a leader emerges and is
able to create personal relationships with the authorities.20 Castro Nieto (1990) proposed a
typology of such leaders: the independent leader, the traditional leader, and themodern leader.
Independent leaders are not aliated to the ocial or ruling party or the government; they
obtain selling permits through ocial and legitimate channels. Traditional leaders rely on
their local origin and friendship and kinship (compadrazgo) relationships to reach their goals.
Finally, modern leaders have a defined status within the community and propose economic
benefits, such as the creation of cajas de ahorro (popular savings banks) (Castro Nieto, 1990).
Some leaders combine characteristics of the dierent typologies, given the heterogeneity of
the leaders and organizations that exists.
In all three cases, the leader constitutes a political intermediary or ‘middleman’ (Lomnitz,
1978; Cornelius, 1986; Castro Nieto, 1990, Stamm, 2007). This clientelistic behavior is re-
lated to the hierarchy of the traditionalMexican political system, which consisted of a certain
number of camarillas (cliques of ocials) competing for the distribution of government posts.
This in turn depended in part on their ability to distribute resources to popular organizations.
However, as John Cross accurately points out, writing about the competition between street
vendors’ leaders for selling spaces and for a largermembership, “vendor leaders cannot reduce
their own interests to those of their political patrons” (Cross, 1998:80).
Clientelistic practices are so deeply rooted among street vendors that in some cases they
have ended up assuming that the dependence on their organization’s leader, the permanent
negotiation, and the non-compliance of laws and regulations are legitimate forms of inter-
mediation between state and society (Grisales Ramírez, 2003). This is culture of informality
at its best, or better said, the consolidation of the culture of informality. Nevertheless, if the
power of vendor leaders is too strong, to the point where they use violence to enforce their
authority, and the functioning of the organization is non-democratic and abusive, that power
has to be reduced as vendor members might rebel or leave the organization (Stamm, 2007).
Therefore, the ability of the state to control street vending has been determined by corpo-
ratist and clientelistic political relations between street vendors, represented by a leader, and
the state, represented by government ocials and ruling party authorities (Cross, 1998). It is
20Examples are Guillermina Rico and Alejandra Barrios, both historic leaders of large and powerful street
vendor associations. The vendor association of the latter is analyzed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
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important to underline that the power of street vendor associations in Mexico City, predomi-
nantly in theHistoricalCenter, seems to be a particularity ofMexicoCity until the years 1980–
1990 (Stamm, 2007). If compared with other studies made of street vending in other Mexican
cities (Ramírez Saiz and Mora, 1998) and other cities in Latin America (Roever, 2005), street
vendor organizations in Mexico City were particularly important numerically, strong polit-
ically and economically, and had a significant power relationship with the government and
authorities (Stamm, 2007).
3.4 The political arrangements and interactions of street vending organizations
3.4.1 The emergence of authoritarianism in street vending organizations
Street vending was often seen as a refuge occupation for ‘marginal’ populations who were ex-
cluded from more lucrative employment. Street vendors’ collective experience of seeing their
occupation and source of revenues threatened, and the subsequent mobilization to save them,
generates a high level of solidarity during the initial phases of organizational development
of street vendor groups. However, once recognition is secured—from the authorities and the
street vendors themselves—and the organization begins to become ‘institutionalized’, solidar-
ity is rapidly replaced by authority (Cross, 1998).21 Authoritarian traces within street vendor
organizations are often found in the assignation of stalls or space on the street, in the pun-
ishment of members who do not participate in political rallies and protests—by suspending
their selling rights for some time—and in the collection of fees or charges, which are often
high, just to name a few.
Often even the most loyal members of street vendor organizations become disenchanted
with the organization when the level of authority of the leader goes beyond limits. Members
of powerful organizations with strong leaders tend to feel that they have lost control of the
organization, that they have just become ‘tenants’ or ‘lessees’, forced to pay fees and attend
political rallies and protests when ordered by the leader, but without any control over ‘their’
association (Cross, 1998).
21Thus, under authoritarian leadership, all decision-making powers are centralized in the leader, as in a dic-
tatorship or autocracy. Often, leaders do not consider any suggestions or initiatives made by subordinates. An
authoritarian management is frequently successful because it provides strong motivation to the leader. It permits
quick decision-making, as only one person decides on behalf of the whole group and these leaders keep each
decision to themselves until they feel it needs to be shared with the rest of the group.
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This type of ‘street vending authoritarianism’ is a reflection of Mexico’s corporatist past
and, ultimately, of Mexico’s authoritative political system; although things started to change
in the 1990s when the government ofMexico City gradually became more democratic. While,
historically, government and party ocials had insisted that street vendors should form asso-
ciations in order to negotiate with them, the system of patronage to which street vendors had
to submit themselves in order to negotiate with the government strengthened the position and
role of the associations’ leaders in relation to their members, as mentioned above.
Thus, there are several reasons for the emergence of and increasing authoritarianismwithin
street vending organizations, mainly relating to the preeminence of the association’s leader
over members. First, in general, only the leader of the association gets to meet with govern-
ment ocials and political patrons on a regular basis. Government ocials usually insist
on this as they disapprove of and dislike large crowds and public meetings. The street vendor
leader thus operates as the liaison between the street vendors in the organization, government
ocials, and political patrons. As the head of a street vendor association, leaders have the au-
thority andpower to distribute the stalls the city government allows them to set up among their
numerous members. They are also required to persuade members to attend political rallies
in support of political patrons, government ocials, or key associates. Street vendor leaders,
and not the individual members of the organization, are ultimately the people with access to
political patrons and government ocials, and these vendor leaders become the sponsors or
benefactors for the members of their association (Cross, 1998; Barrios, 2010).
Some leaders disagree with this type of modus operandi, but although they may not be
authoritarian, they clearly become or establish themselves as the principal of the group, and
even those leaders who do not impose authoritarian control end up assuming more and more
features and behaviors of ‘authoritarian leaders’. For example, they may not charge their
members fees, but they take the best positioned stalls in the area assigned to their group (Cross,
1998).
The second reason for the rise and strengthening of authoritarianism in street vending or-
ganizations is that government policies as well as government ocials and authorities tend
to favor well-established and organized leaders over dissident groups or individuals within
the same association, which strengthens the authoritarian role of leaders within them. Thus,
when a conflict emerges within a street vendor association, the initial inclination of govern-
ment ocials and authorities is to support the time-honored, established leader. Thus, a rebel
street vendor or dissenting group is at an enormous disadvantage if they try to overcome the
leader of the organization they belong to. Not only are they opposed by the leader they are
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challenging, but they also receive no cooperation, if not straight opposition, from government
ocials and authorities. The same holds true for the political patrons, who are inclined to sup-
port the ocially recognized leaders of street vending organizations (Cross, 1998).22
A third reason that reinforces authoritarianism in street vendororganizations is the fact that
these organizations’ leaders can extract considerable monetary benefits from their leadership.
The fees that street vendors pay to their associations are supposed to go towards administra-
tive costs—such as oce costs—or those that benefit all themembers of the association—such
as legal consultancy or lawyer services,23 but these fees can also provide a generous source of
income for the leaders themselves. Several associations charge entrance fees to new members,
which may add up to several hundreds of dollars a month or even a day, as Chapter 6 will
show. In addition, leaders may diversify their activities in ways that also produce revenue. For
example, they can function as suppliers or wholesalers of products to their own members,
or control truck services for transportation where there are mobile markets (mercados sobre
ruedas). Some leaders also control informal credit facilities within the association, such as
rotating credit schemes (tanda) or informal saving accounts. While not all the street vendor
leaders take unfair advantage of these additional benefits of leadership, some have become ex-
tremely rich during the years they have operated as street vendor leaders (Cross, 1998; Barrios,
2010; Castillo-Berthier, 2010).
A fourth and final reason for the authoritarianism within street vendor organizations orig-
inates from the natural need of street vendors to have leaders to organize and defend them.
In a milieu in which street vendors must be eciently assembled and ready for action to pro-
tect their interests and areas against government intrusion or invasion of other street vendors’
groups, and to provide political or economic support to their political patrons, the most suc-
cessful street vendor associations are those where the leaders have more ability to persuade
or coerce members to cooperate politically and economically (Cross, 1998; Castillo-Berthier,
2010).
Sometimes cycles of conflict may lead to more authoritarian measures by street vendor
group leaders in order to obtain indispensable resources to protect the members’ interests
22This is also related to leadership recognition; street vendor leaders are eager to have their leadership rec-
ognized when they first deal with a new authority (Barrios, 2010). Once an authority recognizes a particular
street vendor leader as the interlocutor or representative of an association, it is very hard to listen to a dierent
one from the same association. This helps to perpetuate leaders recognized by those in authority as heads of an
organization, and thus encourages street vendor authoritarianism.
23As we will see in the case study of the alcc (Chapter 6), some street vendor associations have elaborate
management and detailed organizational schemes; they have oces with computer facilities, and can provide
members with identity cards and benefits such as credit services, a social center, and even a child care center.
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or further expand their areas. As John Cross (1998) noted, this suggests that the pressure ex-
erted by government ocials and authorities results in unorganized street vendors getting or-
ganized (and forming associations), and organized street vendor associations becoming more
authoritarian (Cross, 1998). Cycles of conflict may also encourage leaders of associations to
abuse their position. For example, the leader might request street vendors for an emergency
fee to cope with a threat or an unexpected situation (e.g. to pay for a bribe) when in reality the
threat could be exaggerated or the bribe smaller than what the leader asked for. The money
collected invariably ends up in the leader’s pocket (Cross, 1998; Sanchez, 2005). For all these
reasons the democratization of street vendor associations can be extremely dicult.24
3.4.2 How government authorities and political parties control street vendor leaders
There are three main methods used by government authorities and political parties to control
street vendor leaders. The first is threatening street vendor leaders to revoke their positions of
leadership within their organization. Legally, this is against the law as several street vendor
associations are registered as ‘independent civil associations’ (asociación civil), which gives
them ‘legal personality’25 that protects them against such government interventions (Cross,
1998). In other words, the status of being a civil association gives street vendor organizations
legal recognition within the legal framework and the Mexican constitution—despite the in-
formal nature of their activity—which grants them autonomy to choose their leaders.26 This
24Later in this chapter (Section 3.5) I discuss certain democratic practices —identified by Caroline Stamm
(2007)—that gradually have been taking place within the vendor organizations of some commercial plazas in
Mexico City. It is worth pointing out that vendor organizations located on the street and vendor organizations
located in commercial plazas have dierent legal, spatial, locational and ownership contexts. However, despite
the dierence in contexts, the processes of liberation of the commercial plazas’ members from their leaders has
directly influenced the vendor organizations located on the street, according to Stamm (2007).
25Legal personality is the characteristic of a non-living entity regarded by law to have the status of personhood
(Smith, 1928). A legal person (Latin: persona ficta) has a legal name and rights, protections, privileges, respon-
sibilities, and liabilities guaranteed by law, just as natural persons (humans) do. The concept of a legal person is
a fundamental legal fiction. It is pertinent to the philosophy of law, as it is essential to laws aecting a corpora-
tion (corporation law) (the law of business associations). Legal personality allows one or more natural persons
to act as a single entity (a composite person) for legal purposes. In many jurisdictions, legal personality allows a
composite to be considered under law separately from its individual members or shareholders. They may sue and
be sued, enter contracts, incur debt, and own property. Entities with legal personality may also be subjected to
certain legal obligations, such as the payment of taxes (However, street vendor organizations evade them with the
formation of trust funds). An entity with legal personality may protect its shareholders ormembers from personal
liability. The concept of a legal person is now central to Western law in both common-law and civil-law countries,
but it is also found in virtually every legal system (Smith, 1928).
26Civil Associations are groups formed by private individuals and are governed by its statutes. Neither the
government nor the authorities have the power to decide who makes up or who leads the civil association, since
the association’s statutes establish the rules and regulations to be followed for the life of the association.
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type of ‘legal shield’ works for the benefit of the leaders in some other ways. For example,
there have been many complaints from street vendor members to government authorities re-
porting abuse by their leaders, but government authorities almost always reply that they are
not able to interfere, without authorization, in the associations, although they may agree that
the complaints are valid (Cross, 1998).
Nevertheless, in practice there are some ways in which government authorities and party
ocials can intervene eectively when it serves their purposes of control or for another reason.
The second method by which government authorities control street vendor leaders is to bring
criminal charges against the leader in question. This strategy has been used against several
leaders, including Alejandra Barrios, as we will see in Chapter 5. However, this method tends
not to be very eective in the long run and achieves little more than inconsequential hounding
when the leaderswho are being pursuedhave good connections or funds to pay forhigh-quality
legal services (Cross, 1998; Barrios, 2010).
The third method of control by government authorities and party ocials consists of sup-
porting a revolt from within the association itself. They shut o access to the leader and pro-
vide support and access to one of the association’s subordinates instead, much in the same
fashion as Michael Coppedge (1993) described in his paper “Parties and Society in Mexico
and Venezuela: Why competition matters”. This behavior has also been well documented by
John Cross in his book (1998) on informal politics.
While the government and political parties used these methods to undermine the authority
and leadership of politically non-collaborative leaders, there is no clear evidence that shows
that they have used these types of procedures to penalize or control the leaders for expanding
their areas of action or activity (Cross, 1998). That is, they have not used these methods for
the sole purpose of enforcing the law. Thus, even when the government or political parties
have disciplined street vendor leaders for their political inaction or lack of support, this has
not prevented street vending from expanding, not even at the moment of admonition. There-
fore, this sort of control has been used by government authorities or political parties only for
political rather than eective governance or policy-making reasons (Cross, 1998).
3.4.3 How street vendor leaders and organizations can inuence government authorities
In general, street vendor organizations are at a disadvantage when dealing with government
authorities, but there are some tactics street vendor leaders can use to influence them. The
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first is through corruption, by bribing individual government ocials; once ocials have ac-
cepted a bribe or unlawful favor from a street vendor leader it weakens their ability to enforce
the laws eectively, especially when they are required to take measures against street vendor
organizations. As both parties are bound by an act of corruption, street vendor leaders can
always use that fact to oblige the ocial to act in their favor, threatening that they may report
the ocial to authorities higher in the hierarchy. In practice this rarely happens; if a govern-
ment ocial and street vendor leader engage in a corruption scheme, both parties are likely
to respect their agreement until the ocial finishes her or his term of service or is substituted
by a new ocial. Moreover, when a situation of conflict arises between government ocials
and street vendor leaders, government authorities almost always side with their ocials, no
matter the charges against them (Cross, 1998). This is therefore more a tactic street vendors
use to put pressure on ocials or authorities to favor them than a tactic to remove particular
ocials from their post. The latter might only occur if there is irrefutable evidence that o-
cials have accepted bribes or been involved in corrupt practices, to the point that government
authorities can no longer support or defend the ocials in question.
Another tactic street vendor leaders or organizations use to influence government ocials
or authorities relates to the authoritarian model of street vendor organizations, the lack of
continuity of government ocials, and decentralization problems of government authorities.
While street vendor organizations are ‘democratic’ in theory, in practice most street vendor
leaders can retain their position almost permanently. This continuity of power gives them
the advantage of having more practical knowledge and stronger organizational capabilities
than many (sometimes new) government ocials. Therefore, in any conflict between govern-
ment ocials and street vendor organizations, street vendor leaders can adopt a long-term
perspective, postponing changes, negotiations, or decision-making as much as possible until
government ocials change, or the political climate becomes more favorable to them. Street
vendor organizations may also choose to be compliant with certain government ocials in the
hope of gaining their favors, both immediately and/or when they move on to other positions
of greater importance (Cross, 1998).
Concurrently, although street vendors are divided into many dierent rival organizations,
the latent competition among them actually makes them stronger in relation to the govern-
ment. For example, a particular street vendor leader could pretend to support certain gov-
ernmental plans to relocate street vendors or to restrict their growth, while simultaneously
refusing to cooperate until all the other street vendor leaders had also agreed with the govern-
ment’s proposals. Otherwise, the leaders could rightfully argue that the other street vendor
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organizations would simply take over the territory they had left vacant (Cross, 1998). This
tactic would work to their advantage in the long run as a ‘postponement technique’.
3.4.4 How members of a street vendor association can control their leaders
Despite the prevailing authoritarian system and lack of democratic processes in most street
vendor associations, street vendor members are not entirely powerless or completely at the
mercy of their associations’ leaders (Cross, 1998).27
Street vendor organization members have two tools they can use against any of their lead-
ers who take advantage of their power and/or fail to protect their members’ interest. First, as
mentioned earlier, they can dissent and rise up against their leaders, but this course of action
involves great risks. Street vendor leaders whose power is threatened by an internal rebellion
might use violence to preserve their position and expel the dissidents, and the leader’s compre-
hensive network of connections, intercessors, and political patrons can usually provide them
with greater political leverage than that of dissidents. For dissident members to be success-
ful when undertaking this course of action, they need to find their own political patrons and
sponsors, as well as a reasonable number of members who support their cause, and have the
persistence to oblige the government to take notice and listen to them (Cross, 1998; Antunez,
2012).
The second and most important tool street vendor members can use against their organi-
zation’s leader is simply to quit or walk away from the street vendor association if the leader
makes excessive demands in fees and political activism, or is unsuccessful in protecting ma-
jor street vending commercial areas used by the organization. This course of action is not
necessarily political. As Cross points out, “it is the product of the leader’s function as eco-
nomic as well as political entrepreneurs” (Cross, 1998:156). In other words, if street vendors
can no longer make a profit by selling on the streets because the association’s fees are very
high, political demands are too severe, or the vendor leader accepts the authorities’ request
to relocate despite members’ opposition, then street vendor members can choose to abandon
the organization purely because of the adverse economic circumstances (Cross, 1998; Barrios,
2010; Antunez, 2012).
27If the authority of street vendor leaders was all powerful, they could manipulate their members in ways to
suit their interests better, but as the authority of the leader over vendor members is limited, the leaders are obliged
to maximize their profits by expanding their membership rather than fully exploiting it (Cross, 1998).
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As we will see in Chapter 6, there is almost no reliable data (or none was made available
to me when I requested it from vendor associations) on street vendor turnover—the length of
time street vendors stay in a street vendor association—in vendor associations (or markets)
because the notion of membership of a street vendor organization is not clearly defined, or be-
cause street vendor leaders of the largest andmost powerful associations deny having updated
membership lists. However, the leaders of street vendor associations accept that their mem-
bers are first and foremost individuals trying to earn a decent living (Barrios, 2010). Vendor
members are not trying to make political statements and their loyalty to the leader is based
exclusively on the provision of profitable commercial space for street vending. Street vendor
organization members become political entities only when they are required by their leaders
to show support for a particular person (candidate, politician or ocial), but they are not
forced to vote for them (Cross, 1998). The political support is limited only to attending po-
litical rallies or protests and does not include vote coercion (Barrios, 2010).28 This explains
why although street vendor leaders are authoritarian, they cannot force their members to sur-
render wholly to government ocials; a leader who gives up a major selling area or agrees to
limit the expansion of the membership or the proceeds of the organization’s members will
not be deposed; the members of an association with such a leader will simply leave it (Cross,
1998; Antunez, 2012).
In contrast with workers in a factory or large formal business where a single organization—
union, confederation or league—represents all workers, street vendors can change their ‘repre-
sentative’ by relocating their stall from the street vending area of one leader to that of another
(Cross, 1998). The condition of informality and the large number of informal groups give
street vendors the flexibility to move from one organization to another more easily than work-
ers in a factory or business can move from one union to another. This is the main dierence
between a worker’s union and an informal street vendor organization in terms of aliation
and representation. As a result, as we will see later, in order to retain their positions, leaders
of street vendor organizations must ensure that the benefits and costs of membership of the
organization are competitive (Cross, 1998; Barrios, 2010).
Leaving an association and moving to a new one comes at a high price. If street vendors
move from their customary space in an association into a dierent space provided by a new
association, most forfeit the clientele they have built up in the past, and may have to pay an
additional sum of money to have the right to a new space (Cross, 1998; Antunez, 2012). Thus
28Political patronsmay ask the vendororganizations formonetary contributions aswell, whichmaybe included
in the fee paid by the vendor members to the street vendor leader (Sanchez, 2005).
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if street vendors want to move from one association to another they have to cope with the
loss of their previous clientele and the possible obligation to pay a large sum of money to a
new association for a new place to sell their goods. Both these factors are strong economic
disincentives for street vendors to move between associations.29 Thus, economic incentives
and not political motivations are the decisive driving force for street vendor members, just as
they are for street vendor leaders.
3.5 The commercial plazas as new spaces for democratic practices
In a recent study, researcher Caroline Stamm (2007) points out a phenomenon that gradually
has started to happen inMexico City, which has arisen since the democratic transition in 1997
and the emergence of political actors other than the pri. While it is still very limited and slow,
it demonstrates that vendor organizations of commercial plazas inMexico City are becoming
more democratic.
Stamm (2007) comments that the outcome of the plaza construction program—following
its implementation during 1993 and 1994 in Mexico City—has been mixed, and the program
was not necessarily a failure as initially thought.30 The vending activity in commercial plazas
represents a separate legal, spatial, locational and ownership arrangement, dierent from the
street vending activity. Vendor organizations did not disappear with the move from the streets
to commercial plazas in 1993, andmost organizationswhosemembersmoved into commercial
plazas were almost the same as those who previously were on the streets, maintaining their
structure and continuing their practices inside the commercial plazas. However, there was a
key dierence in the dynamics of these organizations: while on the street, the ‘authorized’
owner of the stall or space was the association (and therefore the association’s leader); within
the commercial plazas, the vendormemberswere the rightful owners of their own stall—under
29Interestingly, these are similar to the reasons why street vendor leaders refuse to accept relocations to new
settings oered or forced on them by government authorities. Relocations would obliterate the street vendormem-
bers’ clientele base and thus reduce the costs of leaving for vendor members who want to change associations—
since they do not have the economic incentive to stay in an association, they may as well abandon it—making it
easier for them to leave a particular street vendor association. Thus, relocations weaken both associations and
their leaders, which is why street vendor leaders oppose moves to new settings so tenaciously. What is more, as
Cross (1998) points out, while there have been cases where individuals pay thousands of dollars for well-located
stalls, street vendors can get a stall free of charge if they join a street invasion, whether in progress or planned.
Thus, in practice, there is a great deal of heterogeneity on this issue of relocation (as well as dierent factors to
consider when a vendor decides to change associations).
30The ‘Plaza Construction Program’—also known as the ‘Program for the Improvement of Street Vending’—
implemented by the city government ofManuel Camacho Solís will be described and analyzed in detail in Chapter
4 of this thesis.
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the so-called ‘stalls in condominium’ model.31 This situation may have weakened the position
of power of those former street vendor leaders now turned commercial plaza vendor leaders.
As it will be seen in Chapter 4, some of those commercial plazas did not have the expected
results andwere considered a commercial failure, whichmeant the return to the streets of those
associations initially relocated in them, and therefore the return to the scheme of ‘association
ownership’ of the stalls and spaces and to the dependence of a leader with more absolute
powers over their members. When in 1994 many vendors left the commercial plazas to return
to the streets, they did sowith the support of their leaders. For the latter, thismove represented
a strengthening of their power in relation to both vendormembers (a return to the ‘association
ownership’ scheme) and the government (more bargaining power by having vendors back on
the streets).32
On the other hand, those organizations that remained in the commercial plazas and man-
aged to overcome the initial shock of relocation were benefited not only with the scheme of
‘member ownership’ of their stalls that prevailed in the commercial plazas, but also with a
leader whose power was far more limited than before and whose functions became almost
exclusively administrative. Over time, if the leader was not a good administrator, then the
association would have no choice but to replace the leader or find more ecient forms of
administration. This is what happened in the cases found by Stamm (2007) presented below.
The victory of Cuauhtémoc Cardenas—prd opposition candidate to the headship of Mex-
ico City—in 1997 was a further sign of the move, already in motion, towards a multi-party
system, with the appearance of new political actors. Until then, most vendor organizations
had been aliated with the pri. However, the prd’s influence started to increase and new
groups of prd sympathizers were formed, characterizing what might be described as the di-
versification and multiplication of political actors (Stamm, 2007). Moreover, Stamm (2007)
suggests that the plaza construction program may have weakened clientelistic support for the
pri by dividing organizations that were formerly loyal to them. To illustrate this state of af-
31The ‘stalls in condominium’ model was a new scheme of financing and ownership implemented as a part of
the Plaza Construction Program of the early 1990s. Under this scheme the vendors would pay for the construction
of their commercial plaza and their individual stalls—with intervention from the city government who helped to
provide them with credits at a subsidized rate—which would give them in return the legal ownership of their stall
within the newly-built commercial plaza. This model was in contrast with the traditional public markets of the
1950s, where the government paid for the construction and was the legal owner of the market and stalls. Public
market stalls were leased by market vendors at a minimal cost, since stalls were rent-controlled.
32In some cases, the organizations were divided: part of themembership returned to the streets, while the other
stayed on the commercial plazas. This equally supports Stamm’s (2007) claim that that the plaza construction
program may have weakened clientelistic support for the pri by dividing organizations that were formerly loyal to
them. Sometimes the same vendors who moved back to the streets also retained their stalls inside the commercial
plazas, mainly so they could expand their businesses.
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fairs, Stamm uses the cases of Artesanos del Centro and La Paja, two commercial plazas that
evolved from an authoritarian scheme of administration and leadership to a democratic one
over the last years.
3.5.1 The case of Artesanos del Centro commercial plaza
When Artesanos del Centro commercial plaza was inaugurated in 1993, all the vendors who
moved in belonged to a PRI-aliated organization named Artisans and Vendors in the Center
(Artesanos y Vendedores del Centro). This unity around the pri lasted until 2000. That year,
vendors on the commercial plaza were divided politically into two groups: the Asociación
Artesanos y Vendedores del Centro and the Unión de Locatarios de la Plaza Uruguay. The
reasons for the split were mainly economic—the malfunction of the commercial plaza and,
especially, the excessive fees the vendor leader was demanding. Each owner of a stall gave a
fee to the leader for the maintenance of common spaces and towards the administrative and
operational costs of the commercial plaza. However, the administration of this amount of
moneywas far from transparent andmany believed itwas destined for other purposes (Stamm,
2007). The members of the Unión de Locatarios de la Plaza Uruguay became organized to
defend themselves against the abuses of the vendor leader, but were not able to do much until
the prd entered the scene as a new political actor, as a result of democratic change in Mexico
City (Stamm, 2007).
In 2002, the members of the Unión de Locatarios de la Plaza Uruguay, now close to the
prd, decided to stop paying fees, and the suspension of payments lasted until January 2004.
The administration of the commercial plaza closed the plaza for two days, until both groups
agreed to talks, with the city government as mediator. They reached an agreement. The mem-
bers of the dissident group agreed to pay 50 percent of their debt on condition of depositing
the money in an independent bank account. The funds collected were to be used to refur-
bish the toilets and for additional renovation works within the commercial plaza. One of the
particularities of the agreement was that the bank account was to be controlled by all the ven-
dors in the commercial plaza, not by the leader or any particular group. After this sizing up
of forces, there were observable changes in the commercial plaza: commissions of five or six
people were formed, representing the interests of the dierent groups in the plaza; they met
regularly to discuss the problems faced by the commercial plaza (Stamm, 2007). In this way,
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the members of the Artesanos del Centro commercial plaza took their first steps towards the
democratization of their commercial plaza administration.
In March 2004, an assembly led by the commissions of both groups gathered all the plaza
vendors to discuss the common areas in the plaza. In the absence of the original leader, it was
possible to observe the first steps of a shared administration of the commercial space. Several
decisions were taken and implemented very quickly as a result of this common participation
and agreement between all vendors (Stamm, 2007).
3.5.2 The case of La Paja commercial plaza
The case of La Paja commercial plaza is dierent from that of Artesanos del Centro commer-
cial plaza, but also shows evidence of new democratic practices. La Paja commercial plaza
was planned to accommodate two street vendor organizations, one sympathizing with the
pri and the other with the prd, each one with their respective leader.33 However, after eight
years of cohabitation, the administration of the commercial plaza was inecient. In 2000, a
group of twelve vendors decided to form a civil association (the Asociación Civil de la Plaza
de La Paja). Some time later, the vendors in the commercial plaza threw out the two leaders.
This process was not dicult as the leaders and their organizations put up little resistance.
It seemed that the two leaders realized that it made sense to benefit the plaza tenants by re-
linquishing their authority and leadership to the civil association in order to avoid potential
conflict (Stamm, 2007).
Thus, since 2000, La Paja commercial plaza is self-administered by its vendors through
transparent management: vendors pay no fees and no maintenance costs. The commercial
plaza is self-sucient: the income earned by charging for the use of public toilets provides
funds to cover the salaries of commercial plaza employees, electricity, water, as well as notary
expenses for the title deeds and closing costs of the stands. Each year the tenants choose
their administrator in the general assembly of the commercial plaza, thus ensuring democratic
governance (Stamm, 2007).
With the ‘stalls in condominium’ model, it follows that once vendors become the rightful
owners of their places inside commercial plazas and the rights to their stands are ensured,
33La Paja commercial plaza was planned to house two dierent vendor organizations under the leadership of
two dierent leaders. The first one was very influential in the Historical Center and had always been aliated to
the pri. The second one was a smaller organization—dissident from the first one—which had a rapprochement
with the prd during the late 1980s.
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vendor leaders lose power over their members.34 While it is true that in some commercial
plazas vendor leaders have been able to maintain the same position and control, in others the
power of some organizations and their leaders has been fragmented or weakened. In other
commercial plazas, vendors have become independent from their leaders—instead of organi-
zations headed by a leader, vendors formed ‘united associations’ (asociaciones únicas), which
included all vendors, with no leader but democratic general assemblies in which decisions are
taken together (Stamm, 2007).
These organizations are dierent from those that existed before because they do not obey
a clientelistic or corporatist logic; on the contrary, they can be defined as “assemblies of co-
owners” (asambleas de copropietarios) (Stamm, 2007:91).35 Thus, the new legal, spatial, loca-
tional and, especially, ownership arrangements that prevailed in commercial plazas, together
with the appearance of new political actors other than the pri (e.g. the prd) led to the phe-
nomenon identified by Stamm (2007). The Artesanos del Centro and La Paja commercial
plazas are two noteworthy examples in which the traditional arrangement of an organization
with a dominant and undemocratic leader (or leaders) became a fairer, more open, democratic
entity, with a plurality of actors involved in the decision-making and administration of both
the commercial plazas and the organizations (Stamm, 2007).
3.6 Women and informal street vending in Mexico
3.6.1 Why the most prominent street vendor leaders in Mexico are women
It is important to understand why women tend to be over-represented in the informal sector
in general—and in informal street vending in particular36 (though this is not the current situ-
ation in Mexico)—and why women are concentrated in certain segments within the informal
sector (Chen, 2002). Some scholars argue that women are less able than men to compete
in labor, capital, and product markets because they have comparatively low levels of educa-
tion and skills, or are less likely to own property or have market know-how (Chen, 2002).
34It seems that as an organization gets closer to formality and vendors get closer to economic security, these
factors account for the demise of authoritarian leaders in vendor organizations.
35As discussed earlier, it is essential for vendors to form a civil association, not only to enter the legal framework,
but also to be represented before and be recognized by government authorities, and thus gain bargaining power.
36According to Chen (2002), women account for more than 50 percent (and up to 90 percent) of informal em-
ployment in trade, which the exception of those countries (e.g. India, Tunisia) where social norms limit women’s
mobility outside the home.
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Others suggest that the time and mobility of women are constrained by social and cultural
norms, which assign them responsibility for social reproduction and discourage investment in
women’s education and training (Chen, 2002). These theories clearly apply to street vending
in Mexico.
Traditionally, women in Mexico have worked in more informal environments than men,
starting with housework, which is considered a form of informal activity or job. Thus, while
men looked for and took jobs in the formal sector, women cooperated with the domestic
economy—to make ends meet—in other forms. The most common form was domestic or
home work, but when it was necessary to look for a more profitable source of income, they
went into street vending. This activity gave them not only the opportunity to earnmoremoney
by meeting the market in situ, but also the flexibility they needed to take care of children—if
they had them—as well as their homes, fulfilling their traditional social role as mothers or
housewives (or both).
In Mexico, the rise of women to modern leadership positions within groups of informal
street vendors can be traced back to the 1950s, or more specifically to the administration of
Ernesto P. Uruchurtu as mayor of Mexico City. During the 1950s, Uruchurtu implemented
a public market construction program in an eort to relocate street vendors who populated
the downtown area of Mexico City (Cross, 1998). When it was time for the allocation of
stalls, the criteria was to give priority to the heads of households (Cross, 2010). It is not
clearwhetherwomenwere deliberately not allocated stalls within themarkets—because social
norms dictated they should stay at home—orwhether onlywomen of certain agewere granted
stalls—younger women were not considered. The fact is that several women—the majority in
the group that was not allocated a stall in the newmarkets—were left out of the public market
construction program. As a result, some women (and men) who were not assigned a stall in
the newly built public markets continued selling their products on the streets, as getting hold
of a place in an established market was not possible.
Since public markets were usually designed and built for a single association of vendors37,
those street vendorswho did not get a place in or declined to enter the newpublicmarkets were
left without any organizational representation. In other words, by being left out of the market
construction program, they no longer belonged to any organization, and had no means to
resist the looming repression. These street vendors went through one of the most unyielding
and brutal periods of repression in the history of the city (Cross, 1998). Despite the harsh
repression during the Uruchurtu city government, these abandoned street vending groups,
37As opposed to commercial plazas which sometimes could accommodate more than one vendor association.
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mostly made up of female vendors, became organized and chose their leaders. As a result,
most of the street vendor leaders were women, who continued to lead the groups as they grew
and became more powerful and influential.38
Mexico City is one of the few places in the world where the share of women working in
street vending—and informality—is lower than the share of men (Arizpe, 1977; inegi, 2005,
2010b), yet the leaders of the largest, oldest, and most important street vendor associations
are all women. This makes women’s leadership of street vendor groups in Mexico City even
more unique. There are several possible reasons for the dominance of women leaders of these
associations: women in Mexico City might know better than men how to deal with problems
(and authorities), or be more responsible or subtle than men when negotiating. The reasons
might in fact be the same as of why over 95 percent of borrowers of the Muhammad Yunus’
Grameen Bank are women (Grameen Bank, 2011); that women in general are better than men
in meeting their responsibilities and obligations. The evidence is that, historically, women
tend to be stronger leaders than men and better at managing street vendor organizations in
Mexico’s capital.
3.6.2 Women leaders in Mexico City
Thus, it is not a secret that a group of women leaders controls street vending in Mexico City.
For several years a handful of women have led the main street vending associations and, his-
torically, three women have controlled the largest and most powerful ones: Guillermina Rico,
who died in 1996; Alejandra Barrios Richard, who is still active; and Benita Chavarría, who
has retired. After the alternation of power in Mexico City in 1997, another emerging female
leader is María Rosete, who has links to the PRD; the power and size of her association has
increased considerably over the last years.
GuillerminaRicowas themost powerful of all (Ballinas andUrrutia, 1996). Her occupation
as street vendor leader extended over four decades, from the times of Ernesto P. Uruchurtu
to the years of Oscar Espinosa Villarreal. Through these years, she was equally mistreated
and rewarded by the pri government authorities she had to deal with. In her heydays—the
mid-1980s—her organization controlled the largest area of streets and had the largest mem-
bership, estimated at about 7,000members (Dillon, 1996), inMexico City. Guillermina Rico’s
38As John Cross correctly pointed out: “Such vendors became the nucleus of today’s powerful street vendor
organizations, which helps explain why many of today’s leaders are women, and why all of them seem to have
such strong characters. They have lived through repression and won” (Cross, 1998:167).
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death in September 1996 weakened her organization. Her daughter, Silvia Sanchez Rico, took
control of the organization, but she was detained in 1999 accused of robbery and injury. This
weakened the organization even more, causing some members to leave it (Barrios, 2010). In
addition, Silvia Sanchez Rico’s style of leadership is very dierent from that of her mother.
Silvia Sanchez Rico did not follow her mother’s standards and, it is argued, she does not have
her notions and wisdom; therefore, she failed to keep the unity of the membership (Barrios,
2010). The lack of leadership and the emergence of new leaders caused members of Guiller-
mina Rico’s organization to scatter—they went to other organizations or decided to work
independently (Mondragón, 2005).
According to dierent sources, it is believed that there are about 60 street vendor leaders
heading vendor organizations in downtown Mexico City (Cross, 1998; Nájar, 1998; Paramo,
2003; Sanchez, 2005; Mondragón, 2005, 2006).39 During the first decade of the 21st century, of
the eightmost powerful street vendor groups in downtownMexico City, six are still controlled
by women. The groups are listed here in no particular order: Consejo de Comerciantes en
Pequeño, led by Elena Ortega Padierna40 (relative of Dolores Padierna) (prd); Unión de Com-
erciantes ‘Hijos de Tepito’, led by María Rosete Sánchez (prd); Asociación Legítima Cívica
Comercial A.C. (alcc), led by Alejandra Barrios Richard (pri); Asociación de Comerciantes
de la AntiguaMerced, led by Silvia Sánchez Rico (daughter of Guillermina Rico) (Former pri,
now reportedly supporting the prd); Defensa y Solidaridad de la Unión de Comerciantes en
Cuauhtémoc, led byAlicia Rocha Sánchez (prd); andAsociación deComerciantes en Pequeño
y Semifijos Benito Juárez, led by Esther Chavarría (daughter of Benita Chavarría) (Former pri,
now reportedly supporting the prd) (Nájar, 1998; Paramo, 2003;Mondragón, 2005, 2006; Gas
Natural Fenosa, 2011).
One of the female leaders who consolidated her leadership over the years—after Guiller-
mina Rico’s organization declined—is Alejandra Barrios Richard. At present, her organiza-
39Cross (1998) mentions there are more than 60 dierent street vendor organizations jostling for space inMex-
ico City’s Historical Center. Nájar (1998) lists 24 street vendor leaders operating inMexico City’s center. Paramo
(2003) states that there 60 organizations of semi-fixed street vendors in the Historical Center. Mondragón (2005)
arms that there are between 35 and 40 social organizations fighting for space in the streets of Mexico City.
Sanchez (2005) says there are 35,000 street vendors, grouped in 60 vendor organizations in the center of Mexico
City. Mondragón (2006) says there are 60 smaller street vendor leaders operating in Mexico City.
40ElenaOrtega Padierna is a relative ofDolores Padierna (current prd senator, former head of the Cuauhtémoc
Delegation and former General Secretary of the prd). In addition, Antonio and Ana María Padierna, who are
also mentioned as leaders of street vendor groups, are siblings of Dolores Padierna. This gives an idea of how the
balance of power as measured through party aliation has been changing in street vendor groups in Mexico City
and how the prd has been gaining ground in its influence over marginal groups for political purposes. I leave to
the reader’s consideration the numerous possibilities for corruption, trac of influences, favoritism, cooptation,
patronage, political influence, and so on that this type of relationship may have had.
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tion is the largest and most powerful street vendor organization in Mexico City. Chapter 6 of
this thesis presents a case study of Alejandra Barrios and the organization she leads, the alcc
(or the Legitimate Civic and Commercial Association), in an attempt to shed light on several
aspects of the leadership, structure, and dynamics of a large and well-organized street vendor
organization in Mexico City.
3.7 Conclusions
Historically, relationships between street vendor organizations and governments were schema-
tized under clientelistic practices within a corporatist system where individual street vendors
were obliged to have ‘forcedmediation’ through street vendor organizations, and street vendor
organizations were obliged to ‘compulsory aliation’ to the ruling party. In return for favors
and tolerance, street vendors were obliged to serve as a political support base and sometimes
to provide financial inducements for politicians and government ocials. At present, large
informal (or semi-formal) street vendor organizations exist and have become an entrenched
element of national and city politics, without totally abandoning the clientelistic practices
and the corporatist system that initially shaped their relationship with the government. Street
vendor organizations are an important political tool to put pressure on political adversaries,
further party interests, and foster individual political careers. Some vendor leaders, or close
associates, enter the political arena as a result of their power within their associations and
influence within political parties.
Thus, street vendor groups have gone from being powerless andmanipulated to become key
players in local and federal politics. They have acquired legal status (as independent civil asso-
ciations) to be recognized by the government and other stakeholders, to protect their interests
against legal attacks, and to demand rights as established in the Mexican constitution. The
largest and most powerful street vendor associations have an elaborate level of organization,
whose members report to a sole leader who takes the decisions. These highly sophisticated
associations have come to take on some government functions—they provide housing, educa-




The most prominent street vendor leaders in Mexico are women. This has been the result
of mainly three factors: women are over-represented in the informal sector41; historical and
cultural circumstances which precludedwomen from receiving stalls in newly built public mar-
kets; and because they have greater leadership and organizational skills thanmen. Most street
vendor leaders have humble origins—they started as street vendors during infancy. Until the
late 1990s, their political allegiance was with the pri, but after the alternation in power, sev-
eral shifted their allegiance to the prd. The choices of who to support have increased as more
political actors have entered government and other positions of power; now vendor leaders
can select not only what party they want to support, but also what position or oce at the
dierent government levels available they want to support.42 This degree of choice gives them
strong bargaining power.
Street vendor leaders are authoritarian and autocratic and can both exploit and defend
members of their organizations. They resort to any means possible to defend their interests
andmanipulate government authorities: legal instances, political activism, political influence,
corruption, continuity of power (that builds experience and allows for long-term tactics), sim-
ulated or conditional compliance (to gain the favours of certain ocials, immediately or in
a later date) and/or even violence. These leaders have reached an important level of power,
endurance, and leverage over negotiations, overcoming the government authorities on many
fronts. However, government authorities and political parties still have some methods they
can use to control street vendor leaders, although they are not always lawful: revocation of
leadership positions in associations, bring (true of fabricated) criminal charges against lead-
ers, or support a revolt (another leader) within the association. Moreover, individual street
vendors within an association have some tools to defend themselves against their leader when
she or he becomes too overbearing or abusive: rise up against their leader, or simply leave
the association. The equilibrium in the balance of power between vendor leaders and vendor
members is essentially sustained through economic rather than political incentives.
The process of democratization changed the relationship between street vendors, the po-
litical parties, and the state. As we will see in the following chapters, the rise to power of
the prd increased the possibilities for alliances for street vendor organizations but remained
clientelistic in nature. Although the first prd city government questioned the clientelistic and
41Although this may not be currently the case in Mexico—as there are more men than women working in the
informal sector—it certainly was the case when the largest and better organized street vendor organizations were
born some decades ago.
42This support is provided both in election times as well as in the form of regular, daily political support (for
a particular cause or individual project).
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corporatist practices that were characteristic of the pri (Combes, 2000; Hilgers, 2012), it did
not seem to break with them.
During this process of democratization, there was, on one hand, a politicization of street
vendor organizations, which contributed to their fragmentation—when members opposed
their leader this often led to the group splitting up and a rapprochement with the prd. This
fragmentation made the regulation of street vendors a more complex situation for the author-
ities, changing the conditions (political and operational) of public action towards street vend-
ing (Stamm, 2007).43 On the other hand, the administration of commercial plazas has begun
to depoliticize, as the examples of Artesanos del Centro and La Paja commercial plazas show.
Even when dealing with a dierent legal, spatial, locational, and ownership context from the
one that exists on the street, the processes of liberation of the commercial plazas’ members
from their leaders has directly aected the vendor organizations located on the street; accord-
ing to Stamm (2007), street vendor organizations are losing members and the leadership is
openly being challenged.44 This phenomenon of ‘independence’ by street vendor members
was also noted in the streets of Guadalajara (Ramírez Saiz and Mora, 1998).45
The emergence of new power brokers and the division of political actors in the commercial
plazas make the process of democratization interesting to analyze. Its general implications
allow us, simultaneously, to reflect on the political actors involved in the street vending activ-
ity and on the dierent ways to manage and deal with these activities. The reemergence of
corporatism, the permanence of clientelism, and the potential democratization of street ven-
dors’ political practices make the management and handling of street vending more complex,
resulting in an evolution in the dierent courses of public action towards street vending in
Mexico (Stamm, 2007).
The emergence of this slow, small, but hopeful democratic phenomenon observed in com-
mercial plazas in Mexico City may be a reflection of the change in the political regime in
Mexico and, ultimately, an indication of the changing political culture in the country.
43Current public policy studies agree on the emergence and multiplication of organized and relevant social
actors. Formerly, they were only the target of public policies, but they transformed into independent and ecient
participants involved in the process of decision-making and policy implementation (Massardiere, 2003). This is
expressed under the term ‘public action’.
44As mentioned earlier, it seems that as vendor organizations get closer to formality (by being relocated in
commercial plazas or markets and taking responsibility for the administration and expenses of these commercial
centers—factors which imply that they are within the enforcement radar of the government), and vendormembers
get closer to economic security (by being legal owners of their stalls), these factors account for the demise of
authoritarian leaders in vendor organizations.
45In the case of the municipality of Guadalajara, Ramírez Saiz and Mora (1998) emphasize the refusal of
many independent street vendors to aliate with corporatist groups. In this case, the pan administration had as
an objective to eliminate the intermediation of leaders and street vendor organizations.
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4. IN FORMAL I TY AND STRE ET VEND ING IN
MEX ICO C ITY ( 1 9 2 9  1 9 9 7 ) : THE PR I Y EAR S .
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a general historical-political analysis of the development of informal
street vending in Mexico, focusing on Mexico City, over a time span of 68 years—from 1929
to 1997—which correspond to the period in which the pri ruled Mexico City.1 The chapter
is divided into two main analytical sections: First, there is a chronological generalized de-
scription of the various eorts to regulate informal street vending, crackdowns, and cycles
of toleration and repression that took place over 59 years—between 1929 and 1988. Second,
there is a more detailed political analysis and description of the events that ocurred between
1988 and 1997, the last 9 years the pri held power in Mexico City and the eorts its govern-
mentsmade to control informal street vending aswell as the political implications these eorts
brought. The reason to do a more detailed analysis in the latter part of the period of study of
this chapter has to do with the reforms in the electoral laws and the democratic opening in the
political system that ocurred in those years, which eventually made possible the alternation of
political parties in power. This second analytical section will be used to make a comparative
link with Chapter 5, which speaks about the prd city goverments, the pan federal government,
and the approach these governments took towards informal street vending.2 Finally, the con-
clusions section summarizes what lessons have been learned andwhat general conclusions can
be drawn from the historical-political analysis of street vending in Mexico’s capital under pri
1The pri and its predecessors: the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, pnr)
founded in 1929 after theMexicanRevolution; renamedParty of theMexicanRevolution (Partido de laRevolución
Mexicana, prm) in 1938; and finally obtaining its current name, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional, pri) in 1946.
2As mentioned in Chapter 1, the alternation in power is used in this thesis as a natural experiment to contrast
the distinct approaches towards informal street vending of dierent parties (and leaders) in power; and also to
have the opportunity to observe how linkages between political parties, governments, and street vendor groups
are made and unmade as power changes hands.
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governments by interpreting the cycles of toleration and repression, the changing interests of
the pri, and the policy implications of both.3
The chronological order of events described in this chapter covers the most significant
landmarks in the history of street vending in Mexico—anti-vendor campaigns and new
regulations—as well as broader political and economic events that have influenced and trans-
formed street vending. They include major changes in the economy—the Great Depression,
theMexicanmiracle, the rise (and fall) of the import substitution industrialization (isi) model,
the 1982 Debt Crisis and the 1994 Peso Crisis—andwell as major events in politics and policy-
making such as the arrival of hands-onMexico Citymayors—Ernesto Uruchurtu (1952–1966)
and Manuel Camacho Solís (1988–1993)—who implemented comprehensive programs to re-
move street vendors from the streets. Moreover, this chapter shows how the longstanding
clientelistic arrangements that characterized the relationship between pri governments and
informal groups started to fracture as a result of the failure of the city government to live
up to its promises, the neoliberal policies implemented by the federal government, and the
opening up of the regime to democratic competition and free elections. It is worth remem-
bering that, during this period of study (1988–1997), Mexico City’s executive authority was
not elected democratically but appointed by the president of Mexico. The position of regente
or mayor of Mexico City was comparable to a ministry of state, always subordinate to the
president of Mexico, so the mayor had limited autonomy.4 The history of street vending in
Mexico is closely linked to political matters and features of Mexican political culture—such
as clientelism and corporatism—and to economic issues—such as migration and unemploy-
ment. In the period of study covered in this chapter, the phenomenon of informality and in-
formal street vending mirrored the changes occurring in the Mexican political system and the
3In short, this chapter provides an overall view of street vending in the historical context of modern Mexico,
and establishes the grounds for a comparative analysis in the next Chapter 5 of how regulations, government
actions, policies and their implementation can vary when informal street vending is dealt with from contrasting
perspectives, ideologies, political actors, governments and regimes.
4Article 122 of the Mexican Constitution states the legal nature of the Federal District and notes that its
government will be responsibility of the federal powers and of the local legislative, executive and judicial bodies.
The reason why the institutions of the Federal District are considered ‘bodies’ and not ‘powers’ is because, being
the residence of the federal powers, the Federal District cannot have two powers residing on the same territory. In
addition, unlike the other states that make up the Mexican republic, the Federal Distric is not a sovereign entity,
lacking a constitution, reason why they cannot be considered ‘powers’. However, on January 29 2016, the Diario
Oficial (the government’s ocial gazette) published a reform to Article 122 which has changed most of the above-
mentioned provisions of the Federal District. Among them, the ocial name has been changed to Mexico City,
and it will become the state number 32 of theMexican Federation. Thus, the status ofMexico City will be similar
to that of the other 31 states in the federation. A new constitution for Mexico City is being drafted and that
will give Mexico City the same autonomy and sovereignity as the other states. A new local assembly or congress
will also be elected holding legislative powers over public finance and security. Finally, the ‘delegations’ will be
converted into ‘mayoralties’.
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Mexican economy. Therefore, the analysis done in this chapter presents a valuable historical
and poltical view into these topics of interest.
4.2 A brief history of street vending in Mexico City (19291988)
4.2.1 The historical tradition of street vending in Mexico City
The tradition of selling and buying in temporary and open air markets is a strong feature of
Mexican culture and has a long history that extends far back into the pre-Hispanic period.
Street vending in the Historical Center also has a long history. In pre-Hispanic times, street
commerce had a fundamental part in the Aztec civilization. Tenochtitlan, the city-state of
the Aztec or Mexica empire, was the epicenter of Aztec aairs in all its spheres: public, so-
cial, religious, and economic (Crossa, 2009). It was intended to bring together Aztec people
in polytheistic rituals and housed a market (tianquiztli5) that functioned as the pivotal point
for the give and take of products. This was a big attraction to many people from near and
far. The central markets of Tenochtitlan depended on complex interconnected systems that
extended throughout Mesoamerica (Bahena, 1999). Judges and police inspectors carefully
regulated the systems and networks of exchange (Bustamante and Castillo, 1997). At the
beginning of the colonial era, these regulatory practices were institutionalized through plan-
ning restrictions, which included the delimitation of space and restraining street commerce to
specific areas. During this era a number of attempts were made to centralize commerce in des-
ignated areas. By the end of the 18th century, street commerce was concentrated in just a few
central squares (plazas centrales) and markets (Crossa, 2009). When Mexico City started to
grow in size and population, street commerce activities expanded beyond its restricted squares
and markets. The growing demand for supplementary market spaces put great pressure on
the post-independence authorities of Mexico City, which in 1890 built one of the largest and
most important markets, La Merced market (Crossa, 2009).6 Vendors at this market gener-
ated more than 40 percent of earnings from all markets in the city, and by 1930 more than 80
percent of all commercial activitywas clustered in this area. The number of street vendors kept
5The word tianquiztli or tiya¯nquiztli comes from the Nahuatl—the language of the Aztecs—and means day
market or harvest. It eventually derived in the word tianguis, which is currently used inMexico to refer to open-air
markets.
6Some other sources refer to the period between 1860 and 1880 as the years when LaMerced market was built
(conaculta, 2009; Enríquez Fuentes, 2009).
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on growing, causing the dissemination of street vendors to neighboring streets and avenues
(Bahena, 1999).
4.2.2 The end of revolution and the Great Depression, 19291940
Numerous sources associate the opening of the 20th century in Mexico with the beginning of
the civil war known as theMexican Revolution. This war, which started in 1910 and ended ap-
proximately in 19247, put an end to the period known as the Porfiriato.8 During the Mexican
Revolution, the Federal District (Mexico City) was sequentially occupied by several revolu-
tionary factions: Maderistas, Zapatistas, Villistas, and Carrancistas. This last group was
substituted by the so-called Grupo Sonora—led by Adolfo de la Huerta, Álvaro Obregón and
Plutarco Elías Calles—which later became the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Rev-
olucionario Institucional, pri) and its predecessors—the National Revolutionary Party (Par-
tido Nacional Revolucionario, pnr) and the Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la
Revolución Mexicana, prm)—which governed Mexico from 1929 until 2000.9
In 1928, the municipal system of Mexico City was abolished and the existent municipali-
ties which had formed it disappeared, giving way to the ‘delegations’ (delegaciones),10 modi-
fying their number and demarcation of boundaries. In February 1929, the National Cham-
ber of Commerce (Cámara Nacional de Comercio, canaco)—Mexico City’s chamber of
commerce—released a regulation proposal to control street vending in Mexico City. The cap-
7There is controversy regarding the end of the Mexican Revolution. Some sources believe it is marked by
the Proclamation of the Mexican Constitution in 1917. Other sources say the revolution ended in 1920, when
ÁlvaroObregónwas electedpresident and servedhis full four-year term, although the nation suered fromhorrible
violence for another decade or so. Some more sources state that it ended in 1924 when President Plutarco Elías
Calles took oce.
8The Porfiriato or Porfirismo is a historical period during which the exercise of power in Mexico was under
the control of President Porfirio Diaz. It lasted 35 years, from 1876 to 1911.
9The National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, pnr) was born in 1929. It changed its
name to Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, prm) in 1938. Finally in 1946, it
adopted its current name: Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, pri).
10Mexico City—politically and administratively constituted as the Federal District—is divided into 16 bor-
oughs or delegaciones for administrative purposes. They constitute second-level administrative divisions, on a
par with the municipalities of Mexico, but unlike municipalities they do not have regulatory powers and are not
fully autonomous in their internal administration. The configuration of the delegations has changed over the
course of the 20th century. In December 1970, the Federal District Charter was amended. Among its changes, it
matched the term ‘Federal District’ with ‘Mexico City’. In addition, it disappeared the Central Department or
Centro (ocially called Mexico City) and created four new delegations (Miguel Hidalgo, Benito Juarez, Venus-
tiano Carranza andCuauhtémoc), arriving at the 16 delegations we have at present. As of 2000, the citizens within
a borough elect by plurality a head of government, known simply as a head of the delegation or jefe delegacional
(Ciudad de Mexico, 2013).
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ital city had recently been re-established as a federal district and there were no explicit rules
for the codes regarding street vending or any other informal activity (Gordon, 1997a).
Formal establishedmerchants in theHistorical Center channeled their concerns through the
canaco proposal. They presented a list of suggested anti-street vendor policies. The proposal
complained of the ‘unequal competition’ posed by the street vendors under the argument that
they did not pay taxes. The suggested regulation proposed that street vendors would have to
registerwith government authorities and get a street vending license. Moreover, street vendors
would not be allowed to sell competing products in a radius of 50 meters11 of a formal estab-
lishment. Street vendors who were trying to get a street vending license needed to have letters
of recommendation from two or more canaco members (Gordon, 1997a). Interestingly, the
proposal does not make any reference to vehicle trac or health matters.12
By 1931, the situation was dierent. Several newspaper headlines from March to June of
1931 displayed similar stories pointing to the same problem: “Uneven Competition for Es-
tablished Commerce” (Universal, 1931a:1), “The Regulation of Street Vending” (Universal,
1931b:1), “A Plague that must be Fought” (Universal, 1931e:3), “Growing Invasion of City
Sidewalks - Street Vendors Don’t Leave Any Room for Pedestrians” (Gordon, 1997a:1). It
is dicult to know how many street vendors were selling in the city capital at the time, but
there is no question that the Great Depression wasmostly responsible for the increase in street
vendors noted in the newspapers.
Some of the complaints arose from the overall shortages in the infrastructure of Mexico
City. In 1930, Mexico City had a population of about 1 million (Table 4.1), but basic public
services such as street paving, flood drains, and public markets were inadequate as they were
not growing at the same pace (Cisneros Sosa, 1993; inegi, 2010a). Mexico City was beginning
to become an industrialized large city but without the appropriate infrastructure, which had
not changed suciently since the 19th century. The lack of sucient markets in the city led to
a demand for products sold by street vendors and it became an incentive for them to sell. At
the same time, the structure of the streets—narrow, unpaved, and often flooded—intensified
the congestion problem.
11The actual Law for the Regulation of Semi-Fixed and Itinerant Trade (Reglamento para la Regulación del
Comercio Semi-fijo y Ambulante) implemented in 1931 established this distance as 10 meters, and not 50 meters
as the canaco proposal suggested (Excelsior, 1931).
12The 1931 law, however, makes very general recommendations about trac or health precautions. For exam-
ple, it recommends that street vending pushcarts shall not be parked in zones of high trac, or that products with
pungent odors shall only be sold if they are inside a glass cabinet and in accordance with the regulation of the
City Health Department (Excelsior, 1931).
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The newspapers, representing the view of themiddle and upper classes, described the sights
of underdevelopment and filthiness in the streets that were taken over by street vendors dis-
dainfully. The newspaperElUniversal published a picture onMarch 11, 1931—in its Graphics
andTimelyNotice section—showing Republica de Uruguay Street packedwith street vending
stands. The caption was: “This picture shows the look of the aforementioned street overrun
with all sorts of stalls, which obstruct trac and are unaesthetic and unhygienic. They will
be eliminated” (Universal, 1931d:1). They also noticed that many of the goods and products
sold by the street vendors were imported—this was mentioned to portrait street vendors as
disloyal to the internal Mexican market and industry—and that several street vendors were
immigrants from the Middle East or Eastern Europe13 (Universal, 1931c; Gordon, 1997a).
Those concerns attracted the attention of public ocials andwere taken into consideration
when a new regulation was drawn up. On March 28, 1931, President Pascual Ortiz Rubio reg-
ulated street vending in the capital city through a decree (Universal, 1931f). The first part of
the decree recognized that “the so-called semi-fixed and itinerant trade has increased extraor-
dinarily without having been regulated up until now, with this omission occasioning genuine
problems, as much for transit in the city as for competition with legitimate merchants” (Uni-
versal, 1931f:1).
The new regulation incorporated several of the recommendations of the 1929 canaco pro-
posal. It banned stands (puestos) that were located in public parks, close to formal establish-
ments oering similar products, and street vending was restricted to a certain perimeter in the
Historical Center area. Furthermore, it introduced a requirement that all those who applied
for a license to sell on the streets had to demonstrate the legality of their residence. Immigrants
had to be able to confirm that they did not enter the country on the grounds that they would
work in the agricultural sector (Excelsior, 1931). The canaco praised the regulation, and the
newspapers were glad to announce the imminent riddance of the street vendor ‘plague’ (Excel-
sior, 1931; Universal, 1931f).14 Some newspapers even boasted about their campaigns against
street vending and the success of the enactment of the law for the city (Universal, 1931g).
Despite the new regulation, after a few weeks, it was clear that street vendors had not de-
parted from their places in the Historical Center. A few of the semi-fixed street vendors—who
13Some of the nationalities mentioned are Russians, Poles, Turks, Syrians, Lithuanians, Czechoslovakians, and
Lebanese (Universal, 1931c).
14On March 28, 1931, the title of the front page of the newspaper El Universal was: “The itinerant and semi-
fixed trade is definitively eliminated from the city center” (Universal,1931f:1)
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operated from pliable or foldable stalls—were obliged to get rid of their structures, but a good
percentage of them became itinerant vendors or ambulantes15 (Gordon, 1997a).
The street vendors contested the execution and enforcement of the regulation in dierent
ways: through the political system, through the courts, and on the thoroughfare. By Decem-
ber 1931, the city government enacted an ocial toleration policy, even though it was only
supposed to be temporary and for a short period of time. However, in the following years, the
street vendors were still occupying the streets of the Historical Center. Sociologist Armando
Cisneros Sosa (1993:61–62) gave an explanation to account for the failure in the implementa-
tion of the 1931 regulation:
The government dealt with a divided and complex society to regulate, set stan-
dards, and establish order in accordance with public logic... In the case of the
street vendors, the intentions of the city government went beyond the possible.
The pursuit of an impeccable and organized [Historical] Center... led the author-
ities to propose the expulsion of the street vendors... [But] the economic reality
of the country, the lack of sucient employment, and the political networks that
had been established prevented such a goal from being realized.
Street vendors cleverly used the ocial political system to protect their interests, first of all by
forming associations. Guild-like vendor organizations have a long history in Mexico and can
be traced to the colonial era. They were created by merchants who shared special character-
istics (e.g. selling similar products or sharing a particular area of the city) for the purposes
of protection and support. During the 1920s, a few of those formed part of the recently cre-
ated National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, pnr), the predecessor
of the pri, through its labor aliate, the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (Con-
federación Regional Obrero Mexicana, crom). Street vendors intended to use this aliation
to the organization to put pressure on the annulment of the 1931 regulation, but had to give
up this strategy because of disagreement and dissatisfaction among public market vendors,
who were at that time aliated to the party as well, and strong supporters of the regulation
(Gordon, 1997a).16
15Itinerant vendors or ambulantes are ambulatory street vendors who elude regulation, and its enforcers, by
moving around. Itinerant vendors do not have a fixed space and usually wander around streets with a high circu-
lation of cars and people. The goods and products they sell are fairly cheap and easy to carry, which helps them to
have a greater degree of mobility than other forms of fixed- or semi-fixed-stall street vending. Later, this type of
itinerant vendors would be popularly known as toreros or ‘bullfighters’ for their ability to elude the authorities.
16After the restructuring of the ocial party, street vendor associations were channelled to the party through
the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (cnop) (founded in 1943) as explained in Chapter 3.
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The street vendors were still able to reach the president ofMexico in order to make an emo-
tional appeal, based on their plight as citizens in a situation of great economic disadvantage.
One street vendor group sent a telegram to President Pascual Ortiz Rubio stating: “Small
merchants Dolores Street stands taken... Fifty families no means subsistence. Belong pnr,
have fought favor your Government. Ask you use influence, restore [stands] or indicate new
location; avoid misery homes” (Gordon, 1997a:2).
Street vendors also looked for support in the courts. Using the legal instrument called am-
paro,17 many street vendor groups tried—sometimes successfully—to acquire some sort of
waiver from potential or actual actions of the city government against them. Even when all
these failed, it was still possible to buy o government ocials in charge of granting licenses,
assigning vending spaces, and enforcing the rules, so they could continue performing their
vending activities on the streets (Gordon, 1997a).
The 1931 regulation not only failed to resolve the problems with the street vendors, but also
generated a milieu that encouraged corrupt practices and extortion. The fact that the regula-
tion provided government ocials with the arbitrary power to ban or permit street vending—
as well as the authority and advantage it granted to police, ocials, and inspectors over street
vendors—rapidly led to a corrupt relationship between government authorities and street ven-
dors. A newspaper editorial writer of the time pointed out: “This problem with the street
vendors... has turned into an irresolvable problem for the simple reason that... those who are
responsible for solving it are the same people who have in large part encouraged and created
it” (Gordon, 1997a:2).
Occasionally, public ocials carried out police operations to clear a particular area of street
vendors, but the city government did not have a full and inclusive plan to deal with the street
vending problem. This situation persisted for 20 years, after which a new regulation was
finally put in place. During those years, economic conditions in Mexico and Mexico City
kept changing (Cisneros-Sosa, 1993; Gordon, 1997a).
17An amparo is a form of constitutional relief found in the legal systems of Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Colom-
bia, Spain, the Philippines, and Haiti. In certain legal systems, predominantly those of Mexico and other Latin
American countries, an amparo remedy or action is an eective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of
an individual’s constitutional rights. Such remedies and actions, generally heard by supreme courts or constitu-
tional courts, serve a dual protective purpose: they protect the citizen and his or her basic guarantees, and they
protect the constitution itself by ensuring that its principles are not violated by statutes or actions of the state
that undermine the basic rights enshrined therein. In general, an amparo action is intended to protect all rights
other than physical liberty (which are generally protected by habeas corpus remedies). Thus, in the same way that
habeas corpus guarantees physical freedom, the amparo protects other basic rights. It may therefore be invoked
by any person who believes that any of his or her rights implicitly or explicitly protected by the constitution (or
by applicable international treaties) are being violated (Gozon Jr. and Orosa, 2008).
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An important political event took place towards the end of the 1930s: the National Action
Party (Partido Acción Nacional, pan) was founded in 1939 by Manuel Gómez Morín, with
Efraín González Luna, Aquiles Elorduy, and Luis Calderón Vega, among others, to represent
the interests of the business community and the Roman Catholic Church—which had been
stripped of legal recognition in 1917—and drew its support largely from the urban middle-
class and the northern parts of the country. The pan—created as a political institution that
rejected caudillismo and searched for the institutionalization of democracy—won its first seats
in the Chamber of Deputies in 1946 and its first municipality in 1947. It became the most
consistent opposition party in Mexico throughout the 20th century (pan, 2013).
4.2.3 The Mexican miracle and the import substitution industrialization model, 19401952
The 1940s witnessed the start of the period known as the ‘Mexican miracle’, consisting on
rapid economic growth and lower levels of inflation, as well as the swift demographic and
physical growth of Mexico City. The economic boom was led by the manufacturing industry,
as a result of the implementation of import substitution industrialization (isi) policies. The
isi model was a state-directed, centrally planned form of economic development carried out
by the Mexican government. It was based on a set of economic and trade policies that ad-
vocated replacing foreign imports with domestic production (Baer, 1972).18 Therefore, there
were abundant jobs in the manufacturing sector industry inMexico City, which attracted hun-
dreds of thousands of individuals, who migrated from rural areas and other states in Mexico
(Gordon, 1997a).
Simultaneously, a big proportion of the city’s population—including the rich—started to
move out of the city center, to certain peripheral areas that were developing very fast. By 1950,
over 3 million people lived in Mexico City’s urban areas, one-third in the outskirts of the cap-
ital city (Table 4.1) (Cisneros Sosa, 1993; Gordon, 1997a; inegi, 2010a). The modernization
and growth of the city’s infrastructure changed the face of the capital, turning it into a busy,
populated, and contaminated metropolitan area.
In 1951, President Miguel Alemán Valdés decided to modernize Mexico City’s outdated
market regulation, which addressed street vending in a tangential way. The new regulation
18Import substitution industrialization (isi) is a method to achieve economic growth and socio-economic mod-
ernization. The isi is based on the premise that a country should attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through
the local production of industrialized products. isi policies were enacted between 1940s and 1980s by countries
within Latin America with the intention of producing development and self-suciency through the creation of an
internal market (Baer, 1972).
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Table 4.1.: Population Growth: Federal District, Metropolitan Area, and Country
Year Federal District Metropolitan Area* Country
1900 541,516 344,721 13,607,272
1910 720,753 471,066 15,160,369
1921 906,063 615,367 14,334,780
1930 1,229,576 1,029,068 16,552,722
1940 1,757,530 1,802,679 19,653,552
1950 3,050,442 3,137,599 25,791,017
1960 4,870,876 5,251,755 34,923,129
1970 6,874,165 8,799,937 48,225,238
1980 8,831,079 13,354,271 66,846,633
1990 8,235,744 15,563,795 81,249,645
2000 8,605,239 18,396,677 97,483,412
2010 8,851,080 20,116,842 112,336,538
Source: inegi (2010a), Censos de Población y Vivienda 1900–2010.
*The Metropolitan Area of Mexico City refers to the conurbation around Mex-
ico City, which is also known as greater Mexico City. It is constituted by the Fed-
eral District—composed of 16 delegations—and 41 adjacent municipalities of the
states of Mexico and Hidalgo. The reason why all these delegations and mu-
nicipalities are usually aggregated is because they all form a single conurbation.
NOTE: Over the course of the years, the composition of the so called Metropolitan Area
has changed; this explains the dierence in census numbers between the Federal District and the
Metropolitan Area, particularly in the first decades of the century. It is until 1940 that there is a
homologation of the Metropolitan Area with respect to the Federal District.
expressly replaced all previous provisions, but had no comprehensive approach to solve the
problem of street vending. Instead, it only required street vendors to register with the Mar-
kets Department in order to perform their activity and empowered the city government to
distribute permits for ‘stands located outside of public markets’, on condition that they oper-
ated in specific ‘market zones’ under certain circumstances19 (Diario Oficial, 1951; Gordon,
1997a). The new regulation designated a perimeter in the city center inwhich itwas prohibited
to sell live animals. It also prohibited selling alcohol inside and outside markets, but was not
very specific about street vending, with the exception of generally saying that it was against
the law to block public streets or establish stands in school zones, and near fire stations and
similar public facilities. The new regulation was confusing in its classification and definition
of vendors (a semi-fixed stand in the thoroughfare may have been considered part of the ac-
19The articles that refer to street vending in the new law are Articles 3.iv, 3.V, 3.viii, 7.iv, 7.V, 8, 9, 26, 28.iii,
65, 67, 72, 73, 74, Article Cuarto Transitorio, Article Noveno Transitorio, and Article Décimo Transitorio of the
new market regulation (Diario Oficial, 1951).
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tual market), and it did not define the characteristics of an ambulante or itinerant vendor.20
The ban on selling competing products in front of or near a formal established business was
eliminated, as were directives for immigrants (Diario Oficial, 1951; Gordon, 1997a).
A further innovation of the 1951 regulation was that the city government acknowledged the
formation of vendor organizations—chapter vi of the 1951 market regulation—and required
them to have at least 100 members (Diario Oficial, 1951). This requirement was understand-
able at the time for political and administrative reasons, and given the one party regime in
place. However, it proved critical later for the development of street vendor groups. This mea-
sure allowed government authorities the possibility to interact with street vendors in large
groups and not individually, which was obviously much more costly in time and eort. It
further reinforced the pre-eminence of organizations over individuals when dealing with the
government, another key factor for the future development of street vending groups (Diario
Oficial, 1951; Pyle, 1968; Gordon, 1997a).
However, the 1951 regulation, in what the street vendors referred to, was ineectual in prac-
tice. Shortly after it was enacted, its repercussion was entirely annulled by the administrative
intervention of Ernesto P. Uruchurtu, the new mayor of Mexico City.
Although there were no elections in Mexico City for either a representative legislative body
or for the city’s executive authority until the late 1980s and mid-1990s, respectively, Mexico
City was seen as a key electoral target in presidential elections, as it held a large percentage
of the country’s population and because of its political significance as the center of power of
the country. Therefore, political parties wanted to win it to ensure a share of the votes and
the symbolism that came with it.
During the general elections of 1952, the pan competed for the first time in a presidential
election with the candidate Efraín González Luna. However, the main competition for the
pri came from Miguel Henríquez Guzmán, who was the candidate of the Federation of the
Mexican People’s Parties. Henríquez Guzmán participated in the Mexican Revolution and
had been a member of the military sector of the pri (Estrada Correa, 2009), but in 1951 Hen-
ríquez Guzmán joined with other high-ranking members of the pri to create a break-away
party of former pri activists, which they called the Federation of the Mexican People’s Parties
(Federación de Partidos del Pueblo de México) (Estrada Correa, 2009). Prominent members
of this new party included other former generals from the Mexican Revolution such as Gen-
ovevo de la O, as well as representatives of other political parties—even if these were not of-
20The regulation speaks about Ambulante A and Ambulante B but does not distinguish the dierence between
them, except that the former may have a means of transportation (Diario Oficial, 1951).
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ficially registered—such as the Mexican Constitutionalist Party (Partido Constitucionalista
Mexicano) (Estrada Correa, 2009). The result was a broad alliance of political, pro-agrarian
reform, and social organizations, which seemed a serious challenge to the pri (Flores Rangel,
2005; EstradaCorrea, 2009). However, in the end the pri candidateAldolfoRuizCortineswon
the 1952 elections with over 74 percent of the vote, followed by Henríquez Guzmán with 15.9
percent, the pan’s candidate Efraín González Luna (third), and Vicente Lombardo Toledano
(fourth) from the Popular Party (Partido Popular, later to be known as the Partido Popular
Socialista, pps), which he had created in 1948 (Nohlen, 2005; Rodríguez Araujo, 1997). These
results set o a wave of protests from the Henriquistas in several states, which were violently
suppressed by the administration of President Miguel Alemán Valdés. Despite the intensity
of the protests, the results were not changed. Henríquez Guzmán then retired from public life
(Flores Rangel, 2005; Estrada Correa, 2009).
4.2.4 The administration of Uruchurtu and subsequent years, 19521970
Ernesto P. Uruchurtu was mayor ofMexico City from 1952 to 1966. He was popularly known
as the ‘Regent of Iron’ and is a central figure in the modern history of Mexico City and a key
player in the development of the street vending phenomenon in Mexico City. He is distin-
guished from otherMexico City mayors not only because of his authoritative style during the
modernization of the city during this period, but also because of his unparalleled 14 years in
oce as mayor (Cross, 1995). In a nation where the person with control of the federal district
has the most powerful administrative position after the presidency itself, the normal pattern
was for presidents to appoint their own candidate for the position. For this reason, no other
mayor has ever survived the transition between one president and the next, and often more
than one serves under a single president.21
Uruchurtu’s approach to the problem of street vending was highly authoritarian. Mexico
City’s street vendors who lived through this period regard it as an especially dicult time
(Barrios, 2010). Repression of street vendors, panhandlers, prostitutes, andpolitical dissidents
was common during Uruchurtu’s administration (Cross, 1998).
Uruchurtu put into action a considerable public market construction program, building
more than 160 markets to accommodate more than 50,000 street vendors (Gordon, 1997a;
21Uruchurtu served as mayor of Mexico City during three dierent presidential administrations: those of
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952–1958), Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964), and Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970).
He served from December 1, 1952, to September 14, 1966.
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Cross, 1995, 1998).22 Approximately half of the public markets that existed in Mexico City
around2000—including the La Lagunillamarket, the Sonoramarket, the San Juanmarket and
the massive La Merced market which was demolished and reconstructed—were built under
Uruchurtu’s market construction program.
The public market construction program implemented by Uruchurtu entailed a huge bur-
den on the finances of Mexico City. In 1957, at the pinnacle of the market construction pro-
gram, construction expenses reachedmx$170 million, equivalent to 25 percent of the city bud-
get in that year (Gordon, 1997a).23 In contrast, some years later, records show that the annual
proceeds from market rents had hardly reached mx$27.5 million. The Uruchurtu administra-
tion defended this spending by arguing that the construction of markets facilitated the fight
against inflation, given that ocial price controls could be readily applied and supervised in
public markets (Gordon, 1997a).
The range of goods andproducts sold in themarketplaces substantiated this rationale. Mar-
ket vendors nearly always sold goods related to basic needs, such as food and second-hand
clothes, but these marketplaces came to be a source of inflation instead of a remedy for it. The
reasons for this were two: the first one was that the high construction costs involved deficit
spending; while the second was related to the fact that public market inspectors took bribes
from the market vendors, whose cost was transferred on to consumers (Gordon, 1997a).
Uruchurtu’s activism is probably better understood not because of economic motivations
and price controls but because of local and national politics. In the 1952 general election,
the pri had lost in Mexico City and the voting middle-classes—many of whom had voted
against the pri—were in favor of the policies of market construction and repression in order
to clear the street of vendors. Market construction reached its maximum activity very close
to election time. The pri again won the majority of the votes in Mexico City at the 1955 mid-
term congressional election. In the 1958 general elections, the pri vote exceeded 68 percent of
all votes (Cross, 1998).
The elimination of street vendors from the thoroughfare was an accepted aim among cer-
tain groups within the capital because it was genuinely necessary to take action to solve the
problems street vendors were creating. They had become an annoyance to neighbours, formal
established businesses, and government authorities; and could potentially become a real im-
22According to John Cross, between 1953 and 1966 a total 174 markets were constructed or reconstructed for
52,070 vendors, raising the number of public markets in Mexico City from 44 to more than 200 (Cross, 1998).
23John Cross states that between 1953 and 1958 alone, mx$350 million were spent building or refurbishing
almost 90 markets, the equivalent of a little more than half of the entire budget for Mexico City in 1957 (Cross,
1998).
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pediment to the operation of the city. It is estimated that the number of street vendors reached
about 50,000 before the construction of the markets, as the new markets had space to house
that amount of street vendors (Gordon, 1997a; Cross, 1998).
The existence of these vendors at the time could not be attributed to a major economic
crisis or a temporary economic decline because the Mexican economy was going through a
phase of prosperity, the so-called ‘Mexican miracle’. In the 1950s and 1960s, gdp growthwent
beyond 6 percent annually and the capital city profited from a large portion of the national
employment growth in industrial jobs (Gordon, 1997a).24 Nonetheless, this enormous job
growth in the city was not enough to absorb the large number of migrants from rural areas
and other states.
As Mexico City developed, the proportion of the population of the Historical Center area
continued to fall in relation to the total population of the capital city. The Uruchurtu admin-
istration relocated several government bodies and institutions from the city center to more
remote areas within the city. For example, the National University was moved to the Coyoa-
can Delegation in southern Mexico City. Downtown Mexico City became a space to pass
through and shop rather than a residential area, although some middle and working class
people lived there (Cisneros-Sosa, 1993). In fact, these groups formed some of the most im-
portant constituencies for Uruchurtu, together with construction firms and urban developers.
The late writer and journalist Carlos Monsiváis commented that “Uruchurtu was supported
by the middle-classes who were anxious about respectability, traditionalist sectors, those al-
ready here facing those whomight come [Mexico City residents who did not welcome foreign-
ers and migrants], and, most importantly, groups of the economically powerful” (Monsiváis,
1996:77).
In light of the above-mentioned allegiances, it was rather surprising that 40,000 ex-street
vendors—converted in market stall tenants25—emerged to support the pri in the general elec-
tions of 1958. Actually, the policies promoted by Uruchurtu were somewhat ambiguous for
street vendors. Those vendors with a place in the markets had an established, secure, and
low-cost facility, from which they could derive a good living, but they had to sacrifice the
24This is not what one would expect from the cyclical relationship between economic performance and
informality—that when the economy grows, the informal sector decreases; when the economy shrinks, the in-
formal sector increases. Here, what was happening was that the economy was growing and so was the informal
sector.
25They were lessees, not owners of the stalls. The city government was the legal owner of stalls in public
markets during the Uruchurtu market construction program.
145
a brief history of street vending in mexico city (1929–1988)
advantages of working in the streets, such as good commercial sites and their freedom of op-
eration (Gordon, 1997a; Cross, 1998).
The pri used the concession of stalls in the markets politically, as it had in its tolerance and
recognition of informal settlements, to win support for the party (Cornelius, 1975). Govern-
ment ocials had the power to issue, extend, or revoke the oer of a market space ad libitum,
and street vendors who were excluded from the markets and kept selling on the streets were
treated violently by the police (Cross, 1995; Gordon, 1997a).
These circumstances made vendor leaders obliged to the government authorities and the
pri, and ready to comply with their orders. This was a classical example of political clien-
telism, which helped to strengthen the pri’s political machine (O’Donnell, 1997).26 The same
modus operandi prevailed within street vendor organizations. Street vendor leaders extracted
payments in advance from their vendormembers in return for the guarantee of a market space.
Once they were inside the market, the vendor members continued to depend on their vendor
leaders to mediate and intercede with government ocials formaintenance and other services
in the market. This ensured that vendor members continued to depend on their leaders (Gor-
don, 1997a; Cross, 1998; Monge, 2009).
The relocation to enclosed markets converted informal street vendor organizations into or-
ganizations of market stall tenants. Once they were in a market, vendors became—in essence
and eectively—formally established merchants.27 Very few vendors remained on the streets,
although the government did not succeed in removing them completely (Gordon, 1997a).
Ernesto P. Uruchurtu resigned from his post in September 1966, partly as a result of his
dierences with President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. Because of the length of his tenure as Mex-
26A ‘political machine’ is a disciplined political organization in which an authoritative boss—or small group—
commands the support of a group of followers (usually campaign workers), who receive rewards for their eorts.
Even though these elements are common to most political parties and organizations, they are fundamental to
political machines, which depend on hierarchy and rewards for political power, often enforced by a strong party
whip (enforcer) structure. Political machines sometimes have a political boss, and often rely on patronage, the
spoils system, behind-the-scenes control, and long-standing political connections within the structure of a repre-
sentative democracy. Political machines are typically permanent instead of organized for a single election or event.
Even though the term ‘political machine’ dates back to the 20th century in the United States, where such orga-
nizations have existed in some municipalities and states since the 18th century, similar political machines have
been described in Latin America, where the system has been named ‘clientelism’ or ‘political clientelism’, and
also in some African states and other emerging democracies, such as post-communist Eastern European countries
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013).
27As a matter of fact, moving from the streets to a market is a way for street vendors to become formal, es-
tablished vendors, although it is an expensive way to do it. As mentioned earlier, in Uruchurtu’s public market
construction program, vendors were not owners but lessees of their stalls (as opposed to the plaza construction
program of Camacho Solís where vendors were the owners of the stalls), but they had a formal and established
place to sell regardless of the ownership of the stalls.
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ico City mayor and the power he had accumulated during this time, Díaz Ordaz thought
Uruchurtu was a threat to his presidential authority, and the political culture of the time dic-
tated that no one should have more power than the president, so that he could stand out
(Lerner de Sheinbaum and Ralsky de Cimet, 1979). The departure of Uruchurtu was precip-
itated when he ordered the removal of a community of informal settlers, which was executed
with excessive force and violence. This caused a negative reaction from several branches of
the government and the ruling party, which resulted in Uruchurtu’s resignation (Cross, 1998).
Without delay, the repression against street vendors was reduced and market construction
slowed down. Little by little, the streets of the city center that had been vacated by brute force
were filled once more with informal commercial activity, and the return of a profitable scheme
of corrupt toleration (Gordon, 1997a).
In 1967, the government issued a new vending decree under the pretext of maintaining ve-
hicular transit in the city center area, which should be “comfortable, expeditious, and safe”
(Gordon, 1997a:3). The new regulation mapped out a new area where street vending was for-
bidden within the Historical Center and established sentences of up to 36 hours in prison if
the law was infringed (Gordon, 1997a), but the new mayor of Mexico City, Alfonso Corona
del Rosal, did not implement it forcefully.
For now, street vendors were still recovering from the harsh repression of the Uruchurtu
administration. This gave Mayor Corona del Rosal the opportunity to demonstrate to the
public that he was generous to the poor. After some time, the city government relapsed into
the practices of the 1940s which consisted on a scheme of corrupt toleration, sporadic police
operations, and the absence of future plans to deal with the street vending dilemma (Gordon,
1997a).
After the decree of 1967, the legal situation of informal street vendors did not change for
the next 26 years.
4.2.5 Corruption, the birth of modern street vendor organizations, and the Debt Crisis, 19701988
The continuous decades of pri rule created a broad culture of ilegality, which resulted in a
social norm of non-compliance. Among the regime’s basic codes of conduct, corruption ap-
peared to be one of themost fundamental, with impunity starting at the highest levels (Preston
and Dillon, 2004). During the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly during the presi-
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dency of José López Portillo (1976–1982), corruption reached alarming levels. His administra-
tion epitomizes what is perhaps the most corrupt period in the recent history of Mexico.28 “A
politician who is poor, is a poor politician” was a saying attributed to Carlos Hank González,
the Mexico City mayor from 1976 to 1982. He applied this principle vigorously throughout
his career, and his administration in Mexico City was no exception. Hank González started
as a rural school teacher in his native State of Mexico but became immensely wealthy as a
mayor by contracting city construction projects to his own companies (Preston and Dillon,
2004); in particular the construction of the ejes viales (road axes)—a vast network of wide
arterial roads crossing Mexico City constructed in the late 1970s—is said to have been par-
ticularly lucrative for him (Flores Rangel, 2005). He is also remembered for constructing the
Central de Abasto (Groceries Center), Mexico City’s main wholesale market for produce and
other foodstus, run similarly to traditional public markets. It was established to be the meet-
ing point for producers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers for the entire country. Hank
González best exemplified the pri’s old guard and all of its vices. The Mexican political class
referred to him as el profesor (the teacher) to point out the discrepancy between his humble
origins and his later prosperity (Preston and Dillon, 2004), and it was also an ironic way to
refer to his ability to mix private business with public aairs for his own benefit.
Using money to get around the law and regulations was a cultural norm. Paying a bribe
to a policeman or a public servant was simpler than going through the legal procedures, if
they existed, to pay for a trac ticket, get a driver’s license, a construction permit, or a selling
permit, or to register a property title or a new car. Individuals were continuously induced
to bend the rules to carry out the essential tasks of life, involuntarily becoming accomplices
in the larger corruption of their government authorities and politicians (Preston and Dillon,
2004).
Though the total number of street vendors in Mexico City in the 1970s is unknown and
could only be approximated—one estimate puts the number in 32,000 in 1971 (Gordon,
1997b)—street vendors, government authorities, businessmen, and academics involved in
street vending noted an important rise in the activity in the mid-1970s, occurring simultane-
28The personification of the rampant corruption of this time was Chief of the Federal District Police, Arturo
Durazo Moreno, who was under the orders of Mayor Hank González but a longtime friend of President López
Portillo. Durazo Moreno converted the Mexico City police into a criminal organization. Although he earned a
public servant’s salary, he built two lavish houses, in Mexico City and Zihuatanejo, had a collection of luxurious
automobiles, and bought properties abroad (González G., 1983). Durazo Moreno made a fortune in unlawful
wealth from the bribes paid by every cop in the city, from extortion of other government ocials, and from kick-
backs on the purchase of police equipment. He was involved in the cocaine trade to the United States among other
criminal activities (González G., 1983; Flores Rangel, 2005).
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ously with a slowing down of the economy and a lack of adequate formal sector employment
that could absorb the number of unemployed citizens looking for a job (Cisneros-Sosa, 1993;
Gordon, 1997a).
The numbers again grew significantly following the 1982 Debt Crisis. Estimations of the
number of street vendors in 1988 ranged from 100,000 to over 700,000 in the capital city, and
from 9,500 to 40,000 in the Historical Center alone29 (Ramirez, 1983; Correa, 1987; Gordon,
1997b).
In addition to the contingencies in the economy mentioned above (economic slowdown
and lack of adequate formal jobs), other circumstances played a part in the increase of street
vendors throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The population of Mexico City increased by 29
percent between 1970 and 1980, from approximately 7 million to 9 million people in only one
decade (Table 4.1) (inegi, 1990; 2010a). Urban planners were unsuccessful in building new
public markets to keep upwith the rising demand frommillions of new inhabitants ofMexico
City (Gordon, 1997b). The lack of new established public markets ensured the prominence
of informal street markets and informal street vendors in the metropolitan area. In addition,
the building and opening of the Sistema de Transporte Colectivo—the underground service
better known as the Metro—in 1969, with its focal point in the city center area, as well as the
exodus from the Historical Center by residents and some formal established businesses, made
this area especially susceptible to invasion by street vendors (Gordon, 1997a; Cross, 1998).
The conversion of the Historical Center from a place to settle to a crossing place was fast.
Street vendors proliferated on empty storefronts, vacant lots, and run down streets through
which many commuters, visitors, and travelers passed daily. Street vendors also invaded the
Metro system in the thousands, occupying its entrances, corridors, passageways, and even
Metro train cars (Gordon, 1997b; Cross, 1998).
Eorts to remove and relocate street vendors intensified in the mid-1980s (Correa, 1987;
Monge, 1987; Cross, 1998). The two delegations30—CuauhtémocDelegation andVenustiano
Carranza Delegation—that include the oldest parts of the city (including the Historical Cen-
ter) started relocating clusters of street vendors from more congested to less congested streets.
This move was a response to the concern of the public about the noticeable degradation of the
29Other source give even larger numbers, estimating that there were between 45,000 and 60,000 people in the
Historical Center (Monge, 1987).
30As mentioned earlier, the Federal District Charter was amended in December 1970. Among its changes, it
matched the term ‘Federal District’ with ‘Mexico City’. In addition, it disappeared the Central Department or
Centro (ocially called Mexico City) and created four new delegations (Miguel Hidalgo, Benito Juarez, Venus-
tiano Carranza and Cuauhtémoc), arriving at the 16 delegations we have at present.
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most venerated urban area in the country (the Historical Center). Furthermore, formal estab-
lishedmerchants aected by the Debt Crisis had appealed for action from the city government
(Gordon, 1997b).
The formal established businesses, assembled in the ‘ocial’ canaco and autonomous
neighborhood business associations, accused street vendors of various misdemeanors, includ-
ing disloyal competition, tax avoidance, health risks, safety dangers, and even visual pollution
(Correa, 1987). The vehicular trac and circulation problems caused by street vendors also
provoked the indignation of many city residents. During the 1980s, trac became a partic-
ularly sensitive matter since air pollution had reached critical levels in Mexico City and was
now a public health problem (Correa, 1987; Cross, 1998). The city authorities, acknowledg-
ing that the economic resurgence of the Historical Center was not going to be possible if there
was no cooperation from formal established businesses, progressively started to take action
(Cross, 1998).
As mentioned before, for a long time, the actions performed against street vendors by the
city authorities were inadequate and weak, only executed to fulfill the expectations of the
canaco and middle-class city residents. Powerful vested interests hampered authentic and
thorough control and suppression of street vending. The government bureaucracy set up for
dealing with street vendors did not have an organization with sucient consistency and co-
herence. The 16 delegations that constitute Mexico City were unsuccessful in coordinating
their actions, either between themselves and/or with the dierent agencies and bodies of the
central government dealing with street vending issues. Within the Mexico City government,
various agencies, including the judiciary, the treasury, theMetro administration, and the Gen-
eral Coordination of Supply and Distribution in the Federal District (Coordinación General
de Abasto y Distribucion del Distrito Federal, coabasto)—the central agency responsible of
food supply and markets in Mexico City—demanded authority and control over street vend-
ing, increasing the disorder (Gordon, 1997b; Cross, 1998).
The legal chaos in which the street vendors operated gave authorities the power to make
selling permits entirely discretionary. For example, the tax code included a category with
specifications for street vendors, but city regulations banned the obstruction of the thorough-
fare by street vendors (Gordon, 1997a). In the same way, the Mexican constitution grants the
right to participate in economic pursuits and occupations that do not damage third parties (a
provision that is open to various interpretations and therefore can be used to justify the street
vending activity). However, Mexican presidents and Mexico City mayors had issued decrees
forbidding street vendors from carrying out their economic activities in certain areas of the
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capital city.31 Furthermore, given that the government authorities did not have a single list of
the selling permits or street vending licenses allotted, street vendors frequently evaded justice
by using forged documents. This state of aairs gave government ocials a space for both
policy maneuvering and corruption opportunities (Gordon, 1997a).
On the morning of September 19, 1985, an earthquake of a magnitude of 8.1 on the Richter
scale struck several states of southern and westernMexico, includingMexico City, leaving be-
hind a wake of death and destruction. It is believed the earthquake caused more than 10,000
deaths and left considerable damage in theMexico City area, particularly the city center. The
damage was evident not only in the destruction of buildings and the loss of lives but also in
political and social spheres, as it was immediately clear that the government was unable to
provide basic relief for the city and its inhabitants (Kirkwood, 2000). The government’s re-
sponse to the earthquake was widely criticized at various levels ofMexican society, being seen
as authoritarian, corrupt, and incompetent (Haber, 1995; Monsiváis, 2005). As many of the
collapsed buildings were of recent construction and public works projects, the government
was seen to be at fault because of mismanagement and corruption carrying out these con-
structions. The government itself realized that it could not handle the crisis through already-
established institutions alone and decided to open the process up to opposition and civil so-
ciety groups (Haber, 1995; Monsiváis, 2005). Grassroots organizations rapidly mobilized,
providing food, medicine, shelter, and material for the reconstruction. These civil society
groups proved to be more capable than the government in some instances, resulting in impor-
tant tests to the authority of the pri. The intervention of non-pri organizations where the
government could not act also took its toll on the reputation of the pri. Historian Burton
Kirkwood (2000:23) stated:
Out of the disaster emerged the realization that a viable civil society existed in
Mexico. This revelation caused many to consider why they needed a centralized
state that so obviously could not care for its people. As a consequence, the oppo-
sition movements pointed to the government’s shortcomings and advanced can-
didates for the greater goal of defeating the pri.
As if this were not enough, more pressure in support of a policy of tolerance in favor of street
vendors came from the popular sector of the pri—the so-called National Confederation of
Popular Organizations (cnop)—a political sector of the party to which several organizations
of street vendors were aliated.
31By 1996, there were 16 legal codes that, on one hand, allowed the exercise of street vending and, on the other,
penalized it (Monge, 1996b), as it will be seen later in this chapter.
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The pri had serious concerns about its support among the lower andmiddle-classes inMex-
ico City, as a result of the 1968 student movement crackdown,32 and as a consequence of the
economic crisis of 1982 and the earthquake that hit Mexico City in 1985 (Correa, 1987; Gor-
don, 1997b; Cross, 1998; Philip, 1998). To improve the image of the pri as an advocate of
the people and a protector of the poor, the cnop openly condemned the actions taken against
street vendors. Simultaneously, delegation ocers urged street vendors to side with vendor
organizations that were structured under the cnop guidance. As we will see later, these street
vendor organizations grew in dimension and complexity, and eectively became a significant
political support base for the pri (Gordon, 1997a).
At this time and under this scenario, one might argue that the lack of solution to the prob-
lem of informal street vending was merely the result of a political decision of the government
authorities; particularly because of the political capital that the street vendors represented to
the party and to the lack of clear jurisdiction over which governmental agency was responsible
for implementing any action against street vendors. In other words, there was no political will
to find a solution to the street vending problem because it was in nobody’s interest to do so.
Street vendors served as infantrymen in the pri’s struggle to maintain political support in
Mexico City, and sometimes beyond it (Chavez, 1986; Cross, 1998). In the 1980s, it was com-
mon practice for many street vendors belonging to these pri-aliated groups to demonstrate
publicly in support of the party. They waved flags and chanted political slogans in favor of pri
candidates in electoral or political public rallies, cheered and applauded the president or the
mayor at public appearances, and sometimes supplied disaster relief in other states (Chavez,
1986; Gordon, 1997b; Cross, 1998).
Some observers claim that street vendor leaders channeled funding to the political cam-
paigns of the pri. In exchange, street vendors expected their political patrons to support and
defend their cause before government and party authorities (Gordon, 1997b; Cross, 1998).
Gordon (1997a:4) described how one vendor explained this in simple words: “We expect the
support of the pri because we have given it to them when they call us to attend their events.”
32The 1968 student movement crackdown—also known as the Tlatelolco massacre—was the killing of an es-
timated 30 to 300 (but the real number is unknown) students and civilians by military and police on October 2,
1968 at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the Tlatelolco area of Mexico City. The event was an action taken by
the Mexican government to suppress the student movement of 1968—a social movement that included students,
professors, intelectuals and workers—which sought the democratization of a state characterized by its authoritar-
ianism and its abuse of power. The event is considerer part of theMexican dirty war, when the government used its
forces to suppress political oposition. It is believed that this movement and its terrible outcome prompted a more
active and permanent critical attitude of the civil society (especially in public universities) towards its government,
as well as contributing to the development of urban and rural guerrillas in Mexico (Poniatowska, 1998; Pensado,
2013).
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Some of the largest and most powerful street vendor associations that currently exist—for
example the association established by Alejandra Barrios—emerged at the end of the 1970s
as a response to the government crackdowns of street vendors. Following the economic and
natural disruptions of the 1980s, the number of people joining these organizations increased
rapidly. For example, Guillermina Rico’s organization had more than 10,000 members, be-
coming the most important vendor organization at the time (Gordon, 1997b; Cross, 1998).
The government authorities, explicitly or implicitly, collaborated in the development of these
organizations. They were all aliated to the pri.33
Thus, because of the organizational structure of the government—and the pri—street ven-
dors who wanted a selling permit could not request one directly from the relevant government
authorities. They had to go to an ‘established’ or ‘accredited’ street vendor leader to obtain
it.34 While base members of the street vendor associations were not coerced into ocially join-
ing the pri, they were certainly required to attend public meetings, political rallies, and other
activities to demonstrate their political support. Those who did not do so lost their ‘vend-
ing rights’ for up to three days, or even more, and those who wanted to break away from the
organization were usually subjected to violent retaliation (Gordon, 1997b; Cross, 1998).
The balance of power in the Historical Center was getting more and more volatile in the
final part of the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988). Dissatisfied
and frustrated with the government’s passive posture over street vending, several radical com-
ponents of the Historical Center’s formal business community started to quit the canaco
(Gordon, 1997b).
Following the economic crisis of 1982 and the earthquake of 1985 the number of street
vendors working in the city increased weekly (Philip, 1998), and the plans to improve and
revitalize the Historical Center put pressure on the authorities to take action against street
vending activities. The government bought some time when it implemented an insucient
relocation program—which basically consisted of moving street vendors from one street to
another—in the mid-1980s, but by the end of the 1980s it was clear that a new approach was
essential (Gordon, 1997b; Cross, 1998).
33This relates to the concept of ‘compulsory aliation’ discussed in Chapter 3.
34This relates to the concept of ‘forced mediation’ discussed in Chapter 3.
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4.3 The Camacho Solís administration, the Peso Crisis, and subsequent years (1988
1997)
4.3.1 Political framework
On Wednesday July 6, 1988, Mexicans went to the polls to elect a new president and a new
congress. The 1988 elections were to be a unique development in the history of Mexico. The,
pri, created in 1929 after theMexican revolution, had dominatedMexican politics for 59 years.
Initially conceived as an institutionalization of the ideals of the Mexican revolution, little by
little the pri had evolved into an authoritarian regime with a political culture of its own and
practically no real opposition.
This time things were dierent. The pri presidential candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari,
was confronted for the first time with true competition. His main competitor for the presi-
dency, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano, was a former pri member and the son of a popular
former pri-emanated president, Lázaro Cárdenas del Río. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had left
the pri in protest over the presidential nomination of Carlos Salinas and because he did not
share the economic policy orientation of the incumbent government of Miguel de la Madrid.
Cárdenas’ resignation from the pri led to his nomination as the presidential candidate for the
left-wing coalition, the National Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Nacional, fdn35);
Manuel Clouthier was chosen as the candidate of the right-wing National Action Party (pan).
Several sources state that the first results showed Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had an important
lead at the end of election day, July 6, 1988, butManuel Bartlett Díaz, Minister of the Interior,
who then performed as chairman of the Electoral College during the elections, announced
that the electoral results could not be given at that time because the counting system of the
Electoral College had collapsed, an event that would come to be known as la caída del sistema
(the system crash).
A week later, when the results were finally made public, Carlos Salinas was declared the
winner with 50.4 percent of the total vote (Preston and Dillon, 2004), but the opposition
candidates—among them Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas—did not accept the results, declaring the
election to be invalid. This led to protests taking place all over the country. However, the op-
position parties were unable to prevent Carlos Salinas from being declared president-elect by
the Chamber of Deputies—in which the pri had an advantage of 20 more deputies in front of
35The National Democratic Front will eventually evolve into the Party of the Democratic Revolution (prd).
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the competing set (ipu,1988). In addition, the government of the incumbent president, Miguel
de la Madrid, always maintained the legality of the elections. Carlos Salinas de Gortari was
sworn in as president on December 1, 1988. Nevertheless, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the
opposition—including a segment which later became the Party of the Democratic Revolution
(prd)—together with the pan and almost all other electoral observers, always maintained that
the results had been rigged and therefore the elections were illegal.
4.3.2 The issue of legitimization: the need for popular support
When newly elected president Carlos Salinas de Gortari appointed Manuel Camacho Solís as
mayor of the Federal District in 1988, the pri was facing more diculties than it had in pre-
vious administrations in Mexico City. The citizens still suered from the impact of the 1982
Debt Crisis and were also discontent with the government’s handling of problems resulting
from the devastating earthquake of 1985 in Mexico City. This situation had led to a decline
in the popular support for the party in the capital city, reaching the lowest point at 27 percent
(Davis, 1994). Moreover, for the first time since the inception of the pri, two opposition sen-
ators and a large number of opposition deputies were directly elected to the Senate and the
Federal Chamber of Deputies. The election of President Salinas itself was over-shadowed by
wide-ranging charges of fraud. It is argued that only a careful manipulation of votes preserved
a narrowmajority for the pri in the new local assembly, which was the first elected representa-
tive body for the Federal District36—the Assembly of Representatives of the Federal District37
(Asamblea de Representantes del Distrito Federal, ardf)38.
36Although this assembly had limited legislative powers, it was the first time since 1928—year in which the
municipality system was abolished in the Federal District—that the inhabitants of Mexico City were able to elect
their representatives.
37The Assembly of Representatives of the Federal District (ardf) is born by decree—published in the Diario
Oficial (the government’s ocial gazette) on August 10, 1987—as a body of citizen representation with powers to
issue edicts, ordinances and regulations for the police and good governance. It was first constituted in 1988 and
is the predecessor of the current Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (aldf). As a result of the Political
Reform of the Federal District—which was published by decree in the Diario Oficial on October 25, 1993—the
ardf became a governing body with powers to create legislation for the Federal District. Through this decree, the
third ardf ocially becomes a legislature in 1994. A new decree was published on August 22, 1996, which amends
Article 122 of the Constitution and denominates the Mexico City legislative body as the Legislative Assembly of
the Federal District (Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal, aldf). The same law states that it will be composed
of deputies rather than representatives (aldf, 2013a).
38The general elections of 1988 marked a milestone for the street vendor conflict in the Federal District. The
electorate in the capital had voted substantially for the left-wing opposition embodied in the National Democratic
Front and the new mayor, Manuel Camacho Solís, was committed to regaining their support. For this to happen,
government authorities knew it was essential to find a solution to the street vending dilemma. Thus Camacho
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In an interview for this research, Manuel Camacho Solís (2010) said he remembered those
times as being very dicult for the pri. He said that he had realized that the city could not
be governed using the traditional approach to public administration in which the Federal Dis-
trict was just an arm of the federal government in charge of delivering public services. He had
thought that during that dicult period the strategy needed to be dierent. The administra-
tion of the Federal District had to govern as it would govern in any other state in Mexico, in
one of two ways: using authoritarian methods (because the opposition was very strong), or
together with the opposition. He selected the second option. To show the conciliatory ap-
proach his administration would have, Camacho decided to present his plan for government
at the ardf, even though he was not required to do this. He wanted to send the message that
he would govern by consensus, which gave the impression he was limiting his powers, but he
said that he greatly strengthened them (Camacho Solís, 2010). Thus, the mayor capitalized
on the newly formed local assembly—the ardf—to gain time and support by discussing his
plans for government in this forum (Gordon, 1997b).
Determined to change the nature of theMexican political and economic systems, President
Salinas decided to implement a neoliberal program. He accelerated the privatization of state-
owned enterprises, thoroughly revised the agrarian code eliminating the constitutional right
to the ejidos39 (using the argument of low productivity), liberalized international trade and
opened direct negotiations with Canada and the United States, which led to the signing of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) in December 1992 (Cross, 1998; Philip, 1998).
At the same time, President Salinas promised extensive electoral reforms thatwould eventually
debilitate the pri’s tight control of Mexican politics. These changes directly undermined the
traditional corporatist structure of the pri as the privatized companies laid o workers, rural
peasants becamemore independent, and commercial capitalwas granted greaterpower (Cross,
1998; Thornton, 2000; Shefner, 2006).
At the national level, President Salinas concentrated his eorts on programs that underlined
the direct role of the state, such as the conditional cash transfer program called Solidaridad.40
This social program was administered directly by the presidency and provided resources to
Solís proceeded with prudence and discretion during the first three years of his administration (Gordon, 1997b;
Cross, 1998).
39In Mexico, an ejido is an area of communal land used for agriculture, on which community members indi-
vidually possess and farm a specific parcel.
40The National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad, known as pronasol or Solidaridad)
was launched on December 2, 1988, as the first government action of the Salinas administration. It sought to
achieve greater social justice beyond a scheme of transfer of resources or targeted subsidies. To achieve this, the
project needed not only the support of the government but also the organized participation of the population,
driven by a sense of nationalism and social development.
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communities for self-improvement; it served as an umbrella of resources as previously exis-
tent social programs were channeled through Solidaridad to service the poor. Many pub-
lic markets were designated as Solidaridad projects, and the distribution of basic goods at
subsidized prices was channeled through the program as well. By following these strategies,
President Salinas was trying to swap the image of a benign government from the pri to the
presidency—even as he reduced funding for these services—and in this way capitalize on the
political benefits of these initiatives. Throughout the country, huge advertising campaigns
publicized the benefits Solidaridad and nafta allegedly provided.
President Salinas confronted far greater problems in Mexico City. The low-cost, symbolic
rents for public market vendors and the de facto tax-free privileges of street vendors—both
emerging as a form of subsidy of popular commerce—undermined his plans to implement
a neoliberal program by cutting subsidies, broadening the tax base, reducing the tax rate
for formal firms, and providing an optimal environment for foreign investment (Cross, 1998).
Public market vendors refused government plans to privatize their stalls—even when the city
government oered to provide the titles for free—since they would have to pay maintenance
costs and repair bills for the deteriorating market buildings. Therefore, the city government
turned to street vendors, who did not have legal rights to the space they occupied on the street,
to attain some of its neoliberal objectives (Cross, 1998).
In this way, the formalization of informal street vending turned into one of the key elements
of a wider plan to apply a more rigorous and uniform tax code on commercial businesses in
the city, which would be tough on tax evasion among formal small shop-keepers as well as
public market vendors and street vendors. The expected results would increase tax revenues
and eliminate the advantage small merchants had over large commercial outlets (Cross, 1998).
However, Salinas’ position at the beginning of his government was weak and unstable. His
questioned presidential election victory had taken from him the legitimacy he needed to carry
out these projects. Even within his own party his influence was not complete; his cabinet
was made up largely of political figures, such as Manuel Bartlett, Carlos Hank González, and
Jorge de la Vega Dominguez, whose power bases were secured in the corporatist structure
of the pri and owed little direct loyalty to Salinas for their positions (Camp, 1990). His own
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camarilla41 members only controlled the economic portfolios. Luis Donaldo Colosio,42 who
had been the manager of Salinas’ presidential campaign and was in Salinas’ inner circle, had
been elected as a senator for the state of Sonora, and did not form part of Salinas’ cabinet until
later. Even Manuel Camacho Solís himself was considered to be only a marginal member of
Salinas’ camarilla.
As a result of this lack of legitimacy, most of Salinas’ actions in the first half of his presidency
(1988–1991) were those he could directly manage. That is, he was occupied with national
economic policy—the privatization of businesses, the liberalization of trade, the negotiation
ofnafta, and the Solidaridadprogram—areas directly under the control of the presidency and
from where, eventually, Salinas was largely able to legitimize his presidency and consolidate
his position of power (Cross, 1998).
4.3.3 Politics at work: the Mexico City of Camacho Solís
In Mexico City, Camacho Solís adopted a careful, slow-paced policy towards informal street
vending experimenting with isolated relocation projects in targeted areas,43 even as the size
of informal street vending continued to grow. These projects were administered by the dele-
gations44 (boroughs) rather than the central city government. They were dierent from past
administrations’ attempts to control informal street vending in one important aspect. Rather
than building government-owned markets whose stalls would be leased to informal street
vendors at a subsidized rate, the city government resorted to the construction of ‘stalls in
condominium’—permanent stalls sold to informal street vendors whose maintenance costs
were the responsibility of the street vendor associations (Monge, 1992d; Cross, 1998).
These projects required extensive negotiation between the street vendor associations and
the delegations, backed up by the threat of the use of police force against street vendors in
41A camarilla or clique is a political interest group, in this case, within a political party—a partnership between
individuals or groups of individuals, united by a common interest, who promote the interests of those who are
part of the group, while at the same time frequently preventing or impeding the interests of those outside that
group.
42On December 3, 1988, Luis Donaldo Colosio was appointed chairman of the pri’s National Executive Com-
mittee by President Salinas, in a political move to gain more control over and support from his party. Colosio was
eventually selected by President Salinas as his successor, but was assassinated in March 1994.
43Two such areas were the Basílica de Guadalupe and La Merced. The basílica, a cathedral to the Virgin of
Guadalupe, which attracts thousands of visitors and pilgrims a day, had become surrounded by a large street
market of itinerant vendors selling religious items and food. In a section of La Merced, a market zone near the
Historical Center, a prosperous street market had re-emerged during the preceding three decades (Cross, 1998).
44A delegation (delegación) is a territorial division within the Federal District.
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these areas—a policy of stick and carrot—and the promise that new street vending activity
would not be allowed in the surrounding streets. Moreover, city ocials insisted that any
informal street vendors who were not already organized should become members of an asso-
ciation, and be aliated with the pri (Monge, 1992a).45 At the same time, the street vendor
associations were required to collect down payments for the ‘stalls in condominium’ from the
vendor members while they were still selling on the street (Cross, 1998).
Cross (1998) argued that from the commercial point of view, this pilot version of the ‘stalls
in condominium’ scheme was a complete failure.46 Street vendors preferred to lose their stalls’
down payments—which many viewed as a surcharge on street vending—than to pay monthly
mortgage paymentswhile their clientswent elsewhere. Cross pointed out that the newmarkets
could be seen as a relative success in one sense, however. After acknowledging that themarkets
with ‘stalls in condominium’ were ‘white elephants’ from a commercial perspective, one city
ocial cited by Cross explained that they gave the city government the ‘moral right’ to keep
the surrounding streets free of vendors, even though the street vendors only moved to the
other side of the street (Cross, 1998). In the meantime, the number of informal street vendors
increased noticeably in other areas of Mexico City.
In the Cuauhtémoc Delegation47—which includes the Historical Center, Tepito, and most
of La Merced neighborhood—there was little success in getting the street vendors out of the
streets despite talks with vendor organization leaders and a series of proposals for their re-
location into empty plots of land made available after the 1985 earthquake. Conversely, the
number of informal street vendors in the area grew significantly following a series of street
invasions during the first half of the Camacho Solís administration. With corruption and
disorganization within the delegation administration and with more than 60 dierent street
vendor organizations competing for space in the delegation, local planning seemed unfeasible
(Cross, 1998). Figure 4.1 shows the 16 delegations of the Federal District.
45Unorganized street vendors were taken away from the Basílica de Guadalupe area but then followed sugges-
tions from city ocials to form an association aliated with the pri, after which they were included in the project
(Cross, 1998).
46According to Cross (1998:191) “although the city constructed a series of concrete stalls in the area of the
Basílica, only those closest to the Basílica were actually occupied; the rest of the vendors left to sell in other areas.
In LaMerced a 1,100-stall market called San Ciprian, finished in 1990, was never more than 30 percent occupied.”
Other sources said the San Ciprian market remained empty at least during the two following years after it was
handed in to the vendors (Monge, 1992c).
47The Cuauhtémoc Delegation includes the so called Historical Center (Centro Histórico) of Mexico City,
which has the largest proportion of economic activity of the Federal District. It also has the highest rate of muse-
ums, libraries, theatres, and cinemas per square meter in the country.
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Figure 4.1.: The 16 delegations that form the Federal District. (The Cuauhtémoc Delegation























Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 2009.
Yet, the position of Camacho Solís and other high-level city ocials towards street vending
was far from hostile. What is more, when in January 1990 a group of formal small merchants
and shop-keepers in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation obtained a ruling from the Supreme Court
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of Justice that prohibited informal street vendors from setting up in front of their shops, Cama-
cho Solís condemned the attitude of the formal merchants as “bordering on fascism” (Monge,
1990a:66; Cross, 1998:192) and asked for respect for the right of informal street vendors to
make a living and provide for their own survival (Monge, 1990a; Cross, 1998).
Similarly, the director of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation,48 Ignacio Vazquez Torres, spoke in
favor of street vending in a report to the ardf, criticizing those who “with a baroque vision,
feel that the Historical Center should be a reflection of the greatness of our ancestors, but
not a mirror of the social reality that we live in” (ddf-Delegación Cuauhtémoc, 1990; Cross,
1998:192), and commended informal street vending as a “reliever of social tension, an alterna-
tive employment that closes the door to poverty and opens the possibility of new economic per-
spectives that come to better the quality of life” (ddf-Delegación Cuauhtémoc, 1990; Cross,
1998:192).49
At the national level, it was unclear whether the political system was ready to tackle the
problem of informal street vending. In 1989 Congress passed a new tax code authorizing the
city treasury to collect a very small fee from informal street vendors pending the passage of
new regulations (Monge, 1989b; Cross, 1998). The ardf spent all of its first session—from
1988 to 1991—writing a new set of regulations to replace the outdated market regulation of
1951—the only existing regulation that attempted to regulate street vending (Monge, 1989b,
1992a; Monge and Ortega Pizarro, 1990). Even though the city government tried to incor-
porate a prohibition on street vending in the Historical Center in the new regulations, the
attempt was obstructed by the prd with the support of some of pri’s representatives (Monge
and Ortega Pizarro, 1990). However, the chairman of the Commerce Commission at the
ardf—having worked two years on the new market regulation—pointed to it as one of the
finest achievements of the ardf’s first session, and envisaged it would be passed as soon as
the second session of the ardf convened after the midterm elections of 1991 (Cross, 1998).50
48The terms ‘delegation directors’ or ‘delegates’ (delegados) refer to the directors of the 16 delegations of
Mexico City. Until 2000, they were appointed by the mayor or the head of government ofMexico City. From 2000,
the delegation directors (or delegates) were elected by popular vote and their ocial title was changed to head of
delegation (jefe delegacional).
49Street vending was a frequent target of criticism because the middle and upper class city residents pushed for
public spaces that projected their ideals of modernity and eciency. For them street vendors were an obstruction
and a hideosity. Formal established merchants also opposed street vendors, since they represented a source of
unwelcome competition. Moreover, itwas an obstruction to renovation projects in theHistoricalCenter. However,
street vending was also viewed as an alternative form of employment for many poor people in Mexico City who
could not get a formal job (Monge, 1990a; Gordon, 1997b).
50As part of the eort to understand and find a solution to the problem of street vending, the ardf organized an
open meeting in 1990 to talk about street vending. It was intended to give every group involved the opportunity to
present their viewpoint and find a solution by common consent. Several street vendor groups linked to opposition
parties and formal established merchants participated, but the majority of pri-aliated groups and supporters
161
the camacho solís administration, the peso crisis, and subsequent years
In the meantime, the power of street vendor leaders seemed untouched when about 10,000
street vendors marched to the ardf building in April 1990 to demand more permits to carry
out their activity in the Historical Center area (Baca, 1990).
Manuel Camacho Solís (2010) explained that there were broadly three dierent points of
view about how to proceed with street vendors at the time: leave things as they were; use the
police force to take out the vendors; or use a dierent approach, which consisted on negotia-
tion and the construction of new markets where the vendors would be owners and not lessees
of their stalls.
When I asked Camacho Solís why he did not carry out the aforementioned program in the
first part of his mandate, he said that the conditions to do it were not met until later. He
wanted to find a solution, not repress informal street vendors without a solution (Camacho
Solís, 2010). Indeed, Camacho Solís could not overlook the fact that street vendors were part
of a small number of groups overwhich the pri still had strong political power. He had towork
hard to maintain a balance between opposing constituencies—e.g. the opposite interests of
the middle and upper classes with the lower class; or the formal establishedmerchants and the
street vendors—while waiting for the political capital to be electorally safe, after the mid-term
elections of 1991
4.3.4 The midterm elections of 1991
The midterm elections of August 1991 changed the state of aairs completely. The left-wing
opposition parties, which had been united around the presidential candidacy of Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas in 1988, were now in total disarray. They only oered an unconstructive and badly
coordinated campaign attacking the nafta negotiations and its potential eects. On the right-
wing, the pan’s platform had been practically taken over by President Salinas’s neoliberal pro-
gram. Simultaneously, public service messages appeared on television channels and radio
stations numerous times a day, praising the virtues of nafta and the Solidaridad program,
always presenting a positive image of the Salinas administration (Cross, 1998).
The economic policies implemented by the Salinas administration of lowering taris and
overvaluing theMexican peso resulted in imports becoming considerably cheaper, stimulating
a growth in the standard of living for theMexican middle class at the expense of an increasing
outnumbered them. Ultimately the discussion was not very productive, having as a final outcome a report with
no solutions and ambiguous pledges of endeavors in the future (Gordon, 1997b).
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trade deficit that was barely compensated by growing foreign investment in anticipation of
joining nafta. As a result of all this, the pri swept to victory in the 1991 midterm elections,
winning back almost all the losses it had suered in 1988 (Cross, 1998). Given the power of
Salinas, as leader of the pri, to choose many of the candidates running for oce, most of the
newly elected ocials were far more likely to be loyal to the president and his policies than
before. In this way, President Salinas capitalized on party support and legitimacy after the
1991 elections and the implementation of economic policies.
The consequences of the 1991 election results on informal street vending were promptly
reflected in the change of administrative personnel following the election and its drastic shift
of rhetoric. The ardf scheduled a discussion of the new regulations without delay; the new
body of representatives—now almost completely dominated by the pri—unexpectedly began
attacking informal street vending, using the Supreme Court ruling of the previous year to
claim that these activities could not be regulated; the director of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation,
who had spoken in favor of street vending, was transferred to another position (Cross, 1998).
The mayor himself, Manuel Camacho Solís, began discussing a new agreement he wanted
the street vendor leaders to sign, which called for informal vendors to move into closed mar-
kets and o the streets (Monge, 1992c). Moreover, confidential plans were put down for a
major operation to clear the Metro—the city’s metropolitan underground—of informal ven-
dors who had blocked many of its entrances and passageways with their stalls and products;
and newspapers were filled with stories about the problems caused by informal street vendors
(Cabildo and Monge, 1989; Monge, 1989a, 1990b; Cross, 1998).
Moreover, in opposition to the presence of informal street vendors, several associations of
small, formally established merchants were created to press for the removal of informal street
vendors in the Historical Center area and citywide.51 The most assertive was Procéntrico,
a group formed by Guillermo Gazal Jafif—a Mexican of Lebanese origin—to press for the
eradication of street vending in Mexico City’s center. Initially ignored by city authorities and
disdained by the ocial National Chamber of Commerce (canaco), Procéntrico was very
successful in getting national attention for its cause and was also instrumental in exhorting
51Mexico City’s Historical Center has a special meaning forMexicans. It was the center of power of the former
Aztec empire and is currently the ocial seat of the Federal Mexican government as well as the Mexico City
government. An area where colonial and early independence architecture predominates, it is also the traditional
commercial hub of the city—even though the modern commercial center has moved to areas such as Polanco, La
Zona Rosa, El Pedregal, Santa Fe, and the Benito Juárez Delegation. Together with numerous small, formally
established stores and boutiques, the streets of the Historical Center are also shared by more than 10,000 informal
street vendors, who are blamed by the formal small businesses for stealing or scaring away their customers (Cross,
1998; Ortega Lomelín, 2010).
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the city government to bring about the Historical Center reordering project (Cross, 1998).
By this time, informal street vendors had occupied more than 32,000 square meters in the
Historical Center, enough to form a line of stalls about 20 miles long (Cross, 1998).52
Thus, during the second half of 1991, a combination of events and pressures from dierent
stakeholders started to change the balance of power against street vendors. First, the clear
victory of the pri over the opposition in the 1991 mid-term congressional elections reduced
the pressure on the pri to court the backing of the underprivileged. Additionally, it seemed
that the economic situation had finally started to recover. Throughout the 1980s, street ven-
dors often portrayed themselves as victims of the economic crisis, but the economic upturn
weakened this argument in the eyes of the public opinion (Cross, 1998; Ortega Lomelín, 2010).
Moreover, street vendor groups did not advance their cause when they participated in brutal
territorial pitched battles against rival organizations. With a large number of street vendors
on the streets, competition increased to new levels, as did the financial stakes of the street ven-
dor organizations (Cross, 1998; Silva Londoño, 2010).53 The media described violent clashes
among rival street vendor groups, and between street vendors and government inspectors, so
public sympathy for street vendors continued to decrease (Cabildo andMonge, 1989; Gordon,
1997b; Cross, 1998; Barrios, 2010).
In the meantime, the street vendor leaders—among them Guillermina Rico, Alejandra Bar-
rios and Benita Chavarría (Monge, 1992a, 1997d), whose indefatigable support for the pri’s
candidates had contributed to and been partially responsible for the party’s victory in the
elections—were taken by surprise and went on the defensive. Most street vendor leaders went
along with the negotiations, but it was clear that they were not quite sure why the government
had changed its approach all of a sudden.
The most important change was not made public. Mexico City’s Secretariat of Govern-
ment54 unexpectedly took the control of negotiations with street vendor leaders away from
52According to Mexico City’s Secretariat of Government, in early 1992 there were more than 100,000 street
vendors in Mexico City, distributed as follows: 46,000 in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation; 35,000 in the Gustavo A.
Madero Delegation; 8,500 in the Venustiano Carranza Delegation. The remaining were located mainly in the
Miguel Hidalgo, Benito Juárez, Coyoacán, Iztacalco and Xochimilco Delegations (Monge, 1992a).
53Street vendor leaders charged their vendor members considerable registration fees, plus weekly or monthly
fees and ‘contribution’ or ‘cooperation’ fees for special occasions or other purposes. The proceeds of the organi-
zations with large memberships were considerable, and therefore leaders fought to increase their areas of action,
and therefore the number of association’s members.
54During the first half of the Camacho Solís city administration, Mexico City’s secretary of government was
Manuel Aguilera Gomez. He was replaced in 1991 by Jesus Martínez Alvarez who was in charge from 1991 to
1992 and carried out the negotiations with the informal vendor leaders and the Metro operation (Monge, 1992a,
1992c). Following health problems, Martínez Alvarez was substituted by Marcelo Ebrard who was in oce from
1992 to 1993 (Camacho Solís, 2010). According to Camacho Solís (2010), Marcelo Ebrard was in control of
164
the camacho solís administration, the peso crisis, and subsequent years
the Cuauhtémoc Delegation and planned and carried out a massive police operation against
informal vending in the Metro (Monge, 1992a, 1992b). Thus, the Mexico City’s central gov-
ernment had gone past its supervision function and became directly involved in policy imple-
mentation. Later, it became clear that these changes had originated at the highest possible
level of government—the oce of the president of Mexico (Monge, 1992a; Cross, 1998).
4.3.5 The Metro operation: outcomes and implications
Informal vending in theMetro system inMexicoCity has been a feature since it opened in 1969
but had become far more widespread during the 1980s—mostly as a result of the economic
crisis. Informal vendors often blocked passageways and intermittently set up rudimentary
stalls or blankets where they exhibited their products on the platforms and corridors (Monge,
1989a, 1990b, 1992a, 1992b).55 As a result of the shift in policy towards informal street vend-
ing in the capital, the city government thought it necessary to take concrete action against
informal vendors located in the Metro as well.
According to Cross (1998) the city government found 4,275 vendors in 118 Metro stations
when it carried out a census of all the stations.56 The census was not able to account for about
around 1,000 ‘itinerant vendors’ who sold on the Metro trains by walking from car to car
selling small products from portable bags—the so called vagoneros or ‘train car vendors’.57
City ocials also gathered information on informal vendors they identified as leaders in the
Metro stations, who performed many of the same chores as those on the streets—collecting
fees, controlling access and admission, and arranging for payments to city ocials (Monge,
1990b). Police compiled records on each leader so the city government could show, as one
ocial said, that they “were groups of gangsters—that’s why we were not going to deal with
the reordering and formalization program and controlled the timing and strategy of the whole process. “He
cared about those policies and implemented the program” (Camacho Solís, 2010). However, according to Monge
(1992d), on July 1 1992, Camacho Solís freed Ebrard from his responsibilities for informal street vending and asked
Roberto AlboresGuillen to lead the Program for the Improvement of PopularCommerce (Monge, 1992d). Albores
Guillen remained in oce until 1994. He had previously been director of the Venustiano Carranza Delegation
(1989–1992).
55Although the Metro had its own security sta and occasionally took action against vendors, it attempted
to avoid direct confrontation and was generally ineective. During the period leading up to the police operation,
however, theMetro significantly stepped up its own actions. Ocials later suggested this move may have been due
to a desire to avoid the need for a major operation that would involve subordinating the Metro to the central city
administration (Monge, 1990b; Cross, 1998).
56Other sources calculated there were more than 6,000 vendors (Monge, 1992b).
57This type of itinerant vendor (called vagonero or ‘train car vendor’) usually sells small-size products and
carries them inside a portable bag, and thus does not require a stall or surface to display them. This gives them
greater mobility, which they use to evade the police and authorities.
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them” (Cross, 1998:195). Moreover, Mexico City’s Secretary of Government, Jesús Martínez
Alvarez, had warned: “We will not allow [informal] vendors to continue operating inside the
Metro” (Monge, 1992a, 1992b:172)
The planning for such actions began in secret, shortly after the 1991 midterm elections.58
Originally, the Metro operation was planned to take place after street vendor leaders in the
Historical Center had signed the agreement to reorder vending (the so-called Agreement for
the Reordering of Commerce in the Thoroughfare59), which included a clause banning in-
formal vending in the Metro. But while the street vendor leaders prolonged negotiations by
arguing among themselves, a better opportunity for intervention occurred in February 1992
when a Metro passenger was shot by an informal vendor after an altercation (Monge, 1992a,
1992d; Cross, 1998).60 Without delay, the city government used the opportunity and launched
its operation as if it were a response to this particular act of violence. This incident was used
to provoke reactions and set the press and public in general against the informal vendors in the
Metro by using the shooting to demonstrate the dangers they represented, describing them as
having “an aura of criminality” (Cross, 1998:196).61
The morning after the homicide, 500 riot police were assigned to guard 15 of the most
vendor-crowded Metro stations, giving the impression that the city government was respond-
ing rapidly to a public threat, but in reality itwas executing a carefully planned strategy (Cross,
1998). Over the following two months the police operation moved through the Metro system,
inundating each station with a heavy riot police presence for a two-week period and then leav-
ing a small contingent of police behind to prevent informal vendors from re-occupying the
Metro premises (Cross, 1998).
In the short term, theMetro operation was highly successful, earning praise from the press
and giving city ocials the assurance they could get public support, but this course of action
58John Cross (1998) argues that he first heard rumors about such plans from ardf sta members in October
1991.
59The Agreement for the Reordering of Commerce in the Thoroughfare or Convenio de Reordenación del
Comercio en la Vía Pública.
60On February 14, 1992, a street vendor operating inside Indios Verdes Metro station shot dead a passenger
who had accidentally trodden on his products. Immediately, Camacho Solís capitalized on the indignation this
action provoked among the general public to remove numerous informal vendors from the Metro (Monge, 1992a,
1992b; Cross, 1998).
61In November 1991 theMetro had begun a safety awareness campaign featuring billboards that, among other
safety messages, always included a request for users to avoid patronizing vendors—who were thus labeled contin-
uously as the primary safety hazard in the Metro. Some of the vendors defended themselves by pointing out
that many acts of violence and even killings in the Metro installations had nothing to do with vendors, but one
episode that did was hypocritically used against them. This defense was completely ignored in the press, which
unanimously endorsed the operation.
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required not only a costly police force but also constant surveillance. Informal vendors who
sold on the Metro trains (vagoneros) instead of the stations were only partly aected since
it was fairly easy for them to evade the vigilance and sell surreptitiously. In fact, this type of
vendormight actually have been better o, since there was less competition and therefore their
earnings increased.62 The fact that this outcome was a possibility was in itself a sign of the
weaknesses of the program, and a foretaste of what would come the following years as more
and more informal vendors began returning to the trains (Cross, 1998).
Within the stations—and in contrast to the tactics used by the vagoneros (train car
vendors)—the informal vendors set up on the floor, which made it easier for the police to
handle them, usually forcing them outside the Metro station and far from the station en-
trance. However, the displaced vendors adopted a strategy of setting up closer and closer to
the station entrances until they began occupying the Metro station once more (Cross, 1998).
In the early stages of the operation, this infringement often led to a new raid by the riot police.
However, after some time, some politicians and newspapers began once again to denounce
the presence of informal vendors in the entrances of several Metro stations (La Prensa, 1994a,
1994b; Cross, 1998).63
Asmentionedbefore, two of the factors thatmade it easy to act against the informal vendors
operating in the Metro were the public support and the window of opportunity that resulted
from the shooting of the Metro passenger in February 1992. Another important factor was
the lack of formal organization of the informal vendors operating in the Metro. Even though
most Metro lines and stations were controlled by specific groups of vendors, none of their or-
ganizations was recognized by government or party ocials,64 which undermined the internal
organization of the Metro’s informal vendors and made it easier for the city government to
portray them as thieves or criminals (Cross, 1998). Nonetheless, the long-term success of the
operation was still uncertain, since informal vendors kept on returning to the Metro stations
every time the heavy police enforcement gave way (Cross, 1998).
Regardless of its success or failure, the Metro operation accomplished four fundamental
tasks for the city authorities. First, it demonstrated to informal vendor leaders that the city
62After the Metro operation, only about one-third (36 percent) of this type of vendors were left, but those that
remained saw an increase in their earnings and they prevented new vendors from coming in, “Because it isn’t fair
that we suered and now that it is easy, everyone wants to come in” (Cross, 1998:196).
63This was not the first time such an operation had been attempted. According to Cross (1998), in January
1989 riot police had removed informal vendors from all but three stations, but they soon returned (Excelsior, 1989a,
1989b). Most vendors assumed this operation would be just temporary, not recognizing the real goals of the city
administration.
64Cross (1998) arms that some of these groups were later recognized, on condition that they accepted areas
outside the Metro facilities, which they did.
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government was prepared and ready to use force if necessary to carry out its policies. Second,
by associating the operation with a specific criminal act committed by an informal vendor, the
city government was able to present informal (street) vending to society as a legitimate public
security concern and thus justify theMetro operation on those grounds, and not as an admin-
istrative government decision that damaged the livelihood of many informal vendors, which
might have been far more dicult to justify (Cross, 1998). Third, as a public security mat-
ter, the Metro operation generated mounting public support for anti-vendor policies, which
helped the city government to validate its even more dicult task of relocating vendors in
the Historical Center, where informal street vendors were strongly and thoroughly organized
and had strong political connections. Fourth, it reassured city authorities that the Historical
Center project was politically viable (Cross, 1998).
4.3.6 The Program for the Improvement of Popular Commerce (PMCP)
After sixmonths of compulsory negotiations, but barely twoweeks after theMetro operation,
street vendor leaders signed—on February 28, 1992—an ambiguouslyworded agreementwith
the mayor, Camacho Solís, to reorder street vending in the Historical Center. The project
came to be known as the Program for the Improvement of Popular Commerce (Programa de
Mejoramiento del Comercio Popular, pmcp) (Monge, 1992c, 1992d).65 As the term ‘reorder-
ing’ (reordenamiento) was intentionally left undefined, street vendor leaders proposed to the
authorities that they be permitted to set up neat but permanent stalls on the streets. The city
government had other plans, though did not make them public at the beginning. Later, it was
evident that the city government had planned to build newmarkets for the informal vendors—
in empty buildings and lots within the Historical Center—denominated ‘commercial plazas’
(plazas comerciales) to distinguish them from the previous public markets (Cross, 1998).66
Camacho Solís explained to me the most beneficial features of the program and its imple-
mentation as follows:
First, we presented the program [PMCP] as something positive, because it was
something positive; it was not a program to order the city, but rather a program
65Also known as the ‘Plaza Construction Program’ or the ‘Program for the Improvement of Street Vending’.
66Similar plans had been projected, in various versions, several times during past administrations. After the
earthquake of September 1985, the destruction and abandonment of several buildings in the Historical Center had
led to a series of studies about land use in the city center area, centering on the relocation of street vendors. The
big dierence was that now the stalls were going to be sold directly to the street vendors instead of owned by the
city government (Monge, 1992c; Cross, 1996).
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to improve popular commerce; it was not against the street vendors, but in their
favor. Second, we tried to find spaces, sites where they could really go andnot only
get them out of the street but give them an opportunity; it was about designing
a program with new markets similar to those of the time of Uruchurtu, and giv-
ing street vendors the opportunity to be able to aord the proposal. At the same
time, there was a huge eort in negotiating the very complex logistical operation
with the street vendor organizations while agreeing with the political bases, and
remaining determined to put up a fight to make all of this work, and not end up
with the street vendors remaining on the street. It was an exceptionally compli-
cated logistical operation, and required much care, not only to organize and to
negotiate politically, but also to prevent someone from winning your game... We
had a D-Day on which 10,000 vendors were going to leave the Historical Center,
and we moved that day to an earlier one, just because we knew that there was
going to be a provocation [to hurt the city government’s image because Camacho
Solís was one of the competitors for the pri’s presidential ticket at the national
level]. Then we brought the D-Day forward, and it worked out very well, it was
flawless, there was no protest and people went to their new sites. (Camacho Solís,
2010)
Mayor Camacho Solís wanted to transfer vendors from the streets to indoor commercial
plazas, as Uruchurtu had attempted 40 years earlier. Thus, during 1993 and 1994, the city
government set out to build around 30 commercial plazas with room for about 10,000 vendors
(Gordon, 1997a, 1997b; Cross, 1998, 2005).67
These new commercial plazas were dierent from the classical public markets of the 1950s
and 1960s in many ways.68 In the first place, the construction of the commercial plazas was
paid by the vendors themselves. In the past, it was the government who had paid for the
construction of public markets and was nominally their legal owner. Vendors only leased
the market spaces at a minimal cost. However, under the new program to improve popular
commerce, vendors were converted into some kind of ‘condominium’ owners of their stalls,
67Figures vary regarding the number of markets built: Cross (1998) says the city government built only 24 out
of 30 planned commercial plazas. Cross (2005) says there was a plan for 27 commercial plazas. Gordon (1997a)
says the city government built 28 commercial plazas between 1993 and 1994.
68Gordon (1997b) argues that, although inside the city administration the commercial plazas were still catego-
rized as markets and wholesale food distribution (abasto) centers, they were not intended to house street vendors
to supply basic provisions to the population of Mexico City, but instead to accomplish the more specific and
immediate goal of removing the vendors from the streets.
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with the help of the city government, which provided access to credit at a subsidized rate
(Monge, 1992d).
City ocials at the delegation level, acting with care to avoid open conflict with the street
vendor leaders, struggled with a number of proposals for relocation that would be acceptable
and suitable to the street vendors. As one high ocial stated: “Our biggest fear is arriving at
confrontations. There is a presidential mandate that we have to fulfill, but we don’t have the
means yet” (Cross, 1998:199).
To obtain the agreement of the vendor leaders to move to the new commercial plazas,69
Camacho Solís promised that he would not let competing street vendor groups take over the
streets that the new commercial plaza beneficiaries had emptied. To help in this endeavor, the
ardf enacted a decree (bando) in 1993,70 which banned street vending in the central perimeter
of the Historical Center—known as Perimeter A (Figure 4.2) (ardf, 1993; Monge, 1993a;
Gordon, 1997b). This regulation, just like previousl ones, gave the city government greater
freedom of enforcement and implementation.
69Once the commercial plazas were built and handed over to the vendor organizations, they added to the
prestige of the vendor leaders and gave them an ‘ocial’ base of operations and an extra incentive to oer to
prospective members of their associations.
70The Decree for the Ordering and Regulation of Commerce in the Thoroughfare of Mexico City’s Historical
Center (Bando para la Ordenación y Regulación del Comercio en Vía Pública del Centro Histórico de la Ciudad
de México), passed by the ardf on July 12, 1993 (ardf, 1993).
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Figure 4.2.: Map of Mexico City’s Perimeter A
Source: Author.
One of the city ocials involved in the project, Hector Luna de la Vega—at the time sub-
secretary of government of Mexico City—anticipated that the planning phase of the project
alonewould last for about tenmonths, until October 1992 (Monge, 1992a; Cross, 1998). Only
after this phase was over would the construction of commercial plazas begin. Meanwhile, the
delegations71 carried out a cycle of censuses of informal vendors in the area. Identification
cards were going to be provided to each street vendor in the Historical Center so that only
those vendors with cards would be accepted in the commercial plazas. In the meantime, a
single list of informal vendors operating throughout the whole city would be created. In order
to promote transparency and prevent corruption, this list could not be individually modified
71The first stage of the program dealt mainly with the street vendors of the Cuauhtémoc and Venustiano Car-
ranza Delegations where the Historical Center and La Merced are located, respectively (Monge, 1992a).
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either by the Secretariat of Government or by the delegations; changes would have to be made
jointly (Monge, 1992d; Cross, 1998).72
4.3.7 The problems and setbacks of program implementation
Nothing went as planned.73 Some street vendor organizations started to expand their areas
of influence and increase the number of members in order to guarantee a larger number of
spaces inside the commercial plazas and/or a stronger negotiating position with the city gov-
ernment. Sometimes leaders of organizations benefitted from the new project by charging
vendor members elevated fees in order to secure them a spot in the commercial plazas. Ac-
cording to Cross (1998), one vendor leader charged mx$3 million (us$900 in 199274) for her
members to be allowed to sell in an area in which a commercial plaza was going to be con-
structed on the understanding that this would allow vendors to buy stalls in the commercial
plaza later. The same leader charged a mx$5 million (us$1,500 in 1992) down payment for
each stall when the commercial plaza was ready. And if vendors wanted to be given a good
space in the commercial plaza, they had to pay even more money. Other vendors paid the
government directly less than mx$2 million (less than us$600 in 1992) for a place on the same
commercial plaza (Cross, 1998).
The confusion was exacerbated when ocials determined that each vendor organization
had to create a special fund to pay for the down payment of their commercial plaza project, but
the informal vendors didnot get any kindof credit for that payment. Theywere still required to
make additional individual payments to the city government after paying into funds allegedly
maintained by their vendor associations for the same purpose (Cross, 1998). The lack of
organization among dierent government oces participating in the project and the poor
decision to discuss the dierent plans and proposals of its implementation publicly added to
72The idea behind these measures was to eliminate corruption in the Market Oces. In the past, the Market
Oce director had been the only person who could decide which street vendors would be tolerated and which
would not. As one ocial said, “Before, the director [of the Market Oce] was the king. He gave permits, took
them away, everything. Everything was right there” (Cross, 1998:200).The opportunity for corruption and fa-
voritism was enormous, and city ocials noted that the new program was running into severe diculties, because
some people did not want the system to change (Cross, 1998).
73No credentials were ever distributed, and the single list was never put together. In practice, the number of
informal vendors in the area continued to grow, and interagency rivalry spoiled and damaged the original plans
(Cross, 1998).
74In those years, there was a change of currency in Mexico. The ‘old peso’ was valid until December 31, 1992.
From January 1, 1993, the ‘new’ peso started to circulate. The currency looked the same as the old one, with the
exception that three zeros were erased and the name read ‘new pesos’. The name ‘new peso’ remained until the
last day of 1995. After that, the currency was called ‘peso’ again.
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the confusion, which generated opportunities for misinterpretation, abuse, negligence, and
corruption.
Many of these problems had a financial origin. On one hand, vendors were required to
pay for their own stalls, although city ocials were not sure vendors would in fact occupy the
stalls, as they had tomake considerablemonthly payments on them. On the other, the city gov-
ernment had no budget to build the commercial plazas (Camacho Solís, 2010). Consequently,
loans had to be arranged from financial institutions willing to take the potential risk of many
vendors defaulting. Moreover, most informal vendors did not have collateral with which to
secure the loans, except for the value of their stalls. Therefore, one of the main obstacles that
held back the program to build commercial plazas was the failure to find a commercial bank
willing to finance the building costs (Cross, 1998).
4.3.8 Procéntrico's reaction: small formal merchants versus informal street vendors
The lack of action and results in tackling informal street vending drained the patience of the
small formal merchants in the area. Finally, Guillermo Gazal Jafif—the leader of Procéntrico
and one of themost vocal and insistent campaigners against informal street vending inMexico
City—took a drastic stance, which led him into direct confrontation with street vendor orga-
nizations, the National Chamber of Commerce (canaco), and the city government (Monge,
1990a, 1992d; Cross, 1998).
Since January 1989, Gazal Jafif had criticized city authorities for letting informal street ven-
dors in Mexico City center take about mx$10,000 million (us$4.5 million in 1989) in sales
from small formal stores, claiming that when the city government granted 9,000 selling per-
mits for the Christmas season, the vendor leaders used them to justify 70,000 informal vendors
(Monge, 1990a; Cross, 1998). In January 1990, after obtaining a Supreme Court of Justice rul-
ing against street vending, Gazal Jafif threatened thatmembers of Procéntrico would organize
massive store closings among the 121,256 organized formal businesses in the capital (Monge,
1990a), and tax payment strikes to insist on the enforcement of the ruling. This led Camacho
Solís to accuse him of “bordering on fascism” (La Jornada, 1990; Monge, 1990a:66; Cross,
1998:192). Again, in late August and early September 1991, Gazal Jafif was in the spotlight,
urging city authorities to take vendors o the streets immediately (Cross, 1998).
Notwithstanding his activism during this time, GuillermoGazal Jafif was basically ignored
by the city authorities, which chose to negotiate with the less belligerent National Chamber
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of Commerce (canaco). However, in June 1992, arguing that three months had passed since
the agreement between the city government and informal vendors had been signed, and there
were no visible results, Gazal Jafif threatened to start a succession of strikes among the small
formal merchants of the area. When he was again ignored, he carried on with his threat by
summoning a ‘rolling strike’ in which a few blocks of stores and shops would close between
10 a.m. and 12 p.m. each day (Monge, 1992d; Cross, 1998).75 To attract the attention of the
media, Gazal Jafif went in person to check the progress of the strikes, starting each inspection
with a generous breakfast for the media representatives to make sure they followed him. On
one of those occasions, when some street vendors recognized him, he was encircled by a group
of about 30 vendors who shouted insults at him until he managed to escape (Cross, 1998).
One week later, on June 9, 1992, followed by the cameras and reporters of the most im-
portant television news program of that time, 24 Horas con Jacobo Zabludovsky, Gazal Jafif
went to check the development of a previously announced strike on a street occupied by street
vendors associated with Alejandra Barrios, one of the most important vendor leaders with
more than 800 street vendors in the area (Cross, 1998). When Gazal Jafif arrived, the street
had already been cleared of street vendors. Later, Alejandra Barrios explained she had re-
moved them for the day to avoid any confrontation (Barrios, 2010). However, a numerous
group of street vendors organized a counter-protest against the leader of Procéntrico. The
mob of angry street vendors walked up to where Gazal Jafif was standing, accompanied by
the media contingent. For a few moments, angry words were exchanged. Then tomatoes be-
gan to fall on Gazal Jafif, staining his clothes in red. After a fewmoments of confusion, Gazal
Jafif and two assistants who were with him began to run. The mob ran after them, throwing
more tomatoes at them as they fled. Even though the street vendors could easily have grabbed
Gazal Jafif, they made no attempt to do more than throw tomatoes. They threw no stones
and nobody hit or punched Gazal Jafif or his assistants. When Gazal Jafif got to the corner of
the street and ran around it with his assistants, several of the attackers followed him but they
were called back by the others. Gazal Jafif and his assistants got into two cars parked on the
street and took o as fast as they could (Monge, 1992d; Cross, 1998). Later, interviewed by
a tv channel and with his clothes still stained by tomato, Gazal Jafif claimed that the attack
was planned. The incident certainly did not appear to be spontaneous.76 Alejandra Barrios
75It is not clear to what degree stores actually supported Gazal Jafif, since most were closed at this hour of the
day anyway. Street vendor leaders maintained that Gazal Jafif used intimidation tactics to force stores to close and
claim nominal membership in his organization. Gazal Jafif himself declared that Procéntrico had a membership
in the thousands, an assertion he was unable to prove (Cross, 1998).
76Inexplicably, somebody was selling or unloading tomatoes in large numbers in an area in which fresh vegeta-
bles were rarely sold (Cross, 1998).
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and her aides persistently denied any involvement with organizing the counter-protest or the
tomato attack, but facts suggest that it was organized by someone within her association. A
more skeptical interpretation was that Gazal Jafif may have organized the protest himself to
get attention (Monge, 1992d; Cross, 1998). Street vendors certainly gave the impression that
they hatedGazal Jafif, whom they saw as a serious threat to theirmodus vivendi (Cross, 1998).
This incident was certainly welcomed by Gazal Jafif who—in the opinion of many mem-
bers of the media—had been hoping to incite a response of such impact and dimension. The
story was shown by the top evening news program the same day, generating criticism against
Gazal Jafif’s attackers and informal street vendors in general. This helped to ‘criminalize’
the informal street vendors located in the Historical Center in the same manner as the Metro
shooting had divested the Metro’s informal vendors of any public support (Cross, 1998).77
However, unlike the unanimous media support for action to be taken against the Metro
vendors, several major newspaper supported the informal street vendors this time, criticizing
Gazal Jafif as an opportunist who just wanted to get attention with the purpose of winning a
power struggle with the canaco, among other criticisms (Cross, 1998).
Ultimately Gazal Jafif might have been much more successful than some people acknowl-
edge. After the tomato attack, not only was street vending immediately suspended—with a
24-hour police protection made up of more than 60 riot police—but a week after the incident
President Salinas reorganized key positions and responsibilities within the city government
(Cross, 1998). City Secretary of Government Jesús Martínez Alvarez, who had ignored Gazal
Jafif, was moved from the second most prominent position in the city government to a much
less important post, coordinating policy issues with other states in the Mexican federal gov-
ernment (Cross, 1998).78 With him went his whole team, including those team members re-
sponsible for planning and developing the program for the relocation of street vendors in the
Historical Center (Monge, 1992d; Cross, 1998).
The former general secretary of the pri in the Federal District, young 33-year old Marcelo
Ebrard Casaubon,79 was appointed as the new secretary of government, suggesting that the
mayor Camacho Solís felt a more politically aware secretary was needed. Simultaneously, a
77Paradoxically, in an earlier interview with John Cross (1998), Alejandra Barrios had privately supported the
Metro operation, but after this event she openly sympathized with the Metro’s informal vendors (Barrios, 2010).
78As secretary of government of Mexico City he had been responsible for supervising the 16 delegations and
the police, markets and other public services. He was in charge of almost every administrative body of the city
(Cross, 1998).
79Marcelo Ebrard was general director of government of the Federal District (1989), General Secretary of the
pri in the Federal District (1989–1991), and pri candidate for the ardf (1991) before taking oce as secretary of
government of the Federal District in 1992.
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new ‘oce’ or ‘agency’ was created by the city government. It was headed by Roberto Albores
Guillen, who took over the responsibilities the Secretariat of Government had begun to per-
form in supervising the building of commercial plazas. The specificmandate of this new oce
was to coordinate the construction of facilities for the relocation of all street vendors in the
Historical Center (Monge, 1992d). The ‘oce’ or ‘agency’ created for Albores Guillen was
the Program for the Improvement of Popular Commerce (pmcp) (Monge, 1992d). While some
sources suggest that the Secretariat ofGovernment became a purely administrative oce, with
no direct policy implementation responsibilities (Monge, 1992d; Cross, 1998), Camacho Solís
(2010) told to me that it was Marcelo Ebrard the one who prepared the program and the one
who always had the timing, the strategy and the ultimate control of it.
4.3.9 Procéntrico versus CANACO: small formal merchants versus large formal businesses
The activism of Gazal Jafif against informal street vending is better understood in the light
of wider policy changes and the dynamics of vested interest. Small formal shop-owners in
the area had many common interests with informal street vendors. As informal street market
areas developed, so did many of the small formal stores since they served the same clients
and consumers. A large number of formal shop-owners were wholesalers who depended on
informal street vendors to distribute their products, or themselves used stalls on the street to
unfold and expand their trade. Ironically, most of the small formal shop-owners were also
‘semi-informal’ in the sense that they were able to compete with larger formal commercial
businesses only because they evaded many of their tax obligations by failing to disclose their
full revenues (Cross, 1998). The small formal shop-keepers began to feel themselves crushed
and squeezed between informal street vendors on one hand and large formal commercial busi-
nesses on the other, as the Salinas administration made clear its intentions to cut down on tax
evasion to broaden the tax base and, in doing so, reduce taxes on formal businesses (Cross,
1998).
Thus small formal merchants felt they were at a disadvantage. On one side, the informal
street vendors—who could not be taxed eciently as they were on the street—were strongly
represented by their associations. On the other, the large formal commercial businesses were
expected to profit from the policy changes since they already paid taxes. At the beginning of
his presidency, Salinas had reduced vat from 15 percent to 10 percent, a measure that consid-
erably favored large formal commercial businesses (Ortega Pizarro, 1991; Cross, 1998).
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The motivations behind Gazal Jafif’s position towards the canaco reflected the dissimilar
interests of small and large formal (commercial) companies with regard to the tax policies
implemented by the Salinas administration. Although all formal commercial companies ex-
cept public market vendors were legally required to become members of the canaco, voting
within this organization was based on the level of dues and contributions paid, which obvi-
ously was higher for bigger companies. As a result, the canaco had a tendency to represent
more the large formal commercial businesses of the modern commercial centers rather than
the thousands of small formal stores of the Historical Center (Cross, 1998).80 Hence, accord-
ing to some observers, the actions of Gazal Jafif against informal street vending were in reality
part of a broader campaign to damage the reputation of the canaco and later take it over.81
This attempt was linked to another policy-related issue that would bring the conflict with the
canaco to a critical point, as detailed below (Cross, 1998).
According to Cross (1998), as part of President Salinas’s crusade to reduce tax evasion, the
government began to require that all formal stores—even the smallest convenience stores—
had to use special ‘fiscal cash registers’ that would record all sales performed for tax purposes.
By making tax evasion harder, this policy undermined the competitive edge of small formal
stores relative to the larger formal commercial businesseswhile simultaneously broadening the
dierence between the operational costs of small formal stores and those of informal street
vendors.
The new government policy made evident the lack of organizational power of the small
formal merchants. Street vendors were not included in the policy because they were still tech-
nically informal and, in any case, had no stable place of business, and public market vendors,
who had stable locations and were legally registered with the city government, were not in-
cluded either (Cross, 1998). The big dierence was that the public market vendors and even
some informal street vendors were well organized through associations aliated with the pri,
while the small formal merchants were only nominally represented by the canaco (Cross,
1998).
80To counteract this tendency, it is said thatGazal Jafif attempted to set up a separateHistorical Centercanaco
thatwould be controlled by the small formal stores located there, but legislative approval nevermaterialized. When
Gazal Jafif announced later in 1992 that Procentrico’s members were breaking away from the canaco—and ac-
cused its directors of corruption—he was sued for defamation (Cross, 1998).
81As Gazal Jafif argued in an interview, “When have those of the canaco been with us? The streets that are
clear are not clear due to the canaco. The canaco and the concanaco [Confederation of theNational Chambers
of Commerce] do not act because they have interests with the government, and they are aliated with the same
government” (Cross, 1998:206).
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Thus Procéntrico organized small formalmerchants in the presence ofwider policy changes
that threatened to weaken their economic viability. Its approach towards informal street vend-
ing was a successful and ecient way of both mobilizing small formal shop owners and draw-
ing attention to their specific problems. While the city government attempted to ignore Gazal
Jafif as much as possible to play down his role as a leader and prevent the organization of
small formal shop-owners in the area, city ocials were obliged to accelerate their plans prin-
cipally to undermine his ability to use the issue of informal street vending as an instrument
formobilization (Cross, 1998). Ironically, while Gazal Jafif took every opportunity to criticize
the canaco and other interest groups belonging to large formal commercial businesses, these
criticisms were usually ignored or put down by the media, which portrayed him as a leader in
the struggle against informal street vending (Cross, 1998).
4.3.10 Rivalries between government agencies: Secretariat of Government versus delegations
It was not only discrepancies between informal street vendors and small and large formal mer-
chants and businesses that aected the implementation of the government’s policies. Rivalries
among government oces or agencies also influenced theway these policieswere implemented.
The tomato attack provided an excellent excuse to criticize the Secretariat of Government by
groups that were in danger of losing authority and influence through the expansion of the Sec-
retariat’s powers. Although vested interests were defended by informal vendors as well as the
pri, within the city administration the biggest opposition to government policies came from
the delegations, which were gradually losing their power to the Secretariat of Government
(Cross, 1998; Ortega Lomelín, 2010).82
In those years,MexicoCity’s Secretariat ofGovernmentwas considered the secondmost im-
portant oce in the FederalDistrict, responsible for policymanagement and supervision of all
administration and enforcement-related activities in each delegation (Cross, 1998). These re-
sponsibilities put the Secretariat in conflict with the delegation directors, who were appointed
82It is worth to remember the organization of theMexicoCity government in those days. TheMajor orRegente
was appointed by the president of the country. The mayor had under his authority two types of government
branches: an administrative one (the dierentMexico City’s secretariats), and a territorial one (the 16 delegations
ofMexico City). Themayor (or the president) would appoint the city government secretaries and the same applied
for the delegation directors, depending on the administrative needs and political arrangements. The delegation
director would appoint the sub-delegates which were responsible for the daily administration and policy work
in each delegation. Thus, conflict appeared when (as a result of a more direct involvement of the city’s higher
authorities on the policies to tackle informal street vending) sub-delegates were asked to report to the City’s
secretary of government while in the chain of command they directly depended on the delegation directors.
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by the mayor and who in turn appointed sub-delegates and other ocials responsible for day-
to-day administration (Cross, 1998).83 Tensions appeared when—as a result of a more direct
involvement of the city’s higher authorities on the policies to tackle informal street vending—
sub-delegates were asked to report to the City’s secretary of government while in the chain
of command they directly depended on the delegation directors. Thus, while the Secretariat
of Government was responsible for supervising the work of the sub-delegates, they (the sub-
delegates) were directly responsible to delegation directors. The result was a very high level
of conflict between the delegations (delegation directors) and the Secretariat of Government
(Cross, 1998).84
The second part of the reorganization of the city administration—which consisted of the
creation of a separate agency to coordinate and negotiate the construction of commercial
plazas—also supports the speculation of the high level of conflict between the Secretariat of
Government and the delegations. By transferring responsibility for implementing the poli-
cies related to informal street vending from the Secretariat of Government to the new agency
(pmcp), Camacho Solís appeared to be both allowing centralization and keeping the Secre-
tariat from becoming excessively powerful (Cross, 1998).
Nevertheless, the new agency had no administrative powers and in this respect was equal
to the General Coordination of Supply and Distribution in the Federal District (coabasto),
which until then was in charge of food supply and markets in Mexico City. In fact, the new
agency took over the oces and budget of the coabasto and in eect became coabasto itself,
taking on all of the coabasto’s roles and programs along with its role of reordering street
83Until 2000, the delegation directors were appointed by themayor or the head of government of the city. When
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the prd candidate, won the elections for head of government in 1997, he was responsible
for appointing the delegation directors, selecting members of his party, the prd. In 1998 the law was changed
so that the delegation directors could be elected by popular vote. On July 2, 2000, for the first time the people
of the city elected their delegation directors (delegados), whose name was changed to heads of delegation (jefes
delegacionales).
84John Cross states that while ocials in the Secretariat of Government denied any tensions with the delega-
tions, they were preparing a budget that included more than 80 new personnel to take over most of the tasks the
delegations were supposed to perform. Relations between the Secretariat and the Delegations were certainly tense
(Cross, 1998).
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vending in the Historical Center85 (Cross, 1998). The ocial name of the agency was the
Oce of the Program for the Improvement of Popular Commerce (pmcp) (Monge, 1992d).
The creation of the new agency sent signals of the delimitation of the authority of the Sec-
retariat of Government. This was a relief for vendor leaders, who were worried that the power
of the Secretariat would be unlimited if it became directly involved in the project, as was the
case in its organization of the Metro operation. The Secretariat had been planning a budget
that included the expansion of the relocation program for the whole capital city. However,
one of the direct results of the creation of the new agency was that, while the Secretariat
was exempted from any direct responsibility regarding street vending, the new agency was
given the authority to begin the construction of commercial plazas only for street vendors in
the Historical Center. The outcome was a much more limited authority with less power for
implementation on the part of the new agency commissioned with the elimination of street
vending (Cross, 1998).
4.3.11 New agency, old mistakes: the failure of the PMCP
On July 1, 1992, Roberto Albores Guillen, until then director of the Venustiano Carranza
Delegation, was appointed to head the new agency (pmcp). He brought along a sta of almost
100 people from his previous team at the delegation (Cross, 1998). In his role as director of
the Venustiano Carranza Delegation, Albores Guillen was responsible for building the San
Ciprian market in La Merced neighborhood (Cabildo and Monge, 1989; Guzman Urbiola,
1990; Monge, 1990b). Even though ocials in the neighbouring Cuauhtémoc Delegation had
previously described the market as a ‘white elephant’ they wanted to avoid, Albores Guillen
was chosen precisely because of his alleged success in dealing with street vending in the area
of La Merced, situated in the Venustiano Carranza Delegation (Monge, 1992b; Cross, 1998).
85Since there was neither a budget nor oce space for the new agency, the coabastowas basically cannibalized
tomake room for the newprogram, called the Program for the Improvement of PopularCommerce (pmcp) (Monge,
1992d). Its entire sta was laid o and replaced by the sta of the new agency, all of whom were brought in with
the new director, Roberto Albores Guillen, from his previous post at the Venustiano Carranza Delegation (Monge,
1992d; Cross, 1998). The coabasto’s programs were almost cancelled altogether, but salvaged at the last minute
by being incorporated into the new agency. Thus, the coabasto (now under the banner of the pmcp) had a new
opportunity, although with an entirely new sta, and was now responsible for all forms of street vending and
‘popular commerce’ in Mexico City, but despite its far-reaching responsibilities, coabasto had been downgraded
in importance. While before it had enjoyed the same level as a Secretariat, after the changeover it was ranked on
the same administrative level as a delegation (Monge, 1992d; Cross, 1998).
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In his new post as head of the pmcp—Cross (1998) refers to it as the ‘new’ coabasto86—
Albores Guillen had no autonomous power to carry out any plans. Moreover, he depended
on the Cuauhtémoc Delegation to enforce any agreements and cooperate with the program.
Because of the constant pressure from Camacho Solís and President Salinas himself, this col-
laboration was forthcoming. A month after its launch, in August 1992, the new agency an-
nounced plans to relocate all 10,300 street vendors in the Historical Center, but it had simply
appropriated most of these plans from the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, which had been work-
ing on them with the Secretariat of Government for almost a year (Cross, 1998). The speed
with which the plans were put together thwarted any eort on the part of the city government
to make sure the areas proposed for the commercial plazas had some degree of commercial
feasibility and, therefore, a higher probability of success.
Backed by presidential and mayoral authority, the Albores Guillen’s agency was granted
permission to negotiate credit guarantees for several millions of dollars to secure financial
backing for the project. A special credit institution, the Economic and Social Development
Fund of the Federal District (Fondo de Desarollo Económico y Social del Distrito Federal,
fondedf), was opened as a subsidiary of the government-owned bank Nacional Financiera,
S.A. to manage the financial aspects of the program (Cross, 1998). It contributed 43 percent
of the mx$580 million the project required (approximately us$175,000,000 at 1994 exchange
rates), while most of the rest was made available by the National Bank of Domestic Trade
(Banco Nacional de Comercio Interior), another government-owned financial body (Cross,
1998). The fact that the government had to use state-owned credit institutions to finance the
project demonstrated the inability of the city administration to get financial backing from
private banks because of the evident financial risks of the project. President Salinas himself
had to support and push these state-owned credit institutions into taking on the task and the
risks it involved (Cross, 1998).
The risks of such an undertaking were obvious. In general, being informal agents, street
vendors did not have any proof of their income.87 Moreover, they were unable or unwilling
to provide other property as collateral or guarantee on the debt they would be incurring by
86The title of Roberto Albores Guillen’s appointment was general coordinator of the Program for the Improve-
ment of Popular Commerce and not head of coabasto. Although, as Cross (1998) pointed out, coabasto was
virtually taken over by the new agency.
87Ocially, the market stall itself, as a form of condominium real estate, was the only form of guarantee or
collateral for the individual loans that vendors incurred. At a few markets located on Metro property, vendors
were not owners but merely lessees, and the lease itself had to suce as the security (Cross, 1998).
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entering the plaza construction program.88 Therefore, the pmcp (or new coabasto)—and by
extension the city government—had to act as the guarantor of all the financial credits (Cross,
1998). Although the city government had a new neoliberal approach, dierent from previous
administrations, it still incurred a huge financial risk (ddf-coabasto, 1994).
In addition, instead of introducing the long-awaited and much debated market regulation,
the ardf passed a directive (bando)89 that banned informal street vending in the Historical
Center and La Merced neighborhood, which would come into force as soon as street vendors
could be moved into the new commercial plazas (ardf, 1993; Monge, 1993c).
Tactfully, the city government continued to work with the street vendor associations rather
than antagonizing them. Most of the commercial plazas were designed for particular associ-
ations of street vendors, and the leaders were given several important powers in the process.
4.3.12 The powers conferred on street vendor leaders
The plaza construction program greatly benefited the street vendor leaders. The city admin-
istration negotiated the implementation of the program with them. The exclusive access that
vendor leaders had to information and power—as a result of their role as intermediaries be-
tween vendormembers and authorities—made base members of the associations more reliant
on them, as these leaders were the only people who could guarantee the vendors a place in
the new commercial plazas (Cross, 1998).
As only street vendorswhowere accreditedmembers of an associationwere able to purchase
a stall in the plaza program, the vendor leaders had the last word about who could buy a stall
in the assigned commercial plaza since they defined membership and thus determined who
was and was not a member. Therefore, vendor leaders became the doorkeepers of the plaza
construction program, and had the power to control access to stalls in commercial plazas and,
in most cases, to distribute the stalls among theirmembers (Cross, 1998). Onmany occasions,
leaders reserved the best located stalls for themselves, friends or loyalists, or for thosewho paid
the largest sum (Cross, 1995; Stamm, 2007).
This arrangement of control over the commercial plazas gave vendor leaders the opportu-
nity to take advantage of their powers to the detriment of the base vendor members of their
88According to Cross (1998), the debt would be between us$3,000 and us$7,000 depending on the size and type
of stall.
89A bando or directive is a mandate or ocial announcement published by a superior authority (in this case,
the ardf) to convey policies, responsibilities, and procedures.
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associations, who were supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the program. Far from
being undermined by the plaza construction program—which was supposed to weaken the
vendor leaders’ grip on their associations by making individual vendors into property own-
ers90—vendor leaders became even more powerful. They not only gained full control of the
commercial plazas as well as their association but could also threaten to reoccupy the streets
if they considered it appropriate, which posed a problem for government authorities (Cross,
1998).
The policy to leave considerable power in the hands of the street vendor associations was
coherent and reasonable, given the concern among government ocials that the street vendor
associations would be able to retard or contest eectively the plaza construction program by
refusing to leave the streets. However, this crucial government decision enabled the street
vendor associations to adopt a strategy with two purposes: to take control of the commercial
plazas while at the same time preparing to return to the streets at the first opportunity they
had (Cross, 1998).
It is worth pointing out that the plaza construction program was implemented in the con-
text of forthcoming presidential elections. Even though planning started soon after the 1991
midterm elections, most of the commercial plazas were completed and handed over to the
street vendor associations in 1993, the year when the pri would select its presidential candi-
date, and a year prior to the 1994 presidential elections (Monge, 1998).
The timing was important since the mayor, Manuel Camacho Solís, was considered by
many to be one of the main contenders—together with Pedro Aspe and Luis Donaldo
Colosio—for the pri nomination to the presidency ofMexico.91 Although he denies it (Cama-
cho Solís, 2010), some observers argue Camacho Solís used the plaza construction program
as a lever to gain the presidential ticket and as a way of projecting an image of purposeful-
ness and eciency for middle class voters, and to gain supporters, under the new ‘member
ownership’ scheme, among a new group of micro-entrepreneurs or “vendor-owners” (Cross,
1998:212) who had been favored by his policies.92
Initially the program appeared to be a success. Street vendors evacuated the streets of the
Historical Center in Mexico City for the first time in years. The city government had not
90This objective (of weakening the vendor leaders’ grip on their associations) actually started to become a
reality some years later, as suggested by Stamm (2007).
91Given the prominence and exposure that the position has as the second in importance in the country (only af-
ter the presidency itself), with few exceptions, mayors ofMexico City are frequently considered natural candidates
to run for the presidency of Mexico.
92In the same fashion as Ernesto P. Uruchurtu had done in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
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allowed sucient space in the commercial plazas to accommodate every street vendor previ-
ously working in the streets of the Historical Center, displacing the remaining street vendors
to the periphery of Perimeter A. Residents and established businessmen located in the zones
just outside the prohibited perimeter objected to the program (as well as the 1993 decree),
saying it had merely displaced the remaining street vendors into their neighborhoods. Never-
theless, the government of Camacho Solís was praised for sorting out a state of aairs that had
appeared irresolvable (Gordon, 1997b). The program bolstered Camacho Solís’s reputation
and approval rate, as well as his hope to become the pri presidential candidate in 1994.
4.3.13 Political developments at national level: outcomes at city level
Manuel Camacho Solís was unsuccessful in the bid for the pri’s nomination to the presidency.
In November 1993, Luis Donaldo Colosio was selected as the presidential candidate for the
pri. Angry at not being chosen, Camacho Solís resigned abruptly as mayor of the Federal
District. A few days later he was appointed minister of foreign aairs by President Salinas
(Monge, 1993b).
Events unfolded swiftly andwithin amonthCamacho Solís had left the Foreign AairsMin-
istry and found himself in the southern state of Chiapas with the mandate to negotiate peace
with the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional,
ezln), which staged an armed rebellion against the regime on January 1, 1994.93
President Salinas appointed Camacho Solís to be the coordinator for dialogue and recon-
ciliation in Chiapas. He conducted the negotiations with the ezln and succeeded in signing
a preliminary cease-fire, which gave him great prestige. This event combined with the fact
that he had no ocial position in the cabinet—which legally enabled him to be postulated as
a presidential candidate—triggered rumors that he would be nominated instead of Colosio.
However, Camacho Solís denied such a possibility on March 22, 1994. The next day, Luis
Donaldo Colosio was assassinated in Tijuana. This killing alienated Camacho Solís from the
pri and Salinas, because many attempted to blame him for the murder of Colosio. On March
29, 1994, Colosio’s campaign manager Ernesto Zedillo was chosen as the new pri’s candidate
for the presidency.94
93Designated as the government commissioner for the peace in Chiapas by President Salinas, Camacho Solís
saw it as an opportunity to keep his presidential hopes alive. The spotlights were on him and not on the pri
presidential candidate Colosio, but history had other plans.
94The deterioration in relations betweenCamacho Solís and Salinas—and the pri—became progressivelymore
serious until on October 13, 1995, Camacho Solís decided to leave the pri.
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The administrative changes resulting from Camacho Solís’s resignation as mayor of Mex-
ico City did not halt the plaza construction program, since most of the commercial plazas
were either finished or under construction by that time. Nevertheless, according to Cross
(1998), only 24 out of the 30 initially planned commercial plazas were constructed; further
construction was put on hold for the time being, as the city government ran out of funds.
The break up between President Salinas and Camacho Solís as well as the governance vac-
uums95 and unfulfilled compromises left in the city projects as a result of Camacho Solís’s
departure—requiring the appointment of an interim mayor until a new one could be chosen
by president-to-be Ernesto Zedillo in December 1994—opened the door for street vendor lead-
ers to begin criticizing the agreement they had signed to move into the commercial plazas.
President Salinas appointedManuelAguileraGómez as interimmayor to substituteManuel
Camacho Solís (Monge, 1993b). Aguilera Gómez had a close relationship and was allied with
some of the most powerful street vendor organizations in Mexico City. Some of them had
been influential in his 1991 senatorial campaign. For example the association led by Alejan-
dra Barrios—who described Aguilera Gómez as “an extraordinary person and a good friend”
(Barrios, 2010)—had organized a number of important political rallies for Aguilera at her of-
fices in the Historical Center (Cross, 1998; Barrios, 2010). Even though he used his proximity
and influence with the vendor associations to keep them in the commercial plazas until the
elections, his appointment suggested that the Salinas administration had shifted its focus from
prevention to mitigation (Cross, 1998).
The newmayor could not keep the momentum that his predecessor had achieved. Aguilera
Gómez spoke in a tough tone about the street vending situation, but his administration only
managed to make any progress on the projects that had been started by Camacho Solís. It
was also evident that Aguilera Gómez’s control of the city government bureaucracy was not
as firm as that of Camacho Solís. This became apparent when accusations surfaced about
inspectors and city ocials using the 1993 decree to obtainmoney from street vendors through
coercion. The situation worsened after the December 1994 peso devaluation and the ensuing
crisis. Many people lost their jobs, and the street vendor groups in Mexico City started to
return to the streets of the Historical Center (Gordon, 1997b, Cross, 1998; Philip, 1998).
95A ‘governance vacuum’ refers not to the absence of government but to the absence of processes of governing.
In other words, governance vacuum is the lack of ecacy, quality, or good orientation in government intervention
(which gives it much of its legitimacy).
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4.3.14 The abandonment of the plaza construction program
At first, many street vendors were very excited by the prospect of owning a permanent stall
in a commercial plaza. The ownership of such a stall would give most of them their first
commercial property rights and collateral for future possible investments. The fact that the
commercial plazas were located in the city center—an area considered of high land value—
suggested that the future worth of their investment would be much more than its original
cost. Thus, at the beginning of the plaza construction program, the initial relocation of street
vendors appeared to be successful. In fact, the Christmas and New Year season of 1993–1994
was the first in a long time during which the streets of the Historical Center were virtually free
of street vendors (Cross, 1998).
However, by the summer of 1994, and as the new presidential elections approached, discon-
tent among relocated vendors had increased. While city authorities promised to solve financial
and construction problems in the commercial plazas after the 1994 elections, vendormembers
and leaders began considering the option of going back to the streets. Disenchantment set in
quickly on many of the commercial plazas soon after they were ocially opened as they were
poorly planned and located. They were constructed with little input from the street vendors
or their leaders to oversee their commercial feasibility and many of them turned out to be
commercial failures (Cross, 1998).96
Relocated vendors, confronted with high monthly payments and a reduction in their in-
comes, either left the plazas completely or resorted to themethodof torero vending97 in nearby
streets to make ends meet.
While the street vendor leaders remained ocially committed to the plaza construction
program, they also began to express their concerns. A leader of a small association told Cross
(1998) that vendors expected there to be a prompt solution to the commercial plaza problems
after the elections, hoping that their loyalty to the pri would help. Otherwise, it was the
general feeling to go back to the streets at the first opportunity, but it was up to the larger
96According to Cross (1998) the largest commercial plaza—with 1,500 stalls packed into a crowded area of
narrow corridors—never reached more than 20 percent of occupancy, even though all the street vendors had paid
their down payments on schedule. Another commercial plaza, built for vendors who had been operating in the
Metro, was placed three blocks away from its original market area on the opposite side of a major street. As a
result, it lost all its customers and was unable to attract new ones.
97Toreros or bullfighters are ambulatory or itinerant street vendors whose main characteristic consists of elud-
ing the police and government ocials by means of their mobility. The toreros do not have a fixed space and
usually wander around in streets with a high circulation of cars and people. The goods they sell are fairly cheap
and easy to carry, which helps them to have a greater degree of mobility unlike other forms of stall street vending.
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and most powerful vendor associations to take the first step, as small associations would have
been easily crushed by the city police (Cross, 1998).
The competitiveness among vendor leaders was such that as soon as one association started
to reoccupy the streets, the others would be forced to follow suit to avoid other groups of
vendors from taking over streets that over time they had considered theirs (Cross, 1998). This
eventually would bring not only problems between street vendor associations and the city
government, but also conflict between dierent street vendor associations as well.
Alejandra Barrios, the leader of one of the largest associations—who had made public her
aspiration to get a seat in the ardf on a pri ticket (Monge and Ortega Pizarro, 1990; Cross,
1998)—harshly criticized the city government for not fulfilling the compromises established
on the agreement and argued that this breach gave her association a legitimate right to revert
it. Arguing that she had been coerced into signing the agreement, she accused the city gov-
ernment of building the commercial plazas in cheap areas rather than commercially feasible
ones (Monge, 1992a; Cross, 1998). She also blamed the city government for allowing inten-
sified vending around the Historical Center98 which stole many of their potential customers.
Finally, she pointed to the creation of a new type of toreroswithin the commercial plazas, who
would only respond to the market inspector and not to the association leader. According to
her, market inspectors would collect bribes every day to allow them to do torero vending in
the commercial plazas (Cross, 1998).
The vendor associations did not have to wait too long. Within days of the inauguration of
Ernesto Zedillo as president of Mexico, on December 1, 1994, the economic miracle of his
predecessor, Carlos Salinas, collapsed. An attempt to adjust an overvalued peso—and in this
way control the inflated trade deficit—led to a collapse of the exchange rate. The country was
submerged into a sharp recession as the peso dropped to less than half its former value. This
was accompanied by increasing interest rates and import costs, leaving the commercial plaza
vendors trapped between lower sales and higher costs (Cross, 1998).
While suppliers increased their prices and customers were nowhere to be found, the vari-
able interest rate on the stall mortgages rose rapidly from 10 percent to 50 percent (Cross,
1998). Having reached their limit, the vendor association leaders carried out their threat and
started to organize street markets outside the commercial plazas. By the summer of 1995,
98Groups of vendors left outside the initial commercial plaza buildings were relocated to areas on the edge of
the Historical Center to give the impression the project was finished. However, they began to attract clients who
decided to buy in those street markets outside the traditional commercial city center, aggravating the problems of
vendors located in the commercial plazas (whichwere on the city center). This is what theymeant with ‘intensified
vending’.
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around 4,000 informal vendors were again selling in the streets of theHistorical Center (Cross,
1998).99
Needless to say, the events and problems mentioned above aected the perception street
vendors had of the city government, the pri, and their own vendor leaders. Street vendors
principally blamed the city government for the problems they suered. They also accused the
pri and their own vendor leaders for failing to live up to the commitment to protect them (See
Appendix A.2).100 The failure of the plaza construction program was a key reason for the
reduction in individual and organizational support for the pri among those groups that were
supposed to benefit from it—the informal street vendors themselves (Cross, 1998). All these
reactions had an eect on the future strategy of the vendor associations as they attempted to
reassert their role as organizations (Cross, 1998)
4.3.15 The response of the vendor associations to their members
The changes in political preferences and in the perception of their leaders among the vendors
led the associations to rethink their responsibilities and take eective actions to rearm their
relationship with their members. One measure was to protect vendors who were unable to
continue paying the mortgages on their stalls. The stalls could be repossessed by the fondedf
if three payments were missed, though in practice very few stalls were repossessed despite the
high default rates (Cross, 1998). Another measure taken by the vendor associations was to
encourage vendors to establish stalls outside the commercial plazas in order to compensate
for their losses and be able to survive, arguing that the city government had broken its part
of the agreement because of the poor state of the commercial plazas and the large quantity
of vendors still on the streets (Cross, 1998). The street vendor leaders Alejandra Barrios and
Guillermina Rico, who together controlled about 80 percent of the vendors in the area at the
time, began to put pressure on the city government to allow their vendors back on the streets
to recuperate their original level of sales and thus be able to pay for their stalls101 (Cross, 1998).
99Over time, the commercial plazas had dierent outcomes and levels of profitability. Some were commercially
successful; others were plain failures. The commercial plazas that were not successful became deserted white
elephants as the vendors who had been relocated inside them quickly went back to the streets. Many vendors
became insolvent once they realized their reduced returns were not enough to pay for the mortgages on their stalls
(Cross, 1998).
100See Appendix A.2 and Table A.2 for a more detailed analysis on the reasons for the failure of the Plaza
Construction Program, according to the vendors’ perceptions. The analysis is based on the results of survey
carried out by Cross in 1995.
101They were successful in getting support from the pri. The national pri president, María de los Angeles
Moreno (1994–1995), called for the bando prohibiting vending in the area to be annulled because of the crisis.
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Throughout the 1994 elections and despite the latent problems, there was the belief among
vendors that the pri still represented the best opportunity for the implementation of reforms
in the plaza construction program that would reduce the costs for them. Moreover, the option
of finding political sponsors or patrons in other parties seemed unfeasible at this point in time.
Cross (1998) reported that one vendor told him that they had asked for the support of other
political parties, but only the pri oered to assist them (Cross, 1998).102
However, as the situation deteriorated through 1994 and 1995, vendor leaders aliated to
the pri did not spare their criticism of the plaza construction program and the city govern-
ment. They claimed that the city government consistently ignored them but, paradoxically,
favored opposition-aliated groups. One leader complained: “We can give the system 80 per-
cent of the seats (in upcoming elections for counselors), but they do not seem to realize how
important we are... If we became members of the opposition, we would probably be better
o” (Cross, 1998:223–224). Another vendor leader stated: “Nobody is aliated with the pri
out of conviction. We are all with the system out of convenience. And there may come a time
when it is no longer convenient” (Cross, 1998:224).
Thus, while the vendor leaders remained loyal to the pri for the time being, activists be-
longing to the left-wing opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (prd) and even some
militants from the more radical Independent Proletarian Movement (Movimiento Proletario
Independiente, mpi)103 approached them to discuss the prospect of combining forces (Cross,
1998). However, vendor leaders were unsure about taking this route. Association leaders
wanted to avoid confrontation with the city administration, arguing that they would easily
be crushed by the riot police, but they also made clear that if the city administration did not
solve their problems, they would not be responsible for the consequences (Cross, 1998).
However, she was replaced soon afterwards (as a consequence of the pri’s defeat in Baja California Norte State,
which was won again by the pan in 1995), and her statement, which was badly attacked in the media, was ignored
by government authorities (Cross, 1998).
102As the problems they faced were caused by a pri-led government, it is surprising that many of the vendors
still expressed their support for the pri. They saw it as the only option or cited past favours they had received from
the ocial party as their main motives (Cross, 1998).
103Thempi is one of themost radical unionmovements inMexico. It was built around the sutaur-100, the union
of bus drivers whose leaders were arrested and whose members were fired unilaterally by the government when the
company was declared insolvent in preparation for the privatization of the bus system. The government’s main
reason for attacking the union so severely was its open support of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation
(ezln). An ocial in the mayor’s oce admitted that the government’s greatest fear was that the mpi would make
an alliance with the street vendors in the Historical Center (Monge, 1995; Cross, 1998).
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4.3.16 The presidency of Ernesto Zedillo
Ernesto Zedillo was elected president ofMexico on August 21, 1994, defeating the pan’s presi-
dential candidate Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, and the prd’s presidential candidate Cuauhté-
moc Cárdenas Solórzano. Ernesto Zedillo took oce on December 1, 1994, and within a few
days after taking oce, one of the biggest economic crises inMexican history—caused by the
so-called December mistake, which eventually led to the Tequila Crisis or Peso Crisis—hit the
country. Although the outgoing President Salinas was mainly blamed for the crisis, Salinas
claimed that President Zedillo made a mistake by changing the economic policies of his ad-
ministration. The crisis ended years later, after a series of reforms and actions led by Zedillo.
us President Bill Clinton granted a us$50 billion loan toMexico, which helped one of Zedillo’s
initiatives to rescue the banking system (Philip, 1998).
When Oscar Espinosa Villarreal replaced Manuel Aguilera Gómez as mayor of the Federal
District at the outset of Ernesto Zedillo’s administration, vendor leaders began distinguish-
ing their support of the pri from their attacks on the city government for failing to deliver
on promises made to them by Camacho Solís. Alejandra Barrios maintained: “the program
was successful enough while Camacho was in oce, but after his departure there was no
more promotional support, the government gave us nothing” (Cross, 1998:213). Regarding
Espinosa Villarreal, she expressed her discontent saying that he “hit [informal] commerce and
mistreated [vendor] leaders” (Barrios, 2010).
Other vendor leaders also aired their discontent, arguing that the new mayor Espinosa Vil-
larreal lacked political skills and would not go to the markets and plazas, sending represen-
tatives of inferior level instead (Cross, 1998). Furthermore, many of the vendor leaders dis-
trusted Zedillo, whom they saw as a poor substitute for the late Luis Donaldo Colosio.104
Complaints were directed twofold: first, vendors were expected to pay for the total cost of
their new stalls, although over a five- or six-year period; second, stalls were built within two
years of the notification about the project—a relatively short time—leading to a number of
problems in the planning and design of the commercial plazas (Cross, 1998).
104John Cross (1998, 2012) recounts that Alejandra Barrios had decorated her oce with pictures of herself
and Colosio during the latter’s campaign visit to one of her plazas. I also saw an enormous canvas of Colosio
in Barrios’ oce. After Zedillo took oce, not a single picture of Zedillo was visible, not even the standard
presidential portrait that vendor leaders used to place in their oces as a symbol of their aliation with the pri
(Cross, 1998).
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4.3.17 The Espinosa Villarreal administration
On December 1, 1994, President Zedillo appointed Oscar Espinosa Villarreal as the new
mayor of Mexico City. Early in his administration, Espinosa Villarreal displayed his lack of
expertise in city administration.105 His stern way of treating protesters, his unwise public se-
curity program, and his controversial arrest of the leaders of Ruta-100—the city bus driver’s
union—all worked against him, causing low levels of popularity among city residents (Monge,
1996a, 1996b, 1997a; Gordon, 1997b).
The street vending conflict was the one policy field in which Espinosa Villarreal was able
to gain the public opinion’s approval when he used the police force to control street vending.
The director of the Venustiano Carranza Delegation from 1994 to 1997, Raúl Torres Barrón,
stated early in 1995 that the government wanted to avoid violence (Cross, 1998); but there
was violence as the city government used the riot police to clear the Historical Center of street
vendors, in open opposition to the street vendor associations (Monge, 1996a; Cross, 1998;
Silva Londoño, 2010). In August and December of 1995, Espinosa Villarreal put into eect
huge police operations to eradicate street vendors from the Historical Center.106 The levels of
violence displayed were such that in January 1996 the us State Department cautioned tourists
against visiting the Historical Center of Mexico City (Monge, 1996a, 1996b; Gordon, 1997b;
Silva Londoño, 2010).
Ironically, the pri was still dependent on its associated street vendor groups for many polit-
ical purposes, among them their role as infantrymen in the pri’s eort to maintain political
support in Mexico City.107 In particular, the pri mobilized street vendors to answer the new
obligations that arose from the more open post-1988 political environment. Following the
105Espinosa Villarreal was amember of the pri and had previously been director of the government-owned bank
Nacional Financiera, and finace manager in the Colosio’s presidential campaign.
106In August 1995, about 3,000 riot police clashed with vendor groups associated with Guillermina Rico, who
was the most prominent street vendor leader in Mexico City at the time (Monge, 1996a; Cross, 1998; Silva Lon-
doño, 2010). In the course of the following months, though, vendors continued to occupy areas on the streets
despite several further eorts by the city government to remove them by force (Cross, 1998).
107An event in November 1995 illustrates the roles or functions street vendors associations could perform in
favor of the pri. The Federal District held elections for a new ‘citizen council’ (consejo ciudadano),an irrelevant
and unnecessary body without real power whose goal was to open more spaces for political participation and to
engage the population in the governmental decision-making processes inMexicoCity. Nevertheless, the pri, afraid
of an electoral humiliation as a result of the PesoCrisis, manipulated the election rules so that contenders could run
as independent citizens rather than as representatives of political parties. This enabled the pri to take advantage
of its control of grassroots groups such as street vendor organizations. Several street vendors—among them the
daughters of Guillermina Rico andAlejandra Barrios—stood for oce in their capacity as private citizens. Voters’
participation in the election was insignificant, but many observers agreed that contenders who were close to the
pri won the most seats (Gordon, 1997b; Cisneros-Sosa, 2001).
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elections of 1988, the political parties in the opposition becamemore andmore vocal, uninhib-
ited about putting forward their claims, objections, and petitions, and using protest marches
as instruments of coercion. The pri began to use street vendors as violent clash groups (grupos
de choque) to confront such demonstrations (Gordon, 1997b).
These types of political practices were primitive and crude in implementation but tactical
in their planning, and the street vendors played a key role. For example, when the president,
the mayor, or another notable pri personage went to the Legislative Assembly or Congress,
she or he had to enter through the main door as a sign of her or his power and political status.
However, opposition supporters—mainly supporters of the prd—came and took over the sur-
rounding streets to prevent these people from entering the venue as a sign of protest, censure
or disagreement. Then, enormous brawls would take place (between the opposition and the
pri supporters, or between the opposition supporters and police forces) in the struggle for the
space and to prevent (or allow) the person in question from entering the premises. In order
to avoid these embarrassing displays of disapproval, the pri had to go to the site first and take
over the streets before supporters of the opposition got there. The street vendors did the job
for the pri (Gordon, 1997b). pri-aliated street vendors, sometimes teamed up with infor-
mal settlers (paracaidistas) or garbage pickers (pepenadores), camped out overnight to ensure
that no demonstrators from the opposition came near. When the president, mayor, or pri
personage arrived at the place in question, the followers cheered intensely and helped her or
him to make their way through the main entrance into the Assembly, Congress, or designated
location (Gordon, 1997b).
Under this tacit agreement, street vendors knew that police crackdowns against themwould
be provisional and recognized that the city administration was prepared to revert to the cor-
rupt toleration scheme it had employed in the past. Similarly, government ocials knew they
could have it all: repressing the street vendors to calm down their critics while using them to
advance their interests (Gordon, 1997b).
4.3.18 Rupture and estrangement: the nal balance of the PRI in Mexico City
Nevertheless, in January 1996—and exercising the 1993 decree which banned street vending
within the Perimeter A of the Historical Center—Espinosa Villarreal reactivated the actions
againts street vendors and began the process of distancing himself from the more than 200
street vendor organizations sheltered by the pri. Actions included evictions of street vendors
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and restriction to occupy streets, squares, gardens and public sites in dierent parts of the
capital; the occupation of the Zócalo central plaza by the police; the gradual suspension of
selling permits; and the imprisonment of influential leaders (Monge, 1996b). Convinced that
the uncontrollable expansion of the informal street vending sector generated more harm than
good to Mexico City, Espinosa Villarreal denied the old relationship with that sector and
marked his distance.
In August of 1996, after a violent confrontation between government inspectors and street
vendors in the city center, Espinosa Villarreal armed: “There will not be political clientelism
as in the past, when complicity [between government ocials and street vendors] was in-
curred.” (Monge, 1996b:116).108 As a result of the systematic evictions and the ensuing clashes
between government inspectors and the policewith street vendors,109 the relationship between
city government and street vendors began to deteriorate, leading to reproaches, harassment,
persecution, beatings, threats, and lawsuits.
In response, Alejandra Barrios—leader of the ALCC—warned that: “people are hungry
and sometimes that goes beyond our control; I cannot imagine how people will react when
they have no food to feed their children.” (Monge, 1996b:116). On the position of Espinosa
Villarreal, Barrios said that: “the mayor is wrong, because we are not a few. We are many and
we work as street vendors because the government cannot provide [formal] jobs for all those
who need them.” (Monge, 1996b:116).
At the same time, the canaco urged the city authorities to regularize the thousands of
street vendors operating in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City,110 build shopping bazaars,
and extend the 1993 decree banning street vending to the areas of Coyoacán, San Angel, and
Tlalpan, where informal street vending was growing at a fast pace (Monge, 1996b).
Faced with the government’s onslaught, Alejandra Barrios and Silvia Sanchez Rico111—
daughter of Guillermina Rico, who died in September 1996—tried to negotiate with the city
government, without success. Barrios was furious and warned: “If the authorities try to evict
us, there will be beatings, imprisonment, and theft of merchandise. They will beat us and
108As seen before in this chapter, in previous administrations, authorities and street vendors had lived a rela-
tionship based primarily on tolerance, complicity and mutual benefit.
109There were more than twenty clashes in the first eight months of 1996 (Monge, 1996b).
110The Metropolitan Area of Mexico City refers to the conurbation around Mexico City, which is also known
as greater Mexico City. It is constituted by the Federal District—composed of 16 delegations—and 41 adjacent
municipalities of the states of Mexico and Hidalgo. The reason why all these delegations and municipalities are
usually aggregated is because they all form a single conurbation.
111Silvia Sanchez Rico is the eldest daughter of Guillermina Rico (who died on September 4, 1996), and who
assumed control over her mother’s association.
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look bad [in front of the public opinion], adding on to their already damaged reputation”
(Monge, 1996b:117). But Espinosa did not bow and said the 1993 decree could be good or
bad, modifiable or not, but it was an ordinance that had to be respected.
Apart from the acts of intimidation in the Historical Center, the city government sought
to get along with other groups of street vendors. First, the city government took the past-due
loans of mx$ 25 million pesos that several street vendor organizations had with the National
Bank of Domestic Trade for the purchase of stalls in commercial plazas. Then it issued spe-
cial regulations for the Bosque de Chapultepec Park which, among other measures, regulated
commercial activity in this recreational area. Vendors would be allowed in the area but had
to be properly accredited and up to date with the payment of their dues. In the vicinity of the
Basílica de Guadalupe the government implemented similar actions.
The ardf had also prepared, once again, a bill or law initiative for the regulation of public
markets in the Federal District, which aimed to replace the 1951 Market Regulation, still in
force.112 Gonzalo Rojas Arreola, prd local deputy and president of the Supply and Food Dis-
tribution Commission (Comisión de Abasto y Distribución de Alimentos) of the ardf said
in an interview that this law initiative was intended to give certainty to the public markets,
as a public service, in compliance with Article 115 of the Constitution (Monge, 1996b).113
He alleged that, at that time, the public markets were involved in a complex problem: the
government had abandoned them to their fate, the market administrators did not fulfill their
functions, and street vending and large shopping malls were gaining ground (Monge, 1996b).
On October 21, 1996, Mexico City’s Secretary of Economic Development, Héctor Flores
Santana, revealed part of the general strategy that the city government was seeking to imple-
ment on street vending. He said the reorganization of street vending would not be limited to
the Historical Center, but would extend to Xochimilco, Tepito, Coyoacán, the Zona Rosa,
and the Gustavo A. Madero Delegation, among other areas of the capital. He even detailed
that the reorganization of street vending in Tepito would be conducted with tripartite invest-
ment: private sector, government, and street vendors (Monge, 1996b).
112While the 1993 decree banned street vending in Perimeter A in theHistorical Center, the 1951Market Regula-
tion was still in force for the rest of the matters concerning public markets (and street vending where appropriate).
113Article 115 of theMexican Constitution refers to the internal organization that Federal States and the Federal
District will adopt for their internal governance, specifying the rights and obligations of municipalities (or in the
case of Mexico City, its delegations). Municipalities and delegations are in change of public markets and supply
centers and thus the relevance of this article on the discussion.
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Considered already by city authorities as one of the four main problems in Mexico City,114
street vendingwas registering an unprecedented growth at local and national levels. According
to the president of the canaco, José Alfredo Santos Asséo, the number of street vendors in
Mexico City increased from 112,000 to 250,000 in the last six years (1990–1995) (Monge,
1996b).115 Likewise, according to the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce
(Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo, concanaco),116
between 1988 and 1995, the number of street vendors in the country increased by 108.5 percent
(from 561,794 to about 1.2million street vendors), a rate of growth even higher than that of the
economically active population and the employed population whose rates were 23.25 percent
and 20.45 percent, respectively (Monge, 1996b).117
A count conducted by the city government reported slightly lower numbers. It quanti-
fied 98,379 street vendors, 79,851 stalls, and 181 critical points where street vending took
place, distributed in the following way: 67 percent of the street vending activity (high con-
centration) was located in the Cuauhtémoc, Gustavo A. Madero, Iztapalapa, Miguel Hi-
dalgo and Venustiano Carranza Delegations; 16 percent (intermediate concentration) in Ál-
varo Obregón, Coyoacán, and Iztacalco Delegations; and the remaining 17 percent (low con-
centration) in Azcapotzalco, Benito Juárez, Cuajimalpa, Magdalena Contreras, Milpa Alta,
Tláhuac, Tlalpan, and Xochimilco Delegations (Figure 4.3) (Monge, 1996b).
114The most significant public problems in Mexico City at the time were: public security, pollution, transport,
and street vending.
115The inegi’s National Employment Survey (ene) shows that, in 1998, there were 327,019 street vendors in
Mexico City’s Metropolitan Area, and 160,949 in the Federal District. This may be consistent with the 250,000
street vendors mentioned by the canaco president in 1996 (inegi, 2004, Monge, 1996b).
116The canaco is the local chamber of commerce of Mexico City. The concanaco is the confederation of
chambers of commerce of the country.
117The inegi’s National Employment Survey (ene) shows us that in 1998 there were 1,197,136 street vendors
in the country (inegi, 2004). The number is consistent with the figures given by the concanaco, as quoted by
Monge (1996b).
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Figure 4.3.: Distribution of street vending activity in Mexico City (By delegation, 1996)
Sources: Monge, 1996b.
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By type of operation, the city government found that of all street vendors: 52,603 were
semi-fixed; 14,015 were fixed; 12,728 were itinerant vendors (or toreros); 9,647 were rolling
vendors (or sobre ruedas); 5,510 were extensions (usually of formal businesses who ‘unfolded’
their business on the street); 2,227 were mobile vendors (who are able to set a stall, but able to
move at any time), and 1,649 were automotive vendors (who sold from a car) (Monge, 1996b).
In a 1996 study carried out by the concanaco named Disloyal Competition in the Com-
merce Sector118 this institution stated that, based on the growing trend of this informal activity,
it was projected that for the year 2000 there would be more than 2,200,000 informal traders in
the country, which would represent 44 percent of the personnel employed on the formal trade
(Monge, 1996b).119
These data reinforced the impression of the canaco president, José Alfredo Santos Asséo,
in the sense that while formal trade was plummeting, informal trade was on the rise. Only in
the capital city there were 125,000 formally established businesses for 250,000 informal street
vendors (Monge, 1996b). The canaco president stated in an interview that this indicator was
a clear sign that street vending had ceased to be a subsistence activity to become a profitable
one: “I feel that this activity has been distorted: it is no longer a way out of unemployment
and crisis; now is an activity that perpetuates unemployment and economic crisis” (Monge,
1996b:118). He illustrated this with a couple of numbers: “the informal trade, in all its forms,
represents 40 percent of the commercial gdp of Mexico City; and the underground economy
by itself represents 30 percent of the country’s gdp” (Monge, 1996b:118).
The concanaco study reinforced this theory by pointing out that tax evasion in the coun-
try, generated by street vending, represented 9.11 percent of the programmable government
expenditure120 of the public sector in 1995 (Monge, 1996b). The study also showed that street
vending does not benefit those who exercise it, but those who organize and control it. The
canaco president, as the main advocate of establishing a legal framework to regulate infor-
mal street vending, mentioned that “disguised under a cloak of poverty”, street vendor leaders
had created a kind of parallel power in the capital which, in his opinion, set a bad precedent
(Monge, 1996b:118).
118Its title in Spanish is “Competencia Desleal en el Sector Comercio”, as quoted by Monge (1996b).
119According to the National Employment Survey (ene) performed from 1998 to 2004, the total number of
individuals working on street vending in Mexico, in the year 2000, was of 1,222,223 (inegi, 2004). Thus, the
projection of the concanaco was overestimated by about 1 million people.
120In Mexico, government expenditure is divided into programmable and nonprogrammable. The first is di-
rectly associated to a public program to fulfill government administration or to perform social and productive
activities, the latter are outlays that cannot be associated as part of some specific program and that refer to interest
payments, transfers to states and local governments, debts from previous fiscal years, and third party expenditure
(shcp, 2016).
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Moreover, all recent ocial attempts to regulate this activity had crashed in a contradictory
and ambiguous legal wall: according to Monge (1996b), at this point in time, there were
16 legal codes that, on one hand, allowed the exercise of street vending and, on the other,
penalized it.121
The president of the Supply and FoodDistribution Commission at the ardf, Gonzalo Rojas
Arreola, admitted that, in addition to the legal discrepancy, it had been dicult to reconcile in-
terests of city authorities and local legislators, as there were diering views on how to address
the problem. He noted that there were currents of opinion arguing that the ardf lacked the
authority to legislate on this matter, and others who argued that creating a legal framework to
street vending would be tantamount to legalizing the illegal. “These views have prevented any
progress on thematter; and that the economic and political interests that revolve around street
vending remain intact” Rojas Arreola said (Monge, 1996b:118). Moreover, he estimated that
illegal profits obtained through extortion from street vendors by city public servants reached
mx$ 2.5 million pesos per day; an amount that annually represented the budget of two delega-
tions and the fifth part of the health sector budget (Monge, 1996b). Rojas Arreola argued that
it was the street vendors the most interested in having their activity clearly regulated as they
were “tired of so much extortion, so much exploitation by leaders and authorities” (Monge,
1996b:118)
The canaco president, Santos Asséo, corroborated that behind street vending there were
economic and political interests that should be banished once and for all. He said that the
authority should not, under any circumstance—neither the crisis, nor the unemployment, nor
the social pressure—allow the contravention of the law, because this led to the breakdown of
civic values “which are what gives cohesion to society” (Monge, 1996b:119). He explained
that he was not against those who engage in this activity, but against the activity itself due to
its illegal nature. In his opinion, what the city government had to do was to regulate street
vending, because in that way the government would ‘dignify’ the work of those who exercised
it. He suggested the construction of ‘popular plazas’ (available for lease to vendors), with the
indispensable minimum services, surveillance on the origin of the goods and products sold,
and the collection of taxes, services charges, and vat. He added that these measures must
be accompanied by a regulation that prohibits the sale of merchandise and food in the street
(Monge, 1996b).
121That is, 16 dierent legal codes that directly or indirectly could be used to allow or forbid the street vending
activity (e.g. the Mexican Constitution made it possible while the 1993 decree banned it in the Perimeter A).
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Unlike previous governments, the canaco president was confident that Espinosa Villarreal
would know how to overcome the challenge. He said that, at least, Mayor Espinosa Villarreal
had shown political will, while admitting that it was not enough to control ‘the monster’. “If
the Historical Center is invaded after the holiday season [of 1996], the message will be clear:
that street vendors have more power than the authority” (Monge, 1996b:119). And that is
exactly what happened.
This situation was about to change radically. Reforms in the electoral laws and the demo-
cratic opening in the political system made the alternation of power between dierent politi-
cal parties possible. This first occurred in 1989 in the Baja California Norte state where the
pan won the state governorship displacing the pri, and later it would occur in Mexico City in
1997—where the prd displaced the pri—and in 2000 at presidential or federal level—when the
pan displaced the pri. The street vendors, their leaders, and their associations were about to
enter a new political scenario where the rules of the game were unknown and their dynamics
and modus operandi would have to be adapted.
4.4 Conclusions
Today, after more than 70 years, four dierent regulations, two sets of major market con-
struction programs, and innumerable police operations against informal street vendors, the
authorities of Mexico City and their federal counterparts are still searching for a solution to
the problem of street vending. What conclusions can be drawn from the historical analysis of
street vending in Mexico City under pri governments? What lessons are there to be learned?
4.4.1 Interpreting the cycles of toleration and repression
In the first place, it is essential to understand that several features of the street vending prob-
lem have remained practically unaltered over time and it seems they will remain so in the
immediate future (Gordon, 1997a). Essentially, the street vending problem has been a strug-
gle among dierent sections of society who have dierent interests and opinions about the use
of public space. The antagonism and resistance of formal established businessmen to compe-
tition from informal street vendors has also not changed. Moreover, street vendors have often
been in an ambiguous legal situation, despite periodic attempts to regulate them eectively
(Gordon, 1997a; Cross, 1998).
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Street vendors have always maintained that their activity should be allowed because, in the
absence of formal jobs, the only other options available to them would be criminal activity,
or starvation and extreme poverty. They have never stopped defending their interests in the
ocial political and legal systems (Gordon, 1997a).
Government ocials have frequently used the street vending problem to obtain political
advantages for themselves—or the political parties they represent—and as a source of illegal
income through corruption. The administrations of Mexico City have both repressed street
vendors—to obtain the support of the middle-classes and the business community—and tol-
erated them—to obtain, although unlawfully, additional revenue and the support of the urban
poor who perform this activity.
Thus, a mix of powers, influences, and interests has shifted government policy to and fro
between toleration and repression. Without a sense of direction from the higher authorities
of the city government, lower-rank city ocials have repeatedly imposed a policy of corrupt
toleration, in order to improve their private (and illegal) earnings. However, at times, the
mayor, or even the president himself—in various circumstances and in response to dierent
events—took action in favor of interest groups opposed to street vending (Gordon, 1997a).
For example, the government reacted when the number of street vendors increased dramat-
ically. At some point, the street vendors became not just an annoyance, but an impediment
to the operation of Mexico City. This not only meant that there were trac problems, but
that those who wanted to consume and invest avoided the aected zones. The government at-
tempted to reduce or at least control informal street vending after the GreatDepression (1929),
the Debt Crisis (1982), and the Peso Crisis (1994) because these events triggered an increase
in street vendors beyond bearable and acceptable levels.
Sometimes the number of street vendors in Mexico City increased although there was no
economic crisis to cause it, as in the early 1950s, during the Mexican miracle period. At
this time the number of street vendors rose because the city’s labor force grew excessively,
surpassing the ability of the formal economy to absorb the extra labor. This phenomenon
had several causes, some of them dicult to determine accurately. However, one of the causes
that clearly contributed to it was the high rate of migration from rural areas and other states
to the capital in the late 1940s and 1950s (Gordon, 1997a).
This observation illustrates the dynamic processes of the informal sector. The fluctuation
in the number of street vendors shows that informality is often countercyclical (it increases
during recessions, and decreases during periods of economic growth), but growth or reduction
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in gdp is not at all the most important underlying factor. Intuitively, it is possible to assert
that informal employment—and therefore informal street vending—increases when there are
not enough formal jobs with adequate remuneration. This situation might coincide with an
economic downturn, for example in the 1930s and 1980s, but this is not always the case, as in
the Mexican miracle example.
In some cases, factors not directly related to street vending have exacerbated the aversion
and frustration of formal established businessmen and city residents in relation to street ven-
dors. For instance, in the 1930s and 1950s street vendor adversaries protested mostly about
road congestion and sanitary problems, but their underlying goal was greater than these or-
ganizational issues. For some of the detractors, street vendors were the representation of an
unwanted invasion by strangers, both from abroad and from other Mexican states (Gordon,
1997a).
Some observers have portrayed the Uruchurtu administration as the final attempt—by
wealthier occupants of the Historical Center—to prevent urban decay and the transforma-
tion of Mexico City into an asphalt jungle (megacity). The crusade against street vending
during the Uruchurtu administration is consistent with this interpretation. Something simi-
lar occurred in the 1980s, when the obvious deterioration of the Historical Center caused a
national uproar for action. As attempts to renovate monuments and historic buildings started,
street vendor detractors added the defilement of national treasures to the list of the street ven-
dor’s transgressions (Ponce, 1986; Vera, 1989; Monge, 1993a).
4.4.2 Understanding the changing interests of the PRI
The interests of the pri—the ruling party until 1997 at city level and 2000 at federal level—had
a decisive role in shaping government action in the second half of the 20th century. Important
shifts in policy and strategy in 1952 and 1988 went together with negative electoral results
for the pri in Mexico City. In both cases, the plans that followed to contain street vending
were part of a broader strategy implemented by the pri to recover some of their constituents.
In each of these cases, the severe measures taken by the government were endorsed by large
segments of the population of Mexico City, and they helped the pri to win the forthcoming
elections (Gordon, 1997a; Cross, 1998).
Occasionally, the pri attempted to gain popular support by abandoning its policies of re-
pression. For example, at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, the pri acknowledged it had
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distanced itself from the urban poor and the educatedmiddle-class. The priwanted to portray
itself as modern and considerate with the underprivileged so as to reduce the type of popular
dissatisfaction that led to student protests, urban guerrilla groups, and underground revolu-
tionary movements in those years. The city administration moderated its position towards
the street vendors in search of this goal (Gordon, 1997a).
A comparable situation occurred in the early 1980s. The austerity measures put into ac-
tion as a result of the 1982 Debt Crisis delivered a profound blow to the image of the pri
(Philip, 1998). As the national economy was staggering and general dissatisfaction was rising,
a frontal attack on the numerous street vendors who had started to inundate the streets would
have been perilous. In fact, I believe that the street vendor problem became uncontrollable be-
tween the mid-1970s and early 1980s. During this period, street vendor associations emerged
larger andbetter organized than ever, corruptionwas rampant in theMexican political system,
the import substitution industrialization model was coming to an end, and the 1982 Debt Cri-
sis exploded. All these factors, together with massive migration to the capital,122 contributed
to make street vending an unsolvable quandary.
Throughout most of the 1980s, the government of Mexico City attempted to calm down
detractors with seemingly impressive but insucient relocation projects, which merely moved
street vendors from one street to another (Gordon, 1997a). City authorities responded to crit-
icism that they were not acting as quickly as necessary against the street vendors by pointing
out that they were attempting to avert major social unrest.
When the city government decided to repress street vendors, it seemed reasonable to assume
that such action would involve the loss of street vendors’ support for the pri. Nevertheless, the
plans to contain street vendors actually brought them stillmore firmly into the party enclosure
(Gordon, 1997a). The pri was able to achieve this deed because of the unclear legal status
of the street vendors and lack of solidarity among the dierent street vendor groups. With
almost no other options, street vendors had to follow what concessions they could through
their relationship with the pri. The emergence of the prd in 1989 opened a new channel
through which street vendors could advance their cause. However, the lack of power of the
prd and its inability to influence the government ensured that the number of street vendors
pursuing this option was low before 1997.123
122Therewas a population increase of 29 percent between 1970 and 1980 inMexicoCity. The increase inMexico
City’s Metropolitan Area was even greater (Table 4.1).
123This state of aairs would change drastically after 1997, when elections to select the head of government of
Mexico City were held for the first time, and prd’s Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was the victor.
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Once the city government determined that it was ready to start a new crusade against street
vendors it presented them with a set of incentives and disincentives (carrots and sticks). The
street vendors who collaborated with the government would receive preferential treatment in
the allocation of space in the marketplaces. Those who did not collaborate faced repression
on the streets. Mexico City authorities clearly favored those groups associated with the pri in
the negotiations and planning, which helped to attract new aliates into these associations.
As a consequence, the pri ended up with more aliates at the end of the campaign against
the street vendors than before it began (Gordon, 1997b).
During the mid-1990s, the street vendors became particularly relevant to the pri’s polit-
ical operations in Mexico City, since the party had been losing control in its established
strongholds of support—theConfederation ofMexicanWorkers (ctm) and theNational Peas-
ant Confederation (cnc) (Gordon, 1997a). Ilán Bizberg (1990) has argued that there was a
crisis of Mexican corporatism dating back to 1982, provoked by the inability of the state—
when confronted with the 1982 Debt Crisis—to keep on providing the economic incentives of
populism. Thus, the gradual weakening of party support among the industrial and agricul-
tural unions was in part caused by neoliberal programs of trade liberalization, privatization of
state-owned enterprises, wage controls, and the promotion of foreign investment. As Bizberg
(1990:721) pointed out, “It can be said that the pri appears to have abandoned not only its
original project, its ideology and its discourse, but also its bases [of political support].”
Other researchers—such as Azuela (1990) and Stamm (2007)—have also recognized a gener-
alized deterioration of corporatism in Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. However, within
this widespread deterioration, there was a relative progress in the relevance of the popular
sector. This progress did not emerge from the middle-class element of the National Con-
federation of Popular Organizations (cnop)—such as teachers, small industrialists or bank
employees—but from lumpen124 or marginal groups such as informal street vendors.
Thus, the cnop provided the pri with a relevant tool in its attempt to recover Mexico City,
in the form of informal street vendors and other groups in an equally fragile legal situation,
such as informal settlers and garbage pickers. As one pri ocial said, “The popular sector
had become the spinal column of the party” (Gordon, 1997a:7).
124Lumpen: Of or relating to dispossessed, often displaced, people who have been cut o from the socioeco-
nomic class with which they would ordinarily be identified (i.e. Lumpenproletariat) (The Free Dictionary, 2010).
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4.4.3 The end of the PRI era in Mexico City
The victory of the pri in the 1991 midterm elections changed the institutional relationship
between street vendor organizations and the pri. Customarily, street vendors had been used by
the pri for several purposes—including attending rallies andmaking it appear as if the pri had
vast popular and grassroots support—not necessarily to help win elections but to legitimate
electoral victories, particularly if they were highly contested or downright fraudulent.125
When the 1991 midterm elections proved that the pri could win without recurring to fraud-
ulent practices, the city government decided to tackle the problem of informal street vending
in key areas of Mexico City, as part of its wider neoliberal program, which included, among
other things, a policy of increasing the tax base and cutting subsidies. Moreover, the promise
of providing street vendors with stalls in a commercial plaza was away of removing them from
the streets and gaining their loyalty, to be used as valuable political capital.
The changes in government policy were certainly important, but also influential were the
changes in political context. The construction of markets as a solution to the problem of
street vending had been discussed several times before by other city governments, with no
result. In fact, some people were surprised that commercial plazas were actually built during
the Camacho Solís administration (Cross, 1998). One important factor to take into account
was that Camacho Solís was seen as a prime presidential aspirant, and his plaza construction
programwas thought to be a central element of his political career as he sought the presidential
ticket, as it showed his capacity to deal with important problemswhile developing his network
of supporters.
Cross (1998) argues that, strictly speaking, the plaza construction program of Manuel Ca-
macho Solís could be described as a fiasco in the sense that the city government made an
attempt to buy o the leadership structure of the street vending movement by giving vendor
leaders full control over the administration of the commercial plazas. However, by doing so,
the city government renounced potential long-term success in dealing with the problem of
street vending for the short-term appearance of success on which it hoped to capitalize for the
1994 elections.126
125For example, the election of Carlos Salinas to the presidency in 1988 was marked by wide-ranging charges of
fraud and claims that the true victor of the elections was the candidate of the opposition, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas,
and thus street vendors were needed as a source of support and validation in the process of legitimization of the
victory of Salinas.
126However, Stamm (2007) showed that, some years later, the plaza construction program may have had some
degree of success in one respect, as democratic practices have been registered in the vendor associations of com-
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Thus, street vendor organizations were only momentarily contained, but not vanquished.
Indeed the city authorities had bestowed considerable power on street vendor organizations in
a way that helped to increase their organizational resources, and consequently strengthened
their capacity to resist government policies in the future. Moreover, it facilitated numerous
opportunities for bribery and corruption to their leaders. In fact, the control of the admin-
istration of their commercial plazas resulted in greater economic power and created a whole
new bureaucracy within the largest street vendor organizations, as will be seen in Chapter 6,
which eventually allowed them to hire advisers and professionals well connected to the politi-
cal system (Cross, 1998; Barrios, 2010).
In the end, while the government had limited its role to that of a construction agent—
guaranteeing financial backing but avoiding direct financial responsibility for the projects—
the financial crisis and the consequent collapse of the peso showed how delicate this system
was. The 1994 Peso Crisis not only forced many vendors to go back to the streets to recover
their losses, but also ensured that state-owned credit institutions and the city government
ended up carrying an uncollectable debt as numerous vendors stopped paying mortgages on
their stalls. As interest rates oscillated between 50 percent and 70 percent, any possibility of
negotiating funding for more projects was out of the question.
The Espinosa Villarreal administration represented the beginning of a new cycle of re-
pression, with no alternative option for street vendors, who were complaining of unfulfilled
promises from the city government and suering the dicult economic situation as a result
of the Peso Crisis. The street vending problem had grown to unimaginable proportions in
size and power. The stern and confrontational approach used by Espinosa Villarreal was not
the best policy option. It resulted in a disastrous outcome—with street vendor numbers sky-
rocketing and being repressed by the police—that had a sudden turn when the alternancia
occurred in Mexico City in 1997.
Finally, neoliberal policies, with their corresponding reduction in resources and national
spending restrictions, undercut the logic behind clientelistic informal politics. The resources
the government employed to provide basic needs disappeared as the neoliberal directive re-
duced most forms of social expenditure. Many marginal poor groups, faced with economic
policies under which their political value was diminished, responded by rejecting clientelistic
party politics (Azuela, 1990; Shefner, 2006; Stamm, 2007). They asked themselves: Without
even periodic compensations, why remain clients? (Shefner, 2006) Instead, several of these
mercial plazas as a result of the ‘ownership scheme’ implemented in them, as well as changes of political culture
which have been gradually spreading in civil society groups and therefore in vendor associations.
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groups would organize themselves independently of party aliations, would become less ob-
sequious and more confrontational, would base their demands on citizenship claims rather
than partisan loyalty, andwould combinewith other similar groups and organizations around
mounting non-local demands (e.g. human rights) (Shefner, 2006). Thus, the neoliberal pro-
gram implementedby the federal government had an important eect on the political practices
of the informal street vendors during this time: with fewer resources available to the govern-
ment and the ruling party for patronage, social welfare provisions, and urban services, the
street vendors realized that old, risk-averse, and docile political behaviors no longer fulfilled
their needs, which led them to look for new political opportunities (Thornton, 2000; Shefner,
2006). But this path of action would be feasible and realistic only after the arrival of demo-
cratic change and the alternation of parties in power.
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5. IN FORMAL I TY AND STRE ET VEND ING IN
MEX ICO C ITY ( 1 9 9 7  2 0 0 6 ) : THE DEMOCRAT IC
YEAR S
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is a continuation of the detailed political analysis and description presented in
Chapter 4. It describes the development of informal street vending in Mexico City from 1997
to 2006, years in which street vending was consolidated as an important social, economic,
and political phenomenon, while democratic transformations and new political cycles were
taking place inMexico City. They correspond to the first 9 years the prd held power inMexico
City. Moreover, this chapter uses the process o democratization and the alternation of polit-
ical parties in power as a natural experiment to oer this thesis variation in terms of which
party is in power, and therefore the opportunity to observe how linkages between politicians,
government ocials and street vendor groups are made and unmade as power changes hands,
through the dierent prd city administrations.
The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section describes the development of infor-
mal street vending in Mexico City from 1997 to 2000, years which comprise the alternation
of political parties in power that took place in Mexico City as a result of free and open elec-
tions in the capital and the arrival of a new party to governMexico City—the prd government
of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Moreover, the section explains the attempts and strategies of the
then-incumbent government of the Federal District and federal government ofMexico to cope
with informal street vending during those transition years. On the same line, the section com-
pares the dierent approaches to informal street vending used by the past pri governments of
Mexico City and the new prd city government. The section also partially illustrates the pro-
visions that informal street vendor organizations took after they learned that a government
dierent from the pri and emanating from the opposition was going to governMexico City. In
addition, the section gives a detailed account of the political, economic, and social processes
of the government of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in Mexico City, including his strategy towards
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informal street vending, his overall government policies, the political particularities of his ad-
ministration in comparison with previous ones, the obstacles and constraints he found before
and during his city administration,1 and his departure from the city government in pursuit
of the presidency of Mexico, in the hope of achieving the democratic transition at the federal
level in 2000.
The second section describes the development of informal street vending in Mexico City
from 2000 to 2006, years in which the democratic alternation of political parties in power
occurred at the federal level in Mexico, with the victory of the right in the presidential elec-
tions of 2000—the pan government of Vicente Fox; while the left consolidated its dominance
in Mexico City with a second consecutive prd victory in the capital—the prd government of
AndrésManuel López Obrador. The section analyzes the new political settings that existed in
the Federal District after more political openness resulted in the election of the heads of the 16
delegations that form Mexico City, and the repercussions it had on informal street vending. 2
It explains the initial challenges that the city government undertook at the beginning of the ad-
ministration of López Obrador, in particular, the existence of formal and informal powers in
the capital that prevented the ecient administration of the city government. In an attempt to
understand better the development of informal street vending during this period, the section
analyzes the internal evolution of the prd and tries to identify the reasons why the party came
to use clientelistic practices to do politics, despite eorts to avoid the methods traditionally
used by the pri. A closer look into who makes up the prd and what the party’s immediate
objectives were since its onset sheds some light to answer this dilemma. In addition, the sec-
tion examines two phenomena that took place under the López Obrador administration in
Mexico City: the multiplication of street vendor organizations throughout the city and the
shift in political party aliation (from the pri to the prd) that some street vendor groups un-
derwent during this time. Following the political analysis, there is a description and detailed
assessment of the struggle for space and power that two large street vendor organizations had
during this time. Moreover, the section explains why this conflict represented, in reality, a
1Some were political in nature, particularly the political inertias and bureaucratic culture of the city govern-
ment after 68 years of pri rule in Mexico City, inertias and customs that were extremely dicult to change and
proved the biggest challenge to the new prd administration in the capital.
2The section looks at the problems created by the delegation of authority from the central city government
to the delegations and the eects of the lack of coordination and communication among these two branches of
government on the implementation of policies and plans to address informal street vending. It examines how
dierent authorities—regardless of their party aliation—advocated dierent approaches (violent enforcement
versus dialogue) to tackle the street vending problem. Lack of coordination and contrasting opinions about how
to proceed in the implementation of policies relating to the informal street vending problem resulted in weak and
uncoordinated eorts and incomplete policies and plans.
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political confrontation—with two opposite political parties facing each other—for the con-
trol of these informal street vendor groups in the capital, and what were the outcomes of such
confrontation. The section describes how politics took center stage during the second half of
the López Obrador administration and how politics, and the pressing times of the electoral
calendar, ended up displacing plans and policies for informal street vending to the lower levels
in the list of priorities of the city government. The section concludes by giving a summary of
the plans of the federal government to incorporate the informal sector in general (and infor-
mal trade in particular) into broader government plans to improve employment, broaden the
tax base, and help develop small enterprises and entrepreneurs, and explains whether these
plans were successful or not.
5.2 The Cárdenas administration in Mexico City (19972000)
5.2.1 Political framework
In the mid-1990s, the political situation ofMexico City in general and the executive authority
ofMexicoCity in particular changed radically. The city’s executive authoritywas transformed
from being a post appointed by the president of Mexico—the position of regente (regent) or
mayor of Mexico City—to being one defined by open democratic election—the position of
head of government of Mexico City—after democratic reforms were put in place in 1993.
Thus, the status of Mexico City was transformed. Before, the regencia (mayoralty) of Mex-
ico Citywas equivalent to aministry of state, appointed by and always subordinate to the pres-
ident of Mexico. After the election of July 1997, the status of Mexico City’s head of govern-
ment became closer to that of a state governor, with the occupant having more—although not
absolute3—capacity of self-determination. This new political arrangement gave far more au-
3According to the Mexican Constitution of 1917, the states of the Mexican federation are free and
sovereign. Each state has its own congress and constitution. However, the Federal District—the national capi-
tal commonly known as Mexico City—is a special case. Article 122 of the Constitution states the legal nature
of the Federal District and notes that its government will be responsibility of the federal powers and of the local
legislative, executive and judicial bodies. The reason why the institutions of the Federal District are considered
‘bodies’ and not ‘powers’ is because, being the residence of the federal powers, the Federal District cannot have
two powers residing on the same territory. In addition, unlike the other states that make up the Mexican republic,
the Federal Distric is not a sovereign entity, lacking a constitution, reason why they cannot be considered ‘powers’.
Nevertheless, on January 29 2016, the Diario Oficial (the government’s ocial gazette) published a reform to
Article 122 which has changed most of the above-mentioned provisions of the Federal District. Among them, the
ocial name has been changed toMexico City, and it will become the state number 32 of theMexican Federation.
Thus, the status of Mexico City will be similar to that of the other 31 states in the federation. A new constitution
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tonomy to the executive authority of the capital. This fact is significant as it allows for a com-
parative analysis of how policies and strategies towards informal street vending—and eventu-
ally results—were dierent when the government of the city was an authoritarian, party-state
government versus a new, opposition-emerged democratic government.
There were also changes to the representative body of Mexico City. In 1996, amendments4
to Article 122 of theMexican Constitution allowed for the transformation of the Assembly of
Representatives of the Federal District (ardf) into a collegial body that combined legislative
and administrative tasks. Therefore, the elections of 1997 allowed the integration of the First
Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (aldf).
In this manner, for the first time in recentMexican history, Mexico City residents were able
to vote and elect their executive authority as well as a new, more powerful version of their
legislative body.5
5.2.2 Alternation in power: Cárdenas wins the headship of Mexico City
On Sunday July 6, 1997, Mexicans went to the polls for midterm elections to vote for a new
congress. More importantly, Mexico City residents voted, for the first time in recent history,
to elect the head of government of Mexico City (Jefe de Gobierno del Distrito Federal). The
candidate of the prd, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano, won the elections defeating the pri’s
candidate, Alfredo del Mazo, and the pan’s candidate, Carlos Castillo Peraza. The 1997 elec-
tions in Mexico City were unique in the history of Mexico. They were not only the first
elections in recent history held democratically in the capital to elect the head of government
of Mexico City, but also led to a party other than the pri governing in Mexico City for the
for Mexico City is being drafted and that will give Mexico City the same autonomy and sovereignity as the other
states. A new local assembly or congress will also be elected holding legislative powers over public finance and
security. Finally, the ‘delegations’ will be converted into ‘mayoralties’.
4The Assembly of Representatives of the Federal District (Asamblea de Representantes del Distrito Federal,
ardf) is born by decree—published in the Diario Oficial on August 10, 1987—as a body of citizen representation
with powers to issue edicts, ordinances and regulations for the police and good governance. The first ardf started
its administration on November 15, 1988. As a result of the political reform of the Federal District—which was
publishedby decree in theDiarioOficial (the government’s ocial gazette) onOctober 25, 1993—the ardf became
a governing body with powers to create legislation for the Federal District. Through this decree, the third ardf
ocially became a legislature in 1994. Later, a new decree was published on August 22, 1996, which amends
Article 122 of the Constitution and denominates the Mexico City legislative body as the Legislative Assembly
of the Federal District (Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal, aldf). The same law states that the Assembly
would be composed of deputies rather than representatives (aldf, 2013a).
5Eventually, other city authorities, such as the delegation directors (or delegates), would also be determined
by popular vote, but only after 2000. Between 1997 and 2000, the head of government of Mexico City appointed
each of the delegation directors (or delegates) of the 16 delegations that make up Mexico City.
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first time. Moreover, the fact that Mexico City is the capital of the country and its largest city
gave the post of head of government a preeminence comparable to that of the ministries of
state, and perhaps to the presidency itself.6
This victory was very meaningful for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the prd. After running
and losing the presidential elections of 1988 and 1994, this victory put them on the verge of a
third, and perhaps definitive, run for the presidency in 2000. Winning the elections in Mexico
City proved to Cárdenas and the prd that an undisputed electoral victory was possible and
that the country was ready for—and perhaps demanding—political alternation in power at
the highest level. But first, Cárdenas and his team had to prove themselves as public servants
in Mexico City.
Five months later, when Cárdenas took oce on December 5, 1997, he knew that his man-
date as head of government would be a dicult one given its short length of only three years.
This was an exceptional circumstance, but it was agreed by all political parties before the elec-
tion that this city administration would only last for three years (1997–2000). This was so
that the electoral cycle would align with the electoral calendar of the elections of president of
Mexico andMexico City’s head of government by 2000. This put Cárdenas at a disadvantage
when implementing policies, promoting changes, and demonstrating results, as he would only
have half the time that previous regente administrations had (six-year terms) and administra-
tions of future heads of government of Mexico City would have (six-year terms, starting in
2000). The population of the capital had great expectations and hoped for immediate results
in the most sensitive areas: security, education, employment, environmental pollution, wages,
transport, health (Ziccardi, 2005).
5.2.3 Politics at work: the Mexico City of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas
Cárdenas inherited a city with many problems and diculties, and one where economic ac-
tivity was concentrated in the metropolitan area. It was an enormous urban agglomeration,
whose daily interaction with neighboring cities (Toluca, Cuernavaca, Queretaro, Puebla) re-
quired at least a minimal coordination of public transport and safety with other states’ mu-
nicipalities, whether governed by the prd, the pan, or the pri.7 The capital city until then
6Moreover, the pri, whose dominance was increasingly challenged, lost its absolute majority in the Federal
Chamber of Deputies. The prd thus became the second political force in Mexico, followed by the pan which was
third.
7According to National Population Council (conapo), in 1998, the Federal District had a population of 8.5
million. However, the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City—which extends over part of the neighboring states
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had been mismanaged; it was chaotic and faced problems of urban planning and insecurity,
comparable to those caused by poverty and unemployment. Personal interests and corruption
at all levels—especially at the top of the political hierarchy—prevented programs from being
carried out eectively in crucial areas. It was a megalopolis whose needs and problems could
perhaps only be resolved at the national level and with the full force of the state. This was the
city Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas found.
In July 1997 the prd candidates had won in 38 of the 40 constituencies (electoral districts)
in the capital; the remaining twowere won by the pan. These electoral results gave the prd the
majority of seats in the newly elected aldf. Paradoxically, this success caused some problems.
Given the electoral system in place,8 the highest-profile political candidates—the heads in the
proportional representation list of the prd, consisting of key collaborators ofCárdenas—were
excluded from the new aldf.9 The victorious prd candidates in the electoral districts, repre-
senting dierent currents (groups) within the prd and chosen for their activism in grassroots
organizations, had little experience of government (Monge, 1997b).
The outgoing regente, OscarEspinosaVillarreal, had announced that hewas leaving us$100
million in the city’s treasury. However, Cárdenas found distorted accounting information,
manipulated figures, and empty files. There was a deficit of us$40 million and a debt of us$50
million more (Monge, 1998a; Escarpit, 1999).
One of Cárdenas’s campaign promises was to recover the city for its inhabitants, which
involved a struggle against petty crime and, most of all, against mafias of all kinds and exist-
ing everywhere: in the police, public transportation, wholesale markets, and prisons, among
organized criminals such as car thieves or those running drugs cartels, and of course in the
informal street vendor organizations that yet again encroached on the sidewalks and streets
of the city to sell their products. In short, Cárdenas’s challenge involved a struggle against an
obscure world driven by huge economic interests. The task was daunting, especially with a
police force undermined by corruption, consisting of poorly paid and poorly trained sta.
Another problem requiring urgent solution was environmental pollution. According to the
World Health Organization (who), in 1997, Mexico City was the most polluted city in the
world. On its 9,000 kilometers of streets and avenues, there circulated some 3 million cars;
of Mexico (Edomex) and Hidalgo—has about 20 million people, making it the largest metropolitan area in the
Americas (Escarpit, 1999; inegi, 2010a).
8The aldf consists of 66 local deputies, of which 40 are elected in the first-past-the-post (fpp) system and 26
are elected by proportional representation (pr).
9In uninominal part (one representative per district) and in proportional part (to allow for representation of
parties).
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27,000 minibuses; 92,000 taxis; 2,000 buses and trolleybuses. The altitude of 2,260 meters in
the city center, the age of the automotive fleet (an average of 17 years), the corruption existing
within the motor vehicle emissions testing centers, and the poor quality of fuel thwarted all
programs to fight pollution (Escarpit, 1999).10
The main problem was public security. Whether Mexico City’s citizens approved or re-
jected the Cárdenas administration depended on how it attempted to address and solve this
problem. According to a report published by the aldf in 1998, where an assessment of the
general situation of the city is made, between 1995 and 1997, the number of pretrial investiga-
tions (averiguaciones previas) increased by 20 percent, averaging 650 oenses per day (Monge,
1998e). During the first half of 1998—the first semester of the new city government—there
were 119,921 oenses, which averaged 28 oenses per hour (Monge, 1998e). Oenses that
increased included rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery of banks and passersby (Monge,
1998e). Perhaps the worst statistic was that the Committee for Attention and Citizen Com-
plaints of the aldf received 6,811 complaints, of which 4,460 involved members of the police
(Monge, 1998e).
Finally, and as discussed at the end of the last Chapter 4, after the abandonment of the plaza
construction program, the return of the street vendors to the thoroughfare, and the rupture
and estrangement of the last pri city government with the street vendor organizations—as
well as the internal strengthening of the vendor organizations—street vending was registering
an uncontrollable growth, both in size and organizational power, bringing back to the city
all the problems it traditionally carried with and was blamed for: disloyal competition, tax
evasion, congestion, sanitary and health problems, safety dangers, pollution, defacement of
historical sites, etc.
In short, the most significant public problems Mexico City had could be reduced to four:
public security, pollution, transport, and street vending. The three most important organi-
zational problems were the lack of funds in the city treasury, the relative lack of governing
experience of the prd,11 and, as will be shown later on this chapter, the political inertias and
bureaucratic culture that existed, emanating from years of corrupt pri administrations.
10The city government began to use substitute fuels, such as ethanol and natural gas, instead of gasoline in
their own vehicles. Eventually, the city government also helped the owners of minibuses to renew their vehicles,
which were one of the major sources of pollution in the city.
11Previously, when he was still a member of the pri, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had been governor of the state of
Michoacán (1980–1986) so he had some previous experience in government, as did some of his closer associates
and collaborators in Mexico City. However, this was the first time he would have to exercise power from the
opposition and against the state apparatus. Many of the prd figures had no experience in government whatsoever.
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5.2.4 Informal street vending in Mexico City in the mid1990s
In 1970, the category of ‘street vendor’ or ‘itinerant vendor’ had only been introduced in the
economic censuses, but by 1997 street vending had become one of the most complex problems
to be confronted by the newly elected Cárdenas government (Castillo Berthier, 2004, 2005).
Street vending had grown monumentally in Mexico during the last decade of the 20th century.
With the passing of time and the complicity of the authorities, informal vendors had taken
over streets and avenues, Metro entrances and exits, parks and squares, among other public
places. The 1998 aldf report aforementioned stated that for each one of the 125,000 formally
established businesses in the city, there were 1.8 street vendors (Monge, 1998e). The Ministry
of Finance estimated that informal trade comprised 25 percent of the gdp; in comparison,
formal trade comprised just 18.74 percent of gdp (Monge, 1998e).
According to the last census performed by the city government in the mid-1990s, inMexico
City there were more than 242,000 vendors distributed as follows: over 100,000 were itinerant
vendors (toreros) and vendors with fixed or semi-fixed stands; 23,000 were tianguistas12 dis-
tributed along 152 dierent routes; 20,000 were situated in 200 fixed locations; 2,000 belonged
to ‘market on wheels’ schemes (mercados sobre ruedas); 27,000 were in commercial plazas;
and 70,000 were located around the 318 public markets existing in the city (Bustamante and
Castillo, 1997; Monge, 1998e; Castillo Berthier, 2004). However, if you add up the vendors’
dependants and those with indirect commercial relations to them, there was a total of more
than half a million people whose livelihood and survival was directly linked to informal trade
(Bustamante and Castillo, 1997; Castillo Berthier, 2004, 2005).
The 1998 aldf report stated that the tianguistas and the vendors on fixed and semi-fixed
stands were “the ones causing more conflict since their activities take place outside the laws
and regulations” (Monge, 1998e:225). It also pointed out that there were around 25 street
vendor organizations incorporated into some political parties, whose bond had allowed them
to survive and grow stronger (Monge, 1998e).
According to research carried out by Carlos Bustamante Lemus andMoisés Castillo García
on the realities and future of commerce in the thoroughfare in Mexico City—included in the
book Emerging Problems in theMetropolitan Zone ofMexico City, published by the unam13
in 1997—the forecast for the citywas chaos. Estimates by theNationalChamberofCommerce
12A tianguis is a type of open air market, flea market, or bazaar, which usually operates on certain days of the
week or month in a city neighborhood or town. A person who sells at this type of markets is called a tianguista.
13The National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, unam).
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(canaco) used by the above-mentioned researchers showed that, at national level, the number
of people employed in the informal sector had doubled in the previous eight years (Bustamante
andCastillo, 1997; Scherer Ibarra, 1997a), and from 1988 to 1995 street vending grew by 108.5
percent (Bustamante and Castillo, 1997). Moreover, it was projected that by 2000 there would
bemore than 1,250,000 vendors on the streets of the Federal District (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a).14
In an interview for Proceso magazine in November 1997, Saúl Escobar Toledo—Secretary
of Labor Aairs of the prd and one of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’s closer associates—provided a
well-thought-out analysis of the situation and identified threemain reasons for the aggravation
of street vending in Mexico City. The first was the absence of accurate and reliable records of
the number of street vendors. He suggested that this resulted from the political clientelism that
existed between authorities and street vendor organizations. Escobar Toledo explained that
the street vendor leaders gave the authorities the records of their organizations virtually atwill,
without requirements, forms, or protocols thatwould showwhether this informationwas true
or not. It was a kind of a (betting) game: the more records they presented and the larger the
lists of members they showed to the authorities, the better their chances of obtaining selling
permits. The second reason was that information and issuance of selling permits allowing
street vending were obtained separately in each delegation, without rigor or consistency. Thus
there were 16 dierent ways to request a permit—one for each delegation (Monge, 1998e).
Moreover, the issuance of the permit also varied from delegation to delegation. For example,
some delegations issued selling permits verbally while others gave a paper certificate. The
third reason for the aggravation of the problemof street vending inMexicoCitywas the notion
that informal work—especially street vending—was an activity tolerated but not regulated.
“It is the kind of activity that goes into the closet” Escobar Toledo had said (Scherer Ibarra,
1997a:154).
Escobar Toledo stated that it was necessary to update the legal framework in such a way
that it facilitated the formation of organizations of street vendors and the collection of more
reliable information. He said that while the revision of the legal provisions applying to infor-
mal street vending would not take place during the first months of the Cárdenas government,
14According to the inegi’s National Employment Survey performed from 1998 to 2004, the total number of
individuals working on street vending in the Federal District, in the year 2000, was of 169,275 (inegi, 2004). More-
over, the number of individuals working on street vending in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (the Federal
District plus several adjacent municipalities of the states ofMexico andHidalgo), in the year 2000, was of 320,467
(inegi, 2004). Thus, the projection of the canaco was overestimated by about 1 million people.
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he was confident that after consultation with the aldf and street vendor organizations, it
would be possible to present an initiative or bill on the subject (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a).15
5.2.5 The proposals of Saúl Escobar Toledo towards street vending
Saúl EscobarToledo knew in detail the problemof informal street vending. As a federal deputy
in the preceding Federal Legislature lvi (November 1, 1994, to August 31, 1997) he had pre-
sented a government bill to regulate the informal work nationally. The bill, presented on April
3, 1997, sought to amend several laws in favor of informal workers. At the time, he was confi-
dent that if the bill was not approved in the Chamber of Deputies—which is what ultimately
happened—, the prd would explore the development of a similar bill, exclusively for the Fed-
eral District (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a).
According to Escobar Toledo, informal workers were a very vulnerable group: “there is no
law that mentions them, much less that defends them. There are no adequate institutions
to protect them and to incorporate them gradually into the formal economy. There are no
satisfactory public policies to rescue them, dignify them and make them more productive”
(Scherer Ibarra, 1997a:154–155).
Escobar Toledo foresaw that informal sector workers—among them street vendors—once
incorporated into the legal framework would be subject to rights and obligations. Among
their rights would be the right to organize, to use the thoroughfare while observing the con-
stitutional and legal framework, to be incorporated into the social security system, and to
access education and health benefits. Among their obligations would be their inclusion in the
tax system, complying with the payment of taxes and duties (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a).16
A new law on informal work, Escobar Toledo insisted, would allow “the most constructive
dialogue between street vendor organizations and the government, not based on clientelism
and political considerations. No matter if the vendor leader belongs to the pri or the prd, is
white or colored; what matters is if she or he meets the legal requirements or not” (Scherer
15With ‘initiative’ or ‘bill’ I mean a ‘law initiative’ (iniciativa de ley), also known as ‘legislative proposal’ or
‘government bill’.
16Escobar Toledo had in mind a scheme that was somehow similar to what Santiago Levy (2008) would
promote—in a more elaborate way—a few years later. Both Escobar Toledo and Levy reached the same con-
clusion: that informal workers were unprotected and abused by the system in place and that something had to be
done about it. Both saw the incorporation of informal workers to the social security system as well as accessibility
to education, health and pension benefits—as well as their direct or indirect contribution to the tax system—as
key elements in the proposed reforms.
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Ibarra, 1997a:155). For Escobar Toledo, the proposed law would have two key advantages:
the ability to create reliable statistics, and therefore the possibility to diagnose what public
policies would be required (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a).
For the first time, the approach towards informal street vendors and their activity had be-
come more benevolent. Rather than treating street vendors as a plague that had to be elimi-
nated by any means possible, Escobar Toledo’s proposals were inclusive and conciliatory. He
had claimed:
I see no reason why this type of organization and worker cannot have social se-
curity. Why can’t they apply for a housing loan? Why can’t they benefit from
public policies that enhance their living standards? Why can’t they be the target
of development policies that allow them tomove from the informal—increasingly
precarious—economy to the formal economy and establish their own small busi-
nesses?
(Scherer Ibarra, 1997a:155)
Saúl Escobar Toledo would become the under-secretary of labor and social welfare in the
Cárdenas administration in Mexico City. Before the new city government took oce, he al-
ready had a very clear idea of what had to be done. The new city government would deal with
the street vending problem through two programs: a reorganization or relocation program
for the informal street vendors, which would update the legal framework; and a program to
rescue the Historical Center, one of the promises of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’s campaign for
the city government.
Escobar Toledo believed that the street vending problem could not be separated from the
rest of the problems of the Historical Center and Mexico City, and that it could not be ad-
dressed by ‘ejecting’ or ‘eradicating’ street vendors, but rather should make them part of the
project. Escobar Toledo acknowledged: “The street vendors do not have to be the dirt hid-
den under the carpet. They may also be part of the environment. They can give life to the
Historical Center in a positive way. When they are where they should be, they can be one
more attraction” (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a:156). Escobar Toledo also strongly emphasized his
belief that the growth of informal street vending had political reasons: “I think that street
vending has been fostered deliberately as a way to create a political clientele, mainly by the
pri” (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a:156).
In fact, working in the Historical Center there were about 8,506 street vendors whose orga-
nizations were aliated to the pri (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a). These organizations occupied an
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area from the central road Lázaro Cárdenas to the Circunvalación beltway, and from the street
República de Perú to the avenue José María Izazaga. The organization of Guillermina Rico
controlled 77.6 percent of the vendors. After Rico’s death—in September 1996—her daugh-
ter Silvia Sanchez Rico became leader of the organization. Another female leader, Alejandra
Barrios, controlled 12.18 percent of this area; the rest was handled by vendor leaders Miguel
Huerta and Benita Chavarría (Figure 5.1) (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a).
Figure 5.1.: Map of Mexico City’s Perimeters A and B (Historical Center area, 1997)
Source: Author, with data from Scherer Ibarra, (1997a).
However, not all the vendor organizations were linked to the pri. As a matter of fact, before
the new city government took control of the city administration, in Perimeter B (Figure 5.1)
of the Historical Center17—in the market area of La Merced—about 25 informal street ven-
17The Historical Center was born in 1980 as a result of a presidential decree that declared it ‘Historic Mon-
uments Zone’, and later strengthened its importance with unesco’s declaration as World Cultural Heritage Site
in 1987. Through these public actions, the Historical Center also changed the way the problem of informal street
vending was understood. From a hygienist vision that prevailed until the 1980s, street vending became a problem
associated with the loss historical heritage, violating one of the most representative elements of the national iden-
tity. The 1980 decree defines the Historical Center as an area of 9.1 square kilometers divided into two perimeters:
The PerimeterA of 3.7 square kilometers, which concentrates the highest density ofmonuments, and is surrounded
by the Perimeter B, which covers an area of 5.4 square kilometers and functions as a buer zone. This is an area
that is characterized by being the political and symbolic center of the country in a space that has the largest density
of historic monuments in Latin America (Silva Londoño, 2010).
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dor leaders were active under a scheme of restricted tolerance. Among them were: Domingo
Chavarría, of the Union ofTenants Traders of the FederalDistrict (Unión de Comerciantes Lo-
catarios del Distrito Federal); Rosa María Moreno and Guadalupe Núñez, supported by the
Assembly of Neighborhoods (Asamblea de Barrios); and Teresa Garduño, of the Emiliano
Zapata Popular Revolutionary Union (Unión Popular Revolucionaria Emiliano Zapata, up-
rez) (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a). Some of these groups would develop—or already had—liaisons
with some prd political activists and, directly or indirectly, would become prd grassroots or-
ganizations, especially those groups close to the uprez18 and the Asamblea de Barrios.19 In
addition, the uprez was a member of the Urban Popular Movement (Movimiento Urbano
Popular, mup) (Ramírez Saíz, 2006).20
Knowing its size and complexity, Escobar Toledo did not dare to make any estimations
nor predictions about how he would solve the street vending problem. Political will was not
enough; it was important to have economic stability as well, and cooperation from the street
vendor organizations: “Wemust have dialogue, nomatter how lengthy itmay be. They should
not refuse to speak to us because they fear manipulation, fear to disobey their party’s orders,
or because they resent having another party governing the city. This would make things more
dicult” (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a:156).
Escobar Toledo was also well aware that the conditions for governing Mexico City at that
particular time were not the best, but there was no choice. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the
prd had won the election and would therefore have to face the challenges of governing.
18The uprez, for example, had oces in dierent states of Mexico. One of its objectives was to improve
the living conditions of the Mexican population by renting their ‘political hauling’ services (acarreo)—carrying
people to political rallies, in much the same fashion as pri-aliated street vendor groups did—and violent clash
groups to political parties of the left.
19The uprez is a social organization—created in February 1987—which aims to improve the living conditions
of the Mexican population through grassroots social struggle, in the cities and in the countryside. Likewise, the
Asamblea de Barrios (Assembly of Neighborhoods) is another social organization, constituted two years after the
1985 earthquake (April 1987), as a response to the government innefectiveness to rebuild the ruined houses and
solve the serious housing shortage that prevailed in the city in those years. Both organizations would develop ties
with the prd.
20The Urban Popular Movement (Movimiento Urbano Popular, mup) is a front of left-wing social organiza-
tions, which became the most dynamic social current in Mexican cities for over three decades—between 1968 and
2002—and coincided with countrywide eorts to establish democratic forms of political participation. The mup
became a mainstay in the fight for democratic freedoms and the defense of human rights in the country. It was a
fertile training ground for those seeking social and political change. It contributed by changing the urban land-
scape, increasing the organizational capacity, and providing new ideological resources. The mup gained influence
as groups combined demands with proposals in community and habitat design, and participated in the planning
and construction of low-income housing. The mup also changed the balance of power and influence in Mexico
by attaining a legitimate status in the political arena, creating links with other organizations, and allying with
democratic movements throughout the country (Ramírez Saíz, 2006).
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5.2.6 A new political stage: beginning from scratch
Thus, as mentioned earlier, when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas took oce on December 5, 1997,
he found a city in disarray. During his campaign Cárdenas and his closest aides pointed out
that Mexico City, and the country in general, were struggling to deal with an economic cri-
sis (deepened by governmental policy), a political crisis (expressed in the breakdown of the
pri regime and the questioning of the government institutions), a social crisis (whose most
visible manifestation was the widespread impoverishment of many people), a moral crisis (ev-
idenced by the escalation of violence, the absence of the rule of law, and pervasive corruption),
and an environmental and territorial crisis (the dilapidation of non-renewable resources, the
non-preservation of natural resources for future generations, increasing pollution, and the
deepening inequality in regional development) (Scherer Ibarra, 1997b).
In the document Una Ciudad para Todos (‘A City for All’),21 in which Cárdenas expressed
his plans for government, he stated that the metropolitan area—which includes Mexico City
and several municipalities of the states of Mexico and Hidalgo, whose inhabitants work in
Mexico City and use its services—included the largest number of unemployed and poor in
the country. The diagnosis was made by taking into account the loss of productive industry
and employment in the Federal District. The document also mentioned that the failure of the
internal productive structure was reflected in the high and visible unemployment levels and the
increase of the population devoted to informal activities, in particular street vending (Scherer
Ibarra, 1997b; Cárdenas, 2010).
Having identified informal street vending as one of the key problems to resolve in the city,
Cárdenas and his teams sketched their initial ideas for dealingwith it by stating that in the new
government street vendingwould no longer be treated as an ‘urban conflict’. Cárdenaswarned
that the new government would end “the corrupt relationship that city ocials establish with
street vendors by way of extortion” (Scherer Ibarra, 1997b:573). He also stated that street
vendingwould be regulated and that street vendors would not be treated as a political clientele,
making clear that corruption would have no place in his government (Monge, 1997b). On
November 27, 1997, Cárdenas told members of the American Chamber of Commerce that he
would encourage productive activity in the city and was considering a possible ‘fiscal truce’ in
order to regularize the informal activities of street vendors (Scherer Ibarra, 1997b).
21The document also pointed out that insecurity was the main problem in Mexico City; violent acts occurred
every day and the citizens of the capital were victims of theft, murder, sexual violence, and juvenile delinquency.
Few crimes were reported and even fewer were solved, pretrial investigations were not followed up, and criminals
walked free.
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5.2.7 The cabinet of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas
As a government of alternancia, Cárdenas wanted to form an inclusive government, and his
cabinet was made up of an eclectic set of people, including personal friends, close associates,
ex-ocials, ex-primembers, old left-wingmilitants, ex and active panmembers, businessmen,
financiers, academics and researchers, political activists, and former policemen and military
personnel (See Appendix A.3 for a more elaborate discussion on Cárdenas’s cabinet members
and delegation directors at the beginning of his government).22
Criticism emerged of the composition of Cárdenas’s government, particularly from the
ranks of the pan. Carlos Castillo Peraza, the pan candidate who ran against Cárdenas in
Mexico City, severely questioned the inclusion of those cabinet members who had links with
social movements in the capital. He pointed out that several of them had frequently acted at
the boundaries of the law and undertaken political maneuvering for the prd in the city.23 He
suggested that Cárdenas intended to use these cabinet members to co-opt these groups (social
movements)—among them street vendors—in order to control them and also as a way to start
building a social support structure looking towards the 2000 presidential elections; but surely,
this type of association would come into tension with the need to provide security in the city
(Jaquez, 1997).24
Following his condemnation, Castillo Peraza criticized Cárdenas’s initial words about the
problem of informality and street vending: “Why does he say that the irregular—if not
corrupt—relationship of street vendors and informals with the authority is a problem? Many
22Appendix A.3 includes Table A.3.1 and Table A.3.2 which show detailed lists of both the cabinet members
of the Cárdenas’s administration and the delegation directors, respectively, at the outset of his government.
23In particular, Castillo Peraza referred to René Bejarano, the general director for government in Cárdenas’s
administration. Bejarano has been described as a corrupt figurewho has been accused of financial fraud, nepotism,
and having an obscure background in social movements (Jaquez, 1997). In 2004 a video of Bejarano receiving
money from a businessman in return for procurement favors was aired on tv. This exposed the corruption existing
in the administration of López Obrador. Bejarano was imprisoned in 2004 but in less than a year was released
after a judge ruled that there was no sucient evidence against him.
24In fact, the first mistake attributed to the Cárdenas government came with the appointment of the collab-
orators in charge of public security: Rodolfo Debernardi and Jesús Carrola Gutiérrez. With their appointment,
Cárdenas signaled that hewouldhave a strong hand in the city government, butCarrola resignedonly days after the
beginning of the new government under allegations of police brutality and links with drug trackers. Debernardi,
a man formed in the armed forces, attempted to impose a military-like system in the city’s Public Security Secre-
tariat which failed. On August 28, 1998, Rodolfo Debernardi left his post and was replaced by Alejandro Gertz
Manero. This marked the return of a civilian as head of the police and, with it, the implementation of a new
policy whose pillars were the decentralization of responsibilities and citizen participation. Thus, with the arrival
of Alejandro Gertz to the Secretariat of Public Security, in coordination with the oce of the Attorney General of
Justice of the capital, began an attempt to address the corruption in the police force, not without strong resistance
from certain sectors.
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of them [street vendors and informals] are members of groups that have been under the cus-
tody and control of the prd” (Jaquez, 1997:173). When I asked Cárdenas about this claim, he
denied the accusations (Cárdenas, 2010). It is important to notice that, while it is understood
that some informal groups had a rapprochement with the prd during this time, the majority
were still aliated to the pri. Cárdenas’s victory was relatively unexpected and therefore it is
hard to believe that the number of informal groups related to the prd were significant at that
particular time.25 In addition, by its statutes, the prd did not accept the aliation of groups—
only accepted aliation of individuals—reason why it was not that easy to form ties with the
prd at an institutional level. The pri, on the other hand, had done it systematically for many
years.
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and his collaborators had to implement their policies and demon-
strate that they had an impact on Mexico City in only three years. Cárdenas was aware that
time was short and that performing well was important in the competition for the prd nom-
ination to the presidential elections of 2000. He said: “If we do not do a good job here [in
Mexico City], it would be absurd to seek other political posts” (Monge, 1998a:178). More-
over, he knew that if he was going to run for the presidency, he would eectively be in oce
(as head of government of the Federal District) for less than three years because of the timing
of the campaigns and elections. 26 Therefore, it was important to act quickly and eciently.
5.2.8 The government's agenda
On April 1998, four months after Cárdenas took oce, the government of Mexico City pre-
sented its General Program for the Development of the Federal District 1998–2000 (Programa
General de Desarrollo del Distrito Federal 1998–2000). This document contained a diagno-
sis on Mexico City at the end of the 20th century, which pointed out that “in the past, the
decisions taken by the designated authorities did not respond to the demands of the popu-
lation nor the criteria of long-term development but to political compromises or short-term
business” (Corro, 1998:190). The document added that this was one of the main reasons why
Mexico City was an urban concentration marked by conflict among some groups of the popu-
25Later on, during the administration of López Obrador, this situation radically changed and the number of
street vendor organizations with links to the prd increased significantly; some of the old groups with ties to the
pri moved to the prd and many of the new groups approached the prd without considering other parties.
26Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was in oce from December 5, 1997, to September 29, 1999—this was 662 days as
head of government of Mexico City; not even two full years in oce. The rest of the administration, 1 year and
62 days, was completed by Rosario Robles.
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lation, characterized by a disorganized urban development and by an overall non-compliance
of laws and regulations. These had been ignored for decades in return for perquisites and ad-
ditional benefits, in an extreme broadening of the concept of clientelism that, in general, had
ruled the country (Corro, 1998).
With this program Cárdenas aimed to rescue the city and to give back to it the preeminence
it deserved as a capital of the country. Cárdenaswanted to convert the delegations intomunici-
palities by giving themmore independence; to professionalize andmoralize the security forces
and the justice system; and to introduce the possibility of holding referendums and plebiscites
as means of participation. As the city government was left with an enormous debt,27 he also
aimed to achieve sound public finances by controlling public debt, modernizing the property
tax structure as well as the collection of water consumption fees, and promoting comprehen-
sive development and modernization projects (Corro, 1998).
When examining the factors that aect informal street vending, the General Program ex-
plained that because of the economic (Peso or Tequila) crisis, there were almost no new jobs
being created, while immigration to the city continued. Although the flow of immigrants into
the city had been greatly reduced and the birth rate in Mexico City was one of the lowest in
the country, the labor supply was insucient (Corro, 1998). The document noted that dur-
ing the 1980s, the phenomenon of massive unemployment had forced some of the population
into street vending and this had been acknowledged by the federal government as a ‘solution’
to social pressures. Therefore, the observation and enforcement of the law was relaxed to
allow a large number of Mexico City inhabitants to make a living selling on the streets and
sidewalks (Corro, 1998). Thus, towards the end of the 20th century, street vending in Mex-
ico City had become a phenomenon of the greatest importance and complexity, as it allowed
many city inhabitants to earn a living. However, it also presented serious diculties for other
population groups, among them the formally established merchants. The problem was fully
acknowledged by the Cárdenas government.
TheGeneral Program emphasized that in amegalopolis likeMexicoCity, population groups
tend to hold dierent positions on issues of interest, so conflict may naturally arise, but it con-
sidered that these are not beneficial to social harmony. For this reason, the city government
was determined to maintain a permanent dialogue with the actors of potential or existent
conflicts (Corro, 1998). The General Program explained that there were key players involved
27According to Antonio Ortiz Salinas, secretary of finances during the Cárdenas administration, the previous
administration had left them with little budgetary leeway—85 percent of public expenditure was compromised
and there was a debt of mx$13,000 million (Monge, 1998a).
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in commerce on the thoroughfare: formally established merchants, informal street vendors,
neighborhood associations in the aected areas, and population groups aected by the instal-
lation of street vendors in public areas:
The government of the City, however, understands that the conflict does not have
a sole origin and has no immediate solution. The use of force against street ven-
dors is not possible, because it is not fair, but non-compliance of the law to the
detriment of residents or formally established merchants is not correct either. In
this, as in other cases, the best way for the government to defuse latent conflicts
and achieve long-term solutions is through dialogue.
(Corro, 1998:193)
By the second quarter of 1998, the Cárdenas government took the first actions to tackle
informal street vending. There was a police raid against street vendors in La Merced market,
which was criticized by the opposition in the city: the pan and the pri. The police raid in La
Merced was justified in the name of compliance of the 1993 decree that prohibited this type
of activity in the area. pan’s Carlos Castillo Peraza once more criticized the city government
by saying that while the decree existed and it was not bad to enforce it, it was important to
remember how the prd used to react to former pri city governments when they energetically
enforced this rule. Informal vendor groups would seek and find political protection in Cárde-
nas’s henchmen. Castillo Peraza (1998:197) commented:
The tortilla turned around: the pri—as hypocritical today as the prd was before
in relation to the [1993] decree—gives protection to those who violate it, in the
same way that the prd did in the past. The tortilla is the same. It just changed
sides on the clay hotplate.
Castillo Peraza was right. In June 1998, former pri city ocials, who were protecting infor-
mal vendor groups, organized a demonstration against the new prd city government. Around
20,000 street vendors gathered in the Zócalo—Mexico City’s central plaza—to protest and to
defend their right to sell on the streets. The demonstration was a political success as it forced
the government of Cárdenas into the same position as the pri had been in when it governed
the city. In the words of Castillo Peraza: “The pri does in the opposition what the prd used to
do; and the latter, once in power, what the pri perpetrated there” (Castillo Peraza, 1998:198).
This demonstration showed that the bond between informal vendor groups and the priwas
not broken—at least during those years—as a result of the arrival of an opposition party into
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power in Mexico City. What is more, the informal vendor groups were being used politically
by the pri to put pressure on the prd city government. The demonstration also illustrated
that the pri, as weakened as it might have been after losing Mexico City, was not politically
dead; on the contrary, it was ready to challenge the government of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas
by all means at hand. The pan used the hesitant first actions of the Cárdenas government to
associate it with the pri and concluded that the prd city government was a ‘reheated’ version
of the pri city government. “The discourses are identical: they only changed mouths,” said
Castillo Peraza (1998:198).
5.2.9 Implementing policies to rescue the Historical Center and relocate street vendors
Cárdenas learned from this initial state of aairs that he had to implement his campaign
promises as soon as possible and also be as eective as he could be. Knowing that time was
running out and that the financial situation of the city government was less than healthy, he
decided to find ways to generate resources for the capital. One of the best ways to achieve this
was by developing the city center into a touristic, commercial and cultural hub. To accomplish
this, the city government created a program with the slogan ‘El corazón de la ciudad está en
el centro’ (‘The heart of the city is in the center’).
It was not a new idea. Previous city administrations had put in place similar programs.
In 1991, Manuel Camacho Solís started a process to restore 692 buildings, with private and
public capital. ‘Echame una manita’ (‘Give me a hand’) was the slogan of this campaign.
Oscar Espinosa Villarreal gave continuity to the project started byCamacho—Espinosa called
it ‘Vivir en el centro’ (‘Living in the center’)—and increased the number of rescued edifices to
840. The restoration of buildings and the recovery of public spaces within Perimeters A and
B of the Mexico City center became part of the set of measures implemented by the Cárdenas
government, which was eager to accelerate the city’s renovation process in an urban space
that concentrates more than 1,400 listed buildings into an area of 9.1 square kilometers. In
this way, through the program with the slogan ‘El corazón de la ciudad está en el centro’, the
Cárdenas government took on the challenge of continuing to restore the Historical Center
(Monge, 1998b).
The government of Mexico City thus started to reactivate the process of transforming the
largest group of historical architectural monuments in Latin America, using policies of pro-
moting land value, creating opportunities for undertaking economic projects, recovering and
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regenerating public spaces—buildings, plazas, fountains and gardens—in the Historical Cen-
ter, as well as injecting resources into the Alameda Central public municipal park. However,
a key element for the success of this project was the relocation of street vendors occupying the
streets and public spaces of the city center (Monge, 1998b).
The city government revived the 1993 decree that prohibited street vending, and enforced it,
despite the resistance of the street vendor organizations aliated to the pri. The legal code—
also referred in this thesis as ordinance, decree or bando—had been approved by the then
ardf28 on July 12, 1993, under the administration of Manuel Camacho Solís (ardf, 1993).
Incongruously, pri member Jorge Schiano—who in 1993 was the vice coordinator of the
parliamentary faction of the pri at the ardf and had voted in favor of the ordinance that year—
in 1998, as leader of the popular sector of the pri (cnop) and representative of pri-associated
groups, refused to comply with the ordinance.29 This demonstrates the contradictions in the
political decisions and stances taken by members of the governing bodies before and after the
alternation of political parties in power.
Moreover, on July 25, 1998, the under-secretary of labor and social welfare of Mexico City,
Saúl Escobar Toledo, made public the Land Use and Territorial Planning Program30 (Plan
de Reordenamiento), a package of proposals to organize and regulate street vending in the
Historical Center. It recommended several lines of action:
• the immediate relocation of street vendors into the 24 existing commercial plazas (22
of which belonged to pri-aliated organizations)
• readjustment in the commercial plazas to avoid competition in the activities and occu-
pations
• the extension of public markets
• the construction of new commercial plazas
• the adaptation and authorization of commercial sites (solares comerciales), corridors,
and bridges
• the organization of productive projects and creation of an employment agency (Monge,
1998b)
28As mentioned earlier, the Assembly of Representatives of the Federal District (ardf) is the predecessor of the
Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (aldf).
29In other words, now in the opposition bloc, Jorge Schiano refused to comply with the ordinance for which
he had voted as pri local deputy when the pri was in power.
30Also known as the Land Use Payment Program (Programa de Pagos de Uso de Suelo).
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Around 50 percent of the 24 commercial plazas, administered in 1998 by the Economic De-
velopment Fund of the Federal District (Fondo de Desarrollo Económico del Distrito Federal,
fondeco),31 were abandoned, and the city authorities made eorts to recover the premises,
consisting of about 1,110 stalls (Monge, 1998b) where they planned to locate the street ven-
dors.
With the Plan de Reordenamiento, the city government was trying to attain two objectives:
to clean the streets of the Historical Center of street vendors, and to insert them within the
universe of taxpayers. In 1998, the city authorities estimated that in that area of the city there
were between 10,000 and 12,000 street vendors, 90 percent of which were linked to the pri
(Monge, 1998b).
Thus, through these two programs (the one with the slogan ‘El corazón de la ciudad está
en el centro’ and the Plan de Reordenamiento) Escobar Toledo and the Cárdenas government
finally put into action their strategy to tackle the street vending problem in Mexico City.
5.2.10 Breaking political inertias: the battle within the city government
The challenge CuauhtémocCárdenas faced in governingMexico Citywas to try to change not
only laws, policies, and citizens’ habits but also the city government itself. Mexico City had
never been governed by a party other than the pri and there were many unlawful and corrupt
practices rooted among government ocials andworkers inMexico City’s bureaucracy. Thus,
not all the pressure on the Cárdenas government was external—there was some from within
as well.
In an interview with the political magazine Proceso in 1998, René Arce—vice coordinator
of the prd legislators at the aldf—claimed that the Cárdenas government only controlled
about 70 percent of the real power in Mexico City (Monge, 1998e). He warned that there
were street vendor organizations and sections32 of the Federal District Government Workers
Union (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores del Gobierno del df, sutgdf) that could throw into
crisis some city delegations (Monge, 1998e). Indeed, by mid-1998 the new city government
31The fondeco was created in October 1996 and, most likely, took over some of the functions of the fondedf,
among them what was related to the administration of the abandoned commercial plazas. The fondeco was
closed in February 2001 (FONDECO-df, 2015).
32In Mexico, some unions are divided into ‘sections’. Usually each section represents the workers of a specific
workplace, department, or institution within the union.
227
the cárdenas administration in mexico city (1997–2000)
first began to suer from sudden attacks by the union (sutgdf) in response to measures it had
taken to eliminate power bases (cotos de poder) and sources of corruption.
From the very beginning of his government, the union (sutgdf) hadwarnedCárdenas that it
was a bad idea to confront the city workers organizations. Their leader hadwarned, “without
us, the city comes to a halt” (Monge, 1998c:212). They carried out their threat.
The firstweek of July 1998, workers belonging to the union (sutgdf) disrupted the activities
in the city’s Secretariat of Finance and the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, with a partial strike and
full work stoppage, respectively. In the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, followers of the section rep-
resentative for the Markets and Provisions Oce—Pedro Maldonado Echevarría—stopped
activities for a week (from July 2 to July 9) by preventing trusted and non-union employees
(empleados de confianza), unionized employees, sta members, government ocials, and the
general public from coming into the premises (Monge, 1998c).
The sub-delegate of government of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, Francisco Saucedo Perez,
explained what in reality was behind these actions. He declared that the problems with the
union—and with Maldonado Echevarría in particular—started when the middle and high
rank ocials of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation in charge of the Markets Oce were substituted
with people related to the new city government (Monge, 1998c).
The dissatisfaction among union members grew even more after it was announced that
structural changes were going to be implemented in the management and operation of the
39 public markets of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, with the purposes of updating the single
register of tenants of all the markets, professionalizing the markets’ administrators and other
market personnel, modernizing the regulatory framework, establishing a service desk (ven-
tanilla única) to deal specifically with market issues, and formalizing the accreditation of all
board of directors of each market. These all had the goal of making the overall operation of
public markets in the delegation more ecient (Monge, 1998c). Finally, the rebellion came
when an old unionist—Teobaldo Santana Cruz—was dismissed as head of markets of the
Cuauhtémoc Delegation and in his place María Elena Lara, a prd activist who was mem-
ber of the union, was appointed. Maldonado Echevarría condemned the removal of Santana
Cruz and argued that the post belonged to the union and not to the prd, since it was a ‘union’s
conquest’ (Monge, 1998c).
The sub-delegate Saucedo Perez pointed out that there was neither a document nor a regu-
lation that stated that the post of head of markets belonged to the union. He remarked that it
was the intention of the union to put pressure on the authority to maintain their bastions of
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power and concluded: “We are aecting vested interests, that’s the truth” (Monge, 1998c:212).
prd’s local deputy René Arce had stated ironically: “It is a union that considers corruption
as part of its labor rights” (Monge, 1998e).
Ocials within the Cárdenas government considered that the union (sutgdf) was respon-
sible for breaking the ‘social fabric’ of the public markets and popular provisions in Mexico
City. The rupture took place through dierent violations of the market and provisions laws,
for example: the union made room for new activities not authorized in the markets, it sold or
authorized changes to market spaces, it fostered the existence of street vendors in the markets
area, and it profited from the market permits, all in exchange for money. In short, the union
(sutgdf) had turned the public markets into a gold mine (Monge, 1998c).33
In fact, during the last pri administrations in Mexico City, the administrators of public
markets had operated with total freedom. Acting in connivance with the city authorities of
the time, and in return for large amounts of money, market administrators granted permits to
sell alcohol and open videogame sites inside the markets; they sold spaces inside and outside
the markets, fostering informal street vending; and they administered as private businesses
those services that were part of the market’s public services, such as dental oces or public
bathrooms. All these activities violated the provisions of Mexico City’s Market Regulation,
which had been in force since 1951 (Monge, 1998c).34
However, connivance was prevalent not only between administrators of public markets and
city ocials; it also included leaders of street vendor organizations. A 1998 city government
report that analyzed the functioning of the 39 markets that operated within the Cuauhtémoc
Delegation stated that informal commerce was growing at an alarming rate, capturing and
obstructing the space around the public markets, and urged the government to regulate and
disentangle this problem (Monge, 1998c). According to the report, the leaders of street vendor
organizations—Alejandra Barrios, Miguel Angel Cordero, Miguel Galan andMarciano Islas,
among others—were responsible for having encouraged this activity around public markets
(Monge, 1998c).
To close the circle, there was also connivance between public market administrators and
political parties and political organizations. The Cuauhtémoc Delegation recognized at the
33To give a very specific example of how the union profited from public markets, to apply for a change of
selling activity, the market administrators charged between mx$1,200 and mx$4,000, while at the government’s
over-the-counter services the real cost of the procedure was only mx$48 (Monge, 1998c).
34The worst was that somemarkets, such as Tepito and La Lagunilla markets, became centers of drug distribu-
tion and weapon tracking, where commercial stalls were priced between mx$250,000 and mx$500,000, depend-
ing on their type of activity (Monge, 1998c).
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time that Section 29 of the union controlled all posts in the markets’ administrative unit in
the delegation, and three political organizations controlled the board of directors of the 39
markets.35
The ocial analysis concluded that markets had become “a complex system of corruption
involving government ocials, tenant leaders, market leaders, market’s boards of directors,
union leaders, street vendor leaders, and political activists” (Monge, 1998c:213). The Cárde-
nas government intended to end all this: “this is over” sub-delegate Saucedo Perez had asserted
(Monge, 1998c:213); but the task was certainly monumental.
It is important to understand the situation of the public markets and their administration
in this period because public markets were the following step upwards in the ladder that goes
from informality to formality; in other words, from selling in the streets to selling in an es-
tablished public market or a commercial plaza. The fact that public markets administration
in Mexico City was deficient, disorganized and corrupt did not add any incentive to the con-
dition of being formal. It was better to remain informal, selling on the streets—as risky as it
could be—than formalize by entering into a public market or commercial plaza and be abused
by the market organization in place. Given the collusion between public market administra-
tors, street vendor leaders, city ocials, and political party activists, street vendors were better
o remaining on the streets and continuing to be loyal to their vendor leaders.
5.2.11 The real dimension of the problem: too much to do, too little time and resources
In an interview with the political magazine Proceso in July 1998, Clara Jusidman—the city’s
secretary of education, health and social development during the Cárdenas administration—
gave some alarming numbers to illustrate the plight of the poor in the FederalDistrict, many of
which were informal workers. The hospital network of the capital—with 26 hospitals and 230
health centers—served 4.5 million people excluded from social security36—employees with-
out benefits, the unemployed, and the self-employed—many falling into the category of ‘in-
35These three political organizations were: i) Under the leadership of (unionist) Jesús Dichi Pacheco, the Public
Markets Unified Group (Grupo Unificado de Mercados Públicos) controlled 17 markets. Dichi Pacheco was also
coordinator of 19 self-administered markets. ii) The pri-df Coordinating Committee for Markets (Coordinadora
de Mercados del pri-df) had a presence in 22 markets. It was run by Carlos Alonso Ceballos Torres, who was
linked to the leader of the pri’s cnop, Jorge Schiano. iii) Dierent prd activists shared out the control of at least
ten other markets; thus, in some markets, control was shared among dierent political groups or organizations.
(Monge, 1998c).
36That is, medical care provided by the network of hospitals of the city government—that usually targets gen-
eral population that is not covered by the imss of the ISSSTE—served 4.5 million people (Monge, 1998d).
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formal workers’.37 This number was equivalent to half of the total permanent population of
the Federal District, which was roughly 9 million people in 1998 (Monge, 1998d). Of these
4.5 million people, between 30 percent and 40 percent were indigenous individuals residing
in the Federal District, and 120,000 patients had diseases associated with poverty (Monge,
1998d). Clara Jusidman admitted that the numbers were shocking. They reflected, on one
hand, the process of conversion from the formal to the informal economy; and on the other,
the increasing levels of poverty in the metropolis (Jusidman, 1993; Monge, 1998d).
Jusidman was aware that it had been very dicult to stop the decline in the living standards
of the middle sectors of society, which started in the 1980s, with the emergence of the first
generation of new poor (Jusidman, 1993). “Many qualified professionals have been forced to
be employed in marginal activities or to join the informal trade, in view of the impossibility
to fulfill themselves as professionals”38 (Monge, 1998d:454).
However, the indicator that really worried Clara Jusidman was the continuing process of
social decomposition, which was increasingly manifested in the loss of values, lack of soli-
darity, growing individualism, and desire for personal and family growth at any cost (Monge,
1998d). These types of behavior often led to illegality, crime, and violence. It was this kind
of poverty—in which economic, family, and educational factors concur—which concerned
Jusidman the most, particularly because it was an area the government knew little about.
In the interview, Jusidman stated that the budget authorized to the Secretariat under her
responsibility in 1998 was mx$3,400 million, of which mx$550 million would be spent on
breakfast in schools, and a similar amount on salary payments (Monge, 1998d). She antici-
pated that with that budget it would be impossible to do anything, so she chose to focus the
Secretariat’s work on changing the models of provision of social assistance to the population.
Instead of favoring a type of ‘clientelistic’ welfare policy—the one that had prevailed during
the times of pri city governments—Jusidman opted to change the priorities and assistance
models to make them more responsive to the realities of the city mentioned above.
At the time, Jusidman did not see any short-term solution to all these problems, admitting
that the public resources were not adequate to oset the deterioration in the quality of life
37Santiago Levy (2008:33) defined informal worker in this way: “Informal workers are self-employed individ-
uals and comisionistas working on their own or in a legal non-salaried capacity with a firm, along with salaried
workers who are hired by a firm and paid a wage but, in violation of the law, not registered with the Mexican
Social Security Institute [Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, imss].”
38The city government itself had attorneys who were earning mx$1,400 per month and doctors who earned
mx$1,200 a month (Monge, 1998d); this was the equivalent of approximately us$155 and us$133 in 1998, respec-
tively (using an exchange rate of us$1 = mx$9).
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and coexistence of the majority of the inhabitants in the capital, even less when the social gap
between rich and poor widened.39
5.2.12 The attacks on Cárdenas: evading obstacles in the race for the presidency
It was not surprising that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas—a symbol of a center-left political force
and capable of conquering power—became the target of furious opposition. Moreover, be-
cause Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was an emblematic figure of the prd, his successes or failures
governing Mexico City would inevitably have an impact on the local and federal elections of
July 2000. Since he had become the head of government of the capital city, Cárdenas was the
target of countless attacks, mostly in the mass media, particularly private television networks.
The news programs of Televisa and tv Azteca emphasized the city government’s inability to
solve the city’s fundamental problems.
In 1999, the harassment against Cárdenas increased, nurtured by the fears of certain eco-
nomic groups of seeing him in the presidency, or seeing the prd occupying new areas of power
(Cárdenas, 2010).40 Perhaps, the main reason was because Cárdenas—as head of government
of Mexico City—had progressively gained dimensions of head of state, at times overshadow-
ing President Ernesto Zedillo. Invited to the inauguration of several Latin American leaders,
on tour in Washington or in Montevideo, attending the Davos Economic Forum, Cárdenas
had received in all these occasions the treatment of a head of state (Escarpit, 1999).
Despite the discomfort created in the Presidency of the Republic by the international di-
mension reached by Cárdenas, a degree of peace seemed to prevail between the two powers,
right from the beginning of the Cárdenas’s administration. However, President Zedillo op-
posedCárdenas’s request for federal authorization for a loan of us$650million. Using his veto
39Jusidman had said: “The challenge is enormous. The deterioration of quality of life and social decomposi-
tion of the capital city is brutal. At least in these three years we will not see radical changes in the quality of life
because the problem is not only the responsibility of the government ofMexico City. It has to do with the national
economic context and, I would say, even the global context.” (Monge, 1998d:456).
40A strike organized in April 1999 by the students of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (unam)
against the payment of tuition fees—which lasted almost tenmonths—heightened the attacks againstCuauhtémoc
Cárdenas. Previously, Cárdenas had declared himself in favor of free university education. In addition, the new
president of the prd inMexico City, Carlos Imaz, was a formermember of the University Student Council and had
directed the last major student strike at unam in 1987. These two circumstances were tendentiously related with
the students’ strike and Cárdenas was accused of manipulating the strike for his own benefit (Escarpit, 1999). The
murder of Paco Stanley, a popular tv Azteca entertainer, on June 7, 1999, led to a campaign of political lynching.
Using the popularity of the victim, whose funeral was attended by thousands in situ and through television screens,
the journalists turned into judges and called for Cárdenas’s resignation. The media frenzy only relented when the
first police reports stated that Stanley was a cocaine addict and probably linked to certain drug cartels.
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power, Zedillo significantly reduced the amount of the loan, even at the expense of various
social programs. This measure taken against the inhabitants of Mexico City, and indirectly
against Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, was considered by some as a declaration of war (Escarpit,
1999).41
Moreover, the relentless struggle towhich certain currents (groups) of the prd devoted them-
selves, in order to retain their political clientele and share of power, became a serious problem,
as did the ideological dierences and personal animosities within the party.42 These internal
struggles weakened the image of the prd. Inevitably, these big and small scandals damaged
the image of both Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and his party (Lemoine, 1998). Despite running an
administration that had nothing serious to be criticized about, the slow rate of change and
the disappointment of not witnessing the expected miracle in the city led many to doubt the
ability of Cárdenas and the prd to take control of the presidency (Vázquez Montalbán, 1998).
5.2.13 Cárdenas is presidential candidate: what happens to the policies in the city?
On September 29, 1999, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas stepped down from leading the government
of Mexico City to start his third campaign for the presidency of Mexico. Rosario Robles
Berlanga—whowas general secretary of government during his administration—replacedhim
as the head of government of Mexico City.
At the time of his departure, the outcomes of the policies to tackle informal street vending
implemented by the Cárdenas government were mixed. It was not clearwhether Robles would
continue to operate the policies Cárdenas had implemented, not least because she might wish
to avoid problems with informal groups during the elections and instead prefer to gain their
political favor.
In an interview with me, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (2010) said that at the time he left the
Mexico City government, much progress had already beenmade. Several street vendor groups
41It was precisely to avoid such vengefulmanifestations that Cárdenas wanted the city to become a fully fledged
state, the 32nd of the Federation: the state of Anáhuac (Estado de Anáhuac).
42Despite the great expectations created by Andrés Manuel López Obrador who, in August of 1996, became
the national leader of the prd and revamped the party, making it once again electorally competitive and helping
Cárdenas win the election in Mexico City (Escarpit, 1999). However, the internat struggles showed the limits of
this change. For example, the violent campaign of Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (the second most prominent figure in
the prd) against his party rival, Cárdenas, in the race for the prd presidential ticket; or the election to choose the
successor of LópezObrador as leader of the prd (onMarch 14, 1999), which had to be cancelledwith the discovery
of massive fraud perpetrated within the party, are examples of the internal struggles in the prd which damaged
the party’s image.
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had been relocated to commercial plazas and some public markets had been built (Cárdenas,
2010).
Cárdenas argued that, in general, in the year Robles was in oce she had continued to
implement—and even expand when possible—his policies (Cárdenas, 2010). While Cárdenas
did not give details, he was certain that there was no overall change in any important policy
of the city government regarding street vending and informality. To emphasize this, Cárdenas
pointed out that Robles had not changed the heads of the city government oces in charge
of these issues,43 and not because he had expressly requested her to keep the same ocials.
Robles had a better relationship with some ocials than with others, but the very fewwho left
the administration afterCárdenas stepped down did so out of personal choice and not because
of dierences with her (Cárdenas, 2010). Nearly all the other sta, including all the delegation
directors,44 retained their positions. Consequently, as Cárdenas armed, therewas continuity
in the policies towards street vendors and informality after he left the city government and
when Rosario Robles was in charge (Cárdenas, 2010).
When I questioned Cárdenas about his possible intention to create a political clientele out
of the informal vendor groups for electoral purposes, as the pri had done in the past, he was
swift and clear in his answer:
There was no intention of forming a political clientele. There was the intention
to fulfill an obligation that the state had, in general, and the government of the
city had, in particular. That obligation was to have good governance, to solve the
problems of the city. If the positive results of fulfilling this obligation generated
supporters—I would not call them political clientele—well, that is great and they
are welcome. But that was not the main goal of the government’s activity. The
sympathizers came about because it was a government that worked eciently for
the general benefit of that person, or that group, or that activity.
(Cárdenas, 2010)
43Francisco Cano Escalante—who substituted María Leticia Calzada Gómez in June 1998—continued in the
Secretariat of Economic Development, Moisés Rivera Espinosa at the Economic Development Fund of the Federal
District (fondeco)—involved in constructing commercial plazas—Jorge Legorreta as director of the Cuauhtémoc
Delegation, Clara Jusidman as Secretary of Education, Health and Social Development, and Saúl Escobar Toledo
as Under-Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare.
44The ‘delegation directors’ or ‘delegates’ (delegados) were the directors of the 16 delegations of Mexico City.
Until 2000, theywere appointed by themayor or the head of government ofMexicoCity. From 2000, the delegation
directors (or delegates) were elected by popular vote and their ocial title was changed to head of delegation (jefe
delegacional).
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Cárdenas accepted that, at the time of the interview (September, 2010), it was evident that
there were ties between informal vendor groups and the prd, but that was a rarity in his city
government and social policies during his administration were not deliberately aimed at form-
ing a political clientele. Indeed, the change of modus operandi towards informality and street
vending came later, in another prd city government: “the change came with the administra-
tion of Andrés Manuel [López Obrador]” (Cárdenas, 2010).
5.2.14 Cárdenas, informal street vending, and democratic change
In retrospect and being directly asked whether he considered informality a phenomenon in-
dependent of politics, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas replied that he believed that the phenomenon
was not independent of politics, but a problem closely linked to, or even largely a product of,
social policies and social conditions (Cárdenas, 2010).
Moreover, Cárdenas considered that democratic change had an important influence—for
better or worse—on the informal sector, but he underlined that what really mattered was the
change of model:
It is true that in 1997 in Mexico City the ‘alternation in power’ took place, if
we understand ‘alternancia’ as a change of party—and evidently of people—in
power. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that there was also a change in
the model implemented in the Federal District. (Cárdenas, 2010)
Cárdenas went further in his analysis and compared the alternancia inMexico City in 1997
with the alternation in power that occurred at the federal level in 2000, stating that in the alter-
nation in power that occurred at the level of the federal government, the political, economic,
and social national project was maintained:
Being socially exclusive, concentrating wealth among a small group of people, the
federal project maintained, in general terms, what we call ‘neoliberal’ economic
policies... Thus, I would say that in the first case [city government] there was
a change of model, while in the second case [federal government] there was a
change of party—a change of personnel but not a change in the model that was
being implemented as national model. (Cárdenas, 2010)
When I asked Cárdenas about the most important legacy that his city administration had
made, or would have liked to contribute with, in matters of resolving the informal sector
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problem, he replied that, if anything, the legacy that he would have wanted to leave in the city
was a culture of legality. He armed:
Under this new model the city stopped from being plundered and the new
government—my government—sought to serve its citizens eectively... With all
the limitations and all the errors that may have been committed [by my govern-
ment], we did not seek—and here I speak for all the people who were in key
bureaucratic-administrative positions in my administration—we did not seek to
profit from the city personally.
(Cárdenas, 2010)
5.2.15 The approach of the Ministry of Finance towards informality and street vending
At the federal level, after five years of unsuccessful attempts to reduce tax evasion—by at-
tempting to eliminate fiscal privileges and amend legal loopholes—the Ministry of Finance
focused its eorts on those who were doing business in the informal economy.
On October 11, 1999—at a rather late stage in the administration of President Zedillo
(1994–2000)—the fiscal authority45 launched the National Program for the Regularization
of the Informal Economy (Programa Nacional de Regularización de la Economía Informal).
The program aimed at reducing the tax evasion of a large group of companies—some of them
clandestine and informal in nature butmany formal and fully registered—whose practices con-
sisted on providing informal vendors with merchandise.
The idea was to create an accurate register of those who participated in the informal
economy—street vendors, tianguistas, employees and proprietors of fixed and semi-fixed
stands, among others—and compel them to report from whom and how they obtained their
merchandise. The fiscal authority believed that this would enable them to detect who was
behind the provision of goods and products to the informal vendors; they would be able to
identify what companies or (sometimes large) organizations supplied informal vendors with
merchandise for which they did not pay any taxes.
45The fiscal authority refers to the power the president and congress have to deal with matters related to public
revenues (taxation), public spending, debt, and finance. InMexico, the fiscal authority is embodied in theMinistry
of Finance and the Tax Administrative Service (Servicio de Administración Tributaria, sat).
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Alma Rosa Moreno Razo, appointed head of the Tax Administrative Service (Servicio de
Administración Tributaria, sat46) on July 7, 1999, was principal designer and advocate of the
Program of Regularization. She explained that the program was not targeted at those who
were the ‘visible faces’ of the informal economy—almost 16 million people (Acosta Córdova,
1999),47 most of them informal vendors—since their incomes were nearly always so low that
theywere legally exempt from taxation. Moreover, any tax collected from themore successful
informal vendors—those who soldmore on the streets—would be negligible, according to the
tax authorities (Moreno Razo, 2012).
Thus, the programwas aimed at those companies that distributed massive amounts of mer-
chandise without paying a single peso in taxes at any point in the production-consumption
chain, companieswith inexplicable phenomenal profits, companies that evadedvat (Impuesto
al Valor Agregado, iva), companies that were not subject to taxation as they dealt with illegal
imports or stolen merchandise, and companies that evaded income tax (Impuesto Sobre la
Renta, isr) because they were ‘shell companies’ (empresas fantasma). In short, the program
was aimed at all those companies that used informality in one way or another to increase their
earnings or reduce their costs (Moreno Razo, 2012).
In an interview with me, Alma Rosa Moreno Razo—who had also worked as coordinator
of revenue policies at the Ministry of Finance—argued that the task they were undertaking
was not new and its planning had been systematic, to the point of using intelligence tactics to
gather information: “We had worked on this for many years. We had even infiltrated people
in this scheme of investigation, to learn the forms of operation of the informal economy”
(Moreno Razo, 2012).
One of the most surprising findings of the investigation was that many of the vendors seen
on the streets, or with fixed or semi-fixed stands on the sidewalks, were nothing but employ-
ees of large merchandise distribution chains—much of it stolen, produced underground or
smuggled into the country—or employees of large producers with a manufacturing produc-
tion scheme that used, at times, entire villages to produce and distribute a particular product
46The sat inMexico is the equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service (irs) in the usa orhmRevenue&Customs
(hmrc) in the uk.
47While Acosta Córdova (1999) says there were almost 16 million people working on the informal economy in
Mexico in 1999; the inegi’s National Survey of Employment and Ocupation (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion
y Empleo, enoe) says there were 10,021,991 people working on the informal sector in Mexico that year (inegi,
2010c).
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such as clothing. “Those are the companies that are behind the informal vendors; that is where
the big money is,” commented Moreno Razo (2012).48
Dealing with these types of clandestine informal agents is not an easy task. Moreno Razo
said that the approach to dealing with these agents was complex, expensive and, above all,
elusive (Moreno Razo, 2012). She provided an example to illustrate the situation:
When we detected, for example, that itinerant or street vendors were picking up
their merchandise from a warehouse located in a certain place, or from a trailer
coming from a particular warehouse, we immediately organized a police oper-
ation. We came to the place, we confiscated the merchandise, we detained the
warehouse’s caretaker... but the next morning we would realize that there was
another warehouse in a dierent location, which belonged to the same organi-
zation, from where vendors were picking up their merchandise. It is a dicult,
elusive task. (Moreno Razo, 2012)
This type of informal activity reached even those traditional, popular consumer goods that
nobodywould thinkwere industriallymanufactured in large quantities, such as the traditional
tamales (tamales)49 that are sold from bicycles or tricycles throughout the city or found at
many street corners:
Trucks or vans came to a predetermined location and started distributing steam-
ing, barrel-size tamale containers to people on bicycles or tricycles. When you see
these people selling tamales on the street, anyone would think: ‘Poor thing, they
have to get up really early to make the tamales and sell them outside the oce
building, in front of the school or hospital, outside the church...’ But no. These
tamales are made industrially and on a large scale. We found trucks with up to 80
tamale containers. That was what we set out to detect. The people behind these
organizations were the ones we were going after, not the ones who sold these
products on the streets. (Moreno Razo, 2012)
48The then vice-president of the CANACO—Manuel Tron—had stated that: “we have verified that about 80
to 85 percent of the people selling goods on the street are only employees—poorly paid and without any social
benefits—of larger organizations. Only very few are proprietors of their merchandise and stands” (Acosta Cór-
dova, 1999:258). Just as Moreno Razo, Manuel Tron also confirmed that there was an enormous organization
behind the informal street vendors, which was in charge of importing without paying taxes, purchasing stolen
goods, or secretly manufacturing products. Everything to achieve competitive prices. “Most [of the street ven-
dors] receive their merchandise in the morning, they are checked two or three times a day, and finally merchandise
is collected from them in the afternoon. There is a tremendous organization behind them” (Acosta Córdova,
1999:258).
49A tamal or tamale is a traditional Mexican dish made of minced meat, fruits or vegetables, mixed with
crushed maize and seasonings, wrapped in maize husks and steamed.
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The sat andMinistry of Finance decided not to tax the street vendors directly for economic
reasons. The income of those engaged in the ‘visible’ informal economy—15.7million people,
among employers, employees, and the self-employed (Acosta Córdova, 1999)—was very low.
A study conducted by the Vice-Ministry of Revenues of the Ministry of Finance showed
that 72.6 percent of those working in the informal sector earned up to two minimum wages;
18.6 percent up to three minimum wages; 5.5 percent up to four; 1.7 percent up to five; and
the remaining 1.6 percent more than five minimum wages50 (Acosta Córdova, 1999).51
The same study indicated that the average salary of informal employees—about 10.7 mil-
lion people—was equivalent to 1.86 minimumwages, and the salary of both informal employ-
ers and the self-employed—about 5 million people—was equivalent to 2.11 minimum wages.
Both figures give an average of 1.94 minimum wages for all those who are working in the
informal economy52 (Acosta Córdova, 1999).
Therefore, the amount of fiscal revenues that could be collected from this group was triv-
ial,53 as those working on the informal sector (e.g. street vendors) had low productivity and
profitability and, perhaps more importantly, the cost of incorporating this group into the tax
system would be greater than the amount the group would pay in income tax once their finan-
cial transactions were formalized; this in what concerns to income tax. In what refers to the
vat, the potential collection of vat from this groupwould also be very low because companies
earning less than mx$1 million per year (around us$105,263 in 1999) were exempt from pay-
ing this tax, and most of the individuals and small firms operating in the informal economy
were below this threshold (Acosta Córdova, 1999). Thus, it was very clear to the Ministry of
Finance and the sat that the big profits of all forms of informal commerce were somewhere
50In January 2000, the minimumwage inMexico for Zone A (the wealthiest geographical zone) wasmx$37.90
per day, equivalent to us$3.95 (us$1 = mx$9.5) (sat, 2011).
51In other words, 72.6 percent of the people working in the informal sector earned us$7.9 or less per day.
52In other words, the average salary of a person working in the informal economy in 2000 would be around
mx$73.5 per day, equivalent to us$7.66 per day.
53Tax collection can be increased significantly by enhancing enforcement; for example, by criminalizing cer-
tain tax oenses. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, if informal firms and workers in fact have low productivity
and profitability, their formalization, though desirable, does not necessarily imply automatic increases in tax col-
lection. This is the case ofMexico. As discussed in Chapter 2—and reinforcing the conclusions reached by Acosta
Córdova (1999) and Moreno Razo (2012) on this direction—there is the analysis performed by Flores et al. (2004)
where they used Mexico’s National Survey of Micro-Businesses (Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios, enamin)
data to compute potential changes in tax collection if informalworkers were taxed. They found that in fact tax col-
lection would not change and net spending would increase, as most informal salaried and self-employed workers
inMexicowould then be eligible for transfers (negative taxation) as their income is below the threshold for taxable
income. Their analysis did not consider potential increases in income after formalization, so in this sense they
took the standpoint of the ‘worst case scenario’ (Flores et al., 2004; Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir,
2009).
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else, well concealed by the large and well organized supplying companies and organizations
that so skillfully evaded both taxes and the authorities.
It was not only clandestine-informal organizations that profited from the informal economy.
Large formal companies also used informal means to improve their economic returns. “There
is always a form of evasion for the large companies through the informal commerce,” said
Moreno Razo (2012). She confirmed that they had found that a large number of goods (tires,
car oils, rims, and all sorts of auto parts) sold in large tianguis (open air markets) had been
manufactured by large formal companies whose sales sta would ask at the moment of sale:
“with or without an invoice? ” (Moreno Razo, 2012). According to Moreno Razo, some of
these companies even distributed the products in vehicles with the company’s logo, driven by
people bearing the company’s badge. “If the company did not report these sales, it was hiding
some form of evasion,” she concluded (Moreno Razo, 2012). Moreno Razo would not give
out any names of the companies on the grounds of tax secrecy, but it was clear
that companies and individuals did not have to be in the informal sector to profit from the
informal economy.54
Moreno Razo acknowledged that another front that needed to be tackled in order to re-
duce tax evasion was not informal street vending but those large formal companies that took
advantage of legal loopholes to pay less taxes by using all kinds of fiscal planning; and those
that abused special tax treatments,55 which allowed them to pay lower taxes. In general, large
formal national and international companies and business groups knew well where the flaws
in the fiscal legislation were, because they had teams of specialists who were well informed
in fiscal and financial—and even engineering—matters, and this knowledge allowed them to
manipulate the law for the company’s fiscal benefit (Moreno Razo, 2012).
54Here again, it is possible to detect another situation: it is not only tax evasion, but also some kind of semi-
formality (as discussed in Chapter 2) where formal companies supply the informal market; and that allows formal
companies to avoid paying taxes on those sales.
55A special tax treatment (tratamientos especiales) is a legal scheme—devised in the early 1990s and thought
of as a major driver of the economy—to give greater capacity of development to the private sector. One example
is the so called ‘régimen simplificado’ (simplified regime) implemented by the Salinas administration with the
goal of capitalizing the primary sector of the economy—specifically, to strengthen the weak agricultural sector in
Mexico—through the exemption of income tax. Another example is the ‘régimen de consolidación fiscal’ (tax
consolidation regime), through which, within a business group or conglomerate, the profits of some firms are
merged with the losses of others, so that those firms making money do not pay tax, and those firms not making
money repay their loss faster. Itwas also designed to stimulate domestic productive investment. Both schemeswere
pertinent in a closed economy because it was important to stimulate the national economy. However, onceMexico
became an open economy, many of these fiscal schemes needed to be changed to adjust to the new economic
realities. The problem then was how to revoke these fiscal privileges from powerful companies.
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Moreno Razo was aware that there were strong political and economic interests behind
both large formal and clandestine-informal companies. So strong that when she included
changes to the legislation of these subjects on a bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies, it
was promptly rejected. “Every time that a law initiative of this sort—proposing changes in
fiscal matters that aect large enterprises or organizations—reaches the chambers, lobbying
and political trouble erupt in such magnitude that it cuts o any attempt to change,” she
commented (Moreno Razo, 2012).
Alma Rosa Moreno Razo lasted less than a year in her post as president of the sat. She was
removed by President Zedillo in March 2000 and substituted by Raul Sanchez Kobashi, who
subsequently was substituted by Ruben Aguirre Pangburn in January 2001 under the new Fox
administration, which signified the end of the Program of Regularization. Learning of the
large organizational schemes that are behind informal activities—particularly informal street
vending—will be useful in Chapter 6, which addresses the case study of the alcc group.
5.3 The López Obrador administration in Mexico City (20002006)
5.3.1 Political framework
On Sunday July 2, 2000,Mexicans went to the polls to vote in general elections. Voters elected
at the federal level for:
• a new president of the Republic to serve a six-year term, replacing then Mexican Presi-
dent Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
• 500 members—300 by the first-past-the-post system and 200 by proportional represen-
tation—to serve for a three-year term in the Chamber of Deputies
• 128 members—3 per each of the 32 federal entities by first-past-the-post system and an
additional 32 through proportional representation from national party lists—to serve
a six-year term in the Senate.56
56In each federal entity (31 Federal States and 1 Federal District, for a total of 32 federal entities), of the three
first-past-the-post seats, two are allocated to the party or coalition with the largest share of the vote, and the re-
maining seat is given to the first runner-up party or coalition. There are also other 32 seats elected by proportional
representation. For this, each political party or coalition registers a list of 32 candidates and the seats are assigned
by proportional representation according to the number of votes obtained by each political party or coalition in
the national election.
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Several state and local elections were also held on the same day, most notably the election
in the Federal District. At stake was the position of head of government of Mexico City. This
time, it was not only the head of government and members of the Legislative Assembly of the
FederalDistrict (aldf) whowere being elected; in addition, the headships of the 16 delegations
that form Mexico City were also going to be elected by popular vote and for the first time in
Mexico City’s history.
The elections of July 2, 2000, became a turning point inMexican political history. The pres-
idential elections were won by pan’s Vicente FoxQuesada of the Alliance for Change (Alianza
por elCambio)—formedby theNationalAction Party (pan) and the EcologicalGreen Party of
Mexico (PartidoVerde Ecologista deMéxico, pvem)—which received 42.52 percent of the vote,
defeating the pri’s candidate Francisco Labastida Ochoa, who received 36.11 percent, and the
prd’s Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the Alliance for Mexico (Alianza por Mexico)—formed by
the prd, Labor Party (pt), Party of the Nationalist Society (psn), Convergence for Democ-
racy (cd), founded by ex-pri dissidents, and Social Alliance Party (pas)—which received 16.64
percent (Nohlen, 2005; ife, 2011). It was the first time in Mexican history that the pri was
defeated in a presidential election.57
In the congressional elections, the Alliance for Change—formed by the pan and the pvem—
emerged as the largest faction in the Chamber of Deputies with 224 of the 500 seats, although
the pri remained the largest faction in the Senate with 60 of the total 128 seats. Voter turnout
was 63.97 percent in the elections, one of the highest in Mexico’s history (Nohlen, 2005).
The election for head of government of Mexico City was won by prd’s Andrés Manuel
López Obrador, who led a coalition of the following six parties—prd, pt, psn, cd, pas, and
the Party of the Democratic Center (pcd). He received 38.32 percent of the vote, defeating the
pan’s candidate Santiago Creel, who received 33.42 percent, and pri’s candidate Jesus Silva
Herzog Flores, who received 22.83 percent (iedf, 2010).
As mentioned earlier, it was the first time thatMexico City residents voted to elect the head
of their delegations (jefes delegacionales).58 The political alliances formed for this election
were similar to those formed for the presidential election, with the exception of the common
candidacy formed out of six parties and led by the prd—prd, pt, psn, cd, pas and pcd. This al-
liance participated in 13 delegations while in the remaining three delegations—Benito Juarez,
57Since its foundation in 1929—as the National Revolutionary Party (pnr)—and until 1994, all the presidents
of Mexico had been candidates of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (pri). But now, after 71 years of pri rule,
the presidency was in the hands of an opposition party—the National Action Party (pan).
58In 2000, for the first time the delegates or delegation directors (delegados) were elected by popular vote and
their ocial title was changed to head of delegation (jefe delegacional).
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Álvaro Obregón and Tláhuac—it was joined by the Social Democracy Party (dsppn), making
it a common candidacy of seven parties.
The coalition Alliance for Change won six delegations, while the coalition of parties led by
the prd won ten delegations (Figure 5.2), among them, the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, the one
which includes the Historical Center and where the street vending problem was at fever pitch
(iedf, 2010).
The 66 seats—counting the 40 first-past-the-post seats and the 26 won through propor-
tional representation59—at the Legislature ii of the Legislative Assembly of the Federal Dis-
trict (aldf) were distributed as follows: 17 seats for the pan, eight seats for the pvem, 16 seats
for the pri, 19 seats for the prd, one for the pt, two for cd and three for dsppn. In other words,
the Alliance for Change had 25 seats, the pri had 16 seats, and the coalition led by the prd
had 25 seats, so there was a high possibility of reaching a stalemate in which the pri would
play the role of the needle of the scale (el fiel de la balanza) (iedf, 2010).
It is important to be aware of the highly complex political map that resulted from the 2000
elections, to understand the events that were to unfold in the subsequent administration at
city and federal level, and how these aected the development of informal street vending.
59The aldf is formed out of 66 seats, 40 first-past-the-post seats (corresponding to 40 uninominal districts that
make up the Federal District) and 26 seats by proportional representation.
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Figure 5.2.: Map of 2000 election results at delegational level (Mexico City).
Source: Author, with data from the iedf (2010).
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5.3.2 Politics at work: the Mexico City of Andrés Manuel López Obrador
Although, after winning the election, he still had five months before taking oce as head of
government of the Federal District, López Obrador had a full agenda. Politically, he wanted
to carry out three main tasks. First, supported by the legislators of his party, he wanted to pro-
mote changes in the Law onCitizen Participation to fulfill one of his main campaign promises:
empowering the neighborhood committees (comités vecinales), giving them authority and
power of decision and action to co-govern along with the delegations. “I want to make a real-
ity the idea of ‘government from below’ and with the participation of all” (Monge, 2000:605).
Second, he also planned to amend the Statute of Government in order to decentralize admin-
istration and expand the powers of the heads of delegations. This would include handing over
the command of the Preventive Police to the delegations. Finally, he wanted to complete the
political reform of Mexico City, left unfinished by past city governments, which consisted of
converting the local legislature in local congress, establishing the figure of the ‘town councils’
(cabildos) and equalizing the powers of Mexico City’s head of government with those of the
state governors. “We areworking on a project of reforms... once the initiative is completed, we
will start negotiations with the political parties and the federal government,” López Obrador
said (Monge, 2000:605).
Administratively, López Obrador wanted to undertake actions that would generate saving.
In principle, and without touching line-level workers (trabajadores de base) and temporary
workers, he wanted to cut payrolls and reduce the governmental structure that Cárdenas and
Robles had increased. “We could not govern well if we do not adjust the administrative ap-
paratus, if we do not sacrifice certain benefits that public ocials have,” he stated (Monge,
2000:605). He considered that the administration of the city government could be divided into
five large areas: finance and administration, works and public services, development, govern-
ment, and citizen participation and organization (Monge, 2000).
Among the many issues pending in the city’s agenda—security, street vending, transport,
civil protection, education—one of the issues that worried López Obrador the most was the
lack of funds. He knew that the public finances in the citywere weak and that theweight of the
debt—mx$23,000 million at the end of 1999 (Monge, 2000)—and the reduction of the federal
contributions to the city government would reduce his room for maneuvering even more.
For this reason, he had two main priorities in this area: an austerity plan and a program of
progressive fiscal reform. This last measure did not involve introducing new taxes but fighting
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tax evasion; at that time almost 400,000 citizens did not pay taxes in Mexico City (Monge,
2000).
However, the great bet of López Obrador was based on strengthening the social policy of
the city government: “I want the humblest people to get compensation from the government.
My compromise is to slow down, to stop the impoverishment of the people. If I accomplish
this, I will be satisfied,” he said (Monge, 2000:606).
To form his government López Obrador stated that the key characteristic of his cabinet
members would be honesty:
The distinctive sign will be honesty; they will be honorable men and women with
a history [of militancy] on the left, not necessarily members of the party [prd] or
with experience in public administration. The handling of money and work in
areas where there has been corruption in the past will be undertaken by the most
honest people, the least corruptible ones. (Monge, 2000:606)60
When López Obrador was questioned about the criteria he was using for electing members
of his cabinet, which were based on moral merit rather than eciency and eectiveness—
and if honesty was enough to ensure a good government—he replied that integrity was very
important since the city operated by keeping the balance among dierent powers:
There is a block of informal powers, something similar to the informal economy,
which interacts with the legal powers. There are informal powers and, sometimes,
[they are] real mafias. To dismantle them you need people with moral integrity.
Power generates a lot of temptation. For this, you need people with principles
and convictions, incorruptible people. (Dresser, 2000:284)
López Obrador was also aware that the political inertias and bastions of informal power
against which Cárdenas had fought were still in place and functioning. He stated: “We will
observe how they work and who is behind them. I will put an end to corruption. If it is about
interests that aect the city, my hand will not tremble... I am ready to face everything, with
the help of the population” (Monge, 2000:607).
Although he had publicized these views, LópezObrador’s candidacy was supported by prd
groups and currents that were characterized by using corporatist and clientelistic practices,
60One of the key conditions to bear in mind for the Mexico City government was that appointments made by
the head of government could be revoked by the president of the Republic. It was one of the constitutional powers
the federal government had over the government of the Federal District. It was put into eectwhenMarcelo Ebrard
was dismissed by President Fox from his position as Mexico City’s secretary of public security, after the violent
events in the Tláhuac Delegation in November 2004.
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such as the Current of the Democratic Left (Corriente de Izquierda Democrática, cid61) led
by René Bejarano. However López Obrador downplayed criticism of these groups, arguing
that the internal struggles within the prd had inaccurately magnified things; he commented,
“In politics what it is desirable is one thing, what it is possible is another. [Politics] is made
by humans, not by saints. What matters is to uphold the principles, but let’s not look for
total purity because even holy water is not chemically pure” (Monge, 2000:603). These very
prd groups had already started to expand among the street vendor groups and proved to be
influential in future developments.
Therefore, López Obrador knew that the task of governing Mexico City would not be easy.
In addition to the formal and informal powers existing in the city—mostly caused by the vices
of previous pri administrations—and the newly clientelistic and corporatists practices being
developed by his own party, he was inheriting a backward city that had been poorly developed
and had many social contradictions. He was aware of this and not afraid of the challenge: “I
am confident that if we open up opportunities for citizen participation, if we make everyone
feel they are part of this project, if we stop corruption, if we put together an ecient and
austere government, we will move forward” (Monge, 2000:606).
5.3.3 A brief history of clientelism, factionalism and personalism in the PRD
To understand what happened to informal street vending during the López Obrador admin-
istration, it is important to understand how clientelism, factionalism, and even personalism
developed inside the prd.
The prd is Mexico’s largest left-wing political party. It was founded in 1989 in opposition
to the pri, which had dominated politics in Mexico since its inception in 1929. The prd has
been fundamental to the democratic transition in Mexico, and has been the cause of hope for
political and economic prosperity for millions of people. Simultaneously, however, the prd
has been hampered by clientelism, factionalism, and personalism, losing many members and
followers who became disenchanted by its practices (Hilgers, 2008, 2012).
Why have prd politicians come to be involved in clientelism, factionalism, and personalism
despite their eorts to keep away from the methods of the pri? It is important to recognize a
series of external factors—such as poverty, the long history of clientelism in Mexican politics,
61The cid evolved into the National Democratic Left (Izquierda Democrática Nacional, idn) led by René Be-
jarano, until he was forced to resign after the video scandals in 2004. In August 2011 there were more than 14
groups and currents within the prd.
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the pri’s widespread use of these methods to guarantee political stability, and the prd’s found-
ing members’ expertise in them—in answering to this question. These factors, however, do
not fully explain the extent to which the prd has been marked by these practices. In addition,
a series of internal events, among which the prd’s strategy for achieving a transition to democ-
racy stands out, have a more direct causal relationship with the consequence of clientelism,
factionalism, and personalism in the prd (Hilgers, 2008, 2012).
The prdwas created from a wide range of left-wing parties, social movements, and individ-
uals, with dierent ideological visions and beliefs. These dierent groups were able to coexist
eectively during the short electoral campaign that brought them together in 1988, but as soon
as the short-term goal of winning the 1988 elections failed, they had diculties conciliating
their strategic and ideological dierences (Sanchez, 1999; Semo, 2003). In an attempt to main-
tain the loyalty of as many adherents as possible, the founding statutes of the prd authorized
the existence of currents, tendencies, or convergences in a democratic context, with the objec-
tive that the dierent groups could preserve their individual identities (prd, 1993).62 Because
it opposed the pri and its methods, the prd refused to utilize corporatist internal processes to
organize its body of members. Permitting the existence of currents (or factions) appeared to
be the only way to neither hamper the identity of the dierent groups nor create corporatist
sectors (prd, 1993). However, thorough and systematic formal procedures for organizing the
currents and guaranteeing democratic processes were not developed (Hilgers, 2008, 2012).
Ordering these groups under a single organizational scheme could have taken several forms,
based on individual direct participation, ideological or programmatic groups, centralized or
decentralized power, and so on. However, the rise of one principal leader, Cuauhtémoc Cár-
denas, and the supremacy of his political strategy positioned the party on a path of person-
alistic factions and centralized power, despite the best intentions of the party not to adopt
these characteristics of the pri. As a result of Cárdenas’s goal to oust the pri from power,
to do so in the electoral arena, and to do it as soon as possible, the prd focused resources
on winning elections. Thus, the resources that would have been necessary for institutionaliz-
ing party rules and regulations to secure democratic procedures and internal cohesion were
not available. Consequently, leadership, alliances, and pacts were personalized, and factions
fought each other for power. When the prd began to win local and state governments, these
practices spilled over into its form of administration and evolved as clientelistic relationships
with the citizenry (Hilgers, 2008, 2012).
62This is found in the prd’s statutes, chapter 12, articles 15, 16 and 17 (prd, 1993).
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As much as the prd rejected the pri’s corporatist methods, the prd’s currents began to
resemble the pri’s camarillas,63 but with an important dierence. The pri could preserve
unity among its camarillas because its control over the state meant that all camarillas had the
chance to access power in time. The prd, on the other hand, had little access to power and not
many resources to distribute, which exacerbated the struggle for access to what power it did
have. Thus, according to some observers, instead of bringing the prd militants from dierent
backgrounds together in a common project, the party statutes granted formal permission for
internal conflicts to take place (Martínez González, 2005; Hilgers, 2008).
The rise of a second principal leader in the prd—Andrés Manuel López Obrador—further
divided the party. López Obrador was elected head of government of the Federal District in
2000, andusedhis post to further the interests of the poor. His social policieswere popular and
his personality—a modest man of the masses, but unafraid to rock the establishment—was
so dierent from that of other politicians that followers inside and outside the party began
to consider him a possible presidential candidate for 2006. Hence, by 2004, Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas was no longer the undisputed leader of the prd, as López Obrador had emerged as
an alternative. The prdwas divided between those loyal to Cárdenas and those who preferred
López Obrador (Hilgers, 2008).
Being a pragmatist, López Obrador strengthened his and the prd’s national presence
through coalitionswith various external politicians and internal operators and activists. How-
ever, this led to further deterioration in party unity and loyalty to the statutory principles of
democracy. The “franchise operation” (Meyenberg andCarrillo, 1999) implemented by López
Obrador—which proved electorally successful—allowed non-prdmembers to run for election
on the prd ticket. Pacts were made between the prd and individuals with important political
capital whose careers in other parties had been hindered. These individuals became the prd’s
electoral candidates in return for joining the party and bringing their supporters with them
(Meyenberg and Carrillo, 1999; Hilgers, 2008). The prd’s urge to win elections had overshad-
owed its principles, and those candidates with the best clientelist networks were wooed simply
because they were most likely to win the elections in a given state or locality (Hilgers, 2008).
63A camarilla or clique is a political interest group, in this case, within a political party—a partnership between
individuals or groups of individuals, united by a common interest, who promote the interests of those who are
part of the group, while at the same time frequently preventing or impeding the interests of those outside that
group.
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5.3.4 The PRD in government: what happens to the PRD currents?
Once the prd won elections at the state and local levels, it carried its factional disputes and
power-seeking behavior into oce. Now power was to be used not only to influence party
strategies and gain positions in the national congressional opposition (federal, state, and local
legislative and representative bodies) but also to determine the political and economic benefits
of forming governments (Hilgers, 2008).
In 1997, when the prd won the first democratic elections in the Federal District, its repre-
sentatives in the Legislative Assembly were evidently inexperienced. They not only failed to
secure consensus with pri and pan representatives, but they and their colleagues in the Mex-
ico City administration were often motivated by factional interests, a trend that proved too
obvious to hide. In the delegations, internal disputes occurred among administrators from dif-
ferent prd currents, who saw themselves as power-brokers (Aguila Franco and Salgado 1999;
Ward and Durden 2002; Hilgers, 2008). Moreover, clientelistic deals designed to strengthen
individual factions were reached between social organizations—among them street vending
groups—and prd politicians and activists with access to public resources.
As mentioned earlier, the Federal District is extremely dicult to govern, given the size
of its population—close to 9 million (inegi, 2010a)—and its socioeconomic diversity. For
example, demands from middle and upper-class residents for improved public security clash
with demands from the lower classes for employment and shelter. The middle and upper
classes desire clean streets free of informal vendors and pirate taxis,64 and buildings or empty
lots free of informal settlers. The lower classes cannot find employment in the formal sector
and demand the right to make a living—even if unregulated and on the streets—and access
to housing (Hilgers, 2008).
In government, the prd’s ocial response to the problems described above has been to
regulate street vending, take a tough stand against pirate taxis, and evict informal settlers.
Unocially, however, party factions are associated with street vendor, pirate taxi, and infor-
mal settler organizations, using the electoral strength of these groups to increase their own
bargaining power in negotiations for positions and policy direction inside the party. In return,
they provide preferential treatment to the members of these organizations (Hilgers, 2008).
Thus, street vendor organizations—such as the organization of María Rosete65—with links
64A pirate taxi or taxi pirata is an unlicensed taxi whose drivers are often responsible for theft and kidnapping.
65As mentioned in previous chapters, María Rosete is a street vendor leader with links to the prd. Since 1992,
Rosete has been organizing informal street vendor groups in Tepito and she is the leader of the Union ofMerchants
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to prd factions have seen their membership and influence increase in the years the prd has
been in power in Mexico City. Similarly, informal settlers from the Francisco Villa Popular
Front66 (Frente Popular Francisco Villa, fpfv) have benefited from their links with one of the
most powerful prd factions in Mexico City by gaining better access to social housing credits
than other citizens (Grajeda, 2005). Individuals unable to make such clientelistic partnerships
are evidently at a disadvantage.
This does not mean that the prd has not had successes in government. The administration
ofCuauhtémocCárdenas inMexicoCity created programs to reorganize and improve the civil
service, the police force, and the criminal justice system; to encourage citizens to denounce
corruption; to mitigate unemployment; to expand health policy and continuing education; to
promote gender equity; and to revitalize the Historical Center (Hilgers, 2008). Cárdenas man-
aged to avoid being totally dominated by the federal government and to maintain confidence
in the viability of a democraticMexico City (Ward andDurden, 2002; Baena Paz and Saavedra
Andrade, 2004). Subsequently, López Obrador extended many of the programs implemented
during the Cárdenas administration. Among other things, he subsidized nutrition for senior
citizens, school supplies for children, and health care for vulnerable sectors of the population;
he created commissions and found the funding to enhance access to subsidized housing; and
he formed partnerships with large-capital businesses to restore the city’s Historical Center
(Hilgers, 2008).
However, the processes that lay beneath these successes also prevented further advances;
they were characterized by the clientelism and factionalism already noted, as well as the ab-
sence of institutional commitment. Therefore, the devotion of López Obrador to the poor—
and his aversion to long-established elites—led him to protect and work in the interests of the
underprivileged through occasionally unorthodox or even extra-institutional methods. He
thought the committees and agencies that ensured transparency in governmental spending or
evaluated the economic status of subsidy beneficiaries were an unnecessary waste of resources
that should go directly to the poor (Trelles and Zagal, 2004; Hilgers, 2008). While this com-
mitment to the poor was praiseworthy, the consequences of López Obrador’s actions in the
long term for democratic governance processes were questionable.
‘Sons of Tepito’ (Union de Comerciantes ‘Hijos de Tepito’). Her organization has grown at a surprising pace over
the years that the prd had been governing Mexico City.
66The fpfv is a radical social organization that defends the rights of the homeless and poor. It has reportedly
led numerous land invasions in Mexico City and built several thousand homes for its members. While the fpfv
has been described as an organization aliated with the prd and was credited with contributing to the prd’s 1997
electoral victory in the Federal District, its relations with the party have not always been simple.
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According to the World Bank (2010), approximately 51.3 percent of the Mexican popula-
tion is considered poor. The poor as a segment of the population have few chances of receiv-
ing support from their insolvent governments, but as individuals they can help themselves by
forming relationships with social and political leaders. These leaders step in as power-brokers
or political patrons to provide assistance to needy individuals and represent them at various
government institutions. In return, the support of these people gives the leaders consider-
able political capital. Individuals who are successful in obtaining the resources they sought
through these relationships tend to be thankful for the negotiating role played by the leaders
who represented them. The norm of reciprocity, as explained by Gouldner (1960), translates
into political support.67
The tendency for clientelistic arrangements has not come only from prd politicians and
activists. Several of the social movements that joined the party in its formative years, and
others that currently seek or take advantages from an alliance with the prd in power, have
a long history of clientelist relations with pri politicians and ocials. Such organizations
also frequently arrange internal relationships with their membership according to clientelis-
tic rules. These are not necessarily organizations whose purpose is simply to exploit their
members but groups that have been highly eective in defending their aliates’ interests with
public ocials68 (Hellman, 1995; Cross, 1998; Haber, 2006). Their organizational experience
and expectations about the relationships between the general public and politicians aect the
prd in government nevertheless. As one founding member of the prd with a long history
in left-wing opposition politics said to scholar Tina Hilgers, “When you form a group that
brings together existing leaderships, such as regional movements that have been fighting other
movements for existence, you’re going to be bringing in their clientelistic practices” (Hilgers,
2008:137).
Thus, as the prd became electorally successful—particularly through its 1997 victory in
Mexico City—and gained access to public resources, a growing numbers of individuals and
organizations turned to prd politicians and activists as possible political patrons in clientelis-
tic arrangements. The urge of certain sectors of the general public to take part in such deals
67American sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1960) proposed the existence of a universal, generalized norm of reci-
procity. He argued that almost all societies endorse some form of the reciprocity norm, and that only a few
members were exempt from it (i.e. the very young, the sick, and the old). The norm regulates the exchanges
of goods and services between people in ongoing group or individual relationships, dictating that people should
help those who have helped them, that people should not injure those who have helped them, and that legitimate
penalties may be imposed on those who fail to reciprocate. Reciprocity thus calls for positive reactions to favorable
treatment and for negative reactions to unfavorable treatment.
68Such is the case of the informal street vendor organizations, especially the well-organized ones.
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further reinforced trends towards clientelism in the prd, as the factions eagerly used such pacts
to outdo each other as they attempted to increase their number of public followers (Hilgers,
2008). The informal street vendor organizations were not an exception.
5.3.5 The formal and informal powers in Mexico City during the PRD governments
Inside and outside the structure of the FederalDistrict government therewere formal and infor-
mal power groups operating at ease and adopting corruption asmodus operandi—plundering
the Treasury resources; extorting money; evading taxes; altering, falsifying and extracting of-
ficial documents; imposing their own rules; and not hesitating to sabotage and obstruct the
work of the authority.
To understand the magnitude of the problem, one single illustration is enough: López
Obrador had admitted—shortly before taking over as the new head of government of the Fed-
eral District on December 5, 2000—that the functioning of Mexico City depended 70 percent
on informal powers (Monge and Zamorán, 2000).
Since 1997, with the end of the pri dominance and the rise to power of the first prd govern-
ment in the FederalDistrict, CuauhtémocCárdenas had raised concerns about the government
in Mexico City. In his first report on the state in which he had taken over the administration
of Mexico City from his predecessor Óscar Espinosa Villarreal,69 Cárdenas denounced the
existence of a “vast network of corruption, which leaves no trace” (Monge and Zamorán,
2000:75).70
Thanks to the power accumulated through the years and the network of vested interests on
all sides, these groups not only withstood the onslaught of the first prd city government but,
69InMarch 2000, Óscar Espinosa Villarreal was charged by the city government of Rosario Robles for the crime
of embezzlement and misappropriation of funds for mx$420 million. The city government itself called for his im-
peachment in theChamberofDeputies, when hewas stillminister of tourismunder the administration of President
Zedillo. Espinosa subsequently resigned as minister of tourism to face trial, which was marred by irregularities.
To avoid arrest, he requested political asylum in Nicaragua, where he was detained by the Nicaraguan authori-
ties (Smith, 2000). Finally, after receiving an injunction (amparo) from the Mexican federal courts, Nicaraguan
authorities released him and Espinosa Villarreal returned to Mexico, where he continued his trial in freedom, un-
til the nation’s Supreme Court exonerated him of all charges. All legal proceedings were declared null and he is
currently free.
70After only 100 days as head of government of the Federal District, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had warned: “The
phenomenon of fraud against the government of Mexico City shows characteristics that suggest the action of
organized crime. To date, we have detected this type of behavior in emission control centers for vehicles (verifi-
centros), in license-issuing centers, in oces of the city treasury, and in urban registry oces, where one or more
of the following criminal acts have occurred: forgery, theft of ocial stationery, and disappearance of accounting
records, which suggests embezzlement on a large scale” (Monge and Zamorán, 2000:75).
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in the end, even managed to impose conditions and confront the authorities by organizing
strikes and work stoppages, and by staging outbreaks of insubordination (Monge, 2001a).
Among these groups of formal power were the Federal District Government Workers Union
(Sindicato Único de Trabajadores del Gobierno del df, sutgdf), the Metropolitan Union of
Collective Transport System (Sindicato Metropolitano del Sistema de Transporte Colectivo,
Metro) and the Auxiliary Police of the Federal District (Policía Auxiliar del Distrito Federal).
The aforesaid actions were carried out by these groups with the purpose of retaining their
bastions of power against the onslaught of the prd city governments, which threatened their
privileges and methods of operation. The fight against these groups was perhaps the hardest,
and yet unnoticed, challenge that the first prd governments had to undertake when they came
to power in Mexico City. To illustrate the situation, some examples of the way the sutgdf
functioned will be briefly discussed in Appendix A.4.
Thus, neither Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas at the beginning of his mandate, nor Rosario Robles
subsequently, were able to solve the problem entirely; at the end of the three-year administra-
tion, these power groups hadmanaged to rebuild themselves and even recover some privileges.
In the new López Obrador administration, they were very much alive (Monge, 2001a).
However, what worried the majority of the members of the López Obrador administra-
tion the most were the informal power groups—those organizations devoted to street vend-
ing, drug-tracking, operating informal public transport, and buying and selling robbed car
parts.
The new head of government of the Federal District had a clear idea of the problem and
knew that the restoration of legal powers was essential. López Obrador said: “I aspire [to the
fact] that legal power begins to gain ground. In the correlation of forces, legal power must
have more decision, more command, because as legal power advances, there will be a better
coexistence in the city” (Monge and Zamorán, 2000:80).
5.3.6 Street vending as a form of informal power in the López Obrador administration
Thus, informal street vending fell within the realm of the informal powers that existed in
Mexico City. At the beginning of the López Obrador administration, the precise number of
street vendors in the city was unknown. The city government had a census of almost 100,000
street vendors distributed in the 16 delegations, while the National Chamber of Commerce
(canaco) )—Mexico City’s chamber of commerce—estimated there were 250,000 street ven-
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dors (Monge and Zamorán, 2000). An additional reliable source, inegi’s National Employ-
ment Survey (ene), showed there were 169,275 individuals working as street vendors in the
Federal District in 2000 (Table 5.1) (inegi, 2004).
Table 5.1.: Individuals Working as Street Vendors (1998–2004). (Federal District, Metropoli-
tan Area, and Country)
Year Federal District Metropolitan Area* Country
1998 160,949 327,019 1,197,136
1999 164,151 290,381 1,155,812
2000 169,275 320,467 1,222,223
2001 163,040 335,644 1,398,781
2002 167,792 348,919 1,549,081
2003 173,964 315,136 1,713,281
2004 220,917 397,989 1,874,915
Source: inegi’s National Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ene† (inegi, 2004).
*The Metropolitan Area of Mexico City refers to the conurbation around Mexico City, which is also
known as greater Mexico City. It is constituted by the Federal District—composed of 16 delegations—
and 41 adjacent municipalities of the states of Mexico and Hidalgo. The reason why all these delega-
tions and municipalities are usually aggregated is because they all form a single conurbation
† The National Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ene) was a demographic tool de-
veloped by the inegi and implemented between 1998 and 2004. Together with the National Urban
Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, eneu) (1987–2004), they provided infor-
mation about the employment status of the Mexican population. In 2005, the National Survey of
Occupation and Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo, enoe) replaced both sur-
veys (ene and eneu) as the main labor-democraphic tool used by the inegi. The enoe did not classify
‘individuals working as street vendors’ (as it had been done in the ene), instead using ‘individuals work-
ing in the informal sector’. Because of this, it became harder to follow the ‘street vendor’ sub-category
after 2004.
By 2000, over 65 percent of informal commerce in Mexico City was located in the Cuauhté-
moc, GustavoA. Madero, Iztapalapa,MiguelHidalgo, andVenustianoCarranzaDelegations
(Figure 5.3). Most of the street vendor organizations had links or were aliated to organiza-
tions run by the pri, the prd, and the pt71 (Monge and Zamorán, 2000).
71The Labor Party or Partido del Trabajo (pt) is a nationally recognized political party in Mexico. It was
founded on December 8, 1990. Its roots lay in a network of community organizations formed by Maoist activists.
The party first participated in federal elections in 1991, but failed to win 1.5 percent of the vote (the amount neces-
sary to be recognized as a national party). In 1994, the prominent activist Rosario Ibarra became the presidential
candidate but later declined in favor of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. In the 2000 elections, the party took part in the
prd-led alliance, Alliance for Mexico (Alianza por México). As part of the Alliance, it won seven seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and one seat in the Senate (Partido del Trabajo, 2013).
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Figure 5.3.: Delegations where 65 percent of street vending was located in 2000.
Source: Author, with information from Monge and Zamorán (2000).
In 2000, according to authorities in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation,72 street vendor organiza-
tions located in that delegation were selling a piece of sidewalk to set up a stand in the His-
torical Center for between mx$5,000 and mx$10,000 (worth between us$526 and us$1,052 at
the time). In the Tepito neighborhood, a square meter was valued as worth up to mx$20,000;
in the Condesa neighborhood: mx$7,000; in the Roma, San Cosme, Alameda, Doctores, and
Zona Rosa neighborhoods: mx$5,000; in the Balderas neighborhood: mx$4,000; in Santa
72Moreover, the most important street vendor organizations had debts—for permits given to them by the
Cuauhtémoc Delegation but that they never paid—hanging over them for ten years (Monge and Zamorán, 2000).
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María la Ribera, Tlatelolco, and Obrera neighborhoods: mx$3,000; and so on (Monge and
Zamorán, 2000).
By early 2001, it was obvious again that the dierent previous governments of the Federal
District had failed to mitigate the problems of public security (delinquency and organized
crime) and informal commerce in the Historical Center of Mexico City. Throughout its 9.1
square kilometers and 668 city blocks—within which there are rich historical, cultural and
architectural sites—there existed an underground world where informal and illegal groups
operated openly and with a highly ecient organizational level (Monge, 2001b).
According to an investigation undertaken by the Federal District government, behind these
groups there were a handful of informal commerce leaders. The report obtained by Raúl
Monge—a journalist for the weekly magazine Proceso—described a number of criminal ac-
tivities performed by these groups in the Historical Center, which included drug distribution,
armed robbery, and illicit sale of firearms.73
Moreover, according to the investigation, with the proceeds of the sale of public spaces
and the collection of fees from members of their organizations, the most important street
vendor leaders in the Historical Center had increased their personal assets and engrossed their
bank accounts (Monge, 2001b).74 According to the investigation, in 2001 the city government
estimated that the street vendor leaders received at least mx$200 million per year from fees
and the sale of spaces on the streets, equal to us$20,408,163 in 2001. Despite the prohibition
of street vending in the Perimeter A of the Historical Center, the authority identified more
than 25,000 points of sale in the downtown area of the city (Monge, 2001b).
73The report states, for example, that in a second floor of a tenement building, located between the streets
of República de Bolivia and República de Argentina in the Historical Center, a so-called shoe repair business in
reality sold drugs. The parking attendants who worked on those streets oered small packets of cocaine (grapas)
to passers-by and regular customers. In another tenement building in the República de Argentina Street, a group
of muggers operated throughout the day. Anyone passing through the entrance was at risk of being taken by force
into the tenement building and robbed. Behind the Abelardo L. Rodríguez market, one of the oldest markets
in the capital, there was a shooting-range, which was used to test the weapons sold on street stalls or in formal
established businesses (Monge, 2001b).
74For example, on April 1989, Alejandra Barrios Richard—leader of the Legitimate Civic and Commer-
cial Association (alcc)—and her siblings acquired several real estate properties—two ancillary facilities and 36
apartments—with a value of 466,202,500 old pesos (the Mexican currency before 1993), equivalent to us$172,668
in 1989. She also bought a house and a plot of land in the downtown area (Monge, 2001b). In June 1987, Sil-
via Sanchez Rico—daughter of the late Guillermina Rico and leader of the Civic Union of Merchants of the Old
Merced (Asociación de Comerciantes de la AntiguaMerced, acam)—bought a house in the city center area valued
at the time at 27million old pesos, equivalent to us$20,610 in 1987 (Monge, 2001b). OnDecember 21, 1983, Benita
Chavarría, another of the most powerful street vendor leaders in the Historical Center, bought a house, as well
as some plots of land. The total value of the transaction was 218,506,000 old pesos, equivalent to us$1,560,757 in
1983 (Monge, 2001b; Monge, 2009). While it is dicult to confirm the accuracy of these figures, it is certain that
street vending was becoming a very profitable activity for the leaders of the street vendor groups. Chapter 6 will
shed more light on this.
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By becoming one of the most profitable businesses in Mexico City, informal street vending
caused several problems. One problem was that the dispute over the street sites generated
confrontations between rival street vendor organizations. Another problem was that some
street vendor groups openly opposed the reorganization (or relocation) programs to be imple-
mented by the city government.75 One more problem was that the number of street vendor
organizations multiplied throughout the city during this time. Some examples are given be-
low.
Óscar Liebre Espinosa used towork in the street vendor organization of Silvia SanchezRico,
but left the group of Sanchez Rico and joined a separate street vending group, which operated
on República de Colombia Street, in the Historical Center. Through threats and intimidation
he gained control of the group. He was always armed and accompanied by three people who
allegedly were engaged in robbing transport trucks and trailers (Monge, 2001b). Gun in hand,
Liebre Espinosa seized a building lot located in Rodríguez Puebla Street, where the residents
had planned to build houses. Without any permit, he set up an imported goods shop. His
headquarters were in República de Argentina Street, where he ran a nightclub and, according
to the city government investigation, distributed drugs (Monge, 2001b).
The case that drew themost attentionwas that of the pri local deputy, EdgarRolando López
Nájera, leader of theMetropolitanAlliance of PopularOrganizations (AlianzaMetropolitana
de Organizaciones Populares, amop). Despite having been the subject of three preliminary
criminal investigations,76 he still managed to get a seat in the aldf and chair the Supply and
Food Distribution Commission (Comisión de Abasto y Distribución de Alimentos) (Monge,
2001b).
On January 31, 2001, López Nájera chaired a meeting with representatives of various ven-
dororganizations aliatedwith the amop, in the auditoriumof the annexof the LegislativeAs-
sembly, right in the heart of downtownMexicoCity. There, all the street vendor leaders—most
of them aliated to the pri—without exception strongly criticized prd’s Dolores Padierna,
who had been elected head of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation in 2000. For example, Marco
Hernández Guerrero, from the vendor group called Los Marcos, said that in the last meeting
75The city authorities documented how Alejandra Barrios—leader of the ALCC—asked each member of her
organization for mx$1,000, equivalent to about us$100 in 2000, with the intention of promoting a writ of am-
paro (injunction) against the relocation of street vendors that the Cuauhtémoc Delegation planned to undertake
(Monge, 2001b).
76On November 17, 1983, Edgar Rolando López Najera—elected pri local deputy in 2000—was charged with
property damage. The lawsuit was filed in Criminal Court 26. On March 29, 1989, he was subjected to a second
criminal inquiry, coded 30/245/89. And in a third inquiry, on April 10, 1989, he was denounced for the crime of
violation of copyright law (Monge, 2001b).
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he and his colleagues had with Padierna, she had insulted them and threatened to put them
in jail. Alejandra Barrios—leader of the alcc, which had been aliated with the pri since its
outset—also complained; she said that Padierna had told her she was her enemy number one
(Monge, 2001b).
The fact is thatDolores Padierna knew verywell theworkings of the informal street vending
groups in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation as she had profound knowledge of the Tepito neigh-
borhood where she had done political work for the prd since 1988. For example, she knew
the route followed by the 150 truck trailers that delivered stolen or contrabandmerchandise to
the clandestine warehouses located in Tepito every day. In Díaz de León Street, truck trailers
would stop and about 20 individuals with dolly carts would move merchandise to dierent
warehouses. The whole procedure would only take ten minutes (Monge and Vivas, 2001).
Padierna had this and more information about the illegal activities taking place in the Histor-
ical Center area, which she had passed to the Federal Judicial Police, the Mexico City Police,
and even the Federal General Attorney, but to no avail as there was no police or governmental
response (Monge and Vivas, 2001).
The CuauhtémocDelegation had an urban rescue programwhich it had not been able to ex-
ecute. The program included several actions, which included the reordering of public markets;
the rehabilitation of land plots, sidewalks, and streetlamps; with private funds, the construc-
tion of a number of town squares; and the rehabilitation of several emblematic sites in the
delegation (Monge and Vivas, 2001). However, when the project was presented, the groups in
the delegation—particularly the street vending groups and organized crime groups—reacted
negatively as they felt their interests would be aected. This created a lot of strain between the
delegation and the potentially aected groups. The street vendor leaders had their own ver-
sion of the facts, and accused Padierna of having a high-handed attitude. Alejandra Barrios
recounted how she started her rivalry with Dolores Padierna. Barrios said that Padierna told
her: “If you do not work with me, in my program, I am going to put you in jail.” Barrios re-
sponded, “I want to be your friend andwant to workwith you, but do not beat upmy people...
That is when the rivalry started” (Paramo, 2004; Barrios, 2010). This reveals the animosity
and tension that existed between some street vendor organizations and the authorities who
were responsible for solving the problems street vending was generating.
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5.3.7 The Historical Center Rescue Program and its impact on street vending
In reality, at the bottom of the revolt of the street vendor organizations lay the ambitious urban
rescue program of the Historical Center, to be implemented by the López Obrador adminis-
tration. The relocation of street vendors would certainly prove detrimental for them, but not
for the Federal District government. With the Historical Center Rescue Program (Programa
de Rescate del Centro Histórico), the city government aimed to give a new image to this im-
portant area of the capital (Monge, 2001b).77 To revitalize the economic activity of the city
center, it was crucial to make this program a success; but of course, it would be detrimen-
tal to all those street vendor groups operating in the streets and spaces that were part of the
program.
On February 9, 2001, Head of Government Andrés Manuel López Obrador ocially an-
nounced the Historical Center Rescue Program, which included the recovery of streets and
public squares; refurbishment of nursery, primary and secondary schools; restoration of his-
toric buildings; and construction of housing units, among other works (Monge, 2001b).
In addition, historic buildings were given in bailment (comodato) to research centers and
private enterprises in return for bearing the cost of renovating the premises. The Histor-
ical Center Rescue Program also proposed to close certain streets to vehicular trac; im-
prove street lighting, street furniture and signposting; set up outdoor cafés; and promote high-
quality artistic and cultural shows in public squares and gardens (Monge, 2001b). With such
an ambitious plan, it was imperative to find a solution to the informal street vending problem.
5.3.8 The situation worsens: conict between city government and street vendor groups
Thus, by the second year of the López Obrador administration it was evident that leaders and
caciques that controlled informal street vending in Mexico City were, once again, prevailing
and imposing their practices, as they had done under successive governments in the past. The
degree of conflict street vending was generating was more apparent day by day.
For example, on February 4, 2002, on Palma Street and 16 de Septiembre Street, police
patrols had a confrontation with a street vendor group led by David García Castañeda, better
77The Historical Center (Centro Histórico) of Mexico City has the largest proportion of economic activity
of the Federal District. It also houses, among other things, 196 civil monuments, 67 religious monuments, 53
museums, 78 public squares and gardens, 19 cloisters, 28 fountains and 12 sites with murals (Monge, 2001b).
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known as ‘El Cari’, just one of the more than 148 street vendor leaders who had taken over
some of the main streets of the Historical Center of Mexico City (Monge, 2002). Previously,
authorities in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation and street vendor leaders had agreed that after
the Christmas season of 2001 they would vacate sidewalks, bus stops, Metro stations, and
public squares, but the vendor leaders violated the agreement by remaining in these places.
Consequently the head of the delegation, Dolores Padierna, sought support from the sectoral
police to evict them by force (Monge, 2002). Street vendors—who were superior in numbers
and perhaps in weaponry—reacted strongly to the police onslaught and not only withstood
the bueting but made the police forces retreat and then chased them once they realized their
superiority. During that incident, the car of a minister of the Supreme Court of Justice of
the Nation was damaged. The complaint came to the oce of the head of government of
the Federal District—Andrés Manuel López Obrador—who referred the matter to Francisco
Garduño Yañez, at the time under-secretary of government of Mexico City78 (Monge, 2002).
In the following meeting of the interagency group of the Federal District government, Gar-
duñoYañez instructed Padierna to contain street vending activities, especially in the areas near
and around the National Palace, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Metropolitan Cathedral,
the Merchants’ Portal, and Pino Suárez Avenue, as well as the financial district, all within the
limits of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation (Monge, 2002).
However, the street vendors, incitedby their leaders, categorically refused to leave the streets.
By the end of 2002, they had managed to retain the most important streets of the Historical
Center, and by early 2003 it was obvious that the influence of some street vendor leaders and
organizations was not confined to the Historical Center. Street vendors had begun to set up in
corners, at bus stops andMetro stations, in the atriums of churches, on sidewalks surrounding
hospitals, in urban corridors, on public squares, and at any site in the capital that had a high
pedestrian flow.
5.3.9 The distribution and growth of street vendor organizations in the Historical Center
According to information gathered by the Federal District government, the Legitimate Civic
and Commercial Association (alcc) run by Alejandra Barrios controlled Motolinia Street,
Palma Street, and part of 16 de Septiembre Street, where it had just over 700 street vendors. In
78During the López Obrador administration in Mexico City, Francisco Garduño Yañez served as under-
secretary of government and, eventually, as secretary of transport and roads administration. In the previous city
administration, he was general director of government.
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the lastmonths of 2002, the alcc appropriated spaces in Eje Central Street, Pino Suárez Street,
Motolinia Street, and República de Argentina Street, and outside the Historical Center, the
alcc had territorial fiefdoms at the Insurgentes roundabout and theChilpancingo-Insurgentes
crossroads (Monge, 2002).
According to the same source, during those years Alejandra Barrios gained relevance as her
association was protected and supported by Enrique Jackson—former pri leader in Mexico
City and, in 2002, coordinator of the pri parliamentary group in the Senate—and for bribing
ocials in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation. According to the investigation carried out by the city
government, she had the protection of hundreds of white guards,79 whom she paid twice the
minimum wage for their services (Monge, 2002).
Considered by city authorities as one of themost violent street vendor leaders, DavidGarcía
Castañeda ‘El Cari’ maintained dominance in Donceles Street, 16 de Septiembre Street, and
sections of Tacuba Street and Palma Street, where he had about 500 street vendors (Monge,
2002).
Edgar Rolando López Nájera—head of the Metropolitan Alliance of Popular Organiza-
tions (amop) and local pri deputy in the Legislative Assembly—exercised his influence over
various areas of the Historical Center. He admitted street vendors who worked on their own
or had left other vendor organizations to amop (Monge, 2002).
Marisela Sanchez, another leader championed by the pri, exercised her powers in the west-
ern part of the city center (Monge, 2002).
The eastern part of the city center was dominated by prd groups. According to some
sources, the strongest informal street vending group in this area was controlled by Roberto
López, who until mid-2002 served as director of public roads in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation;
he made sure to maintain his links with the prd. The Mexico City government estimated
that Roberto López represented the interests of no fewer than 6,000 street vendors located
on Correo Mayor Street, Corregidora Street, and Roldan Street, where Guillermina Rico—
deceased in 1996—and her daughter Silvia Sanchez Rico had their strongholds (Figure 5.4)
(Monge, 2002).80
79The white guards are paramilitary or mercenary groups—from the French expression Mercenaires de la
Garde Blanche—who give protection in return for money.
80In November 2002, two months after being dismissed from his post (as director of public roads) in the
Cuauhtémoc Delegation, Roberto López met with Dolores Padierna in the delegation oces. He told her that he
had an important base of street vendors and he wanted to be a local deputy at the aldf. Otherwise, he threatened,
he would cause her serious problems. Padierna threw him out of her oce (Monge, 2002).
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This reflects another phenomenon that started to occur more frequently during the López
Obrador administration. As street vendor groups multiplied, these new groups became polit-
ical, but looked for the support of the prd rather than the pri. Where there were once strong
and traditionally pri-aliated street vendororganizations—such asGuillerminaRico’s—now
there were new street vendor groups with links to the prd. In this, some of the prd activists,
prd factions, and prd grass-root groups played an important role.
Figure 5.4.: Map of distribution of street vendors in Mexico City (Historical Center area,
2002).
Source: Author, with data from Monge (2002).
The 20 de Noviembre Avenue was controlled by Benita Chavarría, one of the historic street
vendor leaders who in the first years of the López Obrador administration left the pri and
took refuge in the prd (Monge, 2002).
This is yet another street vending phenomenon that occurred during the López Obrador
administration. Seeing that the prd had won the head of government elections for a second
consecutive term in Mexico City, some of the traditional pri-aliated street vendor organiza-
tions (e.g. the organization of Benita Chavarría) started to change parties. This confirms that
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the real interests of the street vending organizations were economical and not political; seeing
that their organizations were in danger for belonging to a party that was no longer in power,
street vendor leaders thought it appropriate to align with the new party in power in order to
ensure the survival of their organization and be favored by it. Gradually, the political clientele
began to switch political parties and allegiances. Only the largest and strongest organizations
such as the alcc resisted, but they used the opportunity to demand more support from the
pri.
5.3.10 Marcelo Ebrard enters the stage: the negotiations with street vending groups
On February 17, 2002, López Obrador surprised his colleagues with the appointment of
Marcelo Ebrard as secretary of public security and chief of the police of the capital81 in place
of LeonelGodoy, who had accepted the invitation fromLazaroCárdenas Batel—Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas’ son who had just been elected governor of the state of Michoacán—to take charge
of the Secretariat of Government in Michoacán (Monge, 2002).
In 2000, Marcelo Ebrard had been a candidate for the headship of government of Mexico
City for the Party of the Democratic Center (pcd),82 but in March of that year declined in
favor of López Obrador with whom, Ebrard argued, had many coincidences (Ebrard, 2010).
From 2000 to 2002, Ebrard was on the board of advisors of López Obrador. Ebrard was a
prd outsider so his appointment as secretary of public security caused surprise among prd
members andocials in the LópezObradoradministration. However, his previous experience
inMexicoCitywouldprove to be useful forLópezObrador, particularly in the subject of street
vending.83
81The Secretariat of Public Security of the Federal District is the law enforcement agency of the capital. It
manages a combined police force of over 100,000 ocers in Mexico City. The secretariat has under its command
the Federal District Police which is divided in two main branches; the first branch is the Preventive Police (the
uniformed policed of the capital) which has four subdivisions: the Proximity Police (Policía de Proximidad), the
Metropolitan Police (PolicíaMetropolitana), Special Forces (Jefatura del EstadoMayor), and Public Transit Police
(Policía de Tránsito). The second branch is the Complimentary Police, which operates under the supervision of
the secretariat, but is not considered a part of the Preventive Police; it is formed by the Auxiliary Police (Policía
Auxiliar) and the Bank and Industry Police (Policía Bancaria e Industrial).
82The Party of the Democratic Center (Partido del Centro Democrático, pcd) was a party created in 1999 by
ManuelCamacho Solís as a platform to contend in the presidential elections of 2000. It came last in the presidential
elections of 2000 and did not reach the required minimum 2 percent of the total vote, reason why it lost its register
as a national political party.
83Marcelo Ebrard had been Secretary of Government during the city administration ofManuel Camacho Solís
(1988–1993) and had directly participated in the elaboration of street vending policies as well as negotiations with
the vendor leaders.
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In his first meeting with the institutional group in charge of resolving the problem of street
vending, Marcelo Ebrard told Dolores Padierna—head of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation—that
the Insurgentes roundabout area was a real “rubbish dump” (Monge, 2002:5) as a result of
the street vending activity taking place there. Two days later, the two ocials visited the Zona
Rosa84 and Ebrard asked Padierna to impose some order. Padierna replied: “I will do it, as
long as you support me, because it is one of the strongholds of Alejandra Barrios” (Monge,
2002:5).
Padierna reminded Ebrard that Alejandra Barrios—the new queen of street vending inMex-
ico City, with whom Padierna had a long-standing rivalry—had no fewer than 700 white
guards at her service distributed around the city, while the Cuauhtémoc Delegation had only
20 code enforcement inspectors for street vending. Marcelo Ebrard said he would try to con-
vince Alejandra Barrios to relocate the street vendors who had taken over the entrances and
exits of the Insurgentes roundabout. Nothing happened (Monge, 2002).
In September 2002, the CuauhtémocDelegation launched a new police operation to remove
street vendors fromDonceles Street, whichwas one of the bastions ofDavidGarcía Castañeda,
better known as ‘El Cari’. However, things got out of control. The police forces gave García
Castañeda a thrashing and left him almost dead. After that incident, Marcelo Ebrard forbade
the police to intervene in street vendor evictions andordered them to concentrate on patrolling
(Monge, 2002).
For the time being, the streets of the Historical Center remained under the control of the
street vendor organizations, despite the 1993 decree (bando) which prohibited such activity in
the area (ardf, 1993; Monge, 2002).
5.3.11 Haggling, shady deals, and political chicanery
Alerted by unesco ocials of the risk of the Historical Center losing its status as a World
Cultural Heritage Site because of the deterioration of the urban space there—including crim-
inality, prostitution, mendicancy, drug addiction, road congestion, pollution, low levels of
education and income, housing shortages, deterioration of the cultural and historical rich-
ness of the city, in addition to social conflicts—López Obrador questioned Padierna on the
84The Zona Rosa or Pink Zone is a neighborhood in Mexico City which is known for its shopping, nightlife,
gay community, and recently established Korean community. The neighborhood is ocially part of the Colonia
Juarez, belonging to the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, located just west of the Historical Center of Mexico City. The
Zona Rosa is where the Insurgentes roundabout is located.
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cause of the anarchy.85 Padierna cited the aggravation of street vending as one of the main
causes of these problems. “This is an abuse, the situation has got out of hand,” reproached the
head of government, and instructed Padierna to impose order on the streets (Monge, 2002:5).
Padierna replied that this task would be virtually impossible, as Marcelo Ebrard had with-
drawn his support, arguing that the removal of street vendors was the responsibility of the
Cuauhtémoc Delegation and not the Preventive Police (Monge, 2002).
Worried of getting into a confrontationwith the pri ofMexicoCity—whichwas supporting
those street vendor organizations aliated with it—that could ruin his plans to regenerate
the Historical Center, and under pressure from a handful of investors headed by businessman
Carlos Slim—who had bought more than 50 properties in the area—López Obrador took a
categorical decision: he displaced Dolores Padierna from the responsibility of dealing with
the street vending problem and entrusted Marcelo Ebrard with the task of bringing order to
the city center, in particular in those streets that were part of the comprehensive rehabilitation
program, located to the west of the Plaza de la Constitution (Monge, 2002).
The secretary of public security and chief of the police of the capital—Marcelo Ebrard—
tried to get out of the task, and argued that the problem of security in the city demanded
all his time and attention. However, López Obrador reminded him that he knew personally
most of the street vendor leaders—Ebrard had dealt with them during his time as secretary
of government underManuel Camacho Solís, when the latter wasMexico City’s mayor—and
that this would help him find a solution (Monge, 2002).
Reluctantly, Ebrard accepted the undertaking, though hemade clear to LópezObrador that
he did not want to enter into a confrontation with the street vendor leaders. López Obrador
agreed and ordered Padierna to hand in to Ebrard information and records of the street vendor
leaders with whom Ebrard would have to negotiate (Monge, 2002).
Padierna complied with López Obrador’s orders and in addition sent Gustavo Cabrera to
help Ebrard with the assignment. Gustavo Cabrera was an ocial from the Cuauhtémoc
Delegation who had dealt with the street vending problem in the delegation before—andmost
likely was close to Padierna. In addition to providing expertise on the subject, he could give
Padierna confidential information about Ebrard’s plans and actions.
Thus, with the support of Gustavo Cabrera from the outset, Marcelo Ebrard drew up a first
project which consisted of the creation of an agency in charge of street vending, with its own
85In 1987, Mexico City’s Historical Center had been declared by unesco as World Cultural Heritage Site for
its architectural, historical, and cultural richness (Monge, 2002).
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resources and structure—similar to that created during the Camacho administration. The
idea was not well received by López Obrador, who argued that the problem of street vending
would not be resolved with decrees or with more bureaucracy (Monge, 2002).
With the works about to start, Ebrard removed Cabrera from the team and instructed his
advisor, Federico EscobedoMiramontes—who hadworked at theMiguelHidalgoDelegation
with pan’s head of delegation Arne Aus den Ruthen Haag—to enter into negotiations with
street vendor leaders, especially those aliated to the priwho occupied several blocks west of
the National Palace building (Monge, 2002).
At this point, it is worth to make a brief digression to note that there had been previous sep-
arate attempts, particularly by the local deputies and delegations, to regulate and/or remove
the street vendorswhowere causing problems. In April 2002, a group of pan local deputies pre-
sented a bill to the aldf that would regulate commerce and the dierent uses of the properties
of common use in the Federal District, which basically was an attempt to regulate vending in
the public thoroughfare. The bill was not passed by the Legislative Assembly (Toscano, 2012).
Previously, in 2001, a year after taking oce as head of the Miguel Hidalgo Delegation, Arne
Aus den Ruthen Haag—a pan member who had won that delegation in 2000—had expressed
the need to clean the delegation of street vendors, and he proceeded with a plan to relocate
them to commercial plazas. The following year (2002), unable to reach an agreement with the
street vendors, he attempted to remove them from the streets forcibly with the help of 50 high-
security police ocers. The operation resulted in a violent confrontation in which the police
were on the losing side. Aus den Ruthen accused Marcelo Ebrard of not providing enough re-
sources to ensure the security of the operation (Servin Vega, 2002). Ebrard declared in a press
conference that the operation had not been coordinated by the Secretariat of Public Security
and that he thought it was a bad idea to confront street vendors in such amanner (Servin Vega,
2002). This event again demonstrates the lack of coordination and communication between
delegations and the central city government. This lack of coordination might have to do with
the dierent approaches each authority had in dealing with the street vending problem; but
also it might have to do with the fact that each authority belonged to a dierent party—Aus
den Ruther belonged to the pan, while Ebrard worked for the prd.86 However, belonging to
the same party was not a guarantee for success, as Ebrard and Padierna were about to realize.
Dolores Padierna became very upset when she was informed that Escobedo Miramontes,
and notGustavoCabrera, would be responsible for conducting the negotiationswith the street
vendor organizations during the first phase of the regeneration program, and withdrew her
86Marcelo Ebrard became a member of the prd on September 12, 2004 (Lloyd, 2009; Maciel, 2010).
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support for the Secretariat of Public Security, although EscobedoMiramontes asked her not to
do so. Ebrard and EscobedoMiramontes continued their negotiations and succeeded in liber-
ating four streets on the west side of the Historical Center that were part of the rehabilitation
program, shortly before the deadline imposed by the head of government (Monge, 2002).
The terms of the agreement were not released, but according to journalist Raul Monge
(2002), the pri-aliated street vendor leaders and Marcelo Ebrard negotiated the provision
of 1,500 stalls in commercial plazas, as well as a certain number of houses, some money, food
provisions (despensas), benefit vouchers for the elderly, permission to sell on primary roads of
the city, and the abolition of a registry of street vendors. When Padierna asked Ebrard why he
had yielded to the demands of the street vendor leaders, he said he had no other choice, and
that in doing so he was avoiding an unnecessary confrontation (Monge, 2002).
By taking this stance, Ebrard sacrificed—for the rest of the LópezObrador administration—
any possibility of eectively reducing street vending in return for the avoidance of conflict, in
order to carry out the regeneration program in the Historical Center. He gave away all control
to informal street vendor leaders and placed the city government in a veryweak position for fu-
ture negotiations. Ebrard justified his decision by stating that he wanted to avoid unnecessary
confrontation, but it could also be the case that he wanted to build a political or clientelistic
base to support his candidacy to become the next head of government of the Federal District.
The fact that he decided to cancel the plan of having a registry for informal street vendors
would make it virtually impossible to control them or to implement any policies to lessen the
street vending problem. As discussed in the Cárdenas administration section, Escobar Toledo
had stressed the importance of creating reliable statistics and thus the possibility of diagnos-
ing what public policies must be implemented (Scherer Ibarra, 1997a). In addition, it also
would give leeway to vendor leaders to keep using membership numbers as they pleased and
for their own benefit, which was detrimental to both the city government and their own street
vendor members.87
The head of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation—Dolores Padierna—told Ebrard that he had
made a mistake, and that it would have been better to follow other courses of action, such
as reviving the preliminary criminal investigations that existed against most of the street ven-
dor leaders, which she said would set a precedent. Marcelo Ebrard retorted: “I did not sign
anything, everything was done verbally” (Monge, 2002:6).
87Without reliable data, no policies could be eectively implemented and that aected the performance of the
city government in solving the problem and individual vendor members since they could not get the benefits of
government policy.
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Padierna was not satisfied with this response. In November 2002, she complained to López
Obrador, whom she reminded that Ebrard’s agreement with the street vendor leaders contra-
dicted his promise of “not entering into political chicanery or shady negotiations with the
political mafia, not negotiating democratic principles and values, and not implementing a
traditional governmental policy” (Monge, 2002:6). Padierna also told him that it was unac-
ceptable that López Obrador’s government itself had shady dealings with “the street vending
mafia”, whose leaders, feeling protected, expanded their domains into other streets in the
Historical Center and the rest of the city (Monge, 2002:7).
Negotiating without having a general agreement among the dierent levels of government
authority—delegational and city governments—inMexicoCity about how to proceedorwhat
policies to follow on street vending caused several problems. The street vendor organizations
observed the lack of unity among the dierent authorities and used it to their advantage.
For example, on December 9, 2002, street vendors in the city center staged a sit-in at the
esplanade of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, demanding permits to allow them to sell on the
thoroughfare during the Christmas season. As there was no response from the delegation, the
next day a group of street vendor leaders, among them Alejandra Barrios and David García
Castañeda ‘El Cari’, openly challenged its head, Dolores Padierna: they warned her that with
or without selling permits they would go out onto the streets and sell their products. And they
did (Monge, 2002).
In an interview with Proceso magazine, Padierna explained that, in the Christmas season
of 2002, selling permits were not given because, the previous year, the vendor leaders misused
them and violated the agreements that had beenmade. She recalled, for example, thatmost of
the street vendor leaders photocopied the certificates permitting them to sell on the street and
sold them for a price ranging between mx$7,000 and mx$10,000 each, equivalent to us$765
and us$1,092 in 2001 (Monge, 2002).88
Again, this shows lack of communication between city and delegational authorities. While
street vendor leaders reached an agreement with Marcelo Ebrard, they simultaneously put
pressure on Dolores Padierna to obtain the selling permits as delegations were the authorities
in charge of issuing them. It was impossible to find a solution unless the delegation and city
authorities were working under the same policy or plan.
Dolores Padierna claimed that if the government really wanted to control street vending, it
had to implement a set of actions:
88The exchange rate in December 2001 was us$1 = mx$9.15 pesos.
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• to freeze the street vendor organizations’ member lists
• to reach agreements directly with street vendors, not with their leaders
• to open commercial plazas and commercial corridors to relocate street vendors
• to disarm the white guards used by some vendor leaders for the purposes of protection,
intimidation and fighting police forces
• to organize police raids in the warehouses where merchandise and products were kept
• to reactivate the pending criminal proceedings against those street vendors leaders who
refused to leave the areas included in the reorganization program
• to set specific hours of sale for street vendors.
Padierna stated:
As long as there is no sanction against those who misuse the public thoroughfare
or no action is taken against those who sell stolen goods, the phenomenon of
street vending will grow without control, because the force of the government is
not big enough to stop this organized and armed army in which street vendors
have become.
(Monge, 2002:7)
This is a rather serious statement as it showed that street vending could not be controlled
and the problem had certainly surpassed the capacity of the delegational authority—and per-
haps even the capacity of the city government. It was necessary to implement a common pol-
icy at delegation and city level to control them, otherwise it would be impossible ever to do
so. The dierences between Padierna and Ebrard obviously benefited the street vendor lead-
ers, who threatened Padierna and negotiated with Ebrard, boosting their bargaining power.
While Padierna might have had a legitimate intention to eradicate and solve the street vending
problem, it seemed that Ebrard was more interested in avoiding the problem altogether and
perhaps wanted to use the support of the informal vendor groups to improve his chance of
becoming head of government of Mexico City in 2006.89
89It is interesting to note that, in an interview with me, the words of praise or criticism that Alejandra Bar-
rios had for Ebrard and Padierna, respectively, fit the story perfectly. She was supported by Ebrard—whom she
described as “good man” and “friend”, but not by Padierna—whom she called a “filthy rat”, a “liar”, and a “re-
volting and evil person” (Barrios, 2010).
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By the end of 2002 and early 2003, the Cuauhtémoc Delegation estimated that in the His-
torical Center co-existed a little over 30,000 street vendors, grouped into 148 organizations
(Monge, 2002). The majority were already political clientele of the pri or the prd.
5.3.12 The conict between Alejandra Barrios and María Rosete
On April 2, 2003, Dolores Padierna left the Cuauhtémoc Delegation to run for a seat in the
Chamber of Deputies. She was elected on July 6 to a first-past-the-post seat in the lix Legisla-
ture (2003–2006), which started on September 1, 2003. Her position as head of the Cuauhté-
moc Delegation was taken by José Alfonso Suárez del Real for the remaining delegational
term, to end in September 30, 2003.90
On August 19, 2003, there was a big confrontation over selling spaces on the street between
two of the most powerful informal street vendor organizations in the Historical Center. That
morning, authorities from the CuauhtémocDelegation received reports of unusual activity on
República de Bolivia Street, betweenRepública de Argentina Street andElCarmen Street. The
head of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation, Suárez del Real, sent watch-keeping personnel to find
out what was happening. They found lines of wooden crates blocking the street and posters
on the walls with the caption ‘Bolivia street for the neighbors’ (Monge, 2003:107). It is worth
noticing that Alejandra Barrios, leader of the pri-aliated Legitimate Civic and Commercial
Association (alcc), had her oces on República de Bolivia Street No. 5 and thus was part
of the neighborhood. The alcc had become the largest street vendor organization in the city
center. The first report back to the delegation indicated that the people who had placed the
wooden crates on the street were street vendors belonging to the association of María Rosete
Sanchez (Monge, 2003).
María Rosete Sanchez was born in Tenochtitlan Street, right at the heart of the Tepito
neighborhood. Since 1992, Rosete has been organizing informal street vendorgroups inTepito
and she is the leader of the Union of Merchants ‘Sons of Tepito’91 (Union de Comerciantes
‘Hijos de Tepito’). María Rosete is aliated to the prd and her organization had grown at a
90prd’s Virginia Jaramillo won the elections in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation in 2003 and replaced José Alfonso
Suárez del Real on October 1, 2003. Previously, Jaramillo was director of social development during the admin-
istration of Dolores Padierna in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation. At the same time, María Rosete had served as
territorial deputy delegate (Sub-delegada Territorial) in Tepito (Paramo, 2003).
91I was able to find at least two more organizations that recognize María Rosete as their leader: United Orga-
nizations of the Tepito Neighborhood (Organizaciones Unidas del Barrio de Tepito) and the Metropolitan Front
of Popular Organizations (Frente Metropolitano de Organizaciones Populares, fmop). The author was not able
to find if these are organizations dierent from the one mentioned above, or if they are related to them.
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surprising pace over the years that the prd had been governing Mexico City. A source claims
it expanded from 100 members to 600 members in only five years—from 2000 to 2005 (Cross,
2005)—but other sources say she had more than 700 members (Jiménez, 2006; Mexico Sí,
2006). One more source also claims that her organization also included 450 itinerant vendors
or toreros (Reforma, 2003).92 There are sources which link María Rosete with certain prd
factions, more specifically, with the National Democratic Left group (Izquierda Democratic
Nacional, idn), led and created by René Bejarano, who happens to be Dolores Padierna’s
husband (Sanchez, 2005). Sources say that the relationship between Rosete’s organization and
the prd’s National Democratic Left may explain the rapid increase in members of Rosete’s
organization, as well as the increasing power the organization has acquired in Mexico City
(Sanchez, 2005).
Between 7:30am and 8:00am on August 19, 2003, ocials in the CuauhtémocDelegation re-
ceived phone calls from residents of República de Boliva Street asking the delegational author-
ities to prevent informal street vendors from setting up on the street. The same day, residents
had sent a letter to López Obrador in which they asked him to prevent street vendors from
setting up stalls in the street, arguing that street vending would block entrances of homes,
schools and businesses; foster crime; and could lead to conflicts with residents, neighbors,
teachers, and established business owners. The letter added: “It should be noted that the
aforementioned [República de Bolivia] street does not belong to any leader and has no his-
tory of having been occupied by this type of [informal] trade” (Monge, 2003:107).
Responding to this request, Suárez del Real ordered 40 public roads ocials to keep the area
free of street vendors. Just after 10am, María Rosete and her followers arrived, and ocials
told her that they would not be allowed to settle in the street. But Rosete—who before joining
the ranks of the prd was an active member of the pri (Monge, 2003)—remained there with
her group. Around 11am, and aware of the possible invasion of street vendors onto República
de Bolivia Street, Rocío González—then general director of delegational programs for the
Mexico City government—ordered Christian Javier López Rubio, head of the Departmental
Unit for Monitoring of the Reorganization of Commerce on Public Roads, to go to the zone
of conflict accompanied by some security personnel. Once there, López Rubio noted that in
the corner of República de Argentina Street and República de Bolivia Street were at least 300
people with sticks, metallic tubes, and stones, belonging to Alejandra Barrios’s group, while
at the other end of the street, near República de Bolivia Street No. 41, was another group
92It is worth mentioning that during the 1990s María Rosete received help from pri ocials such as Manuel
Aguilera. In 2001, Rosete was arrested by the police in a shooting in which a 16-year-old was killed (Reforma,
2013).
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of around 150 people with the same equipment, belonging to María Rosete’s group (Monge,
2003).
In the middle of the two antagonistic groups were 50 public roads ocials and some police
units of the Secretariat of Public Security assigned to the Historical Center (Monge, 2003).
López Rubio asked to speak to the person in charge of Barrios’s group and was directed to
Javier Jiménez Barrios,93 son of the leader Alejandra Barrios. Javier Jiménez Barrios told
López Rubio that María Rosete and her group wanted to remove them from their territory
and that Rosete was bringing them into conflict with residents, neighbors and established
merchants, withwhom, he said, they shared sales in the area.94 López Rubio instructed him to
calm down his people to avoid a confrontation, while he tried to negotiate with his opponents
(Monge, 2003).
López Rubio then spoke with María Rosete, who explained that they were there because
“the residents and neighbors were afraid of being stripped of their workplace” (Monge,
2003:108) by the people of Alejandra Barrios.95 The conversation was interrupted when mem-
bers of Barrios’s alcc began throwing objects. López Rubio saw that Javier Jiménez Barrios
was approaching. López Rubio went out to meet him and asked him to draw back his group,
since he was still in negotiations with Rosete. Javier Jiménez Barrios replied: “It’s too late
and I am not going to control the people” (Monge, 2003:108). According to sources, hid-
den somewhere in the vicinity, Alejandra Barrios used her cell phone to call the head of the
Cuauhtémoc Delegation to whom she said that people wanted to invade República of Bolivia
Street, where her oces were (Monge, 2003). Moments later, Javier Jiménez Barrios made
a signal and his people ran to where their opponents were. Before being pulled to safety by
uniformed police, López Rubio could see one of Alejandra Barrios’s supporters pull out a
handgun; he then heard several shots, two of which were aimed at Jorge Ramírez Espíndola,
the husband of María Rosete. (Monge, 2003).
93Though, several sources consulted mention that the name of the son of Alejandra Barrios that led and par-
ticipated in this clash is Javier Jiménez Barrios, it is likely that the real name is Javier Alejandro Sanchez Barrios.
The latter is the son of Alejandra Barrios and Javier Sanchez Becerra (current husband of Alejandra Barrios), and
half-brother of Sergio Jiménez Barrios and Ruben Antonio Jiménez Barrios who are children of Alejandra Barrios’
first marriage. I will use the name I found in the original sources for consistency (Javier Jiménez Barrios).
94During the course of this research, I found thatAlejandra Barrios had one of her properties right in República
de Bolivia Street, which explains why they defended their territory so vigorously.
95This was a rather vague statement by María Rosete. República de Bolivia Street did not have much commer-
cial activity and there were only very few residents and neighbors with small shops on the street. However, since
Tepito is very near, she may have used the word ‘neighbors’ to refer to her people and, in that way, justify her
attempt to take over that street.
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López Rubio ran towards República de Argentina Street; on his way, he heard screams in-
dicating that there were snipers on the rooftops. He looked up and saw a person on the roof
of a building in República de Bolivia Street with a long-range weapon pointing to where the
battle was occurring. In the distance, he still saw how some young people overturned a vehi-
cle, spilling gasoline on the pavement. Around 12:15pm, five police patrols arrived, but when
the police realized the size of the brawl, they retreated and called for backup. At that time,
a group of vendors were crying aloud for an ambulance, but what arrived was a contingent
of riot police, led by the deputy secretary of public security of the Federal District, Gabriel
Regino. Seeing the heavy police presence, the conflicting groups dispersed. Ramírez Espín-
dola was lying on the ground, with two gunshot wounds, and minutes later he died in an
ambulance on the way to a nearby hospital (Monge, 2003).
After Ramírez Espíndola was buried, María Rosete filed a formal complaint against Ale-
jandra Barrios for the murder of her husband. On September 6, 2003, an arrest warrant was
issued against Alejandra Barrios, who went into hiding. Preliminary investigation found that
the person who shot Ramírez Espíndola was Ernesto Vargas Ruíz, whowas linked to Barrios’s
organization and had been released from prison barely two months before the confrontation
(Bermeo and Herrera, 2003). Alejandra Barrios was detained on October 21, 2003, in the
State ofMexico, under the charge of being the intellectual author of the assassination of Jorge
Ramírez Espíndola (Rodríguez, 2003a).
During the trial and defense of Alejandra Barrios, very dierent versions of the events sur-
rounding Ramírez Espíndola’s death were given by the parts in conflict. María Rosete argued
thatAlejandra Barrios hadbeen present at the fight and that her original goalwas to kill Rosete
instead of Ramírez Espíndola, who had covered Rosete with his body to prevent her being as-
sassinated. Another version confirmed by some witnesses argued that Alejandra Barrios was
present and that it was her who had pointed out Ramírez Espíndola to the shooter. Alejandra
Barrios argued that she had not been anywhere near Ramírez Espíndola during the confronta-
tion, and that Rosete’s own supporters had murdered Ramírez Espíndola, and that she had
been imprisoned for political reasons (Monge, 2003; Rodríguez, 2003b). However, Alejandra
Barrios was chargedwith being the co-author of the assassination of Jorge Ramírez Espíndola
and imprisoned onOctober 28, 2003. Since the crime of homicide is classified as serious by the
Criminal Code of the city, she was to remain in prison during the criminal trial. If convicted,
the penalty prescribed by the law was of 20 to 50 years imprisonment (Fernandez, 2003).
Alejandra Barrios spent more than two years in prison. During this time, members of her
association and pri ocials kept on demanding her liberation, using demonstrations, meet-
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ings with government ocials, and the media to promote her innocence. Barrios firmly main-
tained she was innocent and that she had been imprisoned for political reasons, arguing that
she was the victim of a conspiracy between María Rosete and the political faction of René
Bejarano and Dolores Padierna, who wanted to take over her vendor organization (Bordon,
2004; Paramo, 2004; Zamora, 2004). “They want to eliminate me,” Barrios said in an inter-
view from prison (Paramo, 2004). Finally, on December 15, 2005, Barrios was acquitted of
the crime of aggravated murder and her immediate release was ordered on the grounds that
evidence against her was not conclusive (Reforma, 2005).
5.3.13 The political struggle behind the street struggle
When considering these events, it is important to observe that María Rosete was Alejandra
Barrios’s opponent in the fight for the control of the streets in the northern part of the His-
torical Center. This rivalry, however, represented something more. It represented the battle
between the prd and the pri for control of street vendors in the area, and all that this type of
control involved—the political and economic powers that such groups could contribute for
electoral and political purposes. In other words—and as Alejandra Barrios argued—there is
a great probability that Dolores Padierna, René Bejarano, and María Rosete wanted to break
the alcc in order to take over its members, space on the streets, and sources of financing
(i.e. alcc’s trust funds) (Monge, 2003; Crónica /ntx, 2004; Paramo, 2004; Dickerson, 2007;
Barrios, 2010).
A closer analysis of what happened before, during, and after Barrios’s imprisonment may
help to explain this. Right after Alejandra Barrios was detained, city authorities attempted to
arrest her alleged substitute in front of the alcc oces (González, 2003; Zamora, 2003). This
action was probably an attempt to prevent the alcc from appointing a new leader and to force
its vendor members to look for other options of organization, and eventually dismember the
alcc.
The pri, however, attempted to keep the alcc together, although leaders of other pri-
aliated vendor organizations saw a chance to benefit themselves. For example, during the
two months Barrios spent as fugitive, Edgar Rolando López Najera, former pri local deputy,
held meetings with other street vendor leaders aliated to the pri in the alcc oces in
República de Bolivia Street. López Najera demanded that they should be loyal to the pri and
asked them to close ranks around him as the interim leader of the alcc (Paramo, 2003). In
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light of the arrest of Barrios, Jorge García, leader of the Metropolitan Association of Popular
and Social Organizations (AsociaciónMetropolitana de Organizaciones Populares y Sociales,
amops),96 added to the confusion by deciding to take the leadership of the pri vendor organi-
zations in the Historical Center, Tepito, La Merced, and other areas of the city, according to
several vendor leaders in the area (Paramo, 2003). Eventually, Graciela Coronel Barrios97—
daughter of Alejandra Barrios—assumed the leadership of the alcc, with the support of pri
ocials and other street vendor organizations aliated to the pri (Bordon, 2004).
In the months that Alejandra Barrios was a fugitive and then in prison, the street vending
movement in Mexico City suered a schism. According to some sources98 at least 40 of the
60 organizations of street vendors operating in the Historical Center and Tepito left the pri
to join the prd,99 mainly to the network controlled by René Bejarano and Dolores Padierna,
the National Democratic Left (idn) (Paramo, 2003; Sanchez, 2005). Among the most notice-
able cases was that of Benita Chavarría—one of the historic street vendor leaders in Mexico
City—who abandoned her long-standing support for the pri and sought shelter in the group
of Bejarano and Padierna (Sanchez, 2005).100
This rupture and rearrangement was to be expected since the prd had taken over governing
Mexico City. However, it did not fully occur until the imprisonment of Alejandra Barrios, as
she represented not only the largest and most powerful street vendor organization in Mexico
City, but also the last bastion of power of the pri in the street vending movement. Dismantling
the organization of Alejandra Barrios would have meant that a key pri grass-root group of
informal power had also been dismantled.
The balance of power in the street vending movement was reaching a new equilibrium. Sup-
port and sympathy for the prd were reaching new levels and there were new leaderships. In
96It is worth pointing out that there are three organizations with a similar name: i) alianza Metropolitana de
Organizaciones Populares (amop) (pri, led by Edgar Rolando López Najera). ii) frente Metropolitano de Orga-
nizaciones Populares (fmop) (prd, led by María Rosete). And iii) asociacion Metropolitana de Organizaciones
Populares y Sociales (amops) (pri, led by Jorge García).
97Javier Jiménez Barrios, Sergio Jiménez Barrios and Ruben Antonio Jiménez Barrios—all sons of Alejandra
Barrios—were fugitives from justice as a result of their participation in the clash in whichMaría Rosete’s husband
died and went underground (Bordon, 2004).
98The Chamber of Commerce for Small Traders, Services and Tourism (Cámara Nacional de Comercio en
Pequeño, canacope) estimated that in Mexico City there were over 500,000 street vendors. In the Historical
Center, there were up to 35,000 street vendors grouped in 60 organizations (Sanchez, 2005).
99Let us remember that the prd did not accept group aliations, so the street vendor organizations which
shifted from the pri to the prd could not ‘ocially’ be aliated to the prd. Most likely, the shift consisted of the
vendor leader aliating to the prd, or simply supporting the prd in its political rallies and events, with no ocial
aliation by means of a document.
100According to Sanchez (2005), there are about 100,000 street vendors with leaders linked to the National
Democratic Left (idn) group of Bejarano.
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an interviewwith journalist Arturo Paramo, from the newspaperReforma, street vendor lead-
ers who had recently joined the prd ranks said that Ana Padierna Luna—sister of Dolores
Padierna—was emerging as the main street vendor leader aligned to the prd (Paramo, 2003),
information that was confirmed by Alejandra Barrios in an interview from prison (Crónica
/ntx, 2004). Journalist Raymundo Sanchez, from the newspaperLaCrónica , also reported on
the phenomenon. In an article published in August 2005, he quoted statements by Demetrio
Sodi—then prd senator for the Federal District101—arming that the political group of René
Bejarano had appropriated streets around the Zócalo and behind the National Palace for the
purpose of street vending (Sanchez, 2005). Sodi also pointed out—as street vendors inter-
viewed by Sanchez for the same article did—Antonio and Ana María Padierna, who are rela-
tives (siblings) of Dolores Padierna, as the leaders that controlled this group of street vendors.
Sodi said: “All of them have profited from the city, and that is enough” (Sanchez, 2005).
The issue also concerned the pri, which immediately made an eort to close ranks. Once
the initial shock was over—after the arrest of Alejandra Barrios—the Barrios family, aided
by pri ocials and other pri-aliated vendor organizations, began to organize and started
to press for the liberation of Alejandra Barrios. Graciela Coronel Barrios took the lead and
was supported by pri ocials such as Florentino Castro—pri special cases delegate inMexico
City—and Vicente Gutierrez Camposeco—general secretary of the pri in Mexico City—and
even received the support of Jorge García, local pri deputy and leader of the amops. A well-
organized legal defense headed by the alcc’s lawyer, Miguel Uribe, who built a solid case
in favor of Alejandra Barrios, and an oensive of demonstrations, meeting with government
ocials, interviews, newspaper articles, press conferences, and witnesses’ declarations—all
of which demonstrated the innocence of Alejandra Barrios and blamed prd city government
ocials for the politicization of the case—started to yield results (Bordon, 2004; Zamora,
2004).
The release of Alejandra Barrios in December 2005 could be understood not only as a vic-
tory of Alejandra Barrios over María Rosete (and René Bejarano and Dolores Padierna) but
also as a victory of the pri over the prd for the control of street vendors in the Historical
Center. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the action against Alejandra Barrios took its toll
and weakened the pri’s influence over street vendor organizations in the city. Given the loss of
power that the pri had experienced in the last six or seven years—since the prd took control
of the Mexico City government—numerous street vendor leaders whose organizations had
101Raymundo Sanchez’s article was published on August 15, 2005. Demetrio Sodi resigned from the prd on
August 17, 2005. Eventually, Sodi joined the pan and ran as the pan’s candidate for the headship of government
of Mexico City in 2006.
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been aliated to the pri declared their support for the new party in power in the city, the prd.
Regardless of the imprisonment of Alejandra Barrios, it seemed it was a matter of time before
pri-aliated vendor organizations would move to support the prd linked factions. Street ven-
dor organizations were economically rational and supported those parties which would oer
them protection and the permission or toleration to carry out their vending activities, thus en-
suring their continued existence and profitability. However, the survival of Alejandra Barrios
and the alcc also brought positive eects for that organization and its leader. The alcc had
proved how strong it was and, once it recovered, it became the most prominent street vendor
organization in Mexico City during that time and in the years to come. Similarly, Alejandra
Barrios had become an urban legend and an institution on the streets of Mexico City center.
5.3.14 Video scandals, dismissal, and desafuero in the PRD government
Three key political incidents (described below) may have contributed to the release of Alejan-
dra Barrios: the desafuero or process of removal of immunity of López Obrador; the removal
of Marcelo Ebrard as secretary of public security by President Vicente Fox; and the video
scandals in which René Bejarano was involved.102 Many considered them a federal govern-
ment onslaught against the prd, and they not only took attention away from the Alejandra
Barrios case, but also meant that energy, resources, and political capital had to be refocused to
defend the cases which concerned prd figures, in particular López Obrador, who was aiming
for the prd ticket for the presidential election in 2006. These incidents, which occurred almost
simultaneously, were paramount for the liberation of Barrios. Not only that, they also deter-
mined the course that policies towards informal street vending in Mexico City would follow
in the last stages of the López Obrador administration.
5.3.15 Bejarano's video scandal
On March 3, 2004, a video released on a live tv program called El Mañanero showed René
Bejarano (at the time coordinator of the prd bench at Mexico City’s Legislative Assembly
and who had previously been López Obrador’s personal secretary) receiving us$45,000 from
businessman Carlos Ahumada (whose enterprise had several contracts with the Mexico City
102In total four videos showing prd leaders and ocials in compromising situations were made public. These
prd members were René Bejarano, Gustavo Ponce, Carlos Imaz, and Ramón Sosamontes.
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government) and then clumsily stung the cash into a briefcase and his pockets (Sosa, 2004;
Levy, Bruhn and Zebadua, 2006; Grayson, 2007). After being shown the video, Bejarano de-
nied any wrongdoing and said the money was not given in return for favors but as a donation
to the campaign of prd member Leticia Robles for the headship of the Álvaro Obregón Del-
egation (Pavón, 2004; Grayson, 2007). Then he admitted he had made a mistake and was
ready to face the consequences; he said he had nothing to hide and was at the disposition of
the authorities by his own will. Later that day, Bejarano requested a leave of absence from his
position at the aldf and resigned as coordinator of the prd group at the aldf. Later, he pre-
pared his resignation to the prd, which he handed to the prd’s National Executive Committee,
which accepted it (Llanos and Romero, 2004; Pavón, 2004).
On November 5, 2004, the Attorney General Oce of the Federal District requested an ar-
rest warrant against René Bejarano. He was prosecuted for two oenses—money laundering
and electoral crime. OnNovember 9, a judge turned awarrant of apprehension. Bejaranowas
notified and then sent to prison on November 10, 2004 (Acosta, 2004). During the time Be-
jarano was in prison, the National Democratic Left (idn) organized demonstrations to show
its support for its leader, much in the same way that the alcc organized demonstrations in
favor of Alejandra Barrios. Ironically, both leaders were in prison at the same time, with Bar-
rios spending more time (more than two years) in jail than Bejarano, who despite his high
political profile spent almost eight months behind bars.103
On July 6, 2005, René Bejaranowas released on bond from prison, being acquitted from the
charge ofmoney laundering by a federal court, which found that the evidence against himwas
insucient (Pavón and Barajas, 2005). After his release, Bejarano announced that he would
retire from political life and concentrate on his family and the pending trial for electoral crime:
“The political work will have to be done by somebody else” he stated (Pavón and Baranda,
2005).104 He disappeared from public life and did not return until some years later, in 2008,
as leader of a political movement called NationalMovement for Hope (Movimiento Nacional
por la Esperanza), but always away from the spotlight (Gomez Leyva and Iglesias, 2008).
The video scandal and its consequences—imprisonment, release, and social
condemnation—certainly took a toll on René Bejarano and Dolores Padierna and di-
verted their attention from the street vending problem in Mexico City. They decided to focus
on restoring their personal and family balance and set aside political work for a while. This
103Alejandra Barrios was in prison from October 2003 to December 2005 (2 years and almost 2 months). René
Bejarano was in prison from November 2004 to July 2005 (about 8 months).
104Strangely, although he was involved in alleged acts of corruption and influence peddling, Bejarano was not
disqualified by any legal instance from holding public oce in government.
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was another factor assisting the recovery of Alejandra Barrios’s association once she was
released from prison.
5.3.16 Ebrard's dismissal by President Fox
On November 23, 2004, the inhabitants of San Juan Ixtayopan, a small town located in the
Tláhuac Delegation, captured and beat three agents of the Federal Preventive Police, burning
two of them who died on the scene and almost hanging the third, without the intervention of
the Mexico City Police, which was under the orders of Marcelo Ebrard, at the time Mexico
City’s secretary of public security. The agents were in the town investigating a drug distribu-
tion casewhen inhabitantsmistook them forkidnappers105 andunleashed the violence against
them. Even when the riot police arrived, before the two agents were killed, they did not do
anything to rescue the agents. Police ocers in command said they did not receive any order
to enter the area where the agents were being beaten and eventually burned. Members of the
Judicial Police of the Federal District106—which depends on the Oce of the Attorney Gen-
eral of Justice of the Federal District—arrived one hour later than the riot police and after 15
minutes they rescued the third agent who was about to be hanged in the town’s central kiosk.
The other two had already been killed and set in flames (Fernandez and Zamora, 2004).
Marcelo Ebrard and Ramón Martín Huerta, minister of public security in the Fox admin-
istration, were both accused of not organizing a timely rescue eort of the agents. After a
thorough investigation, López Obrador gave Ebrard a vote of confidence, notwithstanding
a request by President Fox asking him to remove Ebrard from his duties as secretary of pub-
lic security of the capital (Hernández, 2004). Later, on December 6, 2004, seeing that López
Obrador had ignored his recommendation to remove Ebrard from his position, President Fox
usedhis constitutional powers to dismissMarcelo Ebrard fromhis post (Pavón andSosa, 2004).
Many critics condemned the decision and argued it was a politically motivated move to de-
rail Ebrard’s political future (González, 2004; Ocampo, 2004; Sarmiento, 2004; Sierra, 2004).
Ramón Martín Huerta was also implicated in the incident, but President Fox gave Huerta his
full support and did not dismiss him from his post. Nevertheless, on December 7, Marcelo
105Kidnapping cases occurred in the town in previous weeks, and as its inhabitants thought that the agents were
responsible for them they were ready to take the law into their own hands.
106The Judicial Police of the Federal District depends on the Oce of the Attorney General of Justice of the
Federal District (whose holder was Bernardo Bátiz). On the other hand, the Federal District Police depends on the
Secretariat of Public Security of the Federal District (whose holder was Marcelo Ebrard).
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Ebrardwas given a new job by LópezObrador—secretary of social development of the Federal
District (Barajas, Pavón and Bermeo, 2004).
The violent event in Tláhuac, which occurred under the jurisdiction of the Mexico City
government, but had implications at the federal level as the president was also involved, dis-
tracted the attention of Marcelo Ebrard, who was one of the key governmental actors in the
issues concerning informal street vending. López Obrador had given Ebrard direct authority
and responsibility to negotiate and fix the problem of informal street vending, but the event in
Tláhuac focused Ebrard‘s interests and energies on other issues instead. Among those, it was
the possibility of running for the headship of government of Mexico City in 2006; therefore,
it was no coincidence that Ebrard aliated to the prd on September 12, 2004 (Maciel, 2010).
Thus, not was only Ebrard’s attention elsewhere, but it was also in his interest to keep things
calm and under control in Mexico City and that implied not to cause too much trouble in the
area of street vending.107
5.3.17 López Obrador's removal of immunity from prosecution
The same reasoning aforesaid applied to López Obrador. By the end of 2004, it was evident
that López Obrador was the frontrunner in the race for the presidency ofMexico for the 2006
elections and, like Ebrard, he did not want to make enemies of the street vendors. The video
scandals108 and the dismissal of Marcelo Ebrard by the president, as well as the process of
removal of immunity from prosecution (desafuero) started against him in May 2004, were all
part of a broader political attack that was in the making and whose final goal was to prevent
López Obrador from winning the presidency of Mexico in 2006, as Vicente Fox later revealed
(Carreño, 2007).109
The oense for which López Obrador was being blamed took place long before he was
Mexico City’s head of government. On November 9, 2000, Rosario Robles, his predecessor,
107While Alejandra Barrios was still in prison, the city government did not have too much trouble controlling
other street vendor groups asmany of them had already showed support for the prd andwere actively participating
in political activities, such as the demonstrations against the removal of immunity of López Obrador (Sanchez,
2005).
108Not only the one that implicated René Bejarano, but others that involved other prd leaders and ocials such
as Gustavo Ponce (Mexico City’s secretary of finance), Carlos Imaz (prd’s head of the Tlalpan Delegation) and
Ramón Sosamontes.
109In a private conversation held at the Presidential House on September 29, 2004, President Fox had said to
López Obrador: “Prepare your legal defense, defend yourself Andrés Manuel” (Melgar, 2004) in anticipation of
what was coming.
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expropriated a plot of land from a large property called El Encino—located in the Cuajimalpa
Delegation—to build an access road for a private hospital. OnMarch 11, 2001, the owner took
legal action against the FederalDistrict government on the grounds of improper expropriation.
The owner was granted a federal judicial order banning further construction until the matter
was definitively settled, as it (the construction) prevented the owner from having access to his
property. By August of that year, the judge found that construction had continued. According
to prosecutors, López Obrador knowingly disregarded the judge’s order several times. Under
the Criminal Code, this is considered a misdemeanor (desacato). The judge requested the
federal attorney general—Rafael Macedo de la Concha—to make an inquiry and take the
necessary steps to bring the case into compliance. Several months passed, in part because
courts usually sided with the government and not with individuals in expropriation cases;110
therefore the case covered unknown ground: it involved two branches of government (the city
government and the federal government, confronting each other), and it was an extraordinary
step to indict the head of government ofMexico City.111 ByMay 17, 2004, the attorney general
announced he would request the removal of López Obrador’s immunity from prosecution
(Grayson, 2007; El Universal, 2011).
Several months ofmutual accusations followed, including demonstrations in favor of López
Obrador and a television campaign against him (Saldierna and Perez, 2005). Finally, the
case reached the Chamber of Deputies and—on April 7, 2005—deputies voted by 360 to 127
(with two abstentions) to lift López Obrador’s constitutional immunity against prosecution
(Grayson, 2007; El Universal, 2011). On April 8, López Obrador left his post as head of gov-
ernment of Mexico City in order to concentrate on his defense, leaving Alejandro Encinas in
charge of the city government (Bermeo, 2005). At this time, López Obrador’s approval rate
was 80 percent among Mexico City inhabitants (Duran, Aguirre and Pensamiento, 2005).112
Regardless of his popularity, the process against López Obrador was viewed by a larger part
of the society—even by those who were not his supporters—as unjust and undemocratic
(Fuentes, 2005a).
110A process of expropriation occurs when a public agency (e.g. a state government) takes private property
for a purpose deemed to be in the public interest. For that reason, when a legal conflict arises as a result of a
process of expropriation, it is common that legal instances side with the public agency. In the desafuero case, it
was the opposite: legal instances sided with the owner of the private property, something that is quite unusual.
This reinforces the belief that the desafuero was a political manoeuvre implemented by the federal government to
stop López Obrador in his race for the presidency of Mexico.
111If the case had proceeded, López Obrador would have become the only high-ranking public ocial in Mexi-
can history to be prosecuted; an unusual happening in a country with a long tradition of impunity in government.
112López Obrador popularity was evident when, on April 24, 2005, a massive rally in his support was organized
at El Zócalo—Mexico City’s central public square. Some sources cited an attendance of followers exceeding 1
million (La Jornada, 2005), while federal sources claimed there were hundreds of thousands.
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In a dramatic turn of events, on April 27, 2005, President Fox announced changes in his
cabinet. Among those changes was the resignation of Attorney General Rafael Macedo de
la Concha and a reevaluation of the legal case against López Obrador, arguing for a political
solution to the case that, in reality, was more an attempt of the federal government to save
face and avoid further embarrassment (Herrera and Melgar, 2005). The following day, on
April 28, Daniel Cabeza de Vaca was appointed as the new federal attorney general, and on
May 4 his oce announced it would drop misdemeanor charges against López Obrador on
a technicality (Fuentes, 2005b).113 This event became a political victory for López Obrador
and propelled him towards the prd candidacy for the presidency of Mexico in the elections
of 2006.
During the desafuero case against López Obrador, informal street vendor organizations
associated with the prd played an important role by attending political rallies and demon-
strations in his support, participating as violent clash groups (grupos de choque) and, some
sources claim, giving money to the party (Sanchez, 2005). During the uproar that the desa-
fuero case produced among the Mexican political class and in Mexican society in general,
little attention was given to the policies implemented in the city to solve the informal street
vending problem. This favored informal groups in general as tolerance was a direct result of
the little attention authorities had paid street vendors in those dicult political days. Once the
desafuero case was concluded and López Obrador returned to his post as head of government
of Mexico City, it was in his interests not to cause any trouble in the city—much in the same
way as it was for Ebrard—as he was going to run for the presidency in a few more months
and he needed as much support as possible, and the support provided by the informal street
vendor groups was certainly welcomed.
Thus, the three political incidents presented above help to explain the destiny of policies,
programs, government eorts, and intentions of authorities andpolitical parties towards infor-
mal street vending inMexico City, close to the end of the López Obrador administration. The
high degree of political conflict took its toll on almost all the most important informal street
vendor organizations. While initially pri-aliated organizations were severely damaged, they
came out stronger than before, as the jailing of Alejandra Barrios united pri-aliated ven-
dor organizations and pri party ocials in promoting her liberation. This union made them
stronger once Barrios was released. Street vendor groups with links to the prd grew in num-
113In summary, it declared that hewas guilty but his unique post as head of government of the FederalDistrict, of
recent creation, had not been incorporated in all the laws. The law only had provisions for governors or municipal
presidents. López Obrador was neither. Hence, the wording of the relevant article made it unclear if a penalty for
his crime existed (Fuentes, 2005b; El Universal, 2011).
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bers and came together in support of both prd candidates—Marcelo Ebrard and Andrés
Manuel López Obrador—first during the desafuero case and later for the city government
and the presidency campaigns, respectively. Ebrard and López Obrador knew that in elec-
toral times it is better to gain supporters than to lose them, and therefore did not do much
to solve the problems caused by street vending in Mexico City during the last stage of the
López Obrador administration. Once more, solutions to the problem of informal street vend-
ing were set aside as politics and elections took center stage and became more important for
government ocials and politicians alike.
5.3.18 President Fox's policies on informality
Vicente Fox planned to incorporate the informal sector into the policy scheme he was creating
for small and medium enterprises (smes), knowing that micro enterprises were crucial, not
only for their contribution to the country’s gdp but also for its social importance—for the
number of jobs that smes generated every year and for the means of support they represented
for millions of Mexican families. Fox planned to open credits for the smes and to incorporate
the informal sector into the tax scheme under a program called ‘Legalize Your Small Shop’
(Legaliza tu Changarro).114 For this, the Fox administration intended to follow the model
implemented by theGrameen BankofMuhammadYunus, and received advice on the informal
economy and formalization fromHernando de Soto’s Institute for Liberty andDemocracy (El
Siglo de Torreón, 2003; Presidencia de la República, 2003; De Soto, 2010).
Thus, as part of the eort to encourage formalization, Fox implemented a program to sim-
plify the registration process of firms. Asmentioned in Chapter 2, in 2002 theMexican govern-
ment implemented the Fast-Track Business Creation System (Sistema de Apertura Rápida de
Empresas, sare). This program guaranteed thatmicro and small firms could complete the reg-
istration process in two days, by reducing the number of procedures from eight to two. Even
though most firms were eligible (low-risk firms), those in the food sector and those whose ac-
tivity represent environmental risks needed to obtain prior clearance from health authorities
(high-risk firms). This was a gradual program and therefore its impact was not immediately
obvious. It was only after the Fox administration was over that its impact was evaluated and,
according to several sources, it had been positive (Kaplan et al., 2007, 2011; Bruhn, 2008,
114Changarro is a colloquial expression for small shop or small businesses.
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2011).115 However, even though the eect of the program was positive and significant, it was
also concluded that this program alone will most likely have a small eect on informality and
firm creation. More comprehensive programs were necessary to have a sizeable impact on in-
formality in Mexico, a country with a relatively large informal economy (Kaplan et al., 2007,
2011; Bruhn, 2008, 2011).
President Vicente Fox had promised to boost the growth of formal employment in private
enterprises, but also to build the institutions that facilitated the emergence of entrepreneurs
and the self-employed who would generate their own sources of income.
However, halfway through his mandate, Fox recognized that the number of formal jobs was
no longer growing, as a result of the global economic crisis.116 He changed gear and started
to accept the informal work as an option for the unemployed, but always used euphemisms
to refer to it, such as ‘non-structured economy’, ‘entrepreneurship’, or the modality of ‘self-
employment’.
In August 2003, on his radio program aired on Saturdays called Fox Contigo, the president
suggested that people should consider self-employment as an alternative that might help to
address the lack of formal jobs (Notimex, 2003a, 2003b; Presidencia de la República, 2003).
He told his listeners thatwhile inMexico 15millionworkers were in the social security system,
10 million people or families made their living through a small unit of production—namely,
self-employment (Notimex, 2003a).
President Vicente Fox explained that one of the objectives of his administration was to cre-
ate a legal framework that allowed those who worked under a self-employed scheme to be
recognized everywhere as businessmen and entrepreneurs. Notimex (2003a) and Presidencia
de la República (2003) quoted him as saying:
The challenge is to go from macroeconomics to microeconomics, to go from is-
sues at the national level—with the global and world economy—to those of the
115Asmentioned in Chapter 2, Kaplan et al. (2007, 2011) and Bruhn (2008, 2011) and have estimated the impact
of the introduction of the program on the number of new firm registrations, concluding that it has been positive.
According to Kaplan et al. (2007, 2011), registrations increased by 4 to 8 percent, while Bruhn (2008, 2011) finds
the impact to be even more significant. The data do not make a distinction between the creation of new firms and
the formalization of existing ones, so Kaplan et al. (2007, 2011) try to estimate which eect is more important.
Since the increase in registrations took place predominantly within the first ten months after the introduction
of sare, they conclude that its success was to encourage informal firms to formalize rather than to promote the
creation of new firms.
116According to imss’s information as cited by Padilla (2013), Fox promised to create 1,200,000 formal jobs
during his administration. However, only 879,276 formal jobs were created during his government; of which
239,842 were permanent jobs, and the remaining 639,434 were temporary jobs.
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economy of the people. For us, this is the definition of a humanist economy in
which we want to work hard.
However, the global economic situation—led by the us economic recession of the early
2000s and the September 11 attacks—did not favor the Mexican economy, so several of the
planned initiatives and programs to be implemented by the Fox administration did not work
or were not feasible at the time. Under this state of aairs, the federal government once again
opted for a policy of tolerance of the informal activities of street vendors in Mexico.
It was until his last year of government (on January 18, 2006) that Fox announced the imple-
mentation of the Small Taxpayer Regime (Régimen de Pequeños Contribuyentes, repeco).117
The program aimed at broadening the tax base by incorporating those informal firms and
workers into formality and receive the benefits of it.118
Fox referred to this program as an opportunity to give a ‘human face’ to the economy, gener-
ating a true democratization and equal access to the economy (Vargas, 2006). Fox also stressed
that he would eliminate restrictions that prevented informal traders from joining legality. He
also denied that the repeco encouraged informality and the invasion of the streets. Rather,
Fox argued, it would allow small businesses work hand in hand with the federal government
to generate income for their families (Vargas, 2006). Fox said:
We’re not against them, it will no longer be the tax authority against them. They
are now part of the economy of this country. You could hardly find another coun-
try that cherishes more its entrepreneurs; its changarros; its people who want to
progress, work, who want to get ahead.
(Vargas, 2006)
The fact that the repeco was implemented in the last year of the Fox administration did
not favour the program. The program, however, was continued during the following federal
administration, which was also a pan government, registering mixed results: while the num-
ber of repeco contributors did increase, the number of informal agents and informal street
vendors in Mexico continued to grow (Table 5.2).
117Eventually, the repeco would be substituted by the Regime of Fiscal Incorporation (Régimen de Incorpo-
ración Fiscal, rif) in 2014.
118Among its benefits was the issuance of the Business Credit Card for Family Workshops (Tarjeta de Crédito
Empresarial para Talleres Familiares) through which loans were granted to entrepreneurs; lending programs to
acquire technology; and the promotion of tools that facilitated the taxpayer the fulfillment of their tax obliga-
tions once a year and without charges or excuses. Among its restrictions was the fact that program participants
could not commercialize contraband or pirate goods as—it was argued by the authorities—this new contributory
systems was based on trust and on the credibility of people (Vargas, 2006).
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Table 5.2.: Individuals Working in the Informal Sector†

















Source: inegi’s National Survey of Occupation and Employment (Encuesta Na-
cional de Ocupación y Empleo, enoe‡) (inegi, 2010c). Data with population of
15 years or more (The minimum legal working age in Mexico is 15 years old).
Note 1: I have taken the second trimesterof each year andnot the yearly average to complete this ta-
ble.
Note 2: The inegi has used, when possible, the data gathered by the ene (1998–
2004) and eneu (1987–2004) to build the enoe (InfoLaboral) series from (1995–
2004), using the enoe’s criteria. The enoe substituted both ene and eneu in 2005.
†According to the inegi, the Informal Sector refers to all those market economic activities
operating from household resources, but without forming a company, so the activity in question
has no identifiable and independent status away from the household, and therefore tends
to materialize in very small scale operations. The operational criterion for determining the
non-independent condition of production units with respect to the household, is given by the
absence of conventional accounting practices likely to culminate in a balance sheet of assets and
liabilities; if this is not carried out, it means that there is no distinction between the assets of the
household and those of the company, nor is there a distinction between business expense flows
and those of the household (e.g. electricity and telephone costs, vehicle use, etc.) (inegi, 2010c).
‡As mentioned earlier, the enoe did not classify ‘individuals working as street vendors’ (as it had
been done in the ene), instead using ‘individuals working in the informal sector’. Because of this,
it became harder to follow the ‘street vendor’ sub-category after 2004. The Informal Sector is a
broader concept which also covers other sub-categories of informal activities.
Very similar policies and a very similar tax program to that implemented by Vicente Fox
were presented a few years later. On July 22, 2013, Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto an-
nounced the Program for the Formalization of Employment 2013 (Programa para la Formal-
ización del Empleo 2013), a federal government program based on the principles laid down
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by Santiago Levy’s work on informality (Levy, 2008). The initial stage was limited to 200,000
workers (less than 1 percent of the total number of informal workers in Mexico in 2013) and
was in a pilot phase in December 2013. On September 8, 2014 President Enrique Peña Nieto
launched a program to grant fiscal and social security benefits to those working on the infor-
mal sector willing to formalize, in order to stop informality and increase productivity. In an
event named Let’s GrowTogether. Being Formal, It Is Good For You! (Crezcamos Juntos. ¡Ser
formal, sí conviene!) the President signed the decree for the Regime of Fiscal Incorporation
(Régimen de Incorporación Fiscal, rif) and the Regime of Incorporation to the Social Secu-
rity (Régimen de Incorporación a la Seguridad Social) which includes benefits such as access to
health and social services, pension benefits, housing credits, income tax discounts, economic
aid for the small entrepreneurs, credits for businesses, and training programs (Hernández,
2014). It remains to be seen how eective these government actions are, and what role politics
play on them.
5.4 Conclusion
5.4.1 Conclusions of the Cárdenas administration
The alternation of political parties in power that took place in 1997 inMexico City, as a result
of the democratic opening and search for new political options, took everybody by surprise.
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas became not only the first head of government of Mexico City to be
elected by popular vote, but also the first to come from the opposition, after 68 years of pri
rule.
However, becoming the head of government ofMexico City was both a blessing and a curse
for Cárdenas and the members of his administration: a blessing because the victory showed
that the alternancia was possible and attainable at the highest levels of government; a curse
because in order for Cárdenas to reach the presidency of Mexico—his original goal—he first
had to pass the very dicult test of governing Mexico City.
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas could not achieve the results that his collaborators, party support-
ers, and Mexico City inhabitants wanted as he led the city government. While the ideas and
policies were good and innovative, their implementationwas extremely dicult. Furthermore,
the time constraint of governing for only three years left very little room for experimentation
(trial and error, or pilot phases) and to correct mistakes.
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The approach of the prd government of Cárdenas towards informal street vending was
dierent in essence to what past governments had tried, even though the programs it imple-
mented did not seem too dierent. What really changed was the way the city government
looked at the street vendors. The Cárdenas government did not see them as a plague that
had to be eradicated by all means but as an unavoidable consequence of all the problems that
aected the city and country. Saúl Escobar Toledo illustrated this change of view well: “The
street vendors do not have to be the dirt hidden under the carpet,” he said (Scherer Ibarra,
1997a:156). For this reason, the treatment of street vendor organizations by the Cárdenas
government was not repressive and it privileged dialogue over coercion. The approach was
certainly more benevolent than that of pri governments.
The federal government, occupied in solving the Peso Crisis, started to carry out its poli-
cies towards the informal sector late, and retail informal vendors—particularly those work-
ing on the streets—were not its main target. Rather, the federal government attempted to
tackle those large companies and organizations—formal and fully registered or clandestine-
informal—that benefited from the informal economy and evaded taxes, regulations and the
authorities by supplying ‘small-scale’ (retail) informal vendors. This situation essentially led
to a form of ‘tacit toleration’ of informal street vendors.
While the federal government may have adopted a policy of tolerating informal street ven-
dors to some extent, considering informal street vending as an escape valve for the social
tensions brought about by the Peso Crisis, those in the city government were more proactive
in implementing a strategy to relocate street vendors and rescue the Historical Center in order
to solve the problem. This problem urgently demanded their attention, and if they had not
done anything, their inaction would have given their political opponents the perfect excuse
to attack them. Thus the city government aimed to organize street vending in a more com-
prehensive way, by updating the legal framework and subjecting street vendors to rights and
obligations, while permitting them to perform their activities under certain conditions.
The problems started to emerge in the implementation of the strategy to cope with infor-
mal street vending. To begin with, the inertias of the past pri governments were too strong
and very dicult to change. It was impossible to transform 68 years of a specific political
and administrative culture in only three years. In particular, it was very dicult to fight
against those groups within the city government itself—such as the Federal District Govern-
ment Workers Union (sutgdf)—which had strong vested interests and were involved in well-
established schemes of corruption. These were strong elements of resistance that slowed down
the dynamism of the Cárdenas government.
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Second, the situation in the city was dicult; many problems had been exacerbated to the
point of being at the verge of explosion and the social conditions ofmost city inhabitants were
also much damaged, as they faced high levels of poverty, lack of opportunities, and a certain
degree of social decomposition. The Cárdenas government knew that there was no short-
run solution to these problems. In addition, the previous pri government had administrated
resources badly which undermined the city finances and left several debts for the new prd
government. This brought a third problem: lack of resources restricted the new government
ocials and collaborators. Without money, not much could be achieved.
Moreover, governing Mexico City has never been an easy task and former Mexico City
mayors had always been in the spotlight, because of the prominence of the post they held and
because their decisions aected literallymillions of people. Criticism became amatter of daily
life. However, condemnation of the Cárdenas government became exceedingly virulent and
hostile, particularly among certain economic and political groups whose members abhorred
the idea of seeing Cárdenas as president of Mexico. They knew that one way to stop him
was by magnifying in the media every little mistake his administration committed, to give the
impression that he and his collaborators were not capable of holding the highest oce in the
country.
Finally, the Cárdenas administration had too little time to carry out the reforms the city
demanded. By previous agreement, the administration would last for only three years and
Cárdenas was not even in oce for the full extent of his already short administration.
During this time, in the political arena of the street vendors, two interesting phenomena
occurred: First, some existing street vendor organizations had a rapprochement with the
prd. Second, new prd-linked vendor organizations were born during this time. In both cases,
street vendor organizations used prd activists as intermediaries or contact points, and took
advantage of the new approach of the prd city government towards informal street vending.
pri-aliated organizations—especially the older and larger street vendor organizations tra-
ditionally aliated to the pri—still hoped that the pri would return to power soon. At this
point in time (1997–2000), it is still possible to say that the street vendor organizations with
links to the prd were not as numerous as those aliated to the pri, and that they were not
decisive electorally speaking. But as Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas said: “The change came with the
administration of Andrés Manuel [López Obrador]” (Cárdenas, 2010).
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5.4.2 Conclusions of the López Obrador administration
As a result of the power accumulated through the years of pri governments and the network of
vested interests on all sides, the groups of formal powers entrenched in the apparatus of the Fed-
eral District government not only withstood the onslaught of the first prd government in the
city but, in the end, even managed to impose conditions and push the authorities against the
wall by organizing strikes andwork stoppages, and staging outbreaks of insubordination. The
aforesaid actions were organized by these groups—most notably the Federal District Govern-
mentWorkers Union (sutgdf)—with the purpose of retaining their bastions of power against
the new prd governments, which threatened their privileges and methods of operation. The
fight against these powers was perhaps the hardest, though unseen, challenge that the prd
governments had during the Cárdenas and the López Obrador administrations. Moreover,
informal street vending had consolidated as an informal power in the city and its numbers
steadily rose—the number of people engaged in this activity, the number of zones in the city
where street vending took place, and the amount of profits that informal street vendor lead-
ers were able to extract from their associations’ members and through the expansion of their
activities to other informal activities, some allegedly related to organized crime. As a result,
problems caused by the growth of street vending continued to grow throughout the city.
The key organizational dierence between the administrations of Cárdenas and López
Obrador in the Mexico City government was that in the latter, the heads of delegations had
more power—and therefore more responsibility—to tackle local problems confined to their
delegations, such as informal street vending. The increase in power of delegations came as
a direct result of having the heads of delegations elected democratically for the first time in
history, which provided them with a high degree of legitimacy. This situation brought a ‘co-
habitation problem’—the fact thatMexico City’s head of government and the head of a given
delegation could belong to dierent parties, which was a potential source for noncooperation.
This was evident in the case of Marcelo Ebrard—who was appointedMexico City’s secretary
of public security by López Obrador—and Arne Aus Den Ruthen, a pan member who was
head of the Miguel Hidalgo Delegation. While this was true, it is also worth noticing that
when both Mexico City’s head of government and the head of a given delegation belonged
to the same party this was not a guarantee for success, as the dierences between Marcelo
Ebrard and Dolores Padierna showed. Even if they came or worked for the same party, there
was the risk that dierences in party factions or even dierences in approaches to tackle the
problem played a key role in determining how they dealt with informal street vending. In both
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cases there was a lack of coordination and communication between delegations and central
city government, which led to an inadequate and flawed final outcome.
It was impossible to find a solution if the delegation and central city government were not
working under the same policy or plan. Moreover, this is a rather serious consideration as
it showed that the informal street vending problem had surpassed the capacity of the delega-
tional authority—and perhaps even the capacity of the central city government—to control
it. It was necessary to implement a common policy at both delegation and city level to tackle
the problem; otherwise it would be impossible to do so. The dierences and disagreements
between delegational and central city government authorities obviously benefited the street
vendor leaders, who threatened one while negotiating with the other, boosting their bargain-
ing power.
While the administration of CuauhtémocCárdenas was characterized for favoring dialogue
over repression; in the administration of LópezObrador, Dolores Padierna’s approach to deal-
ing with street vendors in the Cuauhtémoc Delegation was very confrontational. Animadver-
sion and hostility grew to such levels that there was no more room for negotiation and again
violent enforcement of the law was implemented. Marcelo Ebrard, on the other hand, fa-
vored dialogue, but it seemed that his approach was more a strategy to avoid conflict than
a well-thought-through plan to solve the problems that informal street vendor organizations
were causing in the city. Yet perhaps it was the only way he could implement the Historical
Center reorganization program, which was one of the key policies of the López Obrador ad-
ministration. In both Padierna’s and Ebrard’s approaches it is possible to perceive political
ends: Padierna might have wanted to break pri-aliated street vendor associations to force
them—leaders and/or vendors—to move to the prd, particularly to René Bejarano’s faction;
while Ebrard might have been interested in building a grassroots political base to improve his
chances of becoming head of government of Mexico City in 2006.
This leads to another phenomenon that developed extensively during the López Obrador
administration—the fact that the prd welcomed informal street vendors as political clientele.
The reason of why prd members came to use clientelism, despite eorts to avoid the methods
used by the pri, responded to dierent external factors such as poverty or the long history
of clientelism in Mexican politics. Yet, these external factors were not enough to explain the
extent to which the prd has been marked by clientelism. A series of internal events had a
more direct causal relationship with the outcome of clientelism in the prd, among which the
party’s strategy for bringing about a transition to democracy stands out (Hilgers, 2008, 2012).
The prd was established from a wide range of left-wing parties, social movements, and indi-
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viduals, with diverse ideological visions. Coordinating these currents or factions under one
organizational scheme could have taken various forms. However, the emergence of one prin-
cipal leader, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and the authority of his political strategy set the prd on
a path of personalistic factions and centralized power. As a result of Cárdenas’s desire to oust
the pri from power, to do so in the electoral arena, and to do it as soon as possible, the prd
focused its resources on elections (Hilgers, 2008, 2012). The resources that would have been
necessary for institutionalizing party rules and regulations to ensure internal cohesion and
democratic procedures were not available. As a result, leadership and alliances were person-
alized, and factions and currents battled for power. When the prd began to win local and
state governments, these tendencies spilled over into its style of government and played out
as clientelistic relationships with citizens (Hilgers, 2008, 2012). As pri-aliated street vendor
groups were initially abandoned by the priwhen the alternation in power occurred, they were
obliged to negotiate with the prd and find every possible means to survive and defend their
interests—from compliance with the law to outright corruption.
This points to yet another phenomenon that developed during the López Obrador adminis-
tration. Seeing that the prd had wonMexico City’s head of government for a second consecu-
tive term, some of the traditionally pri-aliated informal street vendor organizations started
to change parties. Not all the pri-aliated groups did, but several organizations followed this
pattern. This confirmed that the real interests of the street vendor organizations were econom-
ical and not political; seeing that their organizations were in danger for belonging to a party
that was no longer in power, street vendor leaders found it convenient to align with the new
party in power in order to ensure the survival of their organizations and receive favors from the
new ruling party in return for political and electoral support when needed, following the clien-
telistic practices that were already familiar to them. Gradually, the political clientele began to
change from one political party to another. Only the largest and strongest pri-aliated orga-
nizations resisted—such as Alejandra Barrios’s alcc—but they also profited from the option
of changing parties to demand more support from the pri.
There was amultiplication of informal street vendor groups in the city as a result of the lack
of formal employment, but also as a result of the corroboration of street vending as a very prof-
itable business for its leaders. The example of Roberto López, a public servant who became
a street vendor leader, suggests that the power, profitability and eective modus operandi of
informal street vendor organizations was such that he opted to become a leader of one of these
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groups.119 These new groups of informal street vendors became politicized; they did not look
for the support of the pri, but rather for the support of the prd. Where there were once strong
and traditional pri-aliated street vendor organizations, now there were new street vendor
groups with links to the prd. In this, prd factions and activists—such as René Bejarano—
played an important role.
The politicization of the street vending movement, having as political opposing poles the
pri and the prd, guaranteed the conflict for power. This conflictwas embodied by prd’sMaría
Rosete and pri’s Alejandra Barrios. MaríaRosetewas a rising star in the street vending activity,
protected by prd members and authorities; while Alejandra Barrios was one of the historical
leaders of the street vendingmovement, who hadbuilt her powerful vendor organization under
the protection of the pri. Conflict arrived in the form of a struggle for control of selling space
on the streets. Such rivalry, however, in reality represented the battle of the prd and the pri for
the control of street vendors in the area, and therefore, the control of a very important group
of political capital. Ironically, both groups involved in the struggle came out strengthened after
the conflict. María Rosete’s organization grewmore inmembership, power and influence, and
received protection from the prd; Alejandra Barrios’ association, after an initial onslaught
against her and her group by prd factions and prd authorities, also came out stronger—with
both authorities and political parties recognizing her authority—and became an element of
union among pri ocials and pri-aliated vendor organizations.
In the final stages of the López Obrador administration, political attacks and the onset of
political campaigns for the 2006 elections placed the government’s plans to address informal
street vending very low in the list of its priorities, delaying even more the implementation
of the necessary programs, policies, and measures to tackle it. The political and financial
strengthening of some informal street vending groups in the city ensured that they would be
around for quite some time.
At the federal level, President Foxplanned to incorporate the informal sector into the scheme
he had created for smes, which consisted of credits for smes and the incorporation of the in-
formal sector into the tax system. President Fox had promised to boost the growth of formal
employment in private enterprises in addition to building the institutions that facilitated the
emergence of entrepreneurs and self-employed who would generate their own sources of in-
119Similarly, the example of Edgar Rolando López Najera, a street vendor leader who became a pri local legis-
lator, demonstrates the power that street vendor groups had attained by the time of the López Obrador adminis-
tration. Leaders of PRI-aliated vendor organizations could demand and get the support of their party to run
for elected oce or be included in the party list for proportional representation seats. The same situation applies
to Alejandra Barrios—leader of the ALCC—whose case will be studied in Chapter 6.
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come. With those goals in mind, in 2002, he implemented a program to simplify the registra-
tion process of firms (sare). However, realizing that the generation of formal jobs had been
slowed down due to the world economic crisis, President Fox accepted that the informal work
was an option for the unemployed, and opted for a policy of tolerance of the informal activities
in Mexico. It was not until late in his government that he was able to implement a program
to incorporate the informal sector into the tax system (repeco) that, while it lost momentum
as it was being implemented by an outgoing government, it laid the foundations—together
with the sare, and as basic and perfectible as these two programs were—for a better andmore
comprehensive government policy on informality which has yet to crystallize.
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6. THE CULTURE OF INFORMAL I TY : THE CAS E
STUDY OF THE ASOC IAC IÓN LEG Í T IMA C Í V IC A
COMERC IA L A .C . ( A LCC ) .
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the case study of the Legitimate Civic and Commercial Association
(Asociación Legítima Cívica Comercial A.C., alcc) and its leader—Mrs. Alejandra Barrios
Richard, one of the historic leaders of street vendor organizations in Mexico City—to ana-
lyze, understand and illustrate the internal workings and general operation of these type of
organizations in Mexico City.
In an attempt to describe and analyze how the culture of informality works in practice, I
carried out exhaustive research on the alcc and a lengthy interview with Alejandra Barrios.1
The chapter uses the case of the alcc to find out how informal street vendor associations
originate, how they develop and evolve, what their dynamics and mechanisms are, how they
are organized, what their sources of funding are, how profitable informal street vending may
be, how they manage their resources, what their political links and aliations are, and what
their real power is.
Additionally, the chapter looks at the leader of this particular association, Alejandra Bar-
rios. It is important to know the background and personality of the leader to understand how
the association is managed and why it is run in an authoritarian and autocratic manner. At
times, people interviewedmake no distinction between Alejandra Barrios and the alcc, using
their names synonymously and perceiving them almost as a single entity.
The chapter will examine in detail the organizational scheme of the alcc and shed light
on how Alejandra Barrios and her colleagues may benefit from it. The chapter also touches
on the fact that some informal street vendor associations have developed schemes to provide
benefits for their members that resemble those social security benefits provided by the state
1Research for this chapter includes participant observation and interviews with other partakers: government
ocials, journalists and experts; as well as conversations with some members of the alcc.
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to formal workers. This has led many to call such types of informal vendor associations a
‘parallel government’.
The chapter also illustrates how the status of ‘semi-formality’ works in practice and allows
leaders and associations to circumvent the troubles of regulation and avoid reprisals from the
authorities, while taking advantage of the condition of being both informal and formal at the
same time.
Moreover, the chapter looks at social and economic features that characterize the groups
that make up informal street vendor organizations. These social and economic characteris-
tics (demographics, products, merchandise, and tactics to be competitive) are important as
they may have implications in dierent spheres of government (e.g. policy making and law
enforcement) and for dierent actors in society (e.g. formal businesses).
Finally, the chapter analyses the political resources the alcc and Alejandra Barrios have
developed over time and ponders on recent political events that confirm the rising power and
influence of the alcc and its leader—and members of her family—and of leaders of large
and/or powerful informal street vendor organizations in general.
6.2 Alejandra Barrios and the origins of the ALCC
The alcc is the largest, best organized and allegedly the most powerful street vendor associ-
ation in Mexico City today. It is also considered one of the oldest street vendor associations.
Alejandra Barrios is the president of the alcc, and is one of the historic leaders of the street
vendingmovement inMexico City togetherwith the late Guillermina Rico and Benita Chavar-
ría (who has retired from street vending). This section describes Alejandra Barrios’ history as
a street vendor leader, and analyses the alcc as a street vendor organization. These accounts
will allow the reader to understand how the culture of informality develops, how street vendor
leaders work, and how street vendor organizations are structured.
6.2.1 Alejandra Barrios: background and beginnings in informal street vending
Alejandra Barrios is a Mexico City native. She asserts that her parents and other ancestors
(grandparents and great grandparents) were all street vendors. Thus, Alejandra Barrios is in
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the fourth generation of a family of street vendors, and as some of her descendants are also
working in street vending, the family has been involved in this activity for five generations.
Alejandra Barrios has been a street vendor all her life. From a very early age—when she
was seven or eight years old—her mother would take her to sell in the streets ofMexico City’s
Historical Center—the Xocongo and Allende streets, and Tepito and La Lagunilla neighbor-
hoods (Barrios, 2010). That is howAlejandra Barrios got her start as an informal street vendor.
She would peddle plastic tablecloths at her family’s stall. Later she moved on to selling frying
pans, fresh fruit and some fayuca—contraband merchandise smuggled into the country to
avoid import duties. She remembers 1950 as the year she began street vending (Barrios, 2010;
aldf, 2013b). For this reason, Alejandra Barrios claims that she has been involved in the street
vendor movement for 65 years—as of December 2015, she is 72 years old (born on November
28, 1943) (Dickerson, 2007; Barrios, 2010; aldf, 2013b).
Barrios had a very limited formal education. She did not study beyond elementary school—
she has a third grade education (Brayman, 2003). “I did not study,” she toldme (Barrios, 2010).
She abandoned school to work on the street and help her parents. Some years later, at 16 years
old, she got married for the first time and stopped working on the streets. Almost every year,
she had a child. However, at age 18 she had to go back to work on the thoroughfare to help
her household economy, as she and her husband did not have enough money and earned very
little (Barrios, 2010). By the time she was 22 Barrios already had five children, and later she
had three more. All her eight children (by at least two husbands or partners) have now grown
up.2 Eventually, she separated from her first husband and continued working on the streets to
support her children. At a relatively young age, she was on the street with her children trying
to survive. “When you work in street vending you sacrifice a great deal for your children and
I have eight of them,” Barrios asserted (Brayman, 2003).
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when she was a young girl working in the thorough-
fare with her parents, Alejandra Barrios’ life overlapped with the administration of Ernesto P.
Uruchurtu as amayor ofMexico City. As seen before, one of the particularities of Uruchurtu’s
government was the relentless crackdown against street vendors, in addition to his policies of
market construction programs.
Alejandra Barrios recalls that her family used to sell wares in the streets near La Lagunilla
Market. When Uruchurtu started to implement the government’s public market construction
2I deduced this from the dierent family names of her children and other sources consulted. Alejandra Barrios’
current husband is Javier SanchezBecerra (Dickerson, 2007). I was unable to find the first name of herfirst husband,
but his family name is Jiménez. I contacted Barrios’ oce to verify the name of her children, but got no answer.
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program, the authorities threw the vendors out of the streets with the help of the granaderos
(riot police):
They tossedoutmyparents and the peoplewho sold goods there... The police and
granaderos broke up the stalls, destroyed the merchandise and beat up the street
vendors. After a big struggle on the part of my parents and their compadres [col-
leagues] to defend themselves and their livelihood, plazas and designated areas to
sell their goods were set up. (Brayman, 2003)
There is no evidence that Alejandra Barrios’ parents had obtained a stall within the newly
constructed markets. Alejandra Barrios herself could not get one as she was under age during
that time, 16 or 17 years old in 1960.
Despite the public market construction program and the relocation of many street vendors
into them, themarkets were not sucient to accommodate all the individuals devoted to street
vending. Thus, by 1957, the authorities gave formal authorization to some groups to be in-
stalled again in certain streets (Grisales Ramírez, 2003). The rest were banned from involve-
ment in any kind of street vending activity and those who reoended suered ruthless repres-
sion from the Uruchurtu government. Eventually, in 1966 the long-lasting mayor Ernesto
P. Uruchurtu resigned in opprobrium, having failed to propel himself to the presidency and
retired to private life after being broadly criticized by his political rivals for the razing of a
community of land invaders in an incident in 1966. During Uruchurtu’s final stage as mayor,
Alejandra Barrios—22 or 23 years at the time—started to envisage the movement that even-
tually would evolve into the Legitimate Civic and Commercial Association (alcc). Having
survived a ruthless and aggressive administration like Uruchurtu’s, the groups of street ven-
dors that emerged from this period of repression, emerged stronger, and during this period
the character of the street vendor leaders was formed for the future.
Between 1962 and 1972, the number of street vendors in the Historical Center gradually in-
creased, even thought vending on the public thoroughfare was virtually banned. By 1971, the
conflict between the market vendors and the street vendors was more than evident because the
street vendors captured the attention of clients from outside, not allowing them to enter the
markets. In 1972, the city authorities authorized vending on streets, a decision that once again
triggered unease among the market merchants; in response, they came out of the markets and
occupied spaces on the street to sell their products—in many cases keeping simultaneously
their market stand and a space on the streets—increasing the numbers of street vendors even
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more. It is in this context that the leadership of some individuals emerged among street ven-
dors groups (Grisales Ramírez, 2003).
6.2.2 The foundation of the Legitimate Civic and Commercial Association
Sources consulted seem to point to the late 1970s (specifically around 1977) as the period
when the group of individuals that would constitute the alcc came together (Braymann, 2003;
Dickerson, 2007; Barrios, 2010; Yañez, 2012). The alcc was eectively established in 1980
(aldf, 2013b) when Alejandra Barrios was 36 or 37 years old. She recalls that there were other
street vendors in the same street where she worked who—just like her—were trying to make
a living but were unorganized among themselves. Then, police and government inspectors
would come and try to take their merchandise. Violent fights would follow, which inevitably
ended with several street vendors arrested and most of the merchandise being confiscated or
destroyed:
The anger thatwould bring tome thememory of seeingmy parents being arrested
made me think that that [being arrested] would not happen to me, but it did
happen. Then, my courage, my bravery, my temperament made me a leader in
the eyes of the others because I would stand up to the authorities and quarrel and
fight with the police when they committed abuses. It was then that people started
to recognize my leadership, because I would go and defend them.
(Barrios, 2010)
Barrios said that these experiences of seeing street vendors being abusedmade her go around
the Historical Center inviting street vendors to join an organization that was being formed to
defend them. She started with a group of 40 people, but little by little it grew (Barrios, 2010).
This was the origin of the alcc.
Similarly, other sources suggest that Alejandra Barrios became the clear leader of the orga-
nization between 1982 and 1984 (Torres, 2003; Dickerson, 2007; Osorio, 2007a).3 According
to journalist Mario Torres (2003), Alejandra Barrios first registered the organization as a civil
association in 1983, before a notary public, and with its current name (Asociación Legítima
3Alejandra Barrios said in an interview that permanent harassment, continuous pestering, extortion and
intimidation by police led her to group together with a number of street vendors in 1984 to defend themselves
(Dickerson, 2007).
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Cívica Comercial, or alcc). Thus, Barrios promptly emerged as the leader of the newly cre-
ated association (Dickerson, 2007). That is how her leadership of the alcc started.
6.3 The current situation of the ALCC: membership, process of afliation, and fees
6.3.1 The number of ALCC members
In April 2010 Alejandra Barrios said she did not know exactly how many members the alcc
had. She claimed that after the implementation of the Informal Commerce Relocation Pro-
gram (Programa de Reordenamiento del Comercio Informal, prci) in 2008 by Mexico City’s
head of government, Marcelo Ebrard, several street vendors were relocated to commercial
plazas or commercial passages, so it was hard to keep the numbers under control. She esti-
mates that the alcc had between 5,000 and 6,000 aliates (Barrios, 2010).
This general figure fits with those given by several sources (Nájar, 1998; Brayman, 2003;
Dickerson, 2007; Osorio, 2007a). Yet, according to Ernesto Osorio, a Reforma newspaper
journalist, Alejandra Barrios controls the membership of her association and also has influ-
ence over nine more organizations (likely to be those of her family and other smaller organi-
zations which seek her protection), which account for more than 20,000 stallholders (Osorio,
2007a). The exact number is not known, or at least is not publicly known, and was not made
available to me (despite my insistence), and for a good reason: knowing the number of mem-
bers of the association makes it possible to calculate the amount of money the alcc handles
and the potential income earned from its activities. Moreover, city authorities could also use
this information in various ways, including to verify whether the alcc’s leadership is over-
charging (or undercharging) its members for the selling permits the delegations (or other city
authorities) give them; and to calculate if there is any corruption in the association, given its
earnings, among other things.
6.3.2 Who can become an ALCC member?
In theory, anyone can become a member of the alcc.4 If you know of the existence of the
association and take the initiative to join it, or if you are invited by somebody within the
4Barrios claims that there are people who have worked with her for 30 years.
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organization (another vendor member) to join, you can become an aliate of the alcc (Bar-
rios, 2010; Antunez, 2012). Barrios stresses the importance of people recommended to the
association by other alcc members and then explains how easy it is to join the alcc:
Suppose you do not have a job. You have a friend who has a stall and she or he
advises you to set up a stall as well. You go and investigate what line of products
is suitable for sale. Then, you come and speak to me and I will help you.
(Barrios, 2010)
As will be seen later on, this statement may well reveal that the real business of Alejandra
Barrios and the alcc is tomaintain a powerful associationwith ‘captivemembers’ fromwhom
she can extract money by oering in return a suitable economic profitability—flexibly and
without regulation—in street vending. Interestingly, this fits the story told by Alma Rosa
Moreno Razo in Chapter 5 of this thesis, regarding clandestine informal organizations.
6.3.3 The fees ALCC members pay
Individuals who want to become members of the alcc pay a one-time mx$600 registration
or membership fee (equivalent to us$47 or £32 in 2010) (Barrios, 2010).5 Once they become
alcc members, they pay weekly or monthly (and perhaps even daily) fees of 50 pesos (us$4
or £3 in 2010) (Barrios, 2010). Barrios claims that a member pays a weekly or a monthly fee
of 50 pesos depending on the selling capacity6 (merchandise capacity) of their business, but
she also said later in the interview with me, “They pay 50 pesos a week, which are 250 pesos
a month” (Barrios, 2010).7 Other sources state that fees paid to the association are higher
than what Barrios says, as some vendors confirmed they pay 50 pesos a day (Sanchez, 2005;
Dickerson, 2007). Moreover, I found evidence that a former member of the association who
rented an established stall inside the Tacuba Plaza—property of the alcc—paid a monthly
fee of mx$10,000 (us$800 or £600) in 2010 (Antunez, 2012). No matter what the real figure is,
Alejandra Barrios denies speculation that she has become rich on the backs of the poor (Dick-
5When the alccwas still becoming established, joining members did not pay any registration or membership
fee (Barrios, 2010).
6Selling capacity or merchandise capacity is the volume of sales a business has. It is either a small volume
(retail) or a large one (wholesale), or anything in between—half wholesale.
7Barrios says that she charges mx$50 a week, and assumes each month has five weeks, for a total of mx$250
a month. For the construction of Tables 6.1 and 6.2, I took the number of weeks in a year (52) and multiplied by
mx$50.
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erson, 2007; Barrios, 2010), but the revenues of the alcc are certainly considerable (Tables
6.1 and 6.2).
Table 6.1.: The amount of annual fees paid by ALCC members to the leadership
Annual fees paid per person to the alcc
Fee paid per
member




50 * 12 months 50 * 52 weeks 50*21 days *12 months
mx$ 600 2,600 12,600
us$ 48 208 1,008
£ 36 156 756
Source: Author’s calculation using the information given by the alcc and information published in various
sources.
**Calculations for this column were made assuming 21 days per month, as street vendors often work five
days a week. However, some of them work six and even seven days a week, but others might work less than
five days, so an average of five days a week is reasonable.
Exchange rates used (in June 2010): us$1 = mx$12.5; £1 = mx$16.66
Table 6.2.: ALCC annual income from total fees charged to members
(Range is from 5,000 members to 6,000 members)
Fee paid per
member
MX$50 a month MX$50 a week MX$50 a day**
alcc annual
income in
mx$ 3,000,000–3,600,000 13,000,000–15,600,000 63,000,000–75,600,000
us$ 240,000–288,000 1,040,000–1,248,000 5,040,000–6,048,000
£ 180,072–216,086 780,312–936,375 3,781,513–4,537,815
Source: Author’s calculation using the information given by the alcc and information published in various
sources.
**Calculations for this column were made assuming 21 days per month, as street vendors often work five
days a week. However, some of them work six and even seven days a week, but others might work less than
five days, so an average of five days a week is reasonable.
Exchange rates used (in June 2010): us$1 = mx$12.5; £1 = mx$16.66
Table 6.2 shows the dierent annual income ranges for the 5,000 to 6,000 members which
the alcc could earn depending on the fee it charges each member. If the fee charged to
alcc members was mx$50 a month, and the alcc had 5,000 members, then the annual in-
come of the alcc would be mx$3,000,000 (us$240,000 or £180,072), a considerable amount
of money. However, if the actual fee charged to alcc members was mx$50 a day (as some
sources suggest), and the alcc had 6,000members, then the annual income of the alccwould
be mx$75,600,000 (us$6,048,000 or £4,537,815), an extremely large sum of money.
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Given that there is a 25-fold dierence between the minimum and maximum estimates of
the annual alcc income from fees charged tomembers, a best point estimate can be calculated.
Let’s start by taking the arithmetic mean of the number of vendors in the association (5,500).
Then, let’s take themedian fee charged to vendors; since not all the vendors are chargedmx$50
a month and not all are charged mx$50 a day, let’s assume they are charged mx$50 a week. Fi-
nally, the number of weeks in a year is 52.8 Therefore, the best point estimate for the annual
income the alccmakes inmembership fees will bemx$14,300,000 (us$1,144,000 or £858,343),
still a very large sum of money considering that the alcc is, at best, a semi-formal organiza-
tion.
The alcc could have more than 6,000 members—the fact that Alejandra Barrios is never
sure of the number of members may have to do with her not wanting authorities to do the
maths. It works to her advantage not to disclose the membership numbers as she can bene-
fit from this in various ways. It could also be the case, as Ernesto Osorio (2007a) presumes,
that Alejandra Barrios has an influence over 20,000 stall holders—through her family’s as-
sociations and smaller associations linked to hers. Then, the alcc income—and Alejandra
Barrios’ takings—could be much, much more (Monge, 2009).
The alcc leadership may use the unknown numbers in its membership not only to make
a profit, but also for price dierentiation; that is, it might charge very dierent amounts of
money for letting a stall or a space, depending on dierent specific variables (type of stall, size
of stall, location of stall, merchandise capacity, and so on), as noted in Chapter 3. As men-
tioned earlier, a former member of the association told me that he had rented an established
fixed stall of about 1.5 meters long inside Plaza Tacuba—property of the alcc—and paid a
monthly fee of mx$10,000 (us$800 or £600) during 2010 (Antunez, 2012). The amount of that
monthly rent is easily equivalent to what a formal business owner would pay in rent for having
a formally established shop. The former alcc member—who sold jewelry—confirmed that
he paid mx$120,000 (us$9,600 or £7,200 in 2010) to the alcc a year in rent, plus some extra
money in other contributions (Antunez, 2012). The earnings the former member had selling
on the Tacuba Plaza stall were rarely larger than the monthly rent, so he eventually decided
to leave the commercial plaza and the association as it was not a profitable activity (Antunez,
2012).
Once a new alcc member has paid the membership fee, the proceedings continue: “Once
they are members, they get their alcc photo id credential and are included on our register.
Then, I take care of getting spaces for them to work” (Barrios, 2010). The alcc grants its
8In other words 5,500×50×52 = mx$14,300,000.
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members an id card so they can identify themselves to alcc representatives, the police, and
Mexico City authorities if necessary. The id card might also be used for other purposes of
control, for example, when alcc members are asked to attend a political rally and need to
identify themselves when leaders call the roll.
It is particularly telling that vendor associations (the alcc in this case) determine the new
member’s space on the street. There are several considerations to make. First, depending on
the amount of the fee new members are willing or able to pay, their vending space will be
located in a better or worse position, and will be larger or smaller.9 Second, the very fact that
the association has or will get the new members a space demonstrates the level of control or
ownership the association has over the street; either the association has already got a space
available and ready to use, or it makes one available in one way or another. Third, it may
be the case that association and city authorities have already agreed—legally or illegally—on
specific areas of tolerance or specific limits where the activity of street vending can be carried
out. Fourth, the alcc plays the role of a sort of informal employment agency, which is a role
that traditionally has corresponded to the employment government agencies.
6.4 Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of alcc members
6.4.1 Places of origin of ALCC members: locals, nationals, migrants, foreigners
The membership of the alcc is diverse—members have dierent origins and come from dif-
ferent places. Some have been born in the streets and neighborhoods where the alcc operates.
Others come from dierent Mexico City neighborhoods and delegations. Still others come
from dierent Mexican states, and some even come from other countries.
Many of the people who go to Mexico City from other states are looking for better oppor-
tunities. This is reflected in the alcc where about 40 percent of the total alcc membership
comes from outsideMexico City—from other states that make up theMexican Republic, par-
ticularly the neighboring State ofMexico, but some members come from states as far away as
Chiapas (Barrios, 2010). However, not all of them come to stay in Mexico City; some come
and go. In several states in Mexico, there are impoverished small villages whose inhabitants
9The size of the stall or space is as important as the location, and has changed over time. Stalls used to be 1
meter or 1.20 meters long, but now there are stalls that are 2 or 3 meters long—it all depends on the merchandise
capacity the vendor wants to exhibit. Spaces on the street are allocated in accordance with what street vendors
request. They pay the association more or less, depending on its position and size (Barrios, 2010).
305
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of alcc members
come to the capital city to sell their products. They come and sell handicrafts or clothing
that they manufacture in their villages.10 In the same way, people from those states come to
Mexico City to buy goods wholesale in Tepito or through other distributors that oer cheap
prices, and then they go back and sell those products in their villages or cities of origin (Bar-
rios, 2010).
Among the migrants who come to the capital in search for opportunities there is a fair
share of indigenous people. As there is a shortage of opportunities in Mexico City, one of the
migrants’ main activities—not the only one, but certainly the most visible—is informal street
vending, andmazahuas, otomíes, nahuas, huicholes, triquis, among other indigenous groups,
attempt to make a living from it (Albertani, 1999). It is worth noting that very little of the
money flowing through the informal street vending business goes to the indigenous people
since they do not sell products that require a large investment, such electronics or clothes.
Mainly they sell simple products like fruit, vegetables, seeds and—in a smaller proportion—
handicrafts and low-cost imported goods. Many of the indigenous people working on this
activity suer from discrimination and have confrontations with leaders of mestizo, social
or vendor organizations. In addition, they suer abuse from the police who beat them or
confiscate their goods (Albertani, 1999).
There is no accurate figure for the number of indigenous people working in informal street
vending in the Federal District. However, taking into account the number of indigenous asso-
ciations working in street vending in the capital and using the data from the Care Center for
IndigenousMigrants (Centro de Atención al IndígenaMigrante, catim) and the Secretariat of
Social Development of Mexico City, researcher Claudio Albertani (1999) estimated that there
were about 10,000 indigenous families, with a total of 50,000 to 60,000 indigenous individu-
als depending on informal street vending in Mexico City in the year 1999. While indigenous
people usually group in their own street vendor associations—identifying with people from
the same indigenous culture—others work individually and some have joined the alcc.
The alccmembers who come from other countries come from places as diverse as Canada,
several Central American countries, Bangladesh, South Korea, Cuba, Spain and the Czech
Republic, and sell their products—for example, rhinestones or food (crepes), just to mention
two—on stalls on the street or inside commercial plazas. According to Alejandra Barrios,
around 10 percent of alcc members are foreigners. They come to Mexico because things
10An example of this is the town of Santa María Asunción in the Hidalgo State, where 80 percent of the
families living in the town work in small sewing shops and textile factories (maquiladoras) where they produce
foreign-brand pirate shirts (Jimenez, 2013).
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went wrong for them in their countries, or they come as refugees of some sort and look for
opportunities to make a living, finding street vending an option (Barrios, 2010).
6.4.2 Socioeconomic proles of ALCC members
The diversity of the alcc is reflected not only in members’ dierent places of origin but also
in their dierent socioeconomic backgrounds: there are people who barely have any means of
subsistence; people who have an occupation, a profession or a degree but have been laid o
or are unable to find a job and need to work to make ends meet; and professional people who
claim they earn more by working on the streets or commercial plazas than in a formal job.
In addition, there are students who finance their education and schoolwork with the money
they earn working as street vendors, or recently graduated students who cannot find a formal
job after finishing school or university, and need to sell goods on the streets to make a living
(Barrios, 2010).
In theory, informal street vendors do not earnmore than theywould if employed in a formal
job, for various reasons.11 However, Alejandra Barrios argues that this depends on the type of
merchandise a street vendor oers. For example, she says that people who sell prepared food
make about 50–100 percent profit, those who sell clothing make about 20–40 percent profit. It
all depends on the merchandise or product, the selling capacity of the vendor, and the service
the vendor oers. Barrios claims this is what determines the earnings the street vendor is
able to make (Barrios, 2010). In fact, according to some sources, in 2012 an average informal
street vendor was earning more than some formal employees—machine operator, protection
guard, domestic service employee, and even some employees in formal established stores were
earning less than the average earnings of an informal street vendor (Gascón, 2012).12
Most of the individuals who go to Barrios’ association to ask for a space (and membership)
have already had previous experience in selling something—most likely on the streets. Very
11Not to mention the absence of formal employment benefits which certainly improve the quality of life of
formal workers.
12Many of these formal employees earned the minimum wage which is very low in Mexico. In 2012, the mini-
mum wage in Mexico for Zone A (the wealthiest geographical zone) was mx$62.33 per day, equivalent to us$4.47
(us$1 =mx$13.93) (sat, 2015). As we saw in Chapter 5, a study conducted by the Vice-Ministry of Revenues of the
Ministry of Finance showed that the average salary of informal employees was equivalent to 1.86 minimumwages,
and the salary of both informal employers and the self-employed was equivalent to 2.11 minimum wages. Both
figures give an average of 1.94 minimum wages for all those who are working in the informal economy (Acosta
Córdova, 1999).
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few have not had that experience. Alejandra Barrios recounts that some of them still ask what
they should sell:
And I suggest that they go and look around in the wholesale stores for something
marketable and buy from there. If they do not have enough money, I ask them for
the wholesale store address and I go and buy the products for them [so Alejandra
Barrios also has a role as an informal credit agency or moneylender]. Then, I give
it to them so they can sell on their designated space.
(Barrios, 2010)
Barrios also made an interesting and significant confession to me: “I have wholesalers, re-
tail vendors, popular eateries and everything” (Barrios, 2010). This is a subtle indication of
howorganized, big and powerful Alejandra Barrios’ association is, and this supports the story
of Alma Rosa Moreno Razo described in Chapter 5 regarding clandestine informal organiza-
tions. Clearly, there is no question that in order to manage the amount of goods and products,
stalls and members of the association, it takes a well-organized network of transport, storage,
distribution, administration, commercial plaza and street planning, enforcement schemes and
fee collection systems, contacts and influences in and outside the government, in broad day-
light or at night. At times, it seems that vendor members of the alcc are only some kind
of employees within the larger scheme of the association, working on it as if the alcc were a
large and fully organized formal company. Perhaps vendormembers no longer think they own
the association, as it is clear that it belongs to Alejandra Barrios. This phenomenon has also
been noted by Oehmichen (2001), who in 1998 studied the case of Silvia Sanchez Rico—the
daughter of the street vendor leader Guillermina Rico—and pointed out how street vendor
groups were evolving into large corporations whose branches reached the upper echelons of
government.13 This opinion was shared by researcher Héctor Castillo-Berthier (2010).
13According to Oehmichen (2001) the fees charged to street vendors (allowing them to sell on the streets)
constituted a major source of income for the leaders of the street vendor organizations. Oehmichen states that, in
1998, Silvia Sanchez Rico controlled around 100,000 street vendors in Mexico City, each of whom had to pay her
between 40 and60Mexican pesos perweek for their selling space, amounting to aminimumof aboutmx$4,000,000
a week (us$434,783 or £261,438 in 1998) (Oehmichen, 2001; Grisales Ramírez, 2003).
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6.5 Products and merchandise of the ALCC: price, origins, branding, and piracy
6.5.1 How ALCC members obtain lowcost products to sell at competitive prices
One of the key questions regarding street vending is how street vendors manage to obtain
goods and products that are exceptionally cheap, and where they come from. These low-price
products allow street vendors to compete successfully with formal businesses and ensure they
have a clientele (particularly individuals with low incomes) whose income will be maximized
by acquiring these types of low-price, aordable products.
When I asked Alejandra Barrios about the competitiveness and origin of the products sold
by alcc members, she explained that illegal products (i.e. stolen products, illegal imports,
pirate goods) are at one end of the commercial spectrum and goods produced (and/or sold)
by large formal companies are at the other end. What the alcc does is to take advantage of
the gap between one and the other. In other words, the alcc takes advantage of the dierence
in prices:
If you buy from Tepito you will find extremely low prices because the products
or goods are stolen from truck trailers that transport them; or they are brought
as illegal imports through the borders; or the smugglers do not pay taxes as they
bribe the customs ocials. All these maneuvers drive the prices down.
(Barrios, 2010)
This type of goods can only be sold to certain people, mainly those who would be unable
to trace the origin of the products or those who do not care about the unlawful origin of
the products and prefer price over legality. The price dierence between buying something
in somewhere like Tepito and from an authorized retailer might be around 70 percent of the
product (Barrios, 2010).14 Consequently, the association can aord to oer very competitive
prices to its vendor members and these, likewise, to buyers on the streets. Alejandra Barrios
says that she gives special prices to the most disadvantagedmembers15 because otherwise they
would not be able to aord the merchandise (Barrios, 2010). Barrios did not reveal to me from
14In addition, informal street vendors give the value-added of opportunity cost. By bringing the product closer
to the buyer on the streets, informal vendors gain through locational advantage.
15Members of the alcc do not pay value-added tax when they buy from the association, and special prices
are given to its most disadvantaged members so they can aord merchandise and sell it. This intermediary role
also signals, as mentioned earlier, that Barrios’ business is not selling on the streets per se, but rather keeping an
association alive with a ‘captive membership’ from whom she extracts revenues.
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which sources she buys the products for the alcc, but in an interview withMatthew Brayman
(2003) she stated:
Our goods are cheaper than anywhere else and are very accessible. This is because
we buy our goods wholesale and mark them up very little. Street vendors do not
make a lot of money, and they help the low-income individuals because many
people cannot aord the prices of formal shops. Shop owners do not buy in the
massive bulk that we do.
A dierent sort of supply chain for street vendors is that of large formal businesses. In an o-
the-record conversation, a Mexican businessman told me that some large formal companies
sell goods they have in inventory—goods in stockwhich are out of season or not likely to sell—
to informal street vendors for very low prices. Again, this concurs with Alma Rosa Moreno
Razo’s comments in Chapter 5 of this thesis on the formal and fully registered companies that
take advantage of and profit from informality.
If authorities know that street vendor groups buy their goods in places like Tepito, they
could repress the distributors selling them and dismantle their respective chains of supply,
which would suocate part of the informal street vending business by cutting its sources of
supply. However, in an o-the-record conversation, a politician’s assistant told me that the
supply chains that provide street vendor organizations are so sophisticated—not least because
they are in some degree complicit with the authorities through corruption—that they work
even better and are more ecient than those of the large formal enterprises.
6.5.2 Changes in the type of merchandise sold: origin, evolution, preferences, and branding
The merchandise sold by street vendors has evolved over time, responding to dierent condi-
tions, incentives, and motivations. The first change has been in the balance of sales of ille-
gal and legal goods. In the past, people used to go to Tepito to buy fayuca—foreign goods
(of legal or illegal nature) brought into the country surreptitiously to avoid paying custom
duties—because these products were attractive to buyers for their price and novelty. There-
fore, street vendors bought fayuca to sell on the streets, as it would bring business and profits
(Barrios, 2010). Most of the fayuca came from the usa. When the North American Free Trade
Agreement (nafta) came into force in January 1994, the majority of the import duties gradu-
ally disappeared and most former fayuca merchandise progressively became legal. Nowadays
smuggled goods come from several countries and, many times, they are manufactured with
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low-quality materials to reduce their cost but are well-finished products, so they can pass for
good quality products in the eye of the buyer. Additionally, modern smuggled goods are usu-
ally illegal goods and are forbidden for very specific reasons—for example they are counter-
feited or pirate goods, drugs, weapons, or pornography—or simply they come from a country
that does not have a free trade agreement with Mexico.
Alejandra Barrios has observed this change of merchandise over time. She acknowledged it
and excused the behaviour of fayuca vendors and buyers based on economic motivations:
But here, it is not the fault of the buyers or the street vendors, they are not the
ones who should be in charge of fighting the smuggling mafias. The government
should be responsible for fighting these mafia groups. If you go to a store and
find a dvd for 200 pesos and then you go to Tepito and find the same dvd for 20
or 10 pesos, who would you buy it from?
(Barrios, 2010)
This reasoning is even stronger when you are in the low-income bracket and, therefore,
do not have money to spare. In countries with large income inequalities like Mexico, this—
purchasing informally sold products—might be the only way those with low incomes can
obtain the same sort of goods that middle-income or high-income individuals purchase.
Regarding the country of origin of the products, Alejandra Barrios asserts that, at present,
foreign products sold by street vendors come from dierent parts of the world, not only the
usa and China. It all depends on the demand for and price of the product (Barrios, 2010).
Likewise, the overall demand for products on the streets points to a preference for foreign
products over national ones: “Currently, there is more demand for foreign merchandise than
for the national one” (Barrios, 2010). This is another significant change as in the past there
was more demand for national products than for foreign products.16 Nowadays the price of
imported or smuggled products is the same or lower than that of national products, and of
equal or better quality (though, as mentioned before, some very cheap imports or smuggled
products are of very low quality).
This also has to do with branding and piracy. Alejandra Barrios explained it in this way:
If there was demand for an international brand, Nike for instance, and it is in
my line of products, most likely I would add that brand to my business. I would
add a Nike logo and label to jackets or tennis shoes. People might not know the
16The demand for national products was larger than the demand for foreign products throughout the first half
of the 20th century and until the 1970s, after which the demand for foreign merchandise increased.
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quality of the product and therefore buy it thinking it is a foreign product, when
in reality it is made in Mexico. That is the way it is.
(Barrios, 2010)
This is not only informality but also product piracy. As can be observed, some informal
street vendor organizations follow this practice, but most of the time, street vendors are at
the end of the line of the piracy industry as they sell these products on the thoroughfare but
they are not the manufacturers. In other words, pirate goods are usually not produced by
street vendor groups but by other larger, well-organized informal and even criminal groups.
Again, this substantiates the analysis by Alma Rosa Moreno Razo of clandestine informal
organizations described in Chapter 5. I have no evidence that the alcc produces pirate goods,
although the possibility of it doing so cannot be ruled out.
Alejandra Barrios acknowledges that informal street vending is bad for the economy, but
she is also convinced that, as there are no formal jobs available, the informal economy in
general and informal street vending in particular has helped a lot of people: “We know that
[informal street vending] is bad for the country because it is said that it harms the country’s
growth, according to those who know” (Barrios, 2010).17
Nevertheless, she argues that the informal and formal economies help each other in many
dierent ways. For example, she points out that the informal economy is a safety net for all
those people who do not have a job in the formal sector (Barrios, 2010). She argues that it is
also beneficial for thosewhodo not havemoney orhave a low income and cannot aord certain
products at formal prices. Through the informal economy, “they—low-income individuals—
can aord the products that the rich buy and get a benefit from them” (Barrios, 2010). As she
put it, “if the informal economy disappeared, there would be economic and social chaos in the
country because informal vendors would immediately become unemployed, and low-income
individuals would not be able to consume goods bought informally at low prices, among other
things” (Barrios, 2010).
17According to some scholars, informal street vending is bad because street vendors: do not pay taxes and thus
represents a loss of tax revenues; because their products and prices are seen as unfair and disloyal competitors
to formal businesses; and because the underground nature of their activities creates distortions which aect the
economic and social policies, among other things.
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6.6 The organizational structure of the ALCC
The organization of the alcc has grown larger and more complex over the years. The in-
disputable head and leader of the organization is Alejandra Barrios, who holds the title of
president of the alcc. While there is a member’s assembly in the alcc, which helps to delin-
eate the alcc’s agenda (Osorio, 2007b), there is no evidence that there are elections of any
kind in the association.
According to Alejandra Barrios (2010), the alcc has an executive board and in-field repre-
sentatives who help with the administration on the streets. There are usually five members on
the executive board and they have dierent roles—treasurer, conflict manager, general secre-
tary, president, etc. There are 40 in-field representatives, one for each zone where the alcc has
street or commercial plaza vendors (Barrios, 2010). If these figures are correct, the alcc has
40 zones, a considerable number, whether the ‘zone’ refers to a street, a block, a commercial
plaza, a district or a larger area. The in-field representatives are on the street to help members
in situ when there is an‘injustice’ of some sort (Barrios, 2010). “The representatives let us
know when a problem arises and then we fix things politically” (Barrios, 2010). This is a very
telling remark as it suggests that the ‘arrangement’ is made between the alcc leadership and
the government authorities.
I believe that the in-field representatives also supervise and control street vendors in their
zones. These representatives are easily identifiable every time there is a police operative to
remove street vendors from the thoroughfare; there is always a person with a radio transmit-
ter, in constant communication with either the association or the authorities, who tells street
vendors when and where to move with their merchandise. The in-field representatives may
also perform the duties of fee collection, but it is not clear whether or not they do this. Other
informal vendor associations have groups of five or six people who collect the fees every day
(Sanchez, 2005), but these associations are not as big as the alcc.
6.6.1 The administration of trust funds
As noted in Chapter 3, some of the larger and most systematic street vendor organizations
are able to accumulate considerable levels of monetary wealth and create trust funds (fide-
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icomisos) in order to evade tax payments and obtain other economic advantages.18 In situa-
tions like this, a trust fund eectively functions as an informal bank or informal credit insti-
tution from where vendor leaders can draw cash for multiple purposes, some for the benefit
of the association, some for their personal benefit. This is the case with the alcc.
TheReforma newspaper journalist Ernesto Osorio outlined an organizational chart, based
on inquiries he made about the alcc in 2007. According to Osorio (2007a, 2007b), Alejandra
Barrios’ association manages its resources through two trusts fund. The first is the Popular
Commerce Trust Fund, which distributes expenses for four areas:
• education, which includes child care (the child development center) and vocational train-
ing
• medical and health services, provided through agreements reached with physicians who
have their practice in the downtown area
• administration of the Tacuba Plaza, headquarters of the alcc
• alcc general administration, including budget planning.
The second is the Housing Trust Fund, destined to construct apartments for members of
the association, and to grant accessible mortgage loans to buy them (Osorio, 2007a, 2007b)
In addition to these two trust funds, Osorio (2007b) points out that there are three commis-
sionswith very specific taskswithin the alcc (Figure 6.1). These are the Sports Commission—
which organizes sport tournaments for the members, and provides free uniforms and financial
support; the Legal Advisory Services Commission—which provides all types of legal services
to vendors and members of the association; and the Social Communication Commission—
which looks after the public image of the association and its leader and responds to informa-
tion requests from the news media. Dickerson (2007) points out that Alejandra Barrios has
a publicist, and I was able to witness that people in Barrios’ oce maintain direct contact
with newspapers and other media to plead for or advocate Alejandra Barrios’ causes and pub-
lic image. Figure 6.1 shows the organizational chart of the alcc combining the information
gathered by Osorio (2007a) and by me.
18In Mexico, trust funds (fideicomisos) are widely used to avoid paying certain taxes. According to the tax
code of the Mexican federation, only individuals and corporations are required to contribute to the tax system
(to pay taxes). A trust fund has no legal personality and therefore cannot be considered either a legal entity or a
natural person (individual). For this reason, trust funds are not subject to taxes.
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Figure 6.1.: Organizational chart of the ALCC





news media. Dickerson (2007) points out that Alejandra Barrios has a publicist, and the author 
was able to witness that people in Barrios’ office maintain direct contact with newspapers and 
other media to plead for or advocate Alejandra Barrios’ causes and public image. Figure 7.1 
shows the organizational chart of the ALCC combining the information gathered by Osorio 
(2007a) and by this author. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Organizational chart of the ALCC 
 
 
Sources: Osorio, 2007a; author’s research. 
 
 
The benefits of being an ALCC member  
 
The ‘informal’ social security system of the ALCC 
 
Sources: Osorio, 2007a; Author’s research.
6.7 The benets of being an alcc member
6.7.1 The `informal' social security system of the ALCC
There may be some slight dierences betweenOsorio’s version of the alcc’s organization and
what Alejandra Barrios told me regarding the use of trust funds and the structure of the alcc,
as discussed in the last section. What is certain is the highly complex administration of the
alcc’s finances and organization. When asked about the management of the internal finances
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of the association, Alejandra Barrios preferred to elaborate instead on the dierent purposes
of the trust funds.
Barrios explained that in 1990 she created a trust fund (most likely, the Popular Commerce
Trust Fund), which is used by the alcc for several purposes (Barrios, 2010). She said that
most alcc members benefit from this trust fund, as it serves many objectives. It helped to
build the child development center (Centro de Desarrollo Infantil, cendi) so children stay in
the daycare center and learn while their parents sell on the streets; and it helped to renovate the
commercial plazas given to them by the authorities so vendors could sell on better organized
and equipped sites. It is also used:
• to defend and protect women members who are victims of abuse
• to help pay for funeral expenses when members or their relatives die
• to generate jobs for people (particularly prospective or new alcc members) who have
no startup capital to jumpstart their vending activity
• to find ways to help members who are imprisoned and get them out using legal advice
and representation from lawyers and other specialists
• to pay professional experts for special advice on certain specific topics (Barrios, 2010).
6.7.2 The day care center and schooling for children of ALCC members
As mentioned above, the alcc’s child development center, the cendi, was founded and put
into operation by Alejandra Barrios in or before 1996, but was ocially registered with the
relevant authorities on November 4, 1999.19 The cendi, located in the Historical Center, is
ocially recognized by the Ministry of Public Education (Secretaría de Educación Pública,
sep) for childcare and early education, and the Ministry of Health (Secretaría de Salud, ss), as
it meets their standards (Osorio, 2007a). This demonstrates once more the condition of semi-
formality of certain activities and establishments within the informal street vendor groups:
this is a child development center legally establishedby a semi-formal civil association,20 which
provides services to informal workers.
19The cendi is headed by ProfessorElenaHernándezMartínez, whomanages 22 employees, including teachers
and support, administration, and monitoring sta (Osorio, 2007a).
20In reality, the alcc has full legal status by virtue of being registered as a ‘civil association’, but it does operate
as a semi-formal organization.
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Single mothers or couples who work as informal street vendors and are members of the
alcc benefit from the cendi. Parents leave their children there while they work on the streets.
The cendi is open from 7:00 am to 18:30 pm and gives the children three meals and a snack.
Children in the center take part in several activities, including computer classes, artistic classes,
sports, and English lessons. In addition, parents can monitor their children over the internet
through close-circuit television (cctv), to which only they have access. Parents pay mx$25
(us$1.95 or £1.29 in 2010) per week for the cendi, which go directly to the alcc trust fund
(Osorio, 2007b). “Mrs. Barrios does not give us anything for free, but if [she had not estab-
lished the cendi] where else could we find a school or a daycare center [for our children]? The
government daycare centers always have a lot of requirements” says a street vendor who has
registered her three children in the alcc’s child development center (Osorio, 2007b).
6.7.3 Health services for ALCC members
Until recently a doctor oered his services without charge to members of the alcc. After the
doctor left his post, the alcc agreed with the clinics and doctors who have their practices in
the Historical Center area to pay a certain amount of money to these doctors so they provide
medical care to alccmembers. The doctors refermembers who have special health conditions
or serious illnesses to first-level hospitals with which they have a direct relationship and the
alcc covers the medical costs (Osorio, 2007b; Barrios, 2010).
Alejandra Barrios confirmed to me that members with serious health conditions are sent to
the public hospitals and medical centers, specializing in specific diseases, located in the Tlal-
pan Delegation—in southernMexico City—because “it is the most correct and humane thing
I can do” (Barrios, 2010). These hospitals are equipped with the most advanced instruments
and equipment, and the best physicians have practices there as well. Barrios also said that
the alcc gives members who are ill money to buy medicine and help with other needs they
may have (Barrios, 2010). “We also give them housing; I try to give them what little I can. I
give them food provisions (despensas), what little I can give them, I always pay attention to
whatever needs they might have” (Barrios, 2010). Other type of health services available to
alcc members such as dental and ophthalmological services, and alternative medicine, are
oered in the Plaza Tacuba, as I was able to witness.
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6.7.4 Vocational training for ALCC members
Vocational training is one more benefit that the alcc provides to its members. The alcc of-
fers scholarships for members who decide to study a particular line of work or occupation.
An example of this is a beauty school the alcc recently opened, but this was closed down,
according to Alejandra Barrios, because members enrolled in the classes but did not attend
them because they were selling on the streets. In addition, the maintenance cost of the beauty
school and the labor cost (i.e. the teacher’s salary) were high and it was not considered ap-
propriate to run it any more (Barrios, 2010). Nevertheless, a lot of members enrolled and
some finished their courses and graduated in one specialization or another (e.g. hair dyeing,
hair cutting, and so on), becoming beauty professionals. Despite the school’s closure, Ale-
jandra Barrios is not discouraged and is planning to open another occupational school. She
explained that the government has social assistance in several forms—among them vocational
training or technical school, but it does not provide it to everyone: “The government does not
open the doors to everybody. That poses a problem” (Barrios, 2010).
The alcc provides benefits not only to its members but also to the community. The as-
sociation often participates in philanthropic activities. Those administering the alcc have
links with social and charitable organizations, and give them help in kind when there is an
emergency or on special occasions such as Christmas or New Year. Such is the case of the
Asociación Ser Humano A.C., which looks after 2,500 people with hiv. Other groups such
as La Granja Para Ninos La Esperanza A.C., the Casa Hogar San Vicente, and other orphan
homes and children’s educational institutions also receive donations in kind from the alcc
(Osorio, 2007b).
6.7.5 A parallel government?
Several experts and scholars consulted believe that the complexity, soundness, and adaptabil-
ity of the organizational structure of the alcc give Alejandra Barrios and her association such
power that it is virtually impossible to remove alcc street vendors from the Historical Center
area (Osorio, 2007a; Monge, 2009; Castillo-Berthier, 2010). From what has been described
above, it could be argued that, to a certain extent, associations like the alcc are becoming
parallel powers to those of the city and federal government in several respects, for example,
in providing rights that the government does not provide (to informal street vendors) and in
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demanding obligations that the government does not require from them, and filling the gover-
nance vacuums the government has not been able to fill, meet, or answer. In otherwords, street
vendor associations and their members have signed their own ‘social contract’21 (Birdsall and
Menezes, 2005; Perry et al., 2007; Saavedra and Tommasi, 2007).
Dr. Carlos Sirvent, a political science researcher at the National Autonomous University of
Mexico (unam), seems to be of the same opinion:
Alejandra Barrios has an association with guild, labor, and corporate characteris-
tics which include, in addition, the characteristic of territoriality... As the author-
ities cannot provide all the benefits to [informal street] vendors, because they do
not pay taxes and therefore do not have access to government benefits, somebody
has to provide them.
(Osorio, 2007a)
Thus the alcc takes on the role of the government. Alejandra Barrios justifies her work
and that of her association by pointing out that she provides employment options: “I take a
load o the government’s back by giving jobs to the people, by giving them housing, by giving
them healthcare and good education” (Osorio, 2007a).
Organizations such as the alcc grow stronger in political power and influencewhen they of-
fer some kind of political capital to political party candidates or government ocials running
for elective oce. They support these candidates (for elective oces) in return for protection
or permission to keep on with their activities. They become fundamental in election years, as
noted in previous chapters. A new level of participation occurs when members or leaders of
street vendor organizations are themselves nominated and voted to elective posts, for example
as deputies in the local congress or assembly. This illustrates how powerful and influential the
street vending associations have become.
21As explained in Chapter 2, the expression ‘social contract’ refers to “some degree of societal consensus over
basic aspects of the operation and role of the state relative to the private sector and among citizens. In this usage,
‘social contract’ refers to key aspects of a social equilibrium, including beliefs and actions of citizens, organized
groups, and state actors” (Perry et al., 2007:216).
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6.8 The politics of the ALCC
6.8.1 The political liaisons of Alejandra Barrios and the ALCC
“I am a member of the pri,” says Alejandra Barrios boldly (Barrios, 2010). She has been a
member of the pri for many years, following the 1951 regulation, which recognized vendor
associations (of more than 100 members) and required them to join the pri. The alcc itself is
aliated to the pri’s popular sector through the cnop (Nájar, 1998).22 Over time, Barrios has
used her links and friendshipwith some seniormembers of the pri in her favor. She denies that
the alcc makes monetary contributions to the pri but says that some alcc members make
individual and voluntary contributions to support the party (Brayman, 2003), and adds that
members of her association come from—and sympathize with—all political parties and have
the freedom to support whoever they want (Brayman, 2003).
Nevertheless, sources say Barrios has threatened the pri with changing her party aliation
as a leverage to push her demands forward and get the support of the pri when things get
dicult.23 On one hand, she belongs to a critical current of the pri; on the other, she seeks to
get closer to the Party of the Democratic Revolution (prd), which has governed Mexico City
since 1997 (Nájar, 1998). Thus, it seems she has been willing to use the option of change of
party aliation to strengthen her bargaining power with both the prd and the pri:24 with the
prd to gain the favors of the Mexico City government, and with the pri—her party—to get
the party’s top leaders to help the alcc when they need it. This type of bargaining power,
coincidentally, has been a game-changer and has become available to informal street vendor
leaders and association as a result of democracy and the alternation in power.
6.8.2 The effects of the alternation of the PRI and PRD governments on the ALCC in Mexico City
Alejandra Barrios believes that the alteration of political parties in power in Mexico City was
very hard and dicult for the alcc because the prd brought a new group of ocials and
22Barrios’ biographical information, found in aldf (2013b), states that the alcc became aliated to the pri
on February 18, 2003. However, many dierent sources confirm that the alcc became aliated to the pri many
years earlier.
23Alejandra Barrios is credited with the phrase: “I dance with whoever wishes to dance, no matter if it is the
pri, the prd, or the pan” (note of the author).
24There is also evidence thatBarrios has had rapprochementswith panmembers, aswas the casewithDemetrio
Sodi, when he was the pan’s candidate for the headship of the Federal District (Cuenca, 2006).
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politicians which initially mistreated and sometimes repressed leaders and organizations that
were aliated to other parties (Barrios, 2010). However, she acknowledges that, little by little,
this situation began to change:
The prd began to understand us, and eventually provided social assistance, but
that took time. But for us, it [the alternation in power] was such an abrupt change
that it caught us o guard and drove us out of control. But yes, in the end the prd
is also helping our association and has done for some time.While they suppressed
us, they also helped us. Much in the same fashion as the pri did in the past: they
helped us, but also suppressed us.
(Barrios, 2010)
As seen in Chapter 4, the last pri government in Mexico City was that of Mayor Oscar
Espinosa Villarreal (1994–1997). His administration was very tough on Alejandra Barrios’
association. But when Espinosa Villarreal left the post, he was haunted politically for all the
mistakes he had committed during his administration. Then, after the electoral victory of
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in 1997, the prd came to power in Mexico City. Alejandra Barrios
and the alcc had to get used to dealing with a dierent party governing in Mexico City, in
what has been described as a sometimes tense relationship. Barrios’ relationship with the
administration of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (1997–2000) was respectful and characterized by
dialogue, but when Andres Manuel López Obrador became head of government in 2000, ten-
sions rose. In particular, problems emerged with certain prd ocials and leaders such as
Dolores Padierna and René Bejarano. Barrios’ association was badly treated and even Ale-
jandra Barrios herself was imprisoned presumably for planning the murder of Jorge Ramírez
Espindola—as explained in Chapter 5—but according to her it was “for the arrogance of cer-
tain authorities [referring to Dolores Padierna]” (Barrios, 2010). Eventually, when Marcelo
Ebrard became the new city’s head of government in 2006 tensions faded and things went back
to normal.
6.8.3 The ALCC's relationship with the PRD governments of Mexico City
Alejandra Barrios thinks the pri governments were better for the alcc than those of the prd:
The prd does not fall behind, but it took time for them to understand us. All
the people who came with the prd were unknown to us, we knew only very few
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groups, like the group of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, but most of the prd groups
were new and were keen to take over and to take from the old order whatever
they could.
(Barrios, 2010)
She explains how new, prd-associated, political groups were formed:
Many groups linked with the prd came along during that time. They emerged
from neighborhood organizations and other prd support groups that we did not
know then. Therefore, when the prd and its groups took over the government of
Mexico City, it took time for them to respect us. When Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas
becamemayor, he respected us. He was very good and kind to me. He recognized
our association and gave us social assistance, but for other prd groups it took
longer. Particularly, when the group of Andrés Manuel López Obrador and René
Bejarano came to power [in the year 2000], it was chaos for us. They were [the
prd political faction] who hit me harder and created much discontent among the
people. We suered harsh repression from René Bejarano and Dolores Padierna.
That group was my enemy.
(Barrios, 2010)
As explained in detail in Chapter 5, Dolores Padierna was the head of the Cuauhtémoc
Delegation between 2000 and 2003 and had numerous problems with Alejandra Barrios. In
August 2003, during a clash for spaces on the thoroughfare between the antagonistic groups
of Alejandra Barrios and María Rosete—a street vendor leader linked with the prd—the hus-
band of the latter, Jorge Ramírez Espindola, was killed. Alejandra Barrios was accused of
masterminding his murder and was imprisoned. According to Barrios, Padierna is respon-
sible for her imprisonment. She was later released (in December 2005) for lack of evidence,
after spending more than two years in prison (Barrios, 2010). Barrios argues that Dolores
Padierna, René Bejarano and María Rosete wanted to break the alcc in order to take over its
members, spaces on the streets, and trust funds (Monge, 2003; Cronica/ntx, 2004; Dickerson,
2007; Barrios, 2010; Osorio, 2012; Yañez, 2012).
However, after some time, things got back to normal. Marcelo Ebrard, a former primember
but later a member of the prd, became the head of government of Mexico City from 2006 to
2012. He had been an acquaintance of Alejandra Barrios for many years, since the times of
Mayor Camacho Solís, with whom Ebrard was a close collaborator. Ebrard recognized the
alcc as an association and respected its members and leadership. He also helped many other
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vendor leaders, regardless of their political aliation (Barrios, 2010): “He has given us a hand.
Therefore, we have started to work with a little bit more tranquility. There has not been much
repression against us” (Barrios, 2010).
6.8.4 The ALCC's relationship with the delegations of Mexico City
As discussed in Chapter 4, since 1970, Mexico City has been divided into 16 delegations or
boroughs for administrative purposes. During the pri administrations, the relationship be-
tween the alcc and the delegations was unstable in one respect—alcc’s vendor members
were either tolerated or forbidden from vending in the streets depending on the specific poli-
cies of the dierent mayors; but stable in another—delegations directly depended on Mexico
City’s central government and would not take any action without its consent. In fact, all the
delegation directors (or delegates) were appointed by the Mexico City mayor.25
However, after the elections of 1997 and the alternation in power that came with it, one of
the democratic changes in Mexico City’s electoral laws led to the direct election of the head
of each of the 16 delegations of the city by the year 2000. This gave the delegations more in-
dependence to govern. However, they still needed a high degree of coordination with Mexico
City’s central government, particularly when the delegational resources were not enough to
deal with an issue of the magnitude of street vending. This situation has led the informal ven-
dor leaders and groups to negotiate with both the delegation authorities and the city’s central
government authorities, especially if they come from dierent political parties.
Alejandra Barrios explains that over time the relationship between street vendors and the
delegations has changed for the worse. Delegations have the power to provide permits to sell
on the streets but often deny permits to applicants. Moreover, permit requirements are not
clear, since there are dierent application procedures in each delegation and, in some areas of
the city, street vending is in fact prohibited (i.e. the 1993 decree). But Alejandra Barrios notes
that, at least for now, street vendors and their leaders have some alternative means to protect
themselves:
The heads of the delegations do not want to give permits to sell on the streets.
Nowadays, however, street vendors [and their leaders] have ways to defend them-
selves because the law protects and supports us when we form civil associations
[citizen’s associations or unincorporated non-profit associations].
25And at times, by the country’s president himself.
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(Barrios, 2010)
According toMexican law—more specifically theCivilCode of the FederalDistrict (ccdf)26—
a ‘civil association’ is a private, non-profit organization with full legal status, integrated by
natural persons (individuals) to carry out cultural, educational, outreach, entertainment, or
similar purposes with the objective of fostering social activities among their aliates and/or
any third parties (ccdf, 2012). Barrios told me: “As a civil association and as a social assis-
tance association, we have some rights and the authorities also have the obligation to give us
some help and give us our selling permits” (Barrios, 2010). Barrios’ armation is very inter-
esting for the fact that the alcc is made up of individuals who, mostly, perform informal street
vending activities, yet the alcc has full legal status by virtue of being registered as a ‘civil as-
sociation’. Under that status, the alcc and Alejandra Barrios are entitled to demand certain
‘rights’. When appealing for their rights, informal street vendor groups generally refer to Ar-
ticles 4, 5, 6, and 123 of the Mexican Constitution, which cover human rights and the right to
work (Jiménez, 2012). Yet they (Barrios and the alcc) did not mention anything about their
‘obligations’—the most obvious civil obligation is paying taxes—though they might consider
their payment of selling permits as a kind of tax. This is precisely where the relevance of the
status of semi-formality comes into action, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.27
Alejandra Barrios complains about the leadership of certain delegations: “There are some
heads of delegations who do not understand and do not give us any help and prefer to put their
own people [street vendor groups] than to help us [the alcc]” (Barrios, 2010). This statement
reveals that there is a relationship between delegation authorities and other informal groups
more sympathetic to their interests—for example, Elena Ortega Padierna (leader of a street
vendor group) and her relative Dolores Padierna (former head of the Cuauhtémoc Delegation
26Civil Code of the Federal District—Guidelines on Civil Associations:
• Article 2670: When several individuals agree on gathering, in a way that is not entirely transitory, for
a purpose that is not prohibited by law and has no predominantly economic nature, it constitutes an
association.
• Article 2671: The contract to constitute an association must be in writing.
• Article 2672: The association may admit and exclude members.
• Article 2673: Associationswill be governed by their statutes, whichmust be registered in the PublicRegistry
to produce eects against third parties.
• Article 2674: The supreme powerof an association resides in the general assembly. The director ordirectors
of the associations will have privileges granted to them by the general assembly and the statutes, subject
to these documents.
And the specifications continue... to Article 2687 (ccdf, 2012).
27Semi-formality as a combination of the ambiguity of the legal framework and the relevance of the legal status.
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and since September 2012 a prd senator); andMaría Rosete, a street vendor leader with links
to the prd (Mondragón, 2006; Toscano, 2012; Yañez, 2012). One reason for conflict is when
the party in power favors one street vendor group over another: “They themselves trigger the
disorder, as public servants. It is thenwhenwe collidewith them [with delegation authorities]”
(Barrios, 2010).
As Alejandra Barrios points out, these situations have become worse in recent years. Since
the prd came into power in Mexico City, the party—or internal factions within it—has cre-
ated its own groups of informal street vendors linked to the prd, and ‘traditional’ or long-
established street vendor associations (most of them originally pri-aliated) have been aban-
doned or forced to change party allegiance:
We have only survived because the law protects us, otherwise we would have been
crushed long ago... the injustices committed by the delegations—prd dominated
delegations—have caused many deaths and many clashes. There has been a lot
of battering between the city government and the people [street vendors], their
associations and their leaders.
(Barrios, 2010)
6.8.5 The ALCC's relationship with the PRD government of Marcelo Ebrard
Under the administration ofHeadofGovernmentMarcelo Ebrard (2006–2012), things calmed
down. More respectwas paid towards the street vendor leaders (Barrios, 2010), the city govern-
ment worked directly with the leaders, and there was more government assistance to protect
the street vendors working in vulnerable conditions (Serrano, 2012). Alejandra Barrios says
that the delegations have not suppressed them since 2008, but the alcc pays the Mexico City
treasury promptly for the selling permits it gets: “We pay them 360 pesos (us$29 or £22 in
2010) per stand, every three months, and they give us the receipt of the selling permit on be-
half of the delegations” (Barrios, 2010). Thus the alcc pays the city tresury mx$1,440 per
stand per year (us$116 or £88 in 2010).28
However, Barrios acknowledges that there are still problems:
28If the alcc had 5,500 members, each with a stand, then it would pay the city authorities mx$7,920,000
(us$638,000 or £484,000 in 2010) per year for selling permits. For comparison purposes it is worth consulting
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 to have a rough idea of what the net revenues of the alcc could be. These numbers also
give an idea of the income delegations (or city government in this case) may obtain for issuing selling permits to
informal street vendor groups—a considerable amount of money.
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[Of course], there have been police raids. When we were relocated into commer-
cial plazas [under the prci,29 implemented by Ebrard’s administration in 2008],
we decided to modify the commercial plazas in order to accommodate all our
members within them. The people [from our association] who stayed out in
the streets are working as toreros30 [itinerant street vendors]. They are the ones
who are suppressed, whose merchandise is taken away by the authorities, who are
beaten up and mistreated by the police. Then, we have to come and defend and
protect them (our members). Those are the ones who did not get a space in the
commercial plazas [because of the limited spaces available].
(Barrios, 2010)
As Marcelo Ebrard’s administration in Mexico City drew to a close, problems emerged
again. Informal street vendors returned to the streets arguing that the commercial plazas
given to them by the city government did not work as expected. In March 2012, Héctor Ser-
rano Cortés—whowas in charge of the Informal Commerce Relocation Program (prci)—was
appointed secretary of government of the Federal District.31 This appointment signaled that
towards the end of his government ofMexico City, one of Ebrard’s priorities was to strengthen
his policies towards street vending and prevent street vendors invading the streets again (Ser-
rano, 2012).
Negotiations were not easy. In 2011 Victor Cisneros, leader of a group of formally estab-
lished businesses in Mexico City’s downtown area, declared:
There is an agreement between [street vendor] organizations and the government
that, whenMarcelo Ebrard leaves [his post as head of government], street vendors
will return to the streets because the commitment of staying inside [the commer-
cial plazas] was made with the current head of government. Whoever comes after
[Ebrard] will have to negotiate again.
(Paramo, 2011)
29The Informal Commerce Relocation Program (Programa de Reordenamiento del Comercio Informal, prci),
implemented in Mexico City by the Ebrard administration in 2008.
30Toreros or ‘bullfighters’ is a nickname for itinerant street vendorswho elude the government or police ocials
by means of their mobility. The toreros do not have a fixed space and usually wander around in streets with a high
circulation of cars and people. They sell fairly cheap and easily carried goods, which helps them to have a greater
degree of mobility as opposed to other forms of stand street vending.
31According to Héctor Serrano, Alejandra Barrios was the street vendor leader who benefited the most dur-
ing the Ebrard administration—she was assigned six or seven properties to relocate her association members
(Martínez, 2012; Serrano, 2012).
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Marcelo Ebrard reiterated that the Mexico City government would not allow nor tolerate
the return of informal street vendors in Perimeter A of the Historical Center, so police opera-
tions in the area would continue (Aldaz, 2012; Cruz-López, 2012; Serrano, 2012). Alejandra
Barrios acknowledged that street vendors had been working in the streets again but argued
that the commercial plazas32 provided by the Ebrard administration had not worked as ex-
pected, and complained about the strategy the city police used to remove street vendors from
the thoroughfare. She also stated that there would not be more rapprochements with the city
government until Miguel Angel Mancera—the newly elected head of government of Mexico
City (2012–2018)—was sworn into oce in December 2012 (Garcia-Gomez, 2012). Yet again,
history is repeating itself.
6.9 The political ambitions of Alejandra Barrios
6.9.1 Running for elected ofce
In April 2010, when I asked Alejandra Barrios if she had any political ambitions, she said
she had thought about running for a seat in one of the representative bodies in Mexico (the
Federal Chamber of Deputies or the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District):
Yes, of course I would like to hold an elective oce. With the power I get, I would
help my people even more. I would like to be elected for the Legislative Assembly
of the Federal District; I could be federal deputy or local deputy. I hope it happens
one day, that is why I am fighting and I will keep on fighting.
(Barrios, 2010)
In fact, she had requested a candidacy to her party (the pri) several times in the past. How-
ever, when Barrios asked her party if it would support her candidacy, it refused. She believes
the pri rejected her request because party members thought she didn’t know enough about
how things worked within the party, and in politics in general, to run for oce. Now, she
claims she has that knowledge: “I know I need to have advisers [and other types of support]
32Although Héctor Serrano said that Barrios was allocated six or seven commercial plazas during the Ebrard
administration, journalistic sources point out that some of them were used for purposes other than the reloca-
tion of street vendors. For example, some plaza spaces were transformed in formal commercial premises or in
oces and then rented to formal businesses or companies. Serrano admits that street vendor leaders—and not
the city government—are the ones who decide whether to grant these spaces to their members, but leaders can
use commercial plazas for any purpose they wish (Martínez, 2012; Serrano, 2012).
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in order to have authority over my party. I am also learning what it is to have power, in order
to be able to defend myself and eventually reach elected oce” (Barrios, 2010).
After some research, several sources confirmed that Alejandra Barrios was nominated by
the pri as a candidate for a seat in the Federal Chamber of Deputies in 2006 and as a local
deputy for the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (aldf) in 2009,33 but she did not
obtain any of the posts (Castillo-Berthier, 2010; Yañez, 2012). Barrios did not mention to me
that on several occasions her children Maricela, Sergio, Johana, Ruben and Ricardo Jiménez
Barrios34 have sought oce in the local legislature (Yañez, 2012). Sergio Jiménez Barrios35
was a substitute local deputy and had a seat as a pri local deputy at the aldf during the iv
Legislative period (2006–2009), but only for its last five months, as the incumbent holder of
the seat, Martin Olavarrieta, left to pursue the headship of the Miguel Hidalgo Delegation
(Grajeda, 2009; Osorio, 2009). What is more surprising is that during the local elections that
took place in 2009, Maricela Jiménez Barrios—daughter of Alejandra Barrios and sister of
Sergio Jiménez Barrios—sought a nomination to become a prd local deputy, but was denied
this on the grounds that she had generated violence during the internal elections of the prd
(Martínez, 2006; Yañez, 2012). It seems that the Barrios clan was determined not only to get
seats in any representative chamber in one way or another, but also to diversify its political
power and influence regardless of the political party. The fact that Maricela Jiménez Barrios
attempted to receive a nomination through the prd is evidence of the close links that exist
between the Barrios family and the prd. It also shows how street vendor organizations and
their leaders have evolved and deliberately use the democratic game to find ways to get closer
to the governing authorities—and through elected oce become an authority themselves—
to be able to protect and defend their interests from within both the legal system and the
government.
33In 2009, Alejandra Barrios was in 18th place on the pri list for a seat as a plurinominal local deputy at the
aldf.
34In addition, Diana Sanchez Barrios, Graciela Coronel Barrios, and Javier Alejandro Sanchez Barrios (some
sources refer to him as Javier Jiménez Barrios), children (or close relatives) ofAlejandra Barrios, have been involved
in informal street vending through the formation and control of their own associations located in dierent zones
in Mexico City (Alba Vega, 2012; Jiménez, 2012).
35Like his mother, Sergio Jiménez Barrios is a street vendor leaderwho heads the groupDemocraticMovement
for a Dignified Life (Movimiento Democrático por una Vida Digna), which has around two thousand members.
His group has benefited from the prci, and relocated members to commercial plazas (Osorio, 2009; Sebreros,
2011).
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6.9.2 How Alejandra Barrios would deal with the problem of street vending in Mexico City
I asked Alejandra Barrios how she would end the problem of informal street vending in the
event that she had a position of power. Interestingly, and in contrast to the approach taken
by most policy-makers, rather than thinking on how to eradicate street vending, Barrios’ re-
sponse focused on how to make it more ecient and fairer. While she mentioned it was imper-
ative to create more formal jobs and have better wages, she also was in favor of building more
commercial plazas and commercial passages. “If I were somebody important and I had the
power to help the underprivileged, I would do everything with a social focus,” she said (Bar-
rios, 2010), and argued that the main obstacle to solving the issue of informal street vending
was corruption: “Let’s face it, most government ocials steal the money. They come to work
[in public oce] to benefit themselves and those who surround them” (Barrios, 2010). She
considered that Mexico has large resources but as government ocials and politicians make
poor use of public money the many injustices that exist in society are not resolved:
These people [government ocials and politicians] go to the press and publicly
say they have helped here and there, when in reality they have helped no one... If
I had power, the first thing I would do is to set commercial plazas in the most
important commercial locations in order to relocate [street vendors] who would
benefit from that location. I would also give them some financial support from the
government’s treasury so all thiswould growmore. With thatwewould helpmore
people. In the streets, I would standardize the tianguis,36 and help the craftsmen
and artisans to sell their products in certain spaces or tarps for 15 days or amonth
in dierent parts in the country. But you have to give them [street vendors] the
opportunity; you cannot deny people the right to work. I would look after them a
lot, if I had that power. And of course, I would give them housing, health services,
help them in many ways.
(Barrios, 2010)
36A tianguis is an open air market or bazaar that is traditionally held on certain market days in a town or city
neighborhood in Mexico and Central America. This bazaar tradition has its roots in the pre-Hispanic period and
continues in many cases essentially unchanged in the present day. Theword tianguis comes from theNahuatl word
tianquiztli or tiya¯nquiztli used to denominate a day market or harvest. In rural areas, many traditional types of
merchandise, such as agricultural products, are still sold, but nowadays modern, mass-produced goods are sold as
well. In cities, sales are mostly of mass-produced goods, but the organization of tianguis has changed little. There
are also specialty tianguis for holidays such as Christmas, and for particular types of items such as cars or art
(Villegas, 2010).
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When I asked Alejandra Barrios if all she had gone through as a street vendor leader had
been worthwhile, she replied:
Yes, it has beenworth it even though leaderswho defend social causes like ours fre-
quently find government authorities and ocers searching for ways to trap them
and eventually put them in prison; especially when the leader has the conviction
to defend a particular social cause. That is what they do in order to detain a leader.
That is what they did to me, but I came out of prison with more enthusiasm and
desire to fight in favor of my members. (Barrios, 2010)
6.9.3 The exercise of formal power
On Friday September 14, 2012, Alejandra Barrios was sworn in as pri Local Deputy for the vi
Legislature of the aldf. The pri branch inMexico City proposed her as a candidate for a seat
in the local assembly under the scheme of proportional representation.37 Barrios was number
5 in a list of 13 pluri-nominal (or proportional representation) candidates the pri submitted
to the Federal District Electoral Institute (iedf), to occupy a place in the capital’s Legislative
Assembly (Martínez, 2012).38
Immediately, Barrios got involved in the activities of the aldf, and became president of the
Commission for Monitoring and Evaluation of Policies and Social Programs (Comisión de
Vigilancia y Evaluación de Políticas y Programas Sociales). She is also a member of the Hu-
man Rights Commission (Comisión de Derechos Humanos), the Social Development Com-
mission (Comisión de Desarrollo Social), the Equity and Gender Commission (Comisión de
Equidad y Genero), the Supply and Food Distribution Commission (Comisión de Abasto y
37Proportional representation (pr) is a voting system—used to elect an assembly or council—whereby the
number of seats won by a party or group of candidates is proportionate to the number of votes received. For
example, under a pr voting system if 20 percent of voters support a particular party then roughly 20 percent of
seats will be won by that party. pr is an alternative to voting systems based on single member districts or bloc
voting; these non-pr systems tend to produce disproportionate outcomes and to have a bias in favor of larger
political groups. pr systems tend to produce a proliferation of political parties, while single member districts
encourage a two-party system. There are dierent forms of pr. Some are focused solely on achieving the pr
of dierent political parties (such as List pr, as in Mexico); others permit voters to choose between individual
candidates (such as Single Transferable Vote pr, as in Australia). The degree of proportionality also varies; it is
determined by factors such as the precise formula used to allocate seats, the number of seats in each constituency
or the elected body as a whole, and the level of any minimum threshold for election (Colomer, 2004).
38The pri won nine seats on the aldf, allowing Barrios to get a seat. Interestingly, Ruben Erik Alejandro
Jiménez Hernández also got a seat among the pri legislators. He happens to be the nephew or grandson of Alejan-
dra Barrios—according to some sources, he is the son of Ruben Jiménez Barrios—(Jiménez, 2012). His resume on
the aldf website states that he was president of the youth action group of the alcc (aldf, 2012; Martínez, 2012).
330
the political ambitions of alejandra barrios
Distribución de Alimentos)—where Alejandro Padierna, the new local deputy for the prd and
brother of Dolores Padierna, will serve as vice-president of the Commission—and the Com-
mittee for Service, Orientation and Citizen Complaints (Comité de Atención, Orientación
y Quejas Ciudadanas) (aldf, 2012). It remains to be seen how Barrios will use her seat in
the aldf and how she will influence law-making in Mexico City: she may use her position of
power for personal benefit or at last to regulate street vending by enacting a comprehensive
and fair law for popular commerce.
OnOctober 4, 2012, Héctor SerranoCortés39—Secretary ofGovernment of the FederalDis-
trict and former Director of the Informal Commerce Relocation Program (prci)—attended
the Legislative Assembly. As a member of the newly elected aldf, Barrios took the podium
and criticized the policies taken towards street vending and the criminalization of informal
commerce in the Historical Center. The combination of an open, democratic political system
in Mexico (imperfect as it may be) with the rising power of street vendor organizations has
allowed the unlikely situation that an informal vendor leader gets elected for a position of pop-
ular representation and takes her causes and claims for discussion and potential legislation—
directly and personally, as a legitimate and legal representative of such interests—to the au-
thorities in charge, not behind closed doors or in the streets, but on one of the most important
representative and legislative bodies of the country.
This unusual situation is within the legal framework; and it is certainly much better to dis-
cuss the issues concerning informal street vending in a local assembly or congress through
dialogue, agreement, and transparency than on the street or in a police station through vio-
lence, coercion, or corruption.
While government authorities and politicians have not used their positions of power to
do justice to street vendors, it seems that street vendors—with their new-found and grow-
ing power—will do justice to themselves by winning positions and becoming members of
dierent representative and legislative bodies of the nation (and city), using for that purpose
the legal means oered by democracy, free elections and representation. From their position
on these bodies, informal street vendor representatives can either defend their rights, accept
their obligations, and demand and provide solutions to street vending problems reached by
the consensus of all stakeholders; or they can use the privileges and opportunities granted
by these positions of power to increase their individual benefits as street vendor leaders and
strengthen their grip over their associations’ members. The possibility of being a represen-
39Héctor Serrano Cortés would be confirmed as Secretary of Government of the Federal District in the new
city administration headed by Miguel Angel Mancera, which started on December 5, 2012.
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tative on a legislative body oers a unique opportunity for informal street vendor leaders to
present—without intermediaries and in a plural and open space which will reduce the pos-
sibility of corruption—the real plight of street vendors and try to bring about changes that
benefit all parties involved. It is up to street vendor leaders to decide what path they want to
follow.
6.10 Conclusions
Federal and city governments, mayors, heads of governments, heads of delegations, author-
ities, and ocials have come and gone, yet Alejandra Barrios and the alcc have outlasted
them all. The unique character, ability, endurance, and savoir faire of Alejandra Barrios have
allowed her a long life as a leader of informal street vendors. She has built an association that
has grown larger, stronger, and more influential over time. Not only that, the involvement of
her family in the administration of the alcc and the formation of other informal street vendor
associations related to it, but with links to dierent parties, most likely ensures that her legacy
will continue for at least another generation.
The structure of the alcc is highly complex, and it has the capacity to adapt very fast to
new circumstances, in part because it is an authoritarian and autocratic organization. The
alcc behaves towards its members as if it were a ‘parallel government’—it presents themwith
not only rights and obligations, but also several goods and services, which resemble and are
eectively a substitute for those benefits provided by the social security system of the formal
federal or city government. Thus the alcc and its members have a type of ‘social contract’,
independent of the formal federal or city government, which benefits both parties, despite
the alcc’s semi-formal status. However, the leadership of the alcc—Alejandra Barrios and
her closer associates, some of whom are relatives and family—appears to gain more from the
economic benefits of this ‘social contract’ than other alcc members. As discussed earlier in
this chapter, although there is little accurate data on this matter, the alcc is probably a highly
profitable organization.
Indeed, the case study of the alcc shows that the wealth produced by leading and manag-
ing a well-organized and well-connected informal (or semi-formal) street vendor association
may be so great that it is comparable to the revenues of large formal enterprises. One could
reasonably conclude that the reason why a whole family is keen to work on this activity is that
they recognize that street vending is a highly profitable form of commerce, and worth expand-
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ing as a family business. While the association maintains that the money collected from fees
goes to the trust funds and pays for selling permits, members’ benefits, organizational and
managerial costs, and maintenance costs in commercial plazas—in addition to increasing the
leadership’s own earnings—it is also likely that where corruption exists some of that money
ends up in the pockets of government ocials, city authorities, or political patrons.
Finally, Alejandra Barrios and the alcc have used their political support as a bargaining
chip in return for permission, recognition, support, property (such as commercial plazas), or
simply tolerance of alcc members carrying out informal vending activities. In the past, and
obliged by the political system and law of the time, the alcc supported the priwithout hesita-
tion. Since the democratic opening in Mexico City has brought about changes in government
through the alternation of political parties in power, the alcc has maintained its support for
and aliation to the pri. it has, however, also sought ways to cooperate with other political
parties in order to gain their favors and ensure its survival. Under the new democratic system,
the alcc has been willing to support whoeverwould champion its causes and help its interests.
Its strategy of adapting to the new democratic settings has worked well and it has opened to
them (the leadership of the alcc) and to leaders of vendor associations in general newways of
political participation—rather than supporting a pre-established ocial or political patron,
they have competed and won positions of popular representation with the consent of their
party. This may give them the unique opportunity to present their case in the appropriate
representative and legislative bodies and reach a solution in a general consensus with all the
actors involved in informal street vending.
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7. CONCLUS IONS  SOME F INAL
CONS IDERAT IONS ABOUT INFORMAL I TY AND
STRE ET VEND ING IN MEX ICO.
7.1 Introduction
This thesis has stressed the importance of learning to what extent and in what ways recent po-
litical change in Mexico has aected the dynamics between the informal sector (street vend-
ing), the state, and political parties. For that endeavour this thesis has relied on historical-
political and case study research of multiple primary and secondary sources. Moreover, it
uses the process o democratization and the alternation of political parties in power as a natu-
ral experiment to oer this thesis variation in terms of which party is in power, and therefore
the opportunity to observe how linkages between politicians, government ocials and street
vendor groups are made and unmade as power changes hands.
This final chapter recapitulates on the most important research findings of this thesis to
answer the research question; it puts forward some theoretical considerations, followed by a
review of the empirical conclusions in matters of the politics and policies of informality and
street vending in Mexico. It then discusses whether informality and street vending should be
viewed as a ‘problem’ or as a ‘solution’. Finally, it indicates potential avenues for research in
the topics of informality and the informal sector.
7.2 Theoretical considerations
As mentioned above, this thesis has emphasized the importance of learning to what extent
and in what ways recent political change in Mexico—democratization and the alternation
of political parties in power—has aected the dynamics between the informal sector (street
vending), the state, and political parties. For this, it is very important to take into account how
individuals interact with each other and how they react to how the state performs its assigned
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duties of providing quality public services in a fair and ecient way. For that, individuals
both make cost-benefit analyses of their choices and select which one is better for them, and
also take into consideration the general feelings of their peers about the state to make those
choices.
Moreover, evidence suggests that perceptions of government eectiveness and of the perfor-
mance of public services inMexico—and in Latin America in general—are lower than those in
other more ecient countries and regions, and perceptions of corruption practices are higher
(Perry et al., 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006, 2009, 2011). Low levels of trust in
the government might be a reflection of a broken social contract.1 Since the government does
not perform eectively the delivery of public services, citizens are not willing or do not have
the incentives necessary to opt for being included in the formal system. Therefore, low levels
of trust are correlated with high levels of informality.
This thesis makes the case that more attention needs to be placed on understanding the
conditions, stages, and scenarios where formal and informal characteristics are combined in
the same individual or group. This is what is called ‘semi-formal arrangements’. Moreover, a
new concept of semi-formality is introduced in Chapter 2. This new notion of semi-formality
refers to the status and form of operation that some informal agents (particularly organized
informal groups of street vendors) have which shows or presents them as being informal when
in reality they make use of formal instruments (among them their legal status) in order to
sort out better the problems brought about by regulations and avoid the authorities reprisals,
while at the same time taking advantage of the benefits of informality (i.e. such as tax avoid-
ance). The status of ‘independent civil associations’ that some informal groups in Mexico
obtain in order to have both legal personality (and therefore legal recognition from the gov-
ernment) as well as the prerogative to demand certain rights (such as the right to sell on the
streets) deserves special attention. This condition or status of being legally recognized while
still being ‘informal’ may represent a real problem for the state and definitely will have to be
carefully studied in order to avoid additional unfairness and deepening the roots of broken
social contracts in those countries that present such situation.
One thing that is clear from the research is that there exists a continuum between formality
and informality. In general, it is possible to state that few firms follow all the rules governing
enterprise behavior, and few follow none of them. Formalization can be a gradual process
1The expression ‘social contract’ is used by Perry et al. (2007) to refer to “some degree of societal consensus
over basic aspects of the operation and role of the state relative to the private sector and among citizens. In
this usage, ‘social contract’ refers to key aspects of a social equilibrium, including beliefs and actions of citizens,
organized groups, and state actors” (Perry et al., 2007:216).
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that does not involve moving from one fixed state to another. Informality is an abstract con-
cept that permeates many sectors and levels of activity and includes a heterogeneous group
of actors. Most individuals and firms in the informal sector do interact with public institu-
tions to some extent; therefore it is more appropriate to see informal activity as a continuum
of compliance, rather than in a dichotomous manner. Furthermore, depending on the level
of development of the country, the nature of informal activity varies. In developed countries
informal activity refers generally to tax evasion and the use of undeclared labor (often undoc-
umented foreigners). In developing countries, informal activity is the source of employment
for a significant share of the labor force, often compensating for the weak potential of the for-
mal sector to create enough jobs. The underdevelopment of the formal sector may originate
from a variety of causes, from too much red tape and inecient bureaucracies, to low levels
of human capital, to low levels of trust in public institutions and low ‘tax morale’ (Oviedo,
Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009).
Finally, it is worth pointing out that both the ‘semi-formal arrangements’ and the contin-
uum between formality and informality show that the informal agents (firms and individuals)
are rational actors that act strategically by using both formal and informal institutions to
maximize their economic gains and bargaining power, and to adapt to changing political and
economic environments.
7.3 The politics of informality and street vending under democracy
As a general way to answer the research question, it is possible to state that increasing political
competition—as a result of the process of democratization and alternation of political parties
in power—did not result in an improvement in the capacity of theMexico City government or
the federal government to control informality and street vending. On the contrary, democratic
competition among political parties has created still more room for negotiation by street ven-
dor leaders, who can now move from party to party—especially between the PRD and the
PRI—according to their convenience and interest.
As this thesis has shown, the number of street vendors did not diminish with the changes
in political competition through the onset of political reform, democratic elections, and al-
ternation in power. The current basic processes of political maneuvering do not seem very
dierent from those that occurred under the old PRI regime (e.g. corporatism, clientelism,
intermediation, corruption, role of infantrymen played by street vendors, etc.), but the op-
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tions and speed of change have increased significantly. The current version of these forms or
political maneuvering are variations and evolutions of dynamics that were previously rooted
within the Mexican political system, and therefore within Mexican political culture (e.g. the
type of clientelism implemented by the prd). However, there are several things that changed
after democratization and the alternation of political parties in power that are worth pointing
out.
As mentioned above, more competition between political parties strengthened the vendor
leaders’ bargaining powers. Street vendor leaders and organizations have used political sup-
port as a bargaining chip in return for permission, recognition, support, property, or tolerance
to carry out their informal vending activities. In the past, and obliged by the political system
and law of the time, street vendor organizations supported the PRI without hesitation. With
the onset of a democratic system and the alternation in power in Mexico, street vendor orga-
nizations have diversified their support for and aliation to the dierent political parties in
positions of power. Those who remained loyal to their original political parties have sought
ways to cooperate with other political parties in positions of power in order to gain their favor
and ensure their own survival. As a result, informal street vendor groups have become more
participatory in politics.
Moreover, The dispute between the PRI and PRD for the support of street vendor leaders
and their organizations gave street vendor leaders greater capacity to negotiate. The democ-
ratization (and the alternancia) did not automatically mean that the pri lost control of the
informal powers of the city government, including street vendors, to whom the pri used to
weaken the prd governments. On the contrary, democratization meant the beginning—or
the exacerbation—of a struggle between the pri and the prd for the control of the informal
groups whose result, as expected, is the strengthening of the street vendor organizations.
Another important change as a result of the democratization is the division and fragmenta-
tion between dierent layers of government as a result of electoral reforms that made elegible
some government positions that previously were appointed, which weakened the power of
the government to enforce regulations and implement policies and actions to tackle informal
street vendors. Thus, as a result of democratization, there are three levels of decision mak-
ing in matters of informality and street vending in Mexico (delegation, city government and
federal government), whichmay be potentially headed by dierent parties (a sort of ‘cohabita-
tion’), which in turn makes it even more dicult to agree on and implement policies to tackle
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informality and street vending.2 This together with the economic crises that ocurred during
that period (e.g. Peso Crisis) has favoured the growth in the number of street vendors. This
relates to one more change that ocurred after democratization.
Asmentioned before, there was amultiplication of informal street vendors and associations
in the city as a result of the lack of formal employment, but also as a result of the corrobora-
tion of street vending as a very profitable business for vendor leaders. Therefore, leaders had
incentives to increase the number of association’s members (hence of street vendors) not only
for matters of profitability but also to have more bargaining power with the government—the
more members, the more power to negotiate. In addition, given the political scenario (the
pri lost both the presidential election and the Mexico City election in 2000) political parties
(mainly the prd) may have fostered the creation of street vendor groups related to them to
balance the political struggle with the pri in the streets. Thus, democratization and the alter-
nation in power may have indirectly promoted the increase in the number of street vendors
and associations.
Moreover, the shift in political party aliation or allegiance (from the PRI to the PRD) that
some street vendor groups underwent after the alternation in power shows that their alia-
tion with one party or the other is based on economic interests and not on ideology. With the
process of democratization and particularly the alternation of political parties in power it be-
came evident that the real interests of the street vending organizations are economical and not
political. Therefore, under the new democratic game, street vendor organizations in general
are willing to support whoever will champion their causes and help their interests. Hence, the
general rule has been an increment in the politicization of street vendor organizations.
Democratization andopen competition in the political arena inMexico havemade available
more ways for street vendors to put pressure on the government. Traditionally, vendor leaders
and associations used a wide variety of strategies (from the quasi-criminal to the strictest ad-
herence to the law) to strengthen their hand. The strategy of adapting to the new democratic
settings of some leaders of street vending organizations has worked well and opened up new
forms of political participation. Instead of supporting a pre-established ocial or political pa-
tron, they have competed and won positions of popular representation with the consent and
support of their party. This may give them a unique opportunity to present their plight in the
appropriate representative and legislative bodies and reach a solution in a general consensus
with all the actors involved.
2However, belonging to the same party is not a guarantee for success; as shown in Chapter 5 in the case of
Ebrard and Padierna.
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From the perspective of the study of politics and democracy in Mexico, two conclusions
can be drawn. The first conclusion establishes that, as an institution, the Mexico City gov-
ernment does not seem to be very eective in implementing its proposals or plans of action
along the democratic opening of the last years. With three main political parties competing
for power, perhaps it should not be expected that the city government be more ecient than
a single-party regime. In fact, few people praise democracy for being a more ecient way to
implement government plans and policies than authoritarian or autocratic regimes. Instead,
democracy should lead to the representation of the interests of the people. Given the national
and international arrangements in place, the Mexican state must, in many cases, represent
and stand up for the interests of international businesses or large corporations against the
interests of many poor and powerless Mexicans. In other words, the Mexican state faces a
dilemma: whether to represent the interests of large and transnational companies or the inter-
ests of marginal and excluded groups in the Mexican society. The state must try to reconcile
its responsibilities towards those in the two extreme groups of the political interest spectrum:
formal auent businesses and informal marginal populations.
The second conclusion about politics and democracy in Mexico is that the growth of the
informal street vending movement, and its potential capacity to resist government actions and
policies to relocate, control or eradicate them, shows that the democratic government has not
reduced but perhaps expanded further the political and economic role of informal leaders at
local level. The possibility of finding political allies and patrons within the system has grown,
but with an important dierence: during the PRI regime disputes took place in private. Often
the PRI was able to appease those involved in conflicts and negotiate disputes before they
became too violent. Now, the disputes and conflicts between political parties happen openly,
but the internal maneuvering by the parties still remains hidden. Above all, there are fewer
opportunities for intervention by neutral negotiators. Therefore, it is possible to perceive an
increase in the level of conflict between leading informal street vendor groups.3
The empirical evidence gathered during this research shows that there is an interesting
quandary in regards to street vendor associations and commercial plaza associations. On one
side, the democratic process and the alternation of political parties in power has strengthened
the street vendor associations and particularly their leaders (politicizing these organizations
even more). On the other, there is the phenomenon of democratization (or liberation) in the
commercial plazas which has weakened authoritarian leaders (depoliticizing these organiza-
3An example is the conflict betweenMaria Rosete (PRD) andAlejandra Barrios (PRI), as discussed in Chapter
5.
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tions) (see Chapter 3 for details). How to reconcile these two phenomena? Let’s start by clari-
fying that vending activity in commercial plazas represents a separate legal, spatial, locational
and ownership arrangement, dierent from the street vending activity. Vendor organizations
do not disappear with the move from the streets to commercial plazas, and most organiza-
tions whose members move into commercial plazas are almost the same as those who pre-
viously were on the streets, maintaining their structure and continuing their practices inside
the commercial plazas. However, there is a key dierence in the dynamics of these organiza-
tions: while on the street, the ‘authorized’ owner of the stall or spacewas the association—and
therefore the association’s leader (‘association ownership’); within the commercial plazas, the
vendor members are the rightful owners of their own stall—under the so-called ‘stalls in con-
dominium’ model4 (‘member ownership’). This situation has weakened the position of power
of those former street vendor leaders now turned commercial plaza vendor leaders. Thus, we
could arm that the new status of ownership, and the resulting economic stability, of the
vendors located in commercial plazas breaks the dependency of vendors on their association
leaders (particularly if these are abusive). This reconciles the two contrasting phenomena ob-
served on the streets and in the commercial plazas in Mexico City.5 Moreover, it also shows
that there are innovative ideas (the ‘stalls in condominium’ model, which enables the ‘member
ownership’ scheme) that deserve to be carefully studied as they may become potential policies
that truly benefit individual street vendors and not their leaders or intermediaries.
7.4 The policies of informality and street vending under democracy
In general, forwhat can be elucidated from the historical analysis of the period of study (1929–
2006), it is possible to distinguish that the policies to address informal street vending have been
the following: construction of indoor markets (public markets and commercial plazas) and
4The ‘stalls in condominium’ model was a new scheme of financing and ownership implemented as a part of
the Plaza Construction Program of the early 1990s. Under this scheme the vendors would pay for the construction
of their commercial plaza and their individual stalls—with intervention from the city government who helped to
provide them with credits at a subsidized rate—which would give them in return the legal ownership of their stall
within the newly-built commercial plaza. This model was in contrast with the traditional public markets of the
1950s, where the government paid for the construction and was the legal owner of the market and stalls. Public
market stalls were leased by market vendors at a minimal cost, since stalls were rent-controlled.
5However, if a commercial plaza is granted to a vendor association but the ownership of the stalls remains
in the hands of the association (as in the case of the alcc) and not in the hands of individual vendor members,
then the situation will not change. The association and its leaders will continue having a strong position of power
and individual vendor members will continue depending on the association and its leader, with the dierence that
now the association will own an important economic asset (i.e. the commercial plaza) that almost surely will only
benefit the leaders of the association.
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relocations of vendors, in addition to the implementation of regulations or decrees accompa-
nied by cycles of toleration and repression—i.e. sometimes these regulations are enforced and
sometime they are not. Policies of issuance of selling permits and relocation of vendors from
one street to another have also been implemented, but these do not involve the removal of
vendors from the streets. That is all. In the case of Mexico, there have not been more policies
than these to specifically tackle informal street vending.6
Likewise, there seems to be no clear divide in terms of policies between the authoritar-
ian and democratic periods. In fact, dierent administrations emanated from both periods
tried (mostly unsuccessfully) a combination of the same repertoire of policies. The dierence
seems to lie in ideologial or even humanistic aspect. For example, the approach of the PRD
government of Cárdenas towards informal street vending was dierent in essence to what past
governments had tried, even though the programs it implemented did not seem too dierent.
What really changed was the way the city government looked at the street vendors and their
activity. The Cárdenas government did not see them as a plague that had to be eradicated by
all means but as an unavoidable consequence of all the problems that aected the city and
country. The approach of the Cárdenas administration towards informal street vendors and
their activity was inclusive, thoughful, open to dialogue and, in general, more benevolent than
other pri and prd administrations. And yet, this administration could not reach a solution due
to the lack of time, resources and historical inertiae rooted in the political and governmental
culture.
MexicoCity authoritieswho tookpart in themarket construction program implemented by
the Camacho Solís administration acknowledged that it was only a temporary solution (Cross,
1998). One city planner said honestly that informal street vending is “a permanent, historic
and recurrent phenomenon... rooted in the culture... The solution has always consisted of
two things: one, construction of [commercial] plazas [or markets]; and two, regulation. It
has been a totally cyclical phenomenon, but the time frame has become increasingly shorter”
(Gordon, 1997a:7), as the city has increased in size and population. Journalist Raul Monge,
who has covered the problem of street vending inMexico City formore than a decade, reached
a similar conclusion, asserting that informal street vending “is a phenomenon that will always
be there” (Monge, 2009).
6The sare program (aimed at simplifying the registration of firms) and the repeco program (aimed at incor-
porating the informal sector into the tax system) implemented at the federal level by the administration of Vicente
Fox in 2002 and 2006 respectively (discussed in Chapters 2 and 5) were directed at informality more broadly and
not specifically at informal street vending; although it was expected that informal street vending activity would be
aected. According to recent research, the eect of the sare program on informality and firm creation has been
positive but small, and therefore more needs to be done (Kaplan et al., 2007, 2011; Bruhn, 2008, 2011).
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Therefore, it can be concluded that the policies to tackle informal street vending analyzed
in the period of study have been mostly unsuccessful. Some, like the construction of public
markets and commercial plazas have helped to contain, but not to stop street vending, and
therefore have been only a temporary solution. The rules and laws to regulate street vending in
general have been incomplete or ambiguous, have been applied irregularly through the cycles
of toleration and repression, and have given government ocial opportunity for corruption
and abuse. The relocation of street vendors from one street to another, or the issuance of
selling permits have been provisional solution that do not solve the problem of occupation of
the thoroughfare and have only lasted for a very short time.
Furthermore, the implementation and continuity of these policies has depended on the par-
ticular and changing interests of the government in power, on the demands of electoral times,
and on the general policies of the federal government. Politics has played an important role
on policies and many times the implementation, as well as the success and failure of policies
to tackle street vending, has responded to political interests rather than to the genuine inter-
est in improving the condition of street vendors and avoid the negative externalities of their
activity. Even after democratization and alternation in power, the street vending activity still
represents an important source of political capital and a very profitable business; therefore,
there is still strong resistance from certain vested interest and partakers (in goverment, politi-
cal parties and street vendor organizations) to change the situation or find a solution because
it would imply a loss of political or economic power for one or more of the actors involved.
Something very interesting to notice, and the historical analysis is very useful for this pur-
pose, is that the policies to address informal street vending in Mexico City were also federal
government actions until the government of Salinas (1988–1994). In other words, policies to
combat informality and informal street vending were the same for federal and local govern-
ments until the mid-1990s.7 For example, the regulations of 1931 and 1951 to tackle informal
street vending in Mexico City were promulgated by the president in turn; and in 1991, the
order to solve the problem of street vending in Mexico City came directly from President Sali-
nas. From the mid-1990s, however, the federal government began to implement policies at the
macro level to tackle informality and leave the responsibility to fight informal street vending
to local governments (e.g. the Federal District or the Delegations).
7This coincides with the publication of a series of seminal works dealing with informality and/or street vend-
ing, as the De Soto (1989) book on the informal economy, which are the result of increased research and deeper
understanding of the subjects of informality and street vending.
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Therefore, what has been recently changing—starting with the Zedillo administration
(1994–2000)8 and more clearly in the Fox administration (2000–2006)—are the policies to
tackle informality in general, and not only street vending in particular. During the Fox ad-
ministration, the federal government began implementing policies and programs to encour-
age formalization and the inclusion of micro and small enterprises into the tax system. These
policies and programs were not always eective (as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 5). The anal-
ysis of this thesis only extends until 2006 and therefore does not coverwhat has been occurring
in the most recent years (although I update a little in Chapter 6 when I deal with the alcc’s
case study). However, It is only until 2013 that President Enrique Peña Nieto introduces the
Program for the Formalization of Employment, and in 2014 the Regime of Fiscal Incorpora-
tion (rif) which are part of a more comprehensive package to try to benefit those people who
live and work in informality, encouraging them to enter the formal sector and the tax system,
but also oering them a number of benefits including housing benefits, health benefits, income
tax discounts, etc. Obviously, it is too early to know if these programs will have an eect or
not on informality (and some years will have to pass before we know), and also whether they
will have any impact on informal street vending in particular. Meanwhile, the Mexico City’s
government is still trying to stop and control informal street vending.
While the specific recent policies to tackle informality more broadly are discussed in Chap-
ter 2 (and in Appendix A.1), there are several actions that governments can take to facilitate
the transition of individuals and firms from informality to formality. Comprehensive policy
packages containing both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ have proven to be more successful than sin-
gle, isolated policies or reforms in creating the appropriate incentives to increase formality
in the long run. The ‘carrots’—simplifying taxation schemes and reducing taxes for micro
and small firms, and facilitating registration through fewer and cheaper procedures—reduce
the costs of formality, but policies can also go further in increasing growth opportunities for
these firms, for example by oering them support and counselling. On the other hand, the
‘sticks’ can include a strengthening of the enforcement process, from increased collaboration
between government agencies to share information about non-compliers, to higher penalties
for oenders.9
Moreover, there are several lines of action that can be followed to specifically tackle informal
street vending in Mexico.
8As it was seen in the testimony of Alma Rosa Moreno Razo in Chapter 5.
9De Andrade, Bruhn and McKenzie (2013) point out that ‘sticks’ rather than ‘carrots’ seem more eective at
getting firms to formalize, but they also show limits to this approach.
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First, the country needs to create more job openings in formal frameworks with fair, if not
appealing, wages. Jorge AlbertoMendoza García and a team of experts conducted surveys of
Mexico City street vendors in the 1990s. Some of the results suggest that while cultural and
social factors have been important in the decision of individuals to become informal street
vendors, economic factors were even more crucial: “Street traders would be more inclined to
leave their current job [as street vendors] if an adequate salarywere oered” (MendozaGarcía,
1994). Although several street vendors would not leave the streets under any conditions—
either because of ineligibility for formal work or through personal preference—an improved
formal job market would certainly decrease pressure on the streets of Mexico City.
Second, individuals should be provided with basic protection against risks regardless of
their labor status; therefore, providing universal health care and other support systems for the
underprivileged will help to reduce their risks in the face of adversity. In the specific case of
Mexico, the proposal of Levy (2008) that the existing social security system for formalworkers
should be transformed into universal social entitlements—so that it will be possible to provide
all workers (regardless of their status of formality or informality) with the same health and
pensions benefits—in my view, should be the priority of the Mexican goverment, even above
the incorporation of informal street vendors to the tax regime.
Third, the scheme of political clientelism and intermediation that distinguishes relation-
ships between government, political parties, and street vendor organizations must be disman-
tled. Since big street vendor associationswere created, these type or relationships have become
an established feature of national and city politics. The practices of ‘forced mediation’ and
‘compulsory aliation’ need to be eliminated. However, the system of corruption, clientelism,
and intermediation depends on the unclear legal situation of street vendors. Defining in a clear
and unambiguous way the legal specifications and considerations under which the street ven-
dors function would eradicate the excessive dependency of street vendors on political patrons
and other intermediaries for protection and/or intervention.
Finally, a transparent and precise regulatory framework in matters of street vending needs
to be set up. Clearly defining the legal status of street vendors would help to reduce the abuse
and manipulation of base street vendors by city administrators, politicians, and their own
associations’ leaders. In times past, city administrators and politicians with vested interests
have frustrated attempts to set up a transparent and clear-cut regulatory framework. This
opposition needs to be overcome if a solution to informal street vending is to be reached.
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7.5 Informality and street vending as a problem or as a solution?
The informal economy or informal sector in its street vending form is not, for the most part,
illegal. It mostly consists of people who sell legal products but do so in a non-registered form
and without a license to work or sell. Furthermore, when the formal economy spins out of
control, or an economic bubble bursts, many people turn to this activity to survive. Therefore,
informal street vending is a phenomenon of great importance in Mexico City, as in many
other cities in the world. As this thesis has shown, the number of street vendors has not
diminished with the changes in political competition through the onset of political reform,
democratic elections, and alternation in power; or the opening of the domestic market to
free international trade—quite the opposite. Changes have aected some of the modes of
operation of informal street vending groups, however. While some political and economic
spaces have closed, other opportunities have emerged, transforming street vending, as the
individuals involved in it adapt to new circumstances.
General attitudes towards the informal sector in general and informal street vending in par-
ticular appear not to have changed, however. The phenomenon of street vending is often seen
as a ‘problem’ that ought to be solved one way or another,10 although certain segments of
society do not see street vending as such. On the contrary, many people belonging to these
segments work, buy, get dressed and eat thanks to informal street vending. These people see in-
formal street vending as a solution to the challenge of survival, not a problem (García-Bolivar,
2006).
In an ideal world—where everybody received a monthly salary large enough to cover basic
necessities and some luxuries, could aord to shop in large departmental stores, and had a car
and four-bedroom homes—it is possible to imagine a city without an informal sector, but this
is not the case inMexico and many other countries around the world. As John Cross (2005:3)
puts it: “Mexico is a capitalist country but without capital, a country of workers but without
employment, a consumer country butwithout purchasing power, where the formal sector does
not provide enough to the majority of the people.” Thus, the informal sector exists precisely
because it solves these problems—the lack of provision of the formal sector. It provides self-
employment, allows low-price consumption, and above all partially eliminates the need for
capital investment, since street vendors provide their own workforce.
10There is no doubt that informal street vending causes or contributes to a number of problems, from obstruc-
tions to vehicle trac, to non-payment of taxes, and the sale of fayuca or stolen goods. However, it is important
not to confuse an activity with its consequences or side eects.
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Informality in itself represents the evasion of fiscal or commercial regulations, which has
some advantage over similar activities that are eectively regulated (Portes, Castells, and Ben-
ton, 1989). That is, informality is a product of the same formality.11 However, under this per-
spective, informality is seen as something purely negative. Furthermore, it must be considered
that often the costs of regulation cannot be passed to the consumer, especially when dealing
with low-income groups. This implies that it is the ‘equality’ of regulation in conditions of
‘inequality’ that causes market disruptions. Thus, the negative eect of regulation can be seen
in some countries—such as the USA—where people living in poor areas simply lack almost
all commercial services, which results in the contradictory phenomenon that basic goods are
more expensive in poor areas than in middle and high income areas. Thus, from that perspec-
tive, the informal sector complements and feeds the formal sector, providing opportunities
and allowing the full development of formality within the areas where it exists (Cross, 2005).
Thus, the question that governments should ask is not how to get rid of street vendors and
streetmarkets, but how to take advantage of these people’s work in order tomake the economy
grow in a sustainable way and to generate more egalitarian economic growth.
Moreover, the government and society in general should take advantage andmake the most
of the entrepreneurial talents of those who earn their living in the informal sector. Many street
vendors and traders involved in the informal sector are true entrepreneurs. They take risks,
invest capital and manpower, and research their markets. Those who find a way to channel
and make better use of this spontaneous form of entrepreneurship will be better positioned
to create an economic democracy and to grow and prosper in the twenty-first century.
For its significant size and strength, it is not unreasonable to think that the informal model
could become the basis for the world economy. History teaches us that the informal econ-
omy was the ‘original’ economy—street vendors were on the streets long before shops were
established there. As the informal economyworldwide is worth aboutUS$10,000,000,000,000
(Neuwirth, 2012),12 it still has a huge weight in the global economy and makes a large contri-
bution to global finances. According to information from the CONCANACO, the informal
economy in Mexico represents US$80,000,000,000 a year (Suarez and Velazco, 2012).13
The previous chapters of this thesis describe how the annual volume of sales on the streets
of the Historical Center in Mexico City may be greater than that of many of the largest com-
11Otherwise, everything would be informal, which is the original form of economic activity (without regula-
tion).
12That is us$10 trillion in the short scale.
13That is us$80 billion in the short scale.
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panies in the country. Many people still make their living in the informal economy. In the
second quarter of 2013, all forms of informal employment—Rate of Labor Informality 114—
accounted for 59.1 percent of the employed population in Mexico (inegi, 2013). Moreover,
the Informal Sector Employment Rate 115—a more restricted measure of the informal sector
used recently by the inegi, that only includes individuals working for non-agricultural units
under irregular conditions—in Mexico was of 14,171,109 which represented 28.6 percent of
the employed population (inegi, 2013). Thus, the informal economy in Mexico remains ro-
bust and prosperous.
The generation of formal jobs is necessary but not enough to reduce the size and strength
of the informal economy. As the formal economy grows, people have more money, and so the
level of demand for informal consumer goods tends to increase because the goods are price-
competitive. It is also important to see what kind of jobs are created in the formal sector. For
peoplewithhigher education, the formal economic frameworkmay seemmore favorablewhen
formal jobs that demand high skills are created. For people who have never had access to
higher education, however, informal street vending still may oer a better chance of making
a living because formal jobs that demand high-skilled individuals are out of reach.
Will the informal economy one day cease to be considered an illegal activity or a less noble
or dignified part of the economy? I believe that it will happen. As a matter of fact, it is
a possibility that is already being considered and discussed in some places. The economy
will never be 100 percent formalized. There will always be an informal sector or an informal
economy; something I like to call a ‘natural rate of informality’—a term derived from the
14The Rate of Labor Informality 1 (Tasa de Informalidad Laboral 1) refers to the sum, without duplication,
of those individuals who are occupationally vulnerable due to the nature of the economic unit they work for,
those whose labor relationship or labor dependency is not recognized by their source of employment. This rate
includes—in addition to the elements thatwork in unregisteredmicro-businesses or informal sector—other similar
modalities such as the self-employed in subsistence agriculture, as well as those employees working without the
protection of social security and whose services are used by registered economic units (formal firms) (inegi, 2013).
15The Informal Sector Employment Rate 1 (Tasa de Ocupación en el Sector Informal 1) refers to all people
working for non-agricultural economic units operating without accounting records, and functioning from house-
hold resources without forming a company, so the activity in question has no identifiable and independent status
away from the household, and therefore tends tomaterialize in a very small scale operations. This rate is calculated
with respect to the employed or working population (inegi, 2013).
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concept of natural rate of unemployment.16 The question is how toworkwith informal agents,
for example informal street vendors and informal entrepreneurs.
To support the argument in favour of the dignification and the improvement in the repu-
tation of the informal economy, it could be argued that the formal economy— in countries
that present a high incidence of informality—is broken. It can produce growth, but it is not
sustainable or equitable. The informal economy is larger in the sense that it oers more oppor-
tunity for people, especially those who are at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. If this
form of economic activity is more equitable and sustainable, then it is dicult to characterize
it as less noble or less dignified.
When it comes to making cross-country comparisons, it is possible to arm that the infor-
mal sector is more open and organized inMexico than it is in theUSA or theUK. There are no
large informal street markets in downtown New York or London in the same way as there are
in Mexico City’s Historical Center. In Mexico City, everybody knows where to find them. In
New York or London, this type of activity is underground or clandestine. It is possible to find
it in Chinatown in New York or in Brick Lane or Camden Town in London, for example, but
the authorities there are less tolerant. In Mexico City there is a very ecient informal orga-
nization in place, which connects producers, carriers, distributors, and sellers. In New York
and London there is no such a system—or it is very small—which precludes people outside
of the formal economy from having greater range of action and greater power over their work
product.
The informal sectormay bemore resilient to financial crises than the formal sector as people
can often survive in the informal economy when the formal economy is in crisis. However,
overall demand often falls when there is an economic crisis, and the total value of sales may
go down in the informal economy as well as the formal one. Thus, the informal economy
oers resistance, but not immunity, to financial crises.
This thesis has shown that informal street vending in particular—and the informal sector in
general—is more than a reality in Mexico; it is a necessity. It can also be a remarkable benefit
to the country’s development by serving as not only a potential home for entrepreneurs, as
De Soto (1989) suggested, but also as an instrument of distribution and production operating
16The natural rate of unemployment is the lowest rate of unemployment that an economy can sustain over the
long run. Keynesians believe that a government can reduce the rate of unemployment (employ more people) if
it were willing to accept a higher level of inflation (the idea behind the Phillips Curve). However, critics of this
theory say that the eect is temporary and that unemployment would bounce back up but inflation would stay
high. Thus, the natural, or equilibrium rate is the lowest level of unemployment at which inflation remains stable
(Investopedia, 2013). Therefore, the ‘natural rate of informality’—derived from the concept of natural rate of
unemployment—is the lowest rate of informality that an economy can sustain in the long run.
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where there is a scarcity of capital and oversupply of the labor force, thereby providing signif-
icant support for the development of the formal sector. To reach this goal, it is necessary to
transform the state’s perspective of this sector. Rather than perceiving it to be a ‘problem’,
it must be seen as an ‘opportunity’ that has implementation problems. The challenge is to
find ways to solve these implementation problems without destroying the benefits of informal
street vending and of informality in general.
7.6 Potential avenues for research
The informal sectorwill remain an active subject of research for a long time. The large body of
literature on this subject may give the impression that the concepts are well defined, topics are
well known, and possible solutions to some of the problems relating to the informal sector are
well established. The fact that somuchhas beenwritten about the informal sector could partly
be the result of the continuous interest in the subject and its importance to policy-makers, gov-
ernment ocials, politicians, and researchers around the world who are interested in poverty
reduction and social and economic development. However, the discussions on the ‘informal
sector’, the ‘informal economy’ and ‘informality’ are far from over. The more research is pro-
duced, the more open research questions are found. While some of these questions have been
discussed in previous studies in one way or another, considerable further research is needed
to elucidate several issues regarding the informal sector more broadly. Among these are the
following:
• There are still important dierences in the literature regarding the definitions of ‘infor-
mality’ and the ‘informal sector’, so what should the consensual conceptualization of
these terms be? (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom, 2006; Kanbur, 2009; Fields,
2011, 2012; Sinha and Kanbur, 2012).
• Conceptualizations of the ‘informal sector’ and ‘informality’ vary from country to coun-
try.17 How can these concepts be measured empirically and made globally compatible
and comparable? (ILO, 1993; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, Buehn, and Mon-
tenegro, 2010).
17As mentioned in Chapter 1, even with the suggestions and advice given at the 15th International Convention
of Labour Statisticians to use one or more of the guidelines listed below, these are applied dierently from country
to country and are therefore not compatible for cross-country comparison. The guidelines are: no registration of
the enterprise, small size of the enterprise in terms of employment, and non-registration of enterprise employees
(ILO, 1993).
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• In recent years, there has been an attempt to extend the definition of ‘informality’ or the
‘informal sector’ to “include not only enterprises that are not legally regulated but also
employment relationships that are not legally regulated or protected” (Chen, 2006:76).
What dierences are there in estimations and patterns of informality when the two def-
initions are used in dierent countries? (ICLS, 2003; Chen, 2006).
• How can we measure the dierent types of informality carried out by those who evade
regulation, those who adjust their informal activity to avoid regulation, and those to
whom the regulation does not or would not apply? Until researchers get an empirical
sense of the comparative sizes of these groupings in dierent countries, it will be very
dicult to reach an agreement on themost important issues in dealingwith the informal
sector (Heintz, 2012).
• Does a larger product competition (resulting from opening up trade) reduce or foster
informality? (Fiess and Fugazza, 2012; Gibson; 2012).
• What explanations are there for the growth of informality in recent years, despite the
strong growth performances in some developing countries, which contradict the fore-
casts of standard growth theories? (Chen and Raveendran, 2011; Charmes, 2012).
• What are the impacts on informality of social policies such as conditional cash transfer
programs? (Levy, 2008).
• What is the exact character or essence of the heterogeneity in the informal sector in
dierent countries? (Chen, 2006; Kanbur, 2011; Heintz, 2012).
• Is productivity in the formal sector higher or lower than in the informal sector, andwhat
are the reasons behind this? (Levy, 2008).
• What should policy-makers prioritize for the purposes of growth and poverty reduc-
tion? Helping reduce costs to formalization or supporting a rise in productivity in the
informal sector? (Bruhn, 2011; Kaplan et al., 2011; Sinha and Kanbur, 2012).
• What are the top priorities for policy-making and policy-targeting in the informal sec-
tor? What is the most important thing for policy-makers to focus on? (Sinha and Kan-
bur, 2012).
The economic literature on the characteristics of the informal sector has advanced, but the
political economy issues behind the informal sector are much less well understood. There is
still a lot of research to be done on the political aspects of the informal sector. There has been
little research on the relationship between the informal sector and issues related to political
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behavior, regulatory systems, political culture, corruption and evasion practices, governance,
grassroots movements, and the empowerment of social organizations, among other topics.
The following areas merit research:
• What are the political variables that account for the growth and/or reduction of infor-
mality? Just as economic variables have been defined as potential determinants of in-
formality (number of jobs in the formal sector, regulatory burden, level of economic
inequality, degree of access to resources, type of human capital, quality of public ser-
vices, and so on), it is also possible to define political variables that potentially aect
informality (stability of political regime, level of democratization, level of political rep-
resentation, level of institutional transparency, inclusion ofminorities andwomen, level
of trust in institutions, eectiveness of monitoring and enforcement, and so on) and to
evaluate their impact on the development and characteristics of the informal sector.
• It is very important to carry out cross-country comparative political research on the in-
formal sector, for example, by comparing the evolution and enforcement of regulatory
systems in two or more countries and how they relate to the dynamics of informal activ-
ities. Such cross-country comparative studies are needed to explain better the evolution,
particularities, causes, and consequences of the informal sector.18
• A rich area for future research is the way governments or political regimes aect the
formation and behavior of informal workers and organizations. For example, it would
be interesting to investigate the behavior of the informal sector not only during a time
of democratic change, but also under a military dictatorship (North Korea), a socialist
republic (Cuba), a socialist single-party regime (China), and even a religious regime
(Iran) (Bayat, 1997).
These and other research questions will challenge researchers and policy-makers interested
in the informal sector in coming years. I hope that this work and the issues raised in it will
contribute to that eort.
18Two interesting cases for cross-country comparison are Peru and Mexico. Both countries have developed
dierently in their governments, regimes and regulations which may shed some interesting results in terms of the
evolution of both informality and informal street vending in these countries.
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A.1 Policies to reduce informality
Table A.1.: Policies to reduce informality (Mexico marked in bold)




- Reduction of corporate income tax Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
- Tax exemptions for employing under-
privileged workers
Hungary
- Tax concessions in industries with
high percentage of undeclared workers
(domestic work, home improvement,
etc.)
Sweden, Belgium, France
- Tax relief for new employees Montenegro
- Tax amnesty Cyprus, Turkey
- Tax exemption on re-invested earn-
ings
Estonia
- Reduction of personal income tax
(pit)/introduce flat pit
Estonia, Slovakia
- Tax credits for jobs created Netherlands, uk
- Reduction of vat for labor intensive
services
Netherlands, Bolivia
- Reduce aggregate tax burden (as a %
gdp)
Most EU27 countries
- Increase non-taxable income thresh-








- Establish flat rate daily tax for non-
residents
Montenegro
- Introduce on-line filing and payment Estonia





- Simplified tax system for smes Kenya, Tanzania, Uruguay
- Replace VAT/income tax/social secu-
rity contributions of small businesses
with presumptive tax/single tax
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Domini-




policies to reduce informality




- Contractor is liable for ss contribu-
tions of contracted firm (construction
sector)
Germany, Netherlands, uk
- Reduce social security contributions Bulgaria
- Social benefits proportional to per-
sonal contributions and income tax
payments
Estonia, most EU27 coun-
tries
- Shift payments of contributions from
employers to employees
Latvia, Poland, Slovenia
- Reduced contributions for underpriv-
ileged working people
Hungary







- Registered unemployed workers al-
lowed to work part-time occasionally
while still receiving benefits (up to a
limit)
Czech Republic
- Introduce part-time contracts for out-
of-labor force people
Slovakia
- Introduce temporary contracts with





Wage flexibility - Limit increases in minimum wage to






- Reduction of severance benefits Lithuania, Chile, Colom-
bia, Argentina, Brazil,
Panama, Peru
- Redefine “just causes” for dismissal Colombia
- Eliminate union approval to dismiss a
worker
Slovakia
- Eliminate requirement to re-train





- Reduce dependency of unem-
ployed/inactive people from social




- Introduce “transition jobs” for long-
term unemployed
Germany
- Introduce legislation to legalize un-
documented workers
usa (1986), Spain, Italy
- Simplification of wage regulations Lithuania
Enforcement of
labor laws
- Mandate/enforce obligation to regis-
ter all new workers with a social secu-
rity agency
Bulgaria, France
- Encourage denunciation of unfair
competition (undeclared workers) by
trade unions and employers
Most EU15 countries
- Increased ability to monitor un-
declared workers by strengthen-
ing/creating new monitoring agencies
Most EU15 countries
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Area Goal Policy Country
- Increase communication between
agencies
Most EU15 countries
- Targeted actions in specific indus-
tries (domestic work, agriculture, etc.)
where undeclared work is abundant
Netherlands, Austria,
Spain, Sweden, Denmark
- Monitor employers of undeclared







- Facilitate registration of property Bolivia, Croatia, Peru
- Improve enforcement of property
rights
Croatia









- Introduce single common business id Finland
- Temporary amnesty for entrepreneurs
who decide to formalize their business
(no penalties)
Italy
- Establish time limits for courts to is-




- Simplify rules for licensing, introduce
automatic licensing
Georgia





- Simplify procedures to close a busi-
ness, raise standards for public workers
fyr Macedonia
Strengthen enforcement - Information exchange between agen-
cies and inspectorates (social security
agencies, unemployment agencies, tax
bureaus) - e.g., automatic database
linking and updates
Most EU15 countries
- Unique id numbers/worker ss id that
inspectors can check at all times
Most EU15 countries
- Frequency of inspections increased Most EU15 countries
- Increase power of state inspections
agencies
Lithuania, Germany





- Reinforce sta at inspection agencies Austria, Germany
- Create national-level firm/employee
registers
Poland
- Enact anti-corruption laws and inter-
nal policies to curb corruption in public
agencies; adopt codes of conduct/ethic
standards for public and private sector
Most EU15 countries




uk, Lithuania, Estonia, Ro-
mania
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Area Goal Policy Country
- Hire private detectives to track infor-
mal workers
Germany
- Publish names of non-compliers Ireland
- Compensate businesses for delays in
procedures
India
Sources: oecd (2004), usaid (2005), Kuddo (2008), Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir (2009), and others.
*On September 8, 2014 President Enrique Peña Nieto launched a program to grant fiscal and social security benefits to
those working on the informal sector willing to formalize, in order to stop informality and increase productivity. In an
event named Let’s Grow Together. Being Formal, It Is Good For You! (Crezcamos Juntos. ¡Ser formal, sí conviene!) the
President signed the decree for the Regime of Fiscal Incorporation (Régimen de Incorporación Fiscal) and the Regime of
Incorporation to the Social Security (Régimen de Incorporación a la Seguridad Social) which includes benefits such as
access to health and social services, pension benefits, housing credits, income tax discounts, economic aid for the small
entrepreneurs, credits for businesses, and training programs (Hernández, 2014).
A.2 Reasons for the failure of the Plaza Construction Program and its political impli
cations
In August 1995, researcher John C. Cross carried on a survey of 207 commercial plaza and
street vendors in and around six of the new commercial plazas. He asked vendors to point
out the three most important reasons for the failure of the plaza construction program. The
responses fell into 13 categories, which reflected five main areas of concern:
• the economic crisis itself
• specific physical problems with the commercial plazas
• problems of administration
• the continued presence of street vending
• cultural or psychological features of merchants or clients and the need to acknowledge
the commercial plazas (Table A.2) (Cross, 1998).
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Table A.2.: Reasons for the Failure of the Plaza Program, according to vendors.
Areas of concern Categories
1. Economic factors • Crisis: references to the crisis, devaluation, or inflation.
• Cost: references to the high interest rate or cost of stalls.
2. Physical problems with
the commercial plazas
• Location: references to the poor commercial location of the commercial
plaza.
• Design: reference to design or construction flaws.
3. Problems of administra-
tion
• Promises: references to broken promises (mainly, lack of advertising
promised by the city government).
• Corruption: references to corruption by government ocials.
• Crime: references to crime or security in commercial plazas.
• Leaders: references to various problems with leaders.
• Administration: references to poor administration of the commercial plazas.
4. Competition from re-
newed street vending
• Vendors: references to the return of street vending.
5. Cultural factors • Culture: references to cultural or psychological factors, such as “Clients
prefer street”; “People think goods are more expensive [in the commercial
plazas]”.
•Occupancy: references to low occupancy of commercial plazas, such as
“Stalls closed in commercial plaza”; “Merchants left to go outside.”
•Merchants: references to problems with merchants themselves, such as lack
of training, setting prices too high.
Source: Cross, 1998. From a survey carried out in 1995.
All the categories except the last reflect direct or indirect critiques of the government, city
ocials, and/or vendor leaders (Cross, 1998).
The results of the survey suggest that respondents considered the economic problems were
mainly caused by the policy failures of the federal government. The physical and locational
problems of the commercial plazas were caused by the city government wanting to have the
program implemented by election time, and lack of genuine concern for the welfare of the
vendors. Problems of administration are also attributed to more specific accounts of this lack
of concern for the vendor’s welfare, as well as the avarice or incompetence of government
ocials and/or vendor leaders in defending the vendor’s interests. Finally, the resurgence of
street vending was mostly attributed to the complicity of government ocials and vendor
leaders in failing to live up to their promise of keeping the Historical Center free of street
vendors (Cross, 1998).
As it can be seen, most of the reasons given by vendors surveyed for the failure of the plaza
construction project were indictments of the government, both at federal and city level (Cross,
1998).
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For all these reasons, the failure of the plaza construction program led to a reduction of the
support of vendors for the government, the pri, and even their own leaders. At a personal level,
many vendors felt the government had deceived them, while the pri and the vendor leaders had
failed to protect their interests. At managerial and organizational level, now that the vendors
were stall-owners with formal rights, the vendor leaders no longer directly controlled their
access to space, even though they maintained control in other forms (Cross, 1998).
In the same survey, Cross (1998) asked some more questions intending to measure the po-
litical participation of vendors before and after the plaza construction program:
1. Were they required to be members of some (/a) political party?
2. Were they required to support a political party?
3. Whom did they vote for in the last elections, and whom would they vote for at the time
of the survey?
4. Which political party most supports their interests?
The results showed there was a marked loss of support for the pri as a result of the failure
of the plaza construction program (Cross, 1998).
The first two questions measure the degree of organizational pressure placed on vendors to
support the pri. A total of 42 percent of the vendors surveyed said they were required to be
members of the pri, and 61 percent said they were required to support the pri during elections,
before the plaza construction program (Cross, 1998). These numbers show the important role
that street vendor organizations had for the pri. These numbers fell considerably after the
plaza construction program to 28 percent and 33 percent, respectively. This shift indicated
that street vendor organizations were less able or less willing to require their vendor members
to support the pri (Cross, 1998).
The third and fourth questions measure vendors’ individual support for the pri before and
after the plaza construction program according to their voting behavior and preferences, and
the degree to which they believed the pri or some other party best represented their interests as
vendors. While 44 percent of the respondents said they had voted for the pri in the 1994 elec-
tions, barely 27 percent said they would do so at the time of the survey (August, 1995) (Cross,
1998). When asked about their general political orientation, 50 percent of respondents an-
swered that the pri had been the most supportive political party before the plaza construction
program, but only 23 percent felt this was still true at the time of the survey (Cross, 1998).
Thus, the survey found that levels of individual support for the pri were lower than the levels
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of organizational pressure, both before and after the plaza construction project. Yet, those
levels dropped dramatically after the collapse of the plaza construction program.
Thus, in the final analysis, the Cross survey results confirm that the failure of the plaza
construction program was a key reason for the reduction in individual and organizational
support for the pri among those groups that were supposed to benefit from it—the informal
street vendors themselves (Cross, 1998).
A.3 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas's cabinet and delegation directors at the beginning of his
government in 1997
Cárdenas distributed the cabinet posts among three main groups of people:
First, he filled the most important positions of his administration with his personal
friends, close associates, and those who were involved in his political project. Among them
were Rosario Robles (General Secretariat of Government), Carlos Torres Larriva (Private
Secretariat of the Head of Government), Samuel de Villar (Attorney General of Justice),
Leónel Godoy (Under-Secretariat of Government), César Buenrostro Hernández (Secretariat
of Works and Services) , Clara Jusidman (Secretariat of Education, Health and Social De-
velopment) , Saúl Escobar Toledo (Under-Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare) , Jesús
González Schmal (Senior Government Administration Ocer) , Adolfo Gilly (Coordinator
of Planning and Development), Antonio Ortiz Salinas (Secretariat of Finance) , Raúl Livas
Vera (Treasury), Jorge Martínez y Almaraz (Secretariat of Transport and Roads Administra-
tion), and Gregorio Urías Germán (Director of Political Aairs of the General Direction of
Government). Somemore of his close associates and allies served as advisors during his admin-
istration, among them: Carlos Miguel Lavore Herrera (architect in charge of promoting the
Cárdenas’s public image), Ildefonso Aguilar Vázquez (academic), Bernardo Bolaños (lawyer),
Eugenio Anguiano Roch (economist and diplomat), Julio Moguel (economist), Rosa María
Fernandez (academic), José Luis Perez Canchola (ombudsman), Rosario Ibarra de Piedra (ac-
tivist and politician), Marco Rascón (founder of the Asamblea de Barrios), Ifigenia Martínez
(economist and lawmaker), and René Drucker Colin (scientist and researcher).
Second, he assigned positions to left-wing political activists and thosewho formed the prd’s
ideological spectrum such as René Bejarano, Salvador Martínez Della Roca, Graciela Rojas
Cruz, Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo, and Ricardo Pascoe. Cárdenas distributed the delegations
and sub-delegations of the city, as well as other second-tier positions in the central city gov-
ernment, between them.
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Third, he split the remaining positions—mainly as delegation directors—among represen-
tatives of groups and sectors outside of the prd which had supported his campaign. Among
these were Guadalupe Pérez de Tron,1 Jenny Saltiel Cohen, and Diana Rosalía Bernal Ladrón
de Guevara. The appointments of the proposed delegation directors and sub-delegates had
to be approved by the aldf, where the prd had a majority (Monge, 1997b).
Please see below Table A.3 for a more elaborate list of the cabinet members of the Cárde-
nas’s administration and Table A.4 for a list of the delegation directors, both at the outset of
his government.
Table A.3.: Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’s cabinet at the beginning of his government in Mexico City in 1997.
position colaborator
General Secretariat of Government
(Secretaría General de Gobierno)
Rosario Robles Berlanga
Secretariat of Urban Development and Housing (Secretaría de
Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda)
Roberto Eibenschutz Harunan
Secretariat of Economic Development
(Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico)
María Leticia Calzada Gómez
(substituted by Francisco Cano
Escalante)
Secretariat of Environment
(Secretaría del Medio Ambiente)
Alejandro Encinas Rodríguez
Secretariat of Works and Services
(Secretaría de Obras y Servicios)
César Buenrostro Hernández
Secretariat of Education, Health and Social Development





Secretariat of Transport and Roads Administration
(Secretaría de Transportes y Vialidad)
Jorge Martínez y Almaraz
Secretariat of Public Security
(Secretaría de Seguridad Pública)
Rodolfo Debermandi Debermandi
Attorney General of Justice
(Procurador General de Justicia del Distrito Federal)
Samuel Ignacio del Villar
Kretchmar
Senior Government Administration Ocer
(Oficial Mayor)
Jesús González Schmal






Under-Secretariat of Legal Aairs





General Director of the Institute of Health Services
(Dirección General del Instituto de Servicios de Salud del
Distrito Federal)
Armando Cordera Pastor
1Guadalupe Pérez de Tron was proposed by Cárdenas to ocuppy the position of delegation director at the
Álvaro Obregón delegation but the aldf did not confirm her appointment. Instead, Guadalupe RiveraMarin was
appointed for the post.
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position colaborator
General Director of Government
(Director General de Gobierno)
René Bejarano Martínez
Director of Political Aairs of the General Direction of
Government
(Director de Asuntos Políticos de la Dirección General de
Gobierno)
Gregorio Urías Germán
Personal Secretary of the Head of Government
(Secretario Particular del Jefe de Gobierno)
Armando López Fernández
Private Secretariat of the Head of Government








Secretariat of Popular Conciliation and Citizen Services
(Secretaría de Concertación Popular y Atención Ciudadana)
Guillermo Rizo Hernández
Chief Government Spokesman
(Vocero del Jefe de Gobierno)
Javier González Garza
Coordinator of Working Trips
(Coordinador de Giras del Jefe de Gobierno)
José Luis Morales
Coordinator of Planning and Development (Coordinador de
Planeación y Desarrollo)
Adolfo Gilly
Under-Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (Subsecretaría
del Trabajo y Prevision Social)†
Saúl Escobar Toledo
Under-Secretariat of Metropolitan Coordination
(Subsecretaría de Coordinación Metropolitana)
Pedro Etienne Llano
Director of the Judicial Police
(Director de la Policía Judicial del Distrito Federal)
Jesús Carrola Gutiérrez
Economic Development Fund of the Federal District
(fondeco)
Moisés Rivera Espinosa
Sources: Monge (1997b); La Jornada (1997a); author’s own research from dierent sources.
† In a press conference, Javier González Garza, spokesman for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, reported the creation of
two under-secretariats dependent on the General Secretariat of Government, whose oce holders were: Pedro Etienne
Llano for the Under-Secretariat of Metropolitan Coordination, and Saúl Escobar Toledo for the Under-Secretariat of
Labor and Social Welfare, the latter responsible for negotiating with the street vendors (La Jornada, 1997a).
A.4 The power and inuence of the SUTGDF
The sutgdf—with 39 sections and 104,000 unionized workers in 2000—had become a paral-
lel power in the city. It held numerous privileges as a result of its clientelistic relationship with
the pri governments for over nearly 70 years. The sutgdf had not only displaced the author-
ity from positions of command, but had also appropriated key operational areas in the city
administration, such as Treasury receiving oces, public markets, sanitation and transporta-
tion, vehicular control, the Public Property Registry, the Civil Registry, and sports facilities
and cemeteries—all the governmental structures in which money was handled. (Monge and
Zamorán, 2000).
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Table A.4.: Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’s delegation directors at the beginning of his government
in Mexico City in 1997.
delegation colaborator
Álvaro Obregón Guadalupe Pérez de Tron(x) /Guadalupe Rivera Marín
Benito Juárez Ricardo Pascoe Pierce
Coyoacán Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo
Cuajimalpa Jenny Saltiel
Cuauhtémoc Jorge Legorreta
Gustavo A. Madero René Torres Bejarano (x) / Jesus Flores Palafox
Iztacalco Diana Rosalía Bernal Ladrón de Guevara
Iztapalapa Elio Villaseñor Gómez
Magdalena Contreras Luis Guillermo Ysusi Farfán
Miguel Hidalgo Eduardo Terrazas (x) / Jorge Fernández Souza
Milpa Alta Francisco Chavira Olivos
Tlalpan Salvador Martínez Della Roca
Xochimilco Silvia Soriano (x) / Estefanía Chávez
Azcapotzalco Pablo Moctezuma Barragán
Venustiano Carranza Ricardo Bravo (x) / Ramón Sosamontes Herreramoro
Tláhuac Graciela Rojas Cruz
Sources: Monge (1997b); La Jornada (1997b; 1997c; 1997d); author’s own research from dierent sources.
Note: Candidates to delegation directors that were proposed by Cárdenas but not approved by the aldf appear with
a (x). Next to them are the names of the delegation directors that were ultimately approved by the aldf.
Although both Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Rosario Robles had tried to have a good rela-
tionship with unionized workers—by increasing their wages above the wage ceiling imposed
by the Federation and by respecting some of their privileges—the union leaders maintained
a belligerent and confrontational attitude until the end of the first prd administration and it
continued throughout the second prd administration in Mexico City.
The level of belligerence grew when the city authorities began trying to break down the
union’s strongholds and bastions of power, since it was through them that large amounts
of money disappeared. For example, the city treasury lost 30 percent of its annual revenues
through the theft of ocial documents and non-registered payments. In early 1998, it was
found that between 50 percent and 60 percent of the annual property tax collection—worth
around mx$1,500 million—remained in the hands of unionized workers and intermediaries
(Monge and Zamorán, 2000).
The Secretariat of Finance of the Federal District—with a sta of 7,500 employees—had
five union sections. Of these, the largest and most conflictive was Section 17—with 3,322
line-level employees (trabajadores de base)—which depended directly on the Sub-Treasury
for Tax Administration (Subtesorería de Administración Tributaria). Section 17 was led by
Jesus Sandoval Corro and controlled 19 of a total of 40 tax administration centers. It was
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there where the city authorities detected an important drain of money between 1997 and 2000
(Monge and Zamorán, 2000).
In response to this situation, the city government imposed various controls, such as the in-
stallation of closed circuit television (cctv) in the tax centers, and opened the possibility for
taxpayers to pay their taxes at commercial banks. In August 2000, the Secretariat of Finance
of the Federal District had presented 407 formal criminal complaints for various crimes com-
mitted against the public finances of the Federal District: criminal conspiracy, forgery and
possession of ocial documents, tax evasion, bribery, and theft. Of the 731 people under in-
vestigation, 73 had been part of the sta in the city treasury when the crimes were committed
(Monge and Zamorán, 2000).
The delegations of the Federal District also felt the influence of the formal and informal
power groups (Monge, 2001a). prd’s René Arce2—elected head of the Iztapalapa Delegation
in 2000—had to deal with several problems caused by sutgdf sta in his delegation, such as
the illegal authorization of the installation of a gas station in a cemetery. When asked about
the amount of power and influence the union had over the administrative positions of the city
government, René Arce replied: “Before this government [the government of López Obrador]
the union controlled everything: trash collection, cemeteries, markets, sports facilities, hous-
ing units... Gradually, the authority has been recovering control, but it has not been easy to
put an end to these powerful networks of corruption” (Monge and Zamorán, 2000:79).
However, whatworriedRenéArce—and themajority of themembers of the LópezObrador
administration—the most were the informal power groups—those organizations devoted to
street vending, drug-tracking, operating informal public transport, and buying and selling
robbed car parts.
Thus, neither Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas at the beginning of his mandate, nor Rosario Robles
subsequently, were able to solve the problem entirely; at the end of the three-year administra-
tion, these power groups hadmanaged to rebuild themselves and even recover some privileges.
In the new López Obrador administration, they were very much alive (Monge, 2001a).
The new head of government of the Federal District had a clear idea of the problem and
knew that the restoration of legal powers was essential. López Obrador said: “I aspire [to the
fact] that legal power begins to gain ground. In the correlation of forces, legal power must
have more decision, more command, because as legal power advances, there will be a better
coexistence in the city” (Monge and Zamorán, 2000:80).
2René Arce resigned from the prd in December 2009 arguing that during its re-foundational congress, the prd
had not achieved its objectives for the transformation of the party (El Universal, 2009).
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